Every Sparrow that Falls to the Ground

De Natura:The Church Fathers on Creation's Fallenness Matthew T. Warnez B.H. Introduction "Who gave the mosquito its stinger for sucking blood? How narrow is the tube by which it sucks! Who has arranged this? Who has made this?"1 These modern-seeming questions were in fact those of Augustine's fifth-century congregation. Augustine plied his usual rhetorical vigor to dismiss the "the problem of natural evil"—as we call it today—and yet his hearers' doubts have persisted down to our own times. Indeed, pace Augustine, it would seem the problem of natural evil has become only more vexing to Christians in the post-Darwinian era. If the animal kingdom was made through a cruel, evolutionary process, and if the wrath of God fails to justify (at least in modern minds) the woes of—say—pandemics, then, should we not suppose that lower creation is fallen? But if it is, how did it happen? Or, if it is not, why does it so often seem fallen?2 Many conservative Christians today, when pressed on such questions, will suppose that lower creation was somehow soiled by the Fall of man. In addition to ostensibly reifying the literal sense of Genesis 3:17–19 (or Romans 8:19–22), this "negative" view of lower creation carries the advantage of a winsome theodicy. For, if all creation was vitiated by Adam's sin, [End Page 933] then God is not to be blamed for natural disasters, mass extinctions, or animal suffering—though presently "thorns infest the ground," the whole world was originally free from pain and death.3 In pastoral settings of all denominations, this tends to be the "received view," not usually requiring explication nor apology. Attractive as this theodicy may be, however, it flies in the face of an evolutionary reckoning of natural history. According to modern biology, life on earth predated man's existence by some four billion years. The fossil record, in addition to revealing that prehistoric creatures regularly died, also suggests that almost every species that ever existed is now extinct. Lest the Fall of man be pushed back into some preembodied epoch, animal death would not seem to be a consequence of the Fall at all. Indeed, some evolutionary theists would go further, holding that man's Fall had no direct effects on nature. According to this "positive" view, both before the Fall and after, animals persisted in their natural behaviors: killing, dying, and gradually evolving. Thus, only the former view offers a happy theodicy, and only the latter harmonizes with modern science. But what is the Catholic view? Although the fallen version is sometimes presumed in modern Catholic theology,4 the magisterium has never authoritatively addressed the question. Thus, and since the meaning of the Bible is often contested on this point, it becomes important to establish the opinions of the Church Fathers.5 Unfortunately, recent decades have seen the publication of only a few, partial surveys of patristic eco-theology with respect to the Fall,6 most of which have been all-too-obviously prejudiced, whether by creationist,7 [End Page 934] evolutionary,8 or conservationist9 ideals. Admittedly, an incomplete and prejudiced survey is one of the few ways to make sense of the data: the Fathers had a surprising amount to say on this question, and their opinions, which varied considerably, are scattered haphazardly throughout their writings. To make matters worse, in the patristic age, the subject rarely received a sustained treatment, and even more rarely did the Fathers comment on each other's views. While I have attempted to set my own biases aside (let the reader be the judge), I can hardly boast, in light of such difficulties, to have produced an exhaustive study of the Fathers. Nevertheless, I do believe this essay constitutes the most comprehensive such study to date, and I do believe my conclusions, though not exceptionless, are adequately representative. In the course of my analysis there emerged two predominant opinions, opinions it seemed right to title by their most influential exponents: Irenaeus and Augustine. Irenaeus took the negative stance (i.e., that Adam's Fall had certain immediate and negative effect upon...

In general I agree with Hefner's theological view on nature. The framework of his approach to nature is praxis-oriented. This is in line with his main work The Human Factor with the thesis: human beings are created co-creators. Moreover, he regards the relation between human beings and nature as a communion. In spite of my agreement in general with Hefner's view, I have some comments on its elaboration. My main objection is his too optimistic view on nature. The title of his conference-paper is: Nature Good and evil: A Theological Sketch, but he is speaking only about evil in passing. In his book The Human Factor he is calling natural evil the falsifier of his theory of man as a created co-creator. In the preliminary of his conference-paper he refers to his article on natural evil and says God is not yet finished with nature, and that divine providence will unravel the contradictions that are noted. Has this statement to be explained in line with Hick's theodicy which he endorses in The Human Factor and the mentioned article on natural evil? I would like to discuss three questions. Firstly the issue of nature as creation, secondly the problem of natural evil and thirdly nature as a communion.

I examine different strategies involved in stating anti‐theistic arguments from natural evil, and consider some theistic replies. There are, traditionally, two main types of arguments from natural evil: those that purport to deduce a contradiction between the existence of natural evil and the existence of God, and those that claim that the existence of certain types or quantities of natural evil significantly lowers the probability that theism is true. After considering peripheral replies, I state four prominent theistic rebutting strategies: skeptical theism; Richard Swinburne's view that moral knowledge entails natural evil; the soul‐making theodicy; and the natural law theodicy.

Dwayne Moore’s "A Naturalistic Theodicy for Sterba’s Problem of Natural Evil," (Moore, 2024) provides a detailed critique of my logical argument from evil against the existence of the God of traditional theism. While there have been many critiques of my logical argument against the existence of the God of traditional theism from moral evil to which I have replied (2020b, 2020c, 2021, 2023), there has been only one previous critique that was directed at my logical argument from natural evil (see Jordan, 2023). Accordingly, I welcome this opportunity to show how my logical argument from natural evil works against Moore’s critique.

The problem of evil is generally encountered on two different fronts: the evils committed by human beings which cause other creatures pain and suffering, and the pain and suffering of creatures which results from natural causes like hurricanes or drought. This chapter addresses what is the problem of natural evil, what are some possible responses to the problem, what is a stronger response and how does eschatological fulfillment contribute to an adequate response. Backward causation of human sin, a cosmic Fall of Satan, and skeptical theism are unpersuasive attempts at explaining natural evil. Focus on the individual organisms that have suffered and died without achieving anything close to fulfillment drives some Christian thinkers to claim there may be eternal rewards for animals. Keith Ward says, "Immortality, for animals as well as humans, is a necessary condition of any acceptable theodicy".

This article considers the fall of angels as a possible explanation for the problem of natural evil. First, it situates this explanation in relation to other contemporary responses to the problem of natural evil. Second, it charts out the historical development of this view, giving special attention to its articulation in the writings of several prominent 20th-century theologians and Christian thinkers. Finally, it raises several theological principles that commend this view for further evaluation.

This chapter develops a model for the compatibility of design and evolution as explanations, examining how the evidence from biology continues to support belief in design. It argues that we can save both the rationality of an intuitive design discourse and the rationality of seeing biological teleology as evidence of design, even when adopting an evolutionist view of biology. Design and evolution function as conjunctive explanations, so that the success of evolutionary explanations does not remove the explanatory power added by design. Potential objections to the model are considered, building on the traditional philosophical objections. One of these is the problem of natural evil, which has been seen as refuting all design-based views. I argue, however, that the combination of evolution and design that this book has developed can respond to all these concerns as well as any other theological approach, and may even help in better responding to the problem.

The problem of evil has perennially been the strongest objection to religious faith among nonbelievers as well as a major source of crises of faith among believers. The problem centers on the alleged incompatibility between God and evil of all kinds in the world that he supposedly created and governs. On the face of it, this incompatibility seems to support agnosticism or atheism and thus creates difficulties for religion, particularly theistic religion. Since the mid-twentieth century, formulations of the problem – as well as responses to it – have become increasingly technical due to the rise of the analytic philosophy of religion. Moral evil was a salient point of debate, and still is, but theistic replies revolving around the concept of free will have come to be considered quite effective.

This contribution raises the question about where things have gone wrong in evolutionary history. In classic Christian discourse it is typically assumed that the primary problem is human sin, while the problem of natural evil is emphasised elsewhere. It seeks to test the distinction between natural suffering and socially-induced forms of suffering by exploring the roots of violence between species with reference to the emergence of the act of eating in evolutionary history. It draws on a corpus of recent literature on the consumption of food, with specific reference to the work of Edward Farley, Sallie McFague and Norman Wirzba, in order to address the following question: Is the violence associated with what Christians would redescribe as sin merely an extrapolation of the ‘violence’ embedded in the act of eating? The conclusion from this survey seems to be that an Augustinian approach is indeed less plausible and more counter-intuitive than Manichean or Pelagian assessments of where things have gone wrong in evolutionary history. If so, this would have far-reaching consequences for moral formation. The conclusion is offered here in the hope that it would be refuted by others!

While Daoism offers valuable insights into ecotheology, particularly in its view that nature possesses inherent dignity and serves all beings, its lack of a comprehensive account of natural evil poses a challenge to fully addressing ecological issues. Similarly, the theology of ‘deep incarnation’—which posits that Christ became flesh as a complex unity of biological components within the process of evolution—faces a difficulty in adequately engaging with the problem of natural evil. However, the sacramental work of Christ in restoring creation, alongside our active participation in this restoration, offers a potential framework for reconstructing Christian ecotheology.

Summary It is usually supposed that biological design arguments (where biological complex order is seen as evidence of a Creator) are made obsolete by Darwinian evolutionary theory. However, philosopher Alvin Plantinga and others have defended the continued possibility of a rational “design discourse”, in which biological order is taken as a sign of God’s purposeful action. In this article, I consider two objections to design discourse: (1) a theological objection to biological design based on the problem of natural evil, and (2) the evolutionary objection, according to which evolutionary theory removes the justification for any biological design perception. Whereas Plantinga’s own response utilizes the arguments of the Intelligent Design movement, I argue in favor of utilizing “design discourse” as part of a theistic evolutionist view.

Evolution and the problem of natural evil

What is The ‘Problem’ in The Problem of Natural Evil?

O brought from East by monks fleeing th.e Moslem invasion of Holy Land in seventh century, Purification celebrates three elements described in chapter two of St Luke's Gospel [22-35]. Firstly, that Mary and Joseph, in order to conform to Jewish law as laid down in Exodus, should present their first-born son to Temple to be dedicated to God; secondly, that having borne a child, mother was now unclean, disqualified from public worship and therefore in·need of through an offering; and thirdly prophecies of Simeon and Anna. In Easter ritual rites, emphasis was on Christ's presentation, fulfilling prophecy contained in Book of Malachi the Lord whom you seek will suddenly come to his temple [3: 1] and allowing liturgy to reflect story of Christ's life in scriptural order. But emphasis in West was so centred around Virgin that it soon became a Marian feast celebrating her purification, in spite of a major theological problem. Why was Mary [who was free from original sin] in need of purification? The answer was said to lie in Mary's piety and her humble acceptance of religious law: as it says in Ludford's antiphonAvecuius conceptio, cuius purificatio fuit purgatio her purification was our expiation. Simeon's prophecy is enshrined in Catholic·office of Compline and in Anglican office of Evensong as Nunc Dimittis. It contains not only joy of Simeon's fulfilment but also important truth that Christ's redemption is not just for circumcised but for all a light for revelation to Gentiles [Luke 2:23]. Simeon goes on to warn of difficulties of Christ's life and piercing of Mary's heart by a sword. The texts for Mass concentrate on elements of Presentation. The Introit, Gradual, Alleluya and Communion are all concerned with waiting for deliverance: Communion specifically speaks of Simeon. The Sequence and Offertory have Mary as their theme, but make no attempt to deal with her purification, celebrating rather her lack of sin and importance as body through which redemption is made possible. Liturgically, feast falls forty days after Nativity (forty being a mystical number) and is final feast of Christmas cycle. It also has attached to it title of Candlemas which grows out of tradition of processing with candles during singing of antiphons before Mass, symbolising Christ as light of world and welcoming his redemption. In spite of a ban by English Reformers in 1548, it remains a regular part of Feast's celebration.

For anyone interested in wildlife, birds, wilderness areas, parks, ecology, conservation, environmental literature, and ethics, the name Aldo Leopold is sure to pop up. Since first publication, Aldo Leopold: A Fierce Green Fire has remained the classic short, inspiring biography of Leopold--the perfect companion to reading his ever popular A Sand County Almanac. Winning numerous awards, this comprehensive account of his life story is dynamic and readable, written in the context of the history of American conservation and illustrated with historic photographs. Marybeth Lorbiecki has now enriched A Fierce Green Fire in a way no other biography on Leopold has, adding numerous chapters on the ripple effects of his ideas, books, ecological vision, land ethic, and Shack, as well as of the ecological contributions of his children, graduate students, contemporary scholars, and organizations--and the wilderness lands he helped preserve. Lorbiecki weaves these stories and factual information into the biography in a compelling way that keeps both lay and academic readers engaged. In the introduction to this edition, Lorbiecki makes it clear how much better our lives are because Leopold lived and why today we so radically need what he left us to bring about paradigm shifts in our ethical, economic, and cultural thinking. Instead of losing relevance, Leopold's legacy has gained ever more necessity and traction in the face of contemporary national and world challenges, such as species loss and climate change. Even the phenological studies he started at as a hobby are proving valuable, showing the climatic shifts that have occurred at the Shack lands since the 1930s, recognized by the plants and animals.