Evandro Agazzi’s Scientific Objectivity and its Contexts

AMA Announcement: Monday 2/5 12PM ET - Anna Alexandrova on the philosophy of science and well-being

Notes on Contributors

Notes on Contributors

Science is commonly conceived as a system of propositions tested and justified through rigorous methods, that seeks to achieve epistemic values such as objectivity, coherence, precision, systematization, generalization, explanatory and predictive force. Even less orthodox authors, like Thomas Kuhn who focuses not only on science as product but also as a specific kind of social practice, only takes into account epistemic values, and leaves aside moral, social and political considerations. From this point of view, science is morally and politically neutral. More recently some philosophers like Javier Echeverria (2002) and Leon Olive (2000) have pointed out the relevance of non- epistemic values to understand the development of science and technology. However, from Karl Popper to Larry Laudan, most philosophers of science consider that introducing social or political discussions in the context of justification of scientific theories represents a serious threat to the rationality of science. Those authors like Paul Feyerabend and Michel Foucault, who point out the intrinsic relationship between scientific truth and political power, are condemned as irrational postmodernists. Fortunately during the last decades the social, moral and political dimensions of science have caught the attention of philosophers, sociologists and historians of science in the scope of Science and Technology Studies (STS) (Fuller, 1993; Pickering, 1992; Mitcham, 1995; Ibarra and Lopez Cerezo, 2003). But this new and increasingly innovative discipline, although it challenges many presuppositions of standard philosophy of science (mainly logical empiricism), deals more with the interaction of science and technology in applied contexts (techno science) rather than with the intrinsic problems of justification of scientific theories. My main purpose here is to argue that it is necessary to consider moral and political questions in the core of epistemological and methodological problems of scientific theories that are typically discussed in traditional philosophy of science. Accordingly, the first part of my argument relies on two important philosophers of science from the beginning of the twentieth century: Pierre Duhem and Otto Neurath. Both criticized the widespread idea that the rationality and objectivity of science is exclusively based on a rigorous methodology, and both introduced moral, social and political considerations to clarify the nature of scientific rationality. Unfortunately these important insights of the founding fathers of the twentieth century philosophy of science have not been recovered and acknowledged by most of their philosophical heirs. After clarifying some important moral, social, and political aspects of scientific rationality, the second part of my argument uses the pragmatic view of scientific rationality to challenge the methodological and exclusively epistemic concept of rationality that originated with Plato and became the dominant view in modern philosophy through the work of Rene Descartes, Francis Bacon, and Thomas Hobbes. I also discuss the political consequences of methodological and epistemic rationality, taken together with the widespread idea that political and even ethical decisions must be based on scientific knowledge. I maintain that these two theses are not only false, but have strong authoritarian implications. Finally, the third part of my argument turns again to Neurath in order to suggest a republican way of relating science and political decisions, so as to promote social and political values, such as justice and democracy, alongside epistemic values. Empirical Underdetermination, Good Sense, and Auxiliary Motives In his book, The End and Structure of Physical Theory (1906), Pierre Duhem presented one of the most important issues of contemporary philosophy of science: the empirical Underdetermination of theories. This problem was subsequently developed by Willard Van Orman Quine and is commonly know as the Duhem-Quine thesis. …

I hope that no one will think that there is no connection between the philosophy of the formal sciences and the philosophy of the empirical sciences. The philosophy that had such a great influence upon the empirical sciences in the last thirty years, the so-called ‘logical empiricism’ of Carnap and his school, was based upon two main principles: (1) That the traditional questions of philosophy are so-called ‘pseudoquestions’ ( Scheinprobleme ), i.e. that they are wholly senseless; and (2) That the theorems of the formal sciences – logic and mathematics – are analytic, not exactly in the Kantian sense, but in the sense that they ‘say nothing’, and only express our linguistic rules. Today analytical philosophers are beginning to construct a new philosophy of science, one that also wishes to be unmetaphysical, but that cannot accept the main principles of ‘logical empiricism’. The confrontation with the positivistic conception of mathematics is thus no purely technical matter, but has the greatest importance for the whole conception of philosophy of science. What distinguishes statements which are true for mathematical reasons, or statements whose falsity is mathematically impossible (whether in the vocabulary of ‘pure’ mathematics, or not), or statements which are mathematically necessary, from other truths? Contrary to a good deal of received opinion, I propose to argue that the answer is not ‘ontology’, not vocabulary, indeed nothing ‘linguistic’ in any reasonable sense of linguistic.

I am Anna Alexandrova, philosopher of science working on well-being and economics, and author of 'A Philosophy for the Science of Well-Being'. AMA!

'Philosophy of science' suggests to many a highly technical project that offers logical analyses of scientific and metascientific terms a perspective that may not greatly appeal to historians, sociologists, or scientists. This image of philosophy of science owes much to a common understanding of logical empiricism (nee positivism), a project that seemed to attempt to force all of science, and all of our understanding of science, into the Procrustean bed of formal logic. George Reisch laments this vision of the philosophy of science, and seeks to complicate it in a novel way, by arguing that logical empiricism might have bequeathed to us a very different philosophy of science. In so doing, he conducts us through a history of logical empiricism in its European phase during the 1920s and 1930s. He recovers the socialist agenda then at the heart of logical empiricism, and notes its alliances with progressivist wings in early twentieth-century American philosophy. He then offers a history of the technical and apolitical project that philosophy of science has become. As the title telegraphs, Reisch argues that the Cold War led the logical empiricists many of them immigrants from Germany or Austria, often Jewish, and often with socialist leanings away from their youthful political engagement, towards philosophical isolationism. That there is an important political history to the philosophy of science in the twentieth century is largely unknown to many in the profession. Most philosophers of science tacitly endorse a 'liberal neutralist' account of science: they believe that scientific knowledge

Interpretive understanding of human behaviour, known as verstehen, underpins the divide between the social sciences and the natural sciences. Taking a historically orientated approach, this collection offers a fresh take on the development of understanding within analytic philosophy before, during and after logical empiricism. In doing so, it reinvigorates debates on the role of the social sciences within contemporary epistemology. Bringing together leading experts including Martin Kusch, Thomas Uebel, Karsten Stueber and Giuseppina D’Oro, it is an authoritative reference on the logical empiricists’ philosophy of social science. Charting the various reformulations of verstehen as proposed by Wilhem Dilthey, Max Weber, R.G Collingwood and Peter Winch, the volume explores the reception of the social sciences prior to logical empiricism, before surveying the positive and negative critiques from Otto Neurath, Felix Kaufmann, Viktor Kraft and other logical empiricists. As such, chapters reveal that verstehen was not altogether rejected by the Vienna Circle, but was subject to various conceptual uses and misuses. Along with systematic historical coverage, the book situates verhesten within contemporary interdisciplinary developments in the field, shedding light on the 21st-century ‘turn’ to understanding among analytic philosophers and opening further lines of inquiry for philosophy of social science.

This paper reconsiders the relation between Kantian transcendental reflection (including transcendental idealism) and 20th century philosophy of science. As has been pointed out by Michael Friedman and others, the notion of a “relativized a priori” played a central role in Rudolf Carnap’s, Hans Reichenbach’s and other logical empiricists’ thought. Thus, even though the logical empiricists dispensed with Kantian synthetic a priori judgments, they did maintain a crucial Kantian doctrine, viz., a distinction between the (transcendental) level of establishing norms for empirical inquiry and the (empirical) level of norm-governed inquiry itself. Even though Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions is often taken to be diametrically opposed to the received view of science inherited from logical empiricism, a version of this basically Kantian distinction is preserved in Kuhn’s thought. In this respect, as Friedman has argued, Kuhn is closer to Carnap’s theory of linguistic frameworks than, say, W.V. Quine’s holistic naturalism. Kuhn, indeed, might be described as a “new Kant” in post-empiricist philosophy of science. This article examines, first, the relativization of the Kantian a priori in Reichenbach’s work, arguing that while Reichenbach (after having given up his original Kantianism) criticized “transcendentalism”, he nevertheless retained, in a reinterpreted form, a Kantian-like transcendental method, claiming that the task of philosophy (of science) is to discover and analyze the presuppositions underlying the applicability of conceptual systems. Then, some reflections on Kuhn’s views on realism are offered, and it is suggested that Kuhn (as well as some other influential contributors to the realism debate, such as Hilary Putnam) can be reinterpreted as a (relativized, naturalized) Kantian transcendental idealist. Given the central importance of Kuhnian themes in contemporary philosophy of science, it is no exaggeration to claim that Kantian transcendental inquiry into the constitutive principles of empirical knowledge, and even transcendental idealism (as the framework for such inquiry), still have a crucial role to play in this field and deserve further scrutiny.

Hierarchy Theory: A Vision, Vocabulary, and Epistemology Valerie Ahl and T. F. H. Allen New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. 206 pp. There is a growing interest in various fields in the abstract properties of complex systems and ways of studying them. Hierarchy theory, a product of the cross-fertilization of several disciplines, including economics, physics, chemistry, psychology, philosophy and ecology, is believed to be a promising analytical approach for understanding complexity. Central to hierarchy theory is the attempt to provide a framework for considering relationships among levels (whether spatial, temporal or both) and their ordering. The term 'hierarchy,' as it is applied to complex systems, refers not to its original meaning denoting the vertical authority structure in human organizations, but to a partial ordering (more tree-like than rung-like) (Simon 1973: 5) that is believed to be common to all complex systems-whether physical, chemical, biological, social or artificial. While earlier works by Alien and Starr (1982) and Alien and Hoekstra (1992) focused on potential applications of hierarchy theory to the study of complex ecological systems, Ahl and Alien, in this general, more philosophical work, are concerned with challenging the current epistemology of science-that of 'naive realism'-and building a vocabulary of hierarchy theory. In the first three chapters, Confronting the Complexity of Our Time, Levels of Analysis as a Challenge to Realism, and The Critical Dualities in Observation, the authors introduce an alternative paradigm to 'naive realism,' which they refer to as constructivism (p. 73). Inspired by Jean Piaget from psychology, 'constructivism' describes haw the pursuit of understanding should proceed, maintaining that knowledge comes from the interaction between the observer and the world, not from the external world itself (p. 13). The authors uphold 'constructivism' as a more appropriate epistemology for science, arguing that the time has come to recognize the active constructivist role of the scientist in all branches of science. Ahl and Alien are quite persuasive in their arguments and convincingly demonstrate (for those who need convincing) that the process of doing science is teeming with observer decisions. Examples of such decisions include: posing a question, defining entities or units, choosing measurements, noticing phenomena, and evaluating models (p. 50). The authors are quick to emphasize, however, that a constructivist position does not lead to the solipsistic assertion that the observer controls system behavior, only that behavior occurs in the context of the observer's decisions. Under 'constructivism,' the goal of science is not the discovery of objective 'truth' which exists independent of the observer, but rather the development of more reliable predictive models. In addition to raising important questions about the philosophy of science, the authors define key concepts and review some properties of scale derived from hierarchy theory. Some of the key concepts examined are: 1) context and constraint; 2) filters and response rates; and 3) surfaces, bond strength and integrity. Important conceptual distinctions between definitional and empirical entities, laws and rules, and nested and non-nested hierarchies are also discussed. …

Introduction. Part One: Historical Overview: Logical Empiricism and Feminist Empiricism. The Feminism Question in the Philosophy of Science R.N. Giere. Revaluing Science: Starting from the Practices of Women N. Tuana. Part Two: Feminist and Mainstream Philosophy of Science: Continuities and Tensions. Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Values in Science: Rethinking the Dichotomy H.E. Longino. The Last Dogma of Empiricism? J. Nelson. Science as Social? - Yes and No S. Haack. Empiricism without Dogmas L. Hankinson Nelson. Underdetermination Undeterred E. Potter. The Relativism Question in Feminist Epistemology I. Niiniluoto. Part Three: Feminist Philosophy of Science and the Sociology of Knowledge, Social Constructivism, and the Debate over Science Studies. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Realism and Social Constructivism without Contradiction K. Barad. Feminism and the Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge J. Rouse. Science and Anti-Science: Objectivity and its Real Enemies E.A. Lloyd. Part Four: Views from Multicultural and Global Feminisms, and from Feminist Phenomenology. Multicultural and Global Feminist Philosophies of Science: Resources and Challenges S. Harding. Woman - Nature, Product, Style? Rethinking the Foundations of Feminist Philosophy of Science S. Heinamaa. Contributors.

I Begin By Thanking David Hildebrand, Daniel Brunson, and the program committee for the magnificent job they have done under the very difficult circumstances imposed by the pandemic. I'd also like to thank the program committee for their generous invitation to present this 2021 Founders Lecture.Since this is a Founders Lecture, it seems appropriate to recall that one of the society's founders, Ralph Sleeper, said on more than one occasion that he would love to have a séance with Frank Ramsey about what he, Ramsey, said to Wittgenstein about pragmatism.Now, thanks to an extraordinarily well-researched intellectual biography of Ramsey, Sleeper's longed-for séance will not be necessary. Cheryl Misak's book Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers, published in 2020, helps to clarify Ramsey's relationship with Wittgenstein and to establish his role in the foundation of what many today call “analytical pragmatism.” It is also a close study of his seminal contributions to mathematics, economics, and probability theory. All of that and more was accomplished before Ramsey's untimely death, just short of his twenty-seventh birthday.Despite Ramsey's brilliant contributions to the study of formal systems, however, he harbored no illusions about their legislative applicability to everyday life. Although he helped establish rational choice theory in economics, for example (and much like his mentor John Maynard Keynes but unlike some of the rational choice theorists who followed), he understood that conditions such as emotions, cultural factors, and income inequities are important considerations when it comes to formulating economic policy. Like Dewey, Ramsey was also critical of single factor ethical theories. I am confident that Misak's intellectual biography will become the standard reference source for Ramsey's life and work. A great companion piece to Misak's book is Zachary D. Carter's book The Price of Peace: Money, Democracy, and the Life of John Maynard Keynes. It is highly relevant to current thinking about pandemic and post-pandemic economic policies.Given the scholarly excellence demonstrated in her Ramsey book, however, I expect that some may find Misak's brief essay, published in 2019 in the journal Aeon with co-author Robert Talisse, somewhat baffling. In this essay, she rejects what she terms the “eclipse” narrative, which she attributes to Richard Rorty. According to this narrative, pragmatism dominated American philosophy “throughout Dewey's heyday, from the early 1900s until the early ’40s.” Then, post-World War II professional philosophers in America “began fixating on the technical and methodological issues that today are associated with ‘analytic’ philosophy.” This was due in part to the influence of immigrant European positivists during the 1930s and 1940s who dismissed pragmatism as short on rigor and who swiftly gained “strongholds in nearly all the elite Ph.D. granting universities in the US.” Pragmatism, then, according to this “eclipse” narrative, went into—well, eclipse: it “was driven underground, where the remaining loyalists built scholarly networks devoted to keeping the classical idiom alive.” So that is the gist of the eclipse narrative as Misak characterizes it (Misak and Talisse, “Pragmatism Endures”).Pushing back with her own “anti-eclipse” narrative, Misak argues that far from having been eclipsed, “pragmatism has been a constant and dominant force in philosophy for nearly 100 years” (Misak and Talisse, “Pragmatism Endures”). She faults those who buy into the eclipse narrative, among whom are those whose mission (she suggests) has been to recover or re-introduce Dewey's ideas into mainstream philosophy. She thinks that these misguided people have introduced a “principled insularity” that is “tragic for the prospects of pragmatism” (“Pragmatism Endures”) because pragmatism in fact never left the American scene. This “resurrection story,” she argues, is “tinged with resentment.” “The steady production of volumes devoted to establishing Dewey's ‘continuing relevance,’ ‘discovering’ his ideas and recapturing his ‘lessons’” has led these people to “talk mainly among themselves” (“Pragmatism Endures”). The net effect, in her view, is that “[a] more reliable strategy for marginalising the classical pragmatists could hardly be imagined” (“Pragmatism Endures”).I suppose the first thing to note about this view is that it is an outlier. Although it focuses on Rorty's narrative, support for various aspects of the eclipse narrative have also been advanced by Dewey biographers Thomas C. Dalton, Alan Ryan, and Robert B. Westbrook. There are other accounts of the career of American philosophy during this period as well, including those by Bryan G. Norton, John McCumber, and James Campbell, that also include aspects of the eclipse narrative. I will have something to say about some of these in a moment, including the assessment of another of this society's founders, Thelma Z. Lavine.In my view, the anti-eclipse narrative rests on several questionable claims. The ones that seem the most germane to Misak's general thesis, are (1) that logical empiricism and pragmatism featured “remarkable similarities” that included rejection of the correspondence theory of truth; (2) that the view of truth that dominated logical empiricism, a theory of truth according to which true statements were those that were verifiable and successful, “was in fact pragmatism”; and (3) that “each tradition evolved in the light of the other” (Misak and Talisse, “Pragmatism Endures”).Regarding the claim that logical empiricism found fertile ground in America, that logical empiricism and pragmatism held common ideas and evolved together, it seems fair to say that during the mid-twentieth-century, philosophers of various persuasions did communicate with one another more freely than some have tended to do since that time. It also seems clear that there were logical positivists, or logical empiricists as some of them preferred to be called, who sought the support of pragmatists, including Dewey. This is indicated by Neurath's now famous invitation to Dewey to contribute to the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, as well as Reichenbach's contribution to the Library of Living Philosophers volume on Dewey.But since the anti-eclipse narrative makes a general statement about the logical empiricists, it might be fruitful to ask whose strand of logical positivism or logical empiricism the authors of the anti-eclipse narrative have in mind, and at what point in that person's career.A. J. Ayer was by far the best known of the logical empiricists. His book Language, Truth, and Logic went through twelve editions, from 1936 to 1971, and by one account, it “eventually became the text by which logical positivism was introduced to most young philosophers for the next half century” (Norton 536). The professor for whom I worked as a teaching assistant during my first year in graduate school in 1965 may have had that strain of logical empiricism in mind when, much to my horror, he informed his largely freshman class that “all philosophy can be reduced either to the physical sciences or lexicography.”But as for the belief that Ayer and Dewey had similar ideas, Alan Ryan provides a crisp inventory of their differences: (i) Unlike Ayer, Dewey accepted neither correspondence nor atomic facts. [Ayer avoids the term “correspondence, but uses “conforms” (Ayer 99).] (ii) Unlike Ayer, Dewey thought that “we verify not one thought or hypothesis at a time, but an entire approach to the world.” (iii) Unlike Ayer, Dewey did not accept the idea that the “physical sciences [constitute] the touchstone of intellectual respectability.” For Dewey, science “was sophisticated common sense.” (iv) Unlike Ayer, Dewey thought that religion and science could co-exist “on terms of real friendship” (Ryan 129).We might have some minor quibbles with Ryan's terminology, but his conclusion is unassailable: “Ayer's book was a very pure representative of the logical positivist dismissal of everything not compatible with a simple account of ‘the scientific world view.’ Dewey's whole career was a protest against that type of simplicity” (Ryan 130). I might add to this that, unlike Dewey, Ayer accepted a traditional analytic/synthetic distinction (Ayer 78) and that he thought that ethical judgments “have no objective validity at all”(Ayer 108).Perhaps I have not been fair to Misak's anti-eclipse narrative by mentioning Ayer, since he was not one of the émigrés. But I ask you to recall that her anti-eclipse narrative argues in general terms that logical positivism and pragmatism held common ideas, and that the view of truth that dominated logical empiricism was in fact pragmatism.In Thomas Dalton's account, pragmatists Charles Morris, Sidney Hook, and Ernest Nagel did welcome the logical empiricists, thinking that the two projects had a lot in common. Morris and Nagel hoped that they would adopt a common theory of meaning (Dalton 261). As Dalton put it, however, Morris “failed to foresee that the positivist's agenda for reconstruction actually involved a purified rather than a unified science–one cleansed of any residue of naturalism and references to phenomenal experience” (Dalton 261).As Dalton's story continues, Dewey respected Nagel's ability and sought his advice, especially when writing about naturalism and logic. Nevertheless, in a letter to Arthur Bentley, Dewey wrote that he regretted that Nagel “should be taken with logical positivism” (Dalton 261; Dewey, Correspondence [08613] John Dewey to Arthur F. Bentley [1939.03.05]).In a famous exchange with Nagel, Dewey suggested that the law of the excluded middle applied only to formal logic, and not to existential affairs. Nagel responded that surely a door is either open or closed: there is no tertium quid. Dewey's reply was that a door can also be closing or opening.1If you will allow a personal interjection into their conversation, the door to my little greenhouse is what is commonly called a “Dutch door.” The top half is opened on warm days, and the bottom half remains closed to keep out various animals. As a matter of common sense, I leave it to you to decide whether on such occasions the door is open or closed. Dewey's reply was, of course, much more sophisticated: it had to do with the interpretation of formal systems and, more significantly, the importance of thinking in terms of processes rather than static time-slices.Then there was Hans Reichenbach. In his contribution to the Dewey volume of the Library of Living Philosophers, he appeared eager to court Dewey's support. He suggested that he and Dewey were members of the same philosophical group, standing “on the same basis,” as he put it. His suggestion of some “alterations” to Dewey's position would therefore merely strengthen their bond. But his remarks on Dewey's project were in fact quite critical: “[W]e do not think that Dewey's nonrealistic interpretation of scientific concepts is tenable” (Reichenbach 164).Reichenbach was troubled by Dewey's reluctance to say that only scientific objects could be real. He criticized Dewey's treatment of tertiary qualities as real aspects of primary experience, a position that he thought excluded Dewey from the type of realism he himself and the other logical empiricists espoused.In his response, Dewey politely rejected Reichenbach's invitation. He did not see himself as a member of the positivist club. He viewed Reichenbach as holding “to that traditional particularistic empiricism” that fails to take into account the biological-cultural approach to the theory of experiencing that understands “general ways of behavior [as] an unescapable datum” (Dewey qtd. in Schilpp and Hahn 535, 536; LW 14:20–21). In short, whereas Reichenbach was a logical empiricist, he, Dewey, was a radical empiricist.Robert Westbrook highlights some telling details of their exchange. At one point, Reichenbach “suggested . . . an ethical motive beyond Dewey's insistence on the reality of qualitative experience and that this motive . . . stood in the way of rapprochement between Dewey and his positivist critics” (Westbrook 499). According to Reichenbach, “[i]f the pragmatist considers secondary and tertiary qualities as real, he does so because he wants to establish esthetics and ethics as aspects of reality comparable to physics” (178). For Westbrook, this provided an “astute insight into the principal reason why [Dewey] opposed the logical positivists” (Westbrook 499).I'm going to italicize Westbrook's next sentences, because I think he goes to the heart of the anti-eclipse narrative's claim.As for Carnap, Bryan Norton describes his early work as involving a “reductionist, virtuosic logic, and his view that “all that could be said about language could occur in [a] formal mode” (541). But Norton thinks that by the end of Carnap's career, in the early 1950s (and much like Wittgenstein, thanks to Ramsey, I would add), he, Carnap, finally accepted some of the central ideas of pragmatism such as instrumentalism and functionalism with respect to language (Norton 551). An element in this “conversion” was his principle of “tolerance” that allowed “for new conventions and new ways of speaking” (Norton 568). Here is Norton: “So Carnap, the positivist warrior, eventually embraced pragmatism, treating the problems of traditional philosophy as ‘pragmatic’ problems of choosing the best languages for various social purposes” (553). But even at the end, Norton admits, Carnap still couldn't quite make the turn. Unlike Dewey, for example, he still quested for certainty; he never gave up the analytic/synthetic distinction; he never gave up the notion of “necessary truth.” And he never gave up the fact/value dichotomy (Norton 557).To say, as the anti-eclipse narrative does, that the pragmatists and the positivists had the same theory of truth, appears to assert that Dewey would have accepted the idea that truth is solely or for the most part about sentences (or statements, or propositions, depending on the logical positivist). For Ayer and the earlier Carnap, this was the case. But from the standpoint of James and Dewey, the central, key, and quite obvious objection to the program of the positivists was that truth has to do with reconstructive action and the way we humans are able to manage our lives in a world rich in facilities and constraints. Over several decades, I have argued that this is what motivates Dewey's pragmatic account of technology. Truth in farming is about much more than sentences. Truth in industry is about more than sentences. Truth in the visual and plastic arts is about more than sentences. And truth in education is most certainly about more than sentences.Jim Garrison reminded me of a remarkably clear passage in which Dewey explains how his pragmatic theory of truth incorporates, but goes well beyond the propositional account of the positivists. the of the is to a logical of but we to of existential this is the meaning of processes of so that they an For the positivists, truth was about logic. For Dewey, their of truth to for more on the of logical empiricism and pragmatism, I am to another of the society's founders, Thelma Here she writing in the of volume of Dewey's about the that Dewey and his Arthur Bentley in to the of the logical is a narrative, neither “eclipse” nor that, on a period several to the of the “eclipse” narrative, seems to me to great of a of the of This narrative, as I will call it, also the for a narrative, a narrative, which I will a narrative in the work of James He argues that there was at one reason why pragmatism in was not to the of philosophy. had to as Dewey put it, with the problems of (and and not just the problems of It had to do with how we our how we our and how we and as I would that the “eclipse” narrative is but for very than the anti-eclipse narrative has put In narrative, not only had pragmatism a of before James published his book in but in fact that book was an to through ideas about the of pragmatism from dominant for one argues that never was a period of in American there was in America, argues, was a of pragmatism in life the by such as for that included (1) with our in and our role as (2) a with experience as a of belief and with a view an and (3) on as the source of our to his point so that we will not it. “Pragmatism was never primary the of professional It was not pragmatism that dominated life in the the of various of And most of realism were with a scientific philosophy on and they on the professional of as a primary The and of in this view, was and to be on the of professional in philosophy and to Campbell, to the truth . . . could be with and propositional that were by that to An important of this was that philosophy to back on associated from which it could have new such as and The of teaching and to of . . . could be by and was what pragmatists primary to the problems of the ones that or the scientific ones that or the social ones that my graduate when I was on some problems of logic, I was by my of whether I was philosophy or the of philosophy. Although I did not it at the time, Dewey had this type of in when he argued that like and the plastic is a of with social with is (Dewey LW qtd. in Campbell, I became that a language is about a is it true of to and provides for a narrative, which I will call a narrative, in to the several of the eclipse narrative, the anti-eclipse narrative, and narrative that I have so far story aspects of the eclipse narrative and a for the career of pragmatism in the the between pragmatism and logical he rejects the idea that they were on the same as Misak would have it. He for example, that Carnap's 1936 and pragmatic theory of truth as it were a theory of true sentences, when in fact it was something quite in the another of our society's founders, as he responded to the positivist's view that truth is to some to sentences or the earlier appears and . . . is not just true sentences that through the of and the and can be true in their own in McCumber, in the narrative focuses on the fact that philosophy during the largely of own in and it just that American philosophy and at the of the In this narrative, the of professional philosophy to of their and was a into a highly position that was on truth (and philosophy could present as a it might a against what Richard of the in the And the there were people with the and even people who were the of personal who would up in the according to McCumber, the philosophical and on the truth and of sentences in a The as it, is that at the same that American philosophy an the central was more or that of a to the problems of philosophy in the Dewey, of course, thought that many of those problems to be with and are the as he put it, of to many problems of the as by in his to see Dewey, Correspondence Dewey to narrative, at the of the there were in intellectual (1) pragmatic (2) (3) and the the naturalism of Reichenbach. naturalism a for science that on and a of the with objective Reichenbach's naturalism was not compatible with pragmatic I am about Dewey's take on it is fair to say that his pragmatic naturalism held that the of the sciences is a cultural or put another that science is a type of technology. For Dewey, science is a of for of a McCumber, a central of pragmatic naturalism was that a But to do this during the of War when was with was to become to the as well as the of whom were their into the of including This was especially the in which for were similar problems at that at the of that Dewey's C. but that is another logical positivists did not have that naturalism to a their view that all the other sciences could be reduced to was a work in that would take a lot of before it could be And since they could just statements as point that was by the the was naturalism was dominant because it was as is to note the at work in this the formal systems of the logical empiricists, real life tended to be rather they were in many of the positivists had been involved in cultural especially on the But in America, they tended to keep their one me that during the of the Carnap became so that he to the He gave because he couldn't find them in the seems like a to thank Garrison for on an early of this and my to a relevant to my by who has provided what in my view, a very contribution to the eclipse narrative has advanced a well-researched and highly narrative, which he a narrative, but which might also be called a argues that and Dewey a of and even many of their His narrative is opposed to what he Misak's narrative, which to a between on one and James and Dewey on the He thinks that what motivates Misak's anti-eclipse narrative is her belief that . . . the only strain of pragmatism the strain that with to and to thinks this idea since philosophy is one in which logical positivism the agenda and pragmatism, from to time, a for and that they were logical positivism with pragmatic But since they were to the classical pragmatist they thought they were a even they were to thinks that and were in fact largely of the new of philosophers in the and pragmatist in new in narrative, the pragmatism of in the 1940s was not so much as But in the in and pragmatism was For that new as pragmatism did not This a since they were of the to which they on pragmatism” he argues, this eclipse was not so much an eclipse as an all this into account, one the that Misak's anti-eclipse narrative may be on a rather of James and Dewey. This appears to be by of Misak's book The American argues that Misak the to the best of Dewey and taken and . . . to on the of the of is to court what can it to claim that pragmatism never left the American argues that it was never a part of professional philosophy. would be that the of the work of and Dewey was out into various where their ideas to some more and some under the professional of those ideas even became so that they their as The functionalism of James and Dewey, for example, which had in and in Dewey's essay, and which and in had by the 1930s become so accepted in philosophy and that it to be as a is the of philosophy during the half of the did in fact have a highly of pragmatism from which most of the of a existential had been This type of pragmatism remains important in many and in my experience, it is a of pragmatism through which many young philosophers the to their James and Dewey. But the of the anti-eclipse narrative, that is not all there is of have so far suggested that the anti-eclipse narrative the between logical empiricism and I have also on several in to present a that is much more and than the anti-eclipse narrative and, in many to some of central the conclusion that for pragmatism is pragmatism you are to much of the work of Dewey and James (and even some of more as well as the of between logical empiricism and pragmatism more I suppose some of the of Misak's narrative into But in my view, the would be a highly of pragmatism, a of pragmatism of much of and a of pragmatism much in the way of The pragmatism of James and Dewey (and much of was The pragmatism of Misak is In her the term comes to that my earlier on Misak's book on Frank Ramsey to my belief that pragmatism has many It would therefore be a to or that strand of But in my view, it would be an even to as Misak seems that pragmatism is pragmatism add that work in a of what Misak is “tragic for the prospects of to recover Dewey's for philosophy. In such as the ethical treatment of philosophy of and even in which now rich of the between pragmatism and Dewey's current influence is and I I had to many of these important and their some of whom are members of this I will only add that it seems that the anti-eclipse to be of the importance of this very of we a As I was from my and them for their it to me that there was a period when pragmatism it was, like those quite and by work that led to the of the pragmatists, by a of the influence on pragmatism by such as Dewey, and and by several of and All of this and more the conditions that the that the pragmatist are now in the I and as well, including in Frank famous the in There that there would be in the we have of a and pragmatist

<i>Notes on Contributors</i>

In this first half of the paper, the author reflects on the reasons behind the insulation that has been characterizing the relationships between philosophy or science/epistemology and psychology/psychotherapy. It is argued that this relationship has been non-reciprocal in the sense that only philosophy of science has been influencing psychology/psychotherapy through the doctrine of «logical positivism». It is also argued that thanks to the fallacy of «logical positivism» as well as the appearance of «psychology of science» and «non-justificational philosophies» it is possible to inaugurate reciprocity between the two disciplines at both a methodological and conceptual level. Verifying the existence of three recent psychotherapeutic models that can be seen in the context of the relationships between philosophy of science and psychotherapy, the author puts forward four unifying characteristics: 1) they all use as background frameworks borrowed from philosophy of science and epistemology; 2) they take explicitly into consideration the way individuals acquire, organize maintain and modify their knowledge; 3) they reject the existence of «ultimate epistemological authorities»; 4) they adopt the perspective of «motor theories of mind» as well as a constructivism view of human functioning. This part of the paper ends with the description and analysis of the first of the three mentioned models, M. J. Mahoney’s. The author stresses as Mahoney’s theoretical tenets: a) a «constructivist ontology» - the active role played by individuals when constructing the sensorial information to which they respond; b) the «primacy of meaning» - the importance of the personal meaning of events as related to the relationships between order and contrast; c) «heterarchial structuralism» - decentralization and changing coalitions among CNS Knowledge systems; d) «oscillations and emotions» - the importance of oscillatory processes understood as dynamic tensions between contrasts that superordinate the emotional ones. Regarding the therapeutic process, Mahoney argues for the use of multimodal assessment methodologies and an intervention based on T. Kuhn’s analysis of scientific change and progress.

&lt;p&gt;Эпистемология рассматривается как сложившийся в эпоху Нового времени особый тип учений о познании, не опирающихся непосредственно на определенный онтологический базис. Отличие эпистемологии от гносеологии видится в том, что последняя всегда обусловлена таким базисом. В свою очередь, эпистемологический реализм понимается как философская платформа, позволяющая осмыслить проблемы познания в согласовании с некоторой онтологической позицией. В целом эпистемологический реализм представлен как обоснование возможности для научного познания приближаться к истине как идеалу знания, выражению сущности познаваемого, что с необходимостью предполагает обращение к онтологической проблематике.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;В статье показано развитие реалистского направления в эпистемологии XIX–XX вв. от наивного реализма к реализму научному. Указывается, что в русской философии реализм нашел и своих критиков, и последователей. Главным образом имеется в виду философия В. С. Соловьева, который в контексте учения о всеединстве дал характеристику эпистемологическому реализму, а также предвосхитил некоторые тенденции его дальнейшего развития. Рассматривается критическая позиция Соловьева по отношению к наивному реализму, который был характерен для теории познания позитивизма. Показана обоснованность этой соловьевской критики.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Дальнейшее развитие реализма в западной эпистемологии XX в. представлено тремя его версиями: неореализма, критического реализма и научного реализма. Они соотнесены с определенными установками философского учения Вл. Соловьева. Современный научный реализм проанализирован как наиболее убедительная позиция в обосновании возможности научного познания приближаться к истине. В данном отношении показаны определенные созвучия гносеологии Соловьева с научным реализмом.&lt;/p&gt;