Abstract
It may sound strange, if not heretical to suggest, as I wish to do, that there is no such thing as the rationality of science. At best we can talk about rationalities of science. Both historically and contemporarily we have used different criteria for explaining and justifying the alleged rationality of science. By giving different criteria for the justification of rationality, we ipso facto constitute different scopes for rationality.This immediately poses the question. If so, which of these criteria are more “justifiable” than others ? Which rationality is preferable to other rationalities ? Now the point is that in justifying a set of criteria which would elucidate for us a given concept of rationality, in other words, in outlining the scope of a given rationality, we do so by resorting to some kind of rationality. And it would be strange if the hidden rationality we resort to, in order to justify the explicit one, would be much different from the explicit one.
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