Abstract
Cooperation within selfish individuals can be promoted by natural selection only in the presence of an additional mechanism. In this paper, we focus on an indirect reciprocity mechanism in dynamical structured populations. In social networks rational individuals update their strategies and adjust their social relationships. We propose a three-strategy prisoner's dilemma game model to investigate the evolution of cooperation on dynamical networks. In the coevolution of state and structure process, reciprocators adapt their behaviors and switch their partners based on reputation. Simulation results show that the dynamics of strategies and links can promote cooperation provided the partners switch proceeds much faster than the strategy updating.
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