Evolutionary mechanism of conflict resolution

Abstract

Despite the accumulated evidence, many of the investigators as of quite recently have failed to understand that behavioral strategy or decision rules can be inherited and evolve and that they are subject to certain constraints that cannot be “surmounted” other than by natural selection. For example, in [9, p. 422] we read: “The evolutionary pressure cannot act upon the relative contents of social interactions favoring certain individuals over others.” The present study shows that the following scheme of conflict, which favors those individuals that conform to it with a better accuracy, can be evolutionary stable. On the basis of the information they receive, the partners estimate the role situation and the equilibrium pair of elementary strategies and use their strategies. If the role situations of the partners are coordinated, the partners cooperate in reducing the conflict and define its result according to AIS. If AIS are not coordinated, they cooperate in reducing the conflict if its expected loss for each is greater than the expected payoff; they escalate the against those that have a lesser set of elementary strategies but also against those that have a less accurate mechanism of AIS recognition. A poor accuracy of recognition mechanism would replace a strictly equilibrium ESS with a mixed strategy. From the point of view of behavioral control, the multilevel conflict model shows that generally for controlling the choices at a certain level actions of an equally high level are necessary. It is impossible, for example, to accomplish certain economic choices by using only informational actions.