Examining the Geoeconomic Implications of China’s Belt and Road Initiative for US Preeminence in the Horn of Africa

The article explores the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) position and policy toward China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI). South Korea’s interests and intentions regarding linking of Moon Jae-in’s New Northern and New Southern Policies (in an earlier period – Park Geun-hye’s Eurasia Initiative) and China’s BRI are examined. The potential risks and factors that will influence such cooperation are defined, in particular the deepening of US–China rivalry in the region, fears of overdependence on China, instability on the Korean Peninsula, and costs associated with a slowdown in economic growth during the (post) pandemic period. At the official level the ROK has not joined the Belt and Road initiative, but Moon Jae-in’s government adheres to the position of the need to develop cooperation with the PRC. The ROK is interested in economic benefits it can have through its participation in the BRI. In particular, it expects to enter new infrastructure markets together with China. Seoul’s diplomatic curtsy over the BRI is not least related to the ROK’s interest in the Chinese consumer market, which in 2020 became the largest in the world after the US consumer goods market, as well as the importance of economic cooperation with China, its largest trading partner. Projects with the participation of North Korea are of great importance for Seoul as well, but their implementation at this stage is extremely problematic due to international sanctions. Under these circumstances, South Korea is trying to find common ground between its regional policies and the BRI at the level of interregional cooperation and joint investments in third countries (in particular, ASEAN). Thus, South Korea is highly likely to continue its balancing act towards China’s BRI. Seoul will support the Chinese initiative at the level of official rhetoric about the search for formats of linking it with South Korean regional policy, while emphasizing the multilateral nature of cooperation and avoiding as much as possible too much involvement. Acknowledgements. Research for this article was supported by MGIMO University, project No. 1921-01-02.

Since the Cold War, scholars have debated the strategies of states in the context of great power competition. Recent studies on the US–China rivalry have highlighted the concept of ‘hedging’, where states avoid choosing sides. This article examines hedging theory through the lens of a country’s decision to engage in multilateral economic frameworks led by the USA and China, respectively. Using Singapore as a case study, with its involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), this article argues that a new trend, where countries use multilateralism, a liberal approach, to achieve the realist goal of hedging, is emerging. It identifies three key reasons behind states’ decisions to join international economic frameworks: financial security, risk management and strengthening ties with like-minded countries. This study extends the application of hedging to the real-world scenario by offering a new empirical case and highlighting the political functions of multilateral economic institutions. Ultimately, it calls for a broader understanding of hedging beyond the traditional view of ‘aligning with the USA for security and engaging with China for economic gain’, underscoring the need to study the strategies of middle-power states in great power rivalries.

The participation of most Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC) countries in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) since 2018 illustrates how China has filled the void left by the US in its traditional sphere of influence. The BRI represents a vague cooperation platform for developing investment, infrastructure projects, and trade between China and its partners with dubious effects in the region but with certain diplomatic gains for China. The review of the literature and the examination of official documents points to two main factors for its achievement in LAC: the flexibility of choosing different degrees of involvement for each government and the mobilization of the connectivity rhetoric in a region affected by structural infrastructure deficits. This chapter suggests that the BRI should be considered a discursive strategy which has had a noticeable impact on the US–China rivalry in the region.

This qualitative case study examines American and Chinese military installations in Djibouti and their regional security implications. Data were collected from secondary sources. Besides, I relied on key informant interviews and media reports to generate qualitative data. What emerges from this analysis is that the two great powers have competing interests in the Horn of Africa. America is working to limit Chinese presence in the region. On the other hand, in 2013, China introduced its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects that serve as economic means of political interventions. The advent of great power rivalries in the Horn of Africa presents a major regional security challenge. First, the presence of rival powers in the Horn of Africa has exacerbated regional tensions. The protracted civil war in Ethiopia is a case in point. Second, the military engagements of the two great powers have brought securitization of ports and militarization of the Horn region. And third, U.S.–China rivalry at the systemic level has been reflected in the Horn of Africa. The integration of Indo-Pacific security space with the Horn of Africa has cast its long shadow in the Horn of Africa.

Acute US rivalry with China includes strong efforts to counter Chinese challenges to US interests within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This article goes beyond earlier assessments and identifies and explains the wide range of reasons behind these American efforts and the implications for US–China competition. In particular, the study goes beyond examining US commercial competition with China to assess the serious implications of the BRI for the existing US-backed free market economic order and US-supported international governance. The timeframe used in this assessment is the period from the start of the BRI to 2020. The methodology of the assessment relies on and synthesizes findings of a variety of recent foreign studies on China’s statecraft to offer a largely qualitative examination on how China’s statecraft in the BRI works against US interests economically, strategically and in global governance. The study concludes that the BRI legitimates China’s predatory growth model, and fosters corruption, authoritarian rule, unsustainable lending, and dependence China used by Beijing to leverage and control recipient countries. It foresees no easy way for the US to counter these adverse Chinese-directed developments.KeywordsUSChinaRivalryBelt and Road InitiativeInfrastructureGovernance

The article describes the United States - China rivalry and Chinas Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through a fine-grained review of primary materials such as major US policy documents and speeches by and media interviews with key American foreign policy decisionmakers, as well as the selective use of secondary materials such as think tank studies and articles in scholarly publications. It shows that the BRI has fueled the bilateral rivalry since its birth in 2013 and that the rivalry, in turn, has affected US views about the BRI. Under President Barack Obama, the US took a muted stance towards the BRI, expressing modestly cooperative sentiments regarding it. In contrast, under President Donald Trump, Washingtons posture towards the BRI dramatically changed with his administration frequently denigrating the BRI, raising it in major security and foreign policy documents, initiating competing development schemes such as the BUILD Act, and building closer cooperation with allies against Chinas venture. Despite its angst about the BRI, however, the Trump administration never launched any large-scale countermeasures. This article contributes to clarifying the situation by correcting some factual errors in past analyses and updating the general understanding about the Trump administrations response. It systematically contemplates how internal and external economic, political, and ideational factors affected the Obama and Trump administrations responses to the BRI, demonstrating that such factors shaped or shifted US policy or bounded its form and intensity. These factors, being similar to those stressed by neoclassical realists who emphasize the role of leaders as interpreters within limits of the external environment and responders to it subject to various domestic constraints, provide a foundation which is used to speculate about the USs probable response to the BRI under President Joseph Biden, Jr.

This paper examines the potential implications of China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Initiative for Ghana, offering a prospective analysis rather than an assessment of active implementation, as Ghana is not yet a formal participant in the initiative. Launched in 2013, OBOR—comprising the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road—aims to expand trade, investment, and infrastructure connectivity between China and emerging economies. Drawing on a qualitative research approach, the study employs a comprehensive review of existing literature, policy analysis of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) frameworks, and an evaluative case study of the Bui Dam project to explore the likely economic and developmental outcomes of Ghana’s potential participation. The analysis focuses on key areas including trade relations with China, infrastructure development, employment generation, and possible effects on Ghana’s balance of payments. Findings suggest that deeper engagement with OBOR could enhance infrastructure financing and accelerate economic growth through improved connectivity and large-scale development projects. However, the study also highlights significant risks, particularly the potential marginalization of local manufacturing industries due to increased import competition and structural trade imbalances. The paper concludes that while strategic participation in the OBOR Initiative may be vital for Ghana’s long-term infrastructure and development goals, these benefits can only be sustained if accompanied by strong domestic industrial and trade policies. In particular, the government must prioritize the protection and expansion of local manufacturing capacity to ensure that engagement with OBOR supports inclusive growth and strengthens the domestic economy rather than undermining it.

PurposeThis study aims to examine the nexus of the US rebalance strategy to Asia and the US–China rivalry in the South China Sea (SCS) from the perspective of the offensive realism theory.Design/methodology/approachThe study depends on the descriptive approach that deals with the analysis and description of the phenomenon. Also, the study uses the qualitative method to analyze the primary sources concerning the rebalance.FindingsThe study has found four results: first, the rebalance strategy to Asia is a comprehensive strategy to contain China’s rise. Second, China’s offensive strategy in the SCS since 2008 has been the main driver of launching the rebalance. Third, offensive realism presents a convenient analysis to understand the rebalance, China’s offensive strategy in the SCS, and the US–China rivalry in the SCS. Forth, SCS is one of the most important venues of the US–China rivalry for global hegemony.Research limitations/implicationsLimited to the period from 2009 to 2016. The Obama Era.Originality/valueThis study highlights the centrality of the SCS in the US–China global rivalry that has not been yet well researched.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), initiated by China in 2013, has become an important strategic component of Beijing’s global foreign policy. With its key geostrategic position, Southeast Asia is not only a hub for connectivity in the BRI but also a place that reflects the diversity in approaches and policy responses of ASEAN member states. This article conducts a comparative analysis of the policies of three representative countries – Vietnam, Cambodia, and Indonesia – to clarify the motivations, strategies, and consequences in the process of interacting with the BRI. Through a qualitative research approach and typical comparative analysis, the article shows that Cambodia chooses comprehensive integration and is heavily dependent on China; Vietnam takes a cautious and selective approach to protect its strategic space; meanwhile, Indonesia demonstrates a balanced stance by both receiving resources from the BRI and maintaining autonomy in policy making. These differences reflect the international status, institutional capacity, and development orientation of each country. From there, the article proposes a conditional cooperation approach framework for ASEAN and specific policy recommendations for Vietnam to optimize benefits and minimize risks from BRI.

This exploratory article is interested in how transnational foreign policy ideas are shaped and institutionalised. One such idea that has re-emerged more prominently since the early 2000s is that of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ that covers the geoeconomic landscape of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The question is whether such a concept can exist beyond white papers and the current environment of US–China competition. In order to understand how transnational concepts become embedded and promoted, the example of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – not only as the perceived anti-thesis to the Indo-Pacific but also as a relatively successful concept in Africa–China ties – will be examined. While there is no strict formula for the success of foreign policy ideas that go on to become institutionalised, it is of interest to understand the elements and contexts that bring about concept durability beyond their initial formation.

This article examines the nature and impact of US–China competition on international infrastructure financing by analysing the China-financed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the US-backed Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in Nepal. Inductively building from the case of Nepal, it argues that competition in infrastructure financing is not new, but it has become more competitive, with these states using three strategies to promote their initiatives: political lobbying, people-centred diplomacy, and high-level visits. The article also highlights the paradoxical impact of competing infrastructure schemes in recipient states. Competitive promotion of these schemes has impacted domestic politics, fostering controversies around nationalism and sovereignty, and accentuating political polarisation in Nepal, but it has also enabled domestic political actors to scapegoat these schemes to enhance their political standing and portray themselves as more nationalistic than their opponents. Reconciling such political divisions has led to multiple delays and renegotiations of the schemes, ultimately shaping the scope of the BRI and the MCC. The article offers a corrective to the broader scholarship in International Relations by highlighting the agency of political elites and centrality of domestic politics in recipient states, as well as the domestic effects of international infrastructure financing.

In this chapter, the discussion of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has extraordinarily influenced US global hegemony. By putting resources into framework projects and advancing networks between countries, China desires to build its financial and international power through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The objective of this chapter is to analyze how China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is presenting serious difficulties to the customary international and financial aims of the US global hegemony. In any case, the US and its partners have eyes on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its influences on the world economy cautiously. While certain countries see the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as an opportunity to acquire a better network and add to China’s monetary extension, others have voiced stresses over China's aspirations and the conceivable political influence that could accompany its monetary responsibilities. The US has moved toward the BRI, coordinated effort and rivalry. From one viewpoint, the US recognizes the worth of foundation spending in encouraging turn of events and financial development. They also perceive the likely benefits of improved trade and availability that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) can give part countries. Accordingly, the US has tried to cooperate with China and participate in BRI (Kim, 2019). In addition, the US has done whatever it takes to protect its own monetary advantages and public security considering China's extending influence. They have passionately inspected the BRI tasks' terms and conditions, focusing on the worth of receptiveness, maintainability, and fair rivalry. The US has worked to foster elective systems and principles that help great foundations venture and dare steady with their standards through programs like the Blue Dot Network. In this chapter, Neo-Realism theory and a subjective information approach in this part. Utilizing the Neo-Realism theory to offer clarifications, this approach empowers us to look at and decipher qualitative data like reports and observations. The US has presented the Form Act and the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network (ITAN) to back foundation projects in the Indo-Pacific region. This part will inspect and discuss how US approaches toward China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) consolidate wariness, participation, and intensity. While recognizing the potential benefits of expanded network and framework speculation, the US likewise attempts to shield its interests and goals while being careful about China's aims. As the BRI pushes ahead and China's influence in the worldwide field develops, so too will the influence of this venture on US plans.

This independent study analyses the relationship between China and Greece, focusing on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It explores the historical and modern diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties between the two countries, as well as the objectives, scope, and current state of cooperation of the BRI. The paper also explores the EU's views and policy responses (e.g., The Global Gateway) to the China-Greece partnership and the BRI, including concerns about the project's potential impact on European unity and sovereignty. The study used a qualitative research approach, including analysis and summary of existing literature, official documents, plans, activity reports, and press reports. In addition, the study makes recommendations for the better development of Chinese BRI cooperation in Greece, while a more transparent and sustainable approach is needed. It also recommends that China works closely with the EU and Greece and that projects need to be aligned with European standards and regulations. Overall, this paper provides an in-depth analysis of China's relationship with Greece and its potential impact on the EU, making recommendations for China to strengthen its cooperation with Greece on BRI and to influence the economic and political landscape of the region.

The Sino-US relations have faced an unprecedented challenge and deteriorated to the lowest point in 4 decades during the Trump presidency. The ongoing Sino-US strategic rivalry led to the speculation that the two giants would head into the “New Cold War”. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) also becomes a main target of this strategic rivalry. This article offers the strategic analysis of China’s BRI from the US perspective at different levels, focusing on the changing role of BRI and its implications among US think tanks during the Trump presidency. It also provides the policy recommendations from the US think tanks in responding the BRI challenge, emphasizing the Indo-Pacific strategy as the main counter-strategy towards the BRI, and finally reviewed both the Trump Administration’s and the Biden Administration’s main efforts in countering the BRI. The Biden Administration focuses on countering China as its foreign policy priority, particularly countering China’s BRI through variety of means as diplomatic coordination, democratic values, and the global infrastructure alternative made by the US-led Collective West. Thus, China’s BRI will be the major target in the US China policy-making in the long run.

In contemporary times, the pursuit of a sustainable geoeconomics policy is now a requirement. Launched in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aims to enhance economic integration through substantial infrastructure development. Announced in 2021, G7’s Build Back Better World (B3W) also concentrates on sustainable development, with a special emphasis on health, climate security and gender equality. Pakistan, positioned at a geopolitical crossroad, as well as a vital component of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), stands to be affected by both BRI and B3W initiatives. In tandem, both initiatives complement each other. This research will do a comparative analysis of both projects and will use geopolitical realism to understand the various strategic facets and outcomes as well as underscore the broader consequences of BRI and B3W for global development.