Abstract
AbstractPrioritarianism is a variant of utilitarianism. It differs from utilitarianism in that benefiting individuals matters more the worse off these individuals are. On this view, there are two standard ways of handling risky prospects: Ex-Post Prioritarianism adjusts for prioritizing the worse off in final outcomes and then values prospects by the expectation of the sum total of those adjusted values, whereas Ex-Ante Prioritarianism adjusts for prioritizing the worse off on each individual's expectation and then values prospects by the sum total of those adjusted expectations. A standard objection to Ex-Post Prioritarianism is that it violates Ex-Ante Pareto, that is, it prescribes choices that worsen the expectations for everyone. In this article, I argue that Ex-Ante Prioritarianism suffers from much the same problem: it violates a sequential version of Ex-Ante Pareto, that is, it prescribes sequences of choices that worsen the expectations for everyone.
Highlights
Ex-Ante PrioritarianismEx-Ante Prioritarianism satisfies the Weak Ex-Ante Pareto Principle. I will show that Ex-Ante Prioritarianism still violates a sequential version of this principle
It is probably best understood as a variation of utilitarianism, because Prioritarianism has the same aggregative structure as utilitarianism
The value of a final outcome x according to Prioritarianism can be calculated as follows
Summary
Ex-Ante Prioritarianism satisfies the Weak Ex-Ante Pareto Principle. I will show that Ex-Ante Prioritarianism still violates a sequential version of this principle. The Weak Sequential Ex-Ante Pareto Principle If each individual has a higher expectation of well-being in prospect x than in prospect y, a plan is not choice-worthy if its prospect is y and there is a feasible plan whose prospect is x. Since Ex-Ante Prioritarianism prescribes the Up-Up Plan, it violates the Weak Sequential Ex-Ante Pareto. Sequential Ex-Ante Pareto Principle, since the sequence of choices leading to A might not be feasible in the relevant sense at the initial node. The mere fact that you wouldn’t act in accordance with the Down-Down Plan at future nodes is not sufficient to make that plan infeasible in the relevant sense at the initial node, because that fact is due to your choice function – which is the very thing we are trying to assess.. While it may be irrational to form an intention to do something you know you won’t do, it seems that you may still be able to (irrationally) form the intention
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