Even Bigger-Picture Causalism

This paper applies Weber’s distinction between instrumental (outcome focused) and substantive (values driven) rationality to offer both a conceptually-underpinned explanation for the mounting criticism of business schools, and to provide the basis for a new business school model. We begin by extending Brewer’s (2013) treatise on the public good of social science to articulate a substantively rational Public Value Business School. We then report how processes of waysetting, wayfinding and strategic obliquity informed the iterative development of this approach at Cardiff Business School in the UK. Our case study illustrates the significant challenges and tensions that arise from trying to introduce a substantively-rational approach and change process within an institutional context of instrumental rationality. Our analysis underscores the importance of combining both purposive action (away from the current) and substantively rational purposeful action (a direction of travel informed by particular values). It also highlights the potential for some business schools to combine substantive rationality with strategic obliquity in attempts to enhance public good through systemic, institutional change.

O presente trabalho trata de um estudo sobre a racionalidade substantiva no processo decisório em duas instituições que lidam com o tratamento oncológico em crianças e adolescentes na cidade de Natal, no estado do Rio Grande Norte. A partir de uma revisão de literatura sobre a racionalidade substantiva, o objetivo da pesquisa é perceber aspectos relacionados ao processo decisório que possam servir de base para elaborar as categorias de análise do processo Tomada de Decisão, agregando-as a um novo estudo que possa proporcionar o avanço do tema na ciência administrativa. Serviram de base para o aprofundamento do tema os trabalhos acadêmicos que seguiram o modelo de análise elaborado por Maurício Serva, cujo quadro verifica a racionalidade predominante em 11 processos administrativos internos em organizações produtivas. Tendo como base teórica a obra de Guerreiro Ramos, que constata a existência de um tipo de organização ideal, o estudo recorre ao pensamento de Karl Polanyi, que procura compreender o fenômeno econômico independente do valor que permite considerar economias não mercantis. Para melhor compreender a racionalidade resgatam-se os estudos de Max Weber, que investiga o significado de ação social, e com Jürgen Habermas se tem uma concepção mais abrangente de razão através da teoria da ação comunicativa. Como resultado da revisão do tema foi elaborado um quadro com sete categorias de análise que, aplicadas nas instituições pesquisadas, tornou possível conhecer a racionalidade predominante no processo decisório. Os resultados da pesquisa confirmam que, embora a decisão envolva elementos racionais, existem também valores específicos de cada indivíduo ligados à sua experiência de visão de mundo, permeados não só pela racionalidade instrumental como também pela racionalidade substantiva. O estudo comprovou que duas instituições pertencentes ao mesmo setor podem apresentar diferentes tipos de racionalidade na tomada de decisão, quando fatores decisórios podem tender para a racionalidade instrumental, de acordo com o pensamento clássico da administração, como também podem emergir da racionalidade substantiva, contribuindo para o processo de emancipação do ser humano na esfera do trabalho.

§ 1. In the preceding chapters I have treated first of rational, and secondly of disinterested action, without introducing the vexed question of the Freedom of the Will. The difficulties connected with this question have been proved by long dialectical experience to be so great, that I am anxious to confine them within as strict limits as I can, and keep as much of my subject as possible free from their perturbing influence. And it appears to me that we have no psychological warrant for identifying Disinterested with either “Free” or “Rational” action; while to identify Rational and Free action is at least misleading, and tends to obscure the real issue raised in the Free Will controversy. In the last chapter I have tried to show that action strictly disinterested, that is, disregardful of foreseen balance of pleasure to ourselves, is found in the most instinctive as well as in the most deliberate and self-conscious region of our volitional experience. And rational action, as I conceive it, remains rational, however completely the rationality of any individual’s conduct may be determined by causes antecedent or external to his own volition: so that the conception of acting rationally, as explained in the last chapter but one, is not bound up with the notion of acting ‘freely,’ as maintained by Libertarians generally against Determinists.KeywordsVoluntary ActionMoral SentimentVexed QuestionOrdinary NotionMoral BlameThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Sectors of the criminal justice system have bureaucratized to such an extent that their management has supplanted the values for which they were created. Weber predicted this phenomenon, arguing that substantive rationality would be replaced by formal rationality as organizations grew. We test the relationship between size and these two types of rationality with the use of judicial performance checks in arraignments created from conversations with administrative courthouse staff and pilot observations at courthouses. We measure judicial performance through arraignment checklists (n = 481). Findings from multilevel models suggest that there is a positive relationship between size and formal rationality and a negative relationship between size and substantive rationality, even when controlling for workload by research design. Results suggest that abundance of formal rationality or substantive rationality facilitates injustice. These results begin a discourse encouraging quantitatively measuring formal and substantive rationality and that size be considered regarding judicial administrative policy.

Some philosophers argue that coherence is a normatively significant type of rationality, over and above substantive rationality. The most detailed and substantive arguments are given by Alex Worsnip (2021, 2022). In this paper I will criticize his arguments. We are left with the thesis that the only type of rationality we need is substantive rationality.

Plastic Man started the book strongly placed. Nature and nurture were simple ideas but capable of the subtlest refinement. They could be filled out not only technically with models from cybernetics, statistics, economics and other realms of sophistication but also philosophically, in support of many divisions of labour between nature and nurture. Free action could be distinguished from unfree in ways congenial to some philosophers of mind, with familiar results in ethics and politics. The axis of strength was that all processes of action were seen as causally connected and so explicable with the best accounts of this relation to be had from the natural sciences and their philosophy. The one clear doubt was that Plastic Man, being but the intersection of a complex of laws, was not much of an individual. But perhaps the demand for a holier uniqueness was born of an unreflecting or socially generated individualism. At any rate the contrary thesis – that action has determinants unique to the agent- an-sich – was too cryptic to be cogent. In this epilogue I want to ask how he stands now and to end with a query about the notion of context. Autonomous Man was ushered in with the thought that social action occurs on a stage built of shared meanings and norms. That might be awkward for behaviourists and for very mechanical accounts of how nature and nurture operate but it posed no general threat to Plastic Man. Indeed, by cashing the metaphor of the stage in terms of normative expectations attached to social positions and by letting homo psychologicus act within constraints on homo sociologicus, a passive conception did very nicely. An active conception started to emerge only when the thesis that motives were causes of action was contrasted with the claim that reasons were the explanation but not the cause of rational action. Fully rational action was its own explanation, given the context and the actor's identity. Context enabled and constrained, setting him problems because he was who he was. Rational action was a skill, not a pleonasm in the logic-of-the-situation-as-he-saw-it, and shortcomings were for causal explanation.

Let X = S " ' x . . . x S"" be a product of spheres of total dimension n=nl+n2 +... +nk. A fundamental unanswered question is the determination of which finite groups can act freely on X and what actions on the cohomology so arise. In particular it is conjectured that if an elementary abelian group acts freely, then its rank is less than or equal to k. Great progress has been made recently on this question by Carlsson EC], Adem-Browder [A-B], and Hoffman [HI in the case where all the spheres have the same dimension. In this paper we completely solve the rational analogue of the above question. Given an action of a finite group G on the rational cohomology ring H*(X; •), we give necessary and sufficient conditions for G to act freely on a closed manifold Y having the rational homotopy type of X, so that the G-action induces the specified action on H* (Y; Q)= H* (X; Q). In particular the necessary conditions give new obstructions for G to act freely on X with a specified representation in H*(X; Q). Our method includes a general discussion as to when a space with finite fundamental group has the rational homotopy type of a closed manifold. We now give our necessary and sufficient conditions: (A) For all gEG, for all ni even, g*ESn']=~[S nJ] for some nonzero rational number ~. (B) For all g ~ G { e } , ~ ( 1 ) i ( t r ( g . : H,(X; Q ) ~ Hi(X; Q)) =0. (C) (i) For n even, some n i odd, the equivariant intersection form on H "/2 (X; Q) is hyperbolic, (ii) for all ni even, no further condition, (iii) for n odd, z 89 Q)ea*(O.(G, w) )cL , (~G, w).

Recent theoretical developments in economic theory have attempted to relax the assumption that human behavior is guided by “tight calculation” of profit-maximization. Harvey Liebenstein's notion of X-efficiency is a particularly important development in this regard. This article argues, however, that X-efficiency theory does not go far enough in relaxing the assumptions of economic theory. The understanding of human behavior requires a recognition of variability in the ends or goals of action as well as variability in the means which are utilized in the pursuit of these diverse ends. Max Weber's concepts of formal rationality and substantive rationality recognize this variability in the ends toward which action is oriented as well as the intrusion of habit or routine in the “calculatedness” of social and economic action. C. Wright Mills' ideal of craftship is used to represent a type of substantive rationality which contrasts with the formal rationality of calculation toward profit-maximization. The case is made that craftship is a particularly significant substantive rationality in American agriculture. It is argued that, among family farmers, other values, such as autonomy in one's work, often constitute alternative ends toward which action may be directed. Such ends may, in fact, conflict with the goal of profit-maximization. It is concluded that agricultural policy analysis and prescription which fails to consider the significant role of substantive rationalities, such as craftship, are likely to reproduce and enhance the conditions from which the present crisis in agriculture has developed.

One of the prostitutions to be found in Yogjakarta is in Sosrowijayan Kulon village. Geographically, the village is close with Malioboro shopping center and Yogyakarta train station. The prostitution place is much visited by consumers of sex. The existence of prostitution in the society of Sosrowijayan Kulon village makes sex workers have to mingle and follow various regulations applied by the local community. This research will explore rationalizing religious values and a model of action done by female sex workers. Data are obtained from primary sources and secondary technical resources by using interviews and observation. Data are to be analyzed by using the theory of rationalizing and type of action by Max Weber. The research found that religious values are understood by sex workers grouped into four types of rationality. First is rationality in religious activities. This can be viewed from sex workers who fail to perform a fast and keep working in Ramadan month. Second is substantive rationality. Religious values are seen from the sex workers perspective who gives alms, following formal religious gatherings (tahlilan/yasinan) and practices. Thirdly is formal rationality which is the responses of sex workers toward the rules of the village. The forth is theoretical rationality. It is employed to analyze the sex workers’ concept of religion. Keywords: Sex workers, Rationalization, Religiosity

Este artigo objetiva apresentar as especificidades envolvidas em um processo de profissionalização numa empresa familiar de grande porte. As empresas familiares são objeto de visões opostas sobre a capacidade de gestores familiares possuírem habilidade para gerenciar um negócio de forma competitiva. No processo de profissionalização aqui analisado, uma alternativa aos valores familiares desencadeou avaliações contraditórias entre os investigados. Utilizando o antagonismo entre uma racionalidade instrumental, associada aqui à visão dos novos gestores profissionais, e uma racionalidade substantiva, vinculada à noção dos antigos empregados, esta pesquisa contrapõe os ditos e os não ditos no espaço simbólico organizacional. Com uso de metodologia qualitativa, a partir de uma estratégia de estudo de caso, foram realizadas entrevistas em três unidades empresariais para posterior análise de conteúdo. Os resultados sugerem uma degradação dos ideais do fundador diante do discurso modernizante implantado pelos gestores profissionais. Observa-se uma diluição do seu legado em nome de outros valores, os quais foram associados a uma questão de competitividade e de longevidade organizacional.

This research examines the factors driving the development of accessibility in tourist destinations and interprets them within the Weber’s theoretical framework on types of rationality. To do so, a Stakeholder Analysis with the testimony of accessible tourism stakeholders has been conducted by means of 83 in-depth interviews. Both formal and substantive rationality play a key role in the development of Accessible Tourism. That is to say, the motivation of the tourism industry towards promoting accessibility is not only economic but also grounded in moral values (substantive rationality). Formal rationality underlies one of the most significant drivers: the certification of a Smart Tourist Destination, as it generates a public–private synergy that significantly drives accessibility. Unlike previous works, this research has unraveled a diversity of explicit and tacit alliances among actors within a “favorable climate” towards accessible tourism, as well as some types of social conflicts that even stimulate its development.

Reviewed by: Medieval Religious Rationalities: A Weberian Analysis, and: Rationalities in History: A Weberian Essay in Comparison Jeffrey Bowman Medieval Religious Rationalities: A Weberian Analysis. By D. L. d’Avray. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. x, 198. $85.00 cloth-bound, ISBN 978-0-521-76707-1; $29.99 paperback, ISBN 978-0-521-18682-7.) Rationalities in History: A Weberian Essay in Comparison. By D. L. d’Avray. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. x, 214. $85.00 cloth-bound, ISBN 978-0-521-19920-0; $29.99 paperback, ISBN 978-0-521-12808-7.) In Collected Essays on the Sociology of Religion (Tübingen, 1920–21) and Economy and Society (Tübingen, 1925), Max Weber developed a taxonomy that distinguished four types of rationality. In the pair of studies under review, D. L. d’Avray argues that Weber’s four rationalities (instrumental, [End Page 89] value, formal, and substantive) might be fruitfully applied to the study of history. The two volumes are closely related and best understood as parts of a single argument. In Rationalities in History, the more theoretical of the two volumes, d’Avray reviews the Weberian framework and suggests the rewards of using it to interpret diverse historical evidence. In Medieval Religious Rationalities, he applies Weber’s schema to case studies from the European Middle Ages. In both volumes, the author rejects readings of Weber that describe the rise of rationality as a defining feature of modernity. D’Avray argues convincingly that to accept such readings is to misunderstand both Weber and the premodern world. Gratian’s Decretum, for example, serves as a compelling example of the operation of formal rationality in the medieval period. The Weberian approach has benefits aside from allowing us to cultivate a subtler understanding of the differences between the modern world and the Middle Ages. The diverse examples adduced in Rationalities in History (Azande witch oracles, Hume’s essay on miracles, and Buddhist asceticism, to name a few) dramatize the appealing prospect that Weber’s model can foster broadly comparative approaches to the study of religion and history. D’Avray is especially interested in the interface of different rationalities. In Rationalities in History, the Congregation of the Council, a body formed to interpret the decisions of the Council of Trent, serves as an example of how value rationalities informed formal legal rationalities. In Medieval Religious Rationalities, the interplay of rules and exceptions to rules in canon law illustrates the interface of Weber’s types. In a particularly learned and engaging discussion, d’Avray shows how papal dispensations for marriages within prohibited degrees of consanguinity reflect a symbiosis of formal and substantive rationalities. D’Avray is to be applauded for his range of reference and his eagerness to confront thorny questions about the relation between history and other social sciences rather than indulging in the opportunistic cross-disciplinary borrowing that too often characterizes the boundaries among history, sociology, and anthropology. The works under review are richly thought provoking, but not entirely convincing at every point. The decision to pursue the argument in two volumes is puzzling. Organizing the material in a single volume would have allowed the author to knit the empirical evidence more tightly to the broader theoretical agenda. One also might hope for a more decisive report of what we gain from looking at the past in this way. D’Avray shows that Weber’s scheme might be coherently applied to historical evidence, but it is not always clear what benefits are derived from such applications. One could, for example, read with keen appreciation d’Avray’s insightful account of how medieval religious convictions were parts of inter-locking, mutually reinforcing belief systems without believing that recourse to Weberian models is absolutely necessary. D’Avray’s overarching claim that Weber can help us hone a more precise analytical vocabulary for describing [End Page 90] the choices, preferences, and values of people in societies unlike our own should inspire lively discussion among medievalists, historians in general, and students of religion. Jeffrey Bowman Kenyon College Gambier, OH Copyright © 2012 The Catholic University of America Press

<p>Pilgrim tour is a religious tour or frequently called pilgrimage tour.<br />Pilgrimage tour is undertaken as the manifestation of action the visitors or the<br />tourists do. The objective of research was to find out the tourist type,<br />knowledge on pilgrimage tour, the factors encouraging and attracting the<br />tourists to undertake pilgrimage tour, and the tourists’ rationality action in<br />pilgrimage tour. The theory employed as the instrument of analysis was Max<br />Weber’s social action theory and Stephen Kalberg’s rationality type. <br />This study was taken place in pilgrimage tour area in Gunungpring,<br />Muntilan Subdistrict, Magelang Regency. The type of study was qualitative<br />with phenomenological strategy. The sampling technique used was accidental<br />sampling, while the data collection was conducted using direct observation<br />and in-depth interview methods. The data validation was carried out using data<br />triangulation technique and data analysis was conducted using data collection,<br />data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing. <br />The result of research showed that the pilgrimage tourists were divided<br />into two types: existential and recreational tourists. The tourists’ knowledge <br />on pilgrimage tour could be classified into two: modern pilgrimage and search<br />for pleasure. The factors encouraging and attracting the tourists to undertake <br />pilgrimage tour were: modern pilgrimage and search for pleasure. The factor<br />encouraging modern pilgrimage was self-fulfillment, while the attracting one <br />was culture. The factors encouraging the search for pleasure were social<br />interaction, educational opportunity, leisure activity, while the attracting one<br />was location climate. The tourists’ action and rationality in pilgrimage tour<br />included some action undertaken originating from traditional element, the<br />present, life ideology values, and psychological conditions affecting an<br />individual to perform pilgrimage tour, either pilgrimage or non-pilgrimage<br />actions. The tourists who had undertaken social action in pilgrimage tour, the<br />rationality would be apparent and contained the meaning in the visitors who<br />conducted a variety of activity in pilgrimage tour. The rationality existing in<br />pilgrimage tourists included practice rationality, theoretical rationality, and<br />substantive rationality.</p><p>Keywords: Pilgrimage tour, Tourists, Rationality.</p>

This is the first of a series of papers with the aim to follow up the program initiated in [12], i.e., to investigate which classes of manifolds are symmetric in the sense that they allow some non-trivial group action. The general approach for constructing cyclic group actions on a given manifold M is to start with an action of the circle group T=S1 on some manifold in the rational homotopy type of M and to “propagate” most of the restricted cyclic group actions to M itself. In [12], we only considered free actions, whereas the focus of this and the following paper [15] is on the non-free case.This note is primarily concerned with a closer look at T-actions on Poincaré complexes and in particular with the interpretation of the Borel localization theorem in the language of deformations of algebras [14,2]. In the subsequent paper [15], we will show how to realize an abstractly given deformation in the rational homotopy category by a circle action on a manifold of the given rational homotopy type.The first two sections of this paper should be of independent interest, whereas the short final ones are mainly to be considered as background material for [15].

In recent years a number of sociologists have suggested that some conversions to new religious movements should be understood as active accomplishments and not as passive occurrences. The experience of some converts, it has been proposed, might be profitably treated as acts of creative role-play. This paper develops the notion of distinguishing between active and passive conversions by elaborating a role-theoretical approach to the study of conversions which is grounded in the theoretical identification of free and rational actions. Active conversions are demarcated through reference to the ideal limiting case of rational conversions, based on the principle that rational actions are their own explanation. Under the argument advanced for a broadened conception of rationality, a conversion is deemed more rational the more it is reflectively monitored. The notion of a reflectively monitored conversion is then recast as a reflexive role-enactment, entailing role-person merger, with awareness of the conditions of merger.