EVALUATING INFLATION TARGETING REGIME - CASE STUDY: GEORGIA

[Author Affiliation]Chi-Young Choi, cychoi@uta.eduYoung Se Kim[Acknowledgment]The authors are grateful to coeditor Kent Kimbrough and two anonymous referees for constructive comments that helped to improve this article. The authors also wish to thank Steve Cecchetti, Kang Liu, Shin-Ichi Nishiyama, Margie Tieslau, Taka Tsuruga, and the seminar participants at the Academia Sinica, National Chung Cheng University, National Sun Yat-Sen University, National Taiwan University, Texas Tech University, and the University of Texas at Arlington for helpful comments and Vikas Kakkar for providing CPI data for Hong Kong. Any remaining errors are the authors'.1. IntroductionVariability in relative prices is known to be a major channel through which inflation can induce welfare costs by impeding an efficient allocation of resources in the economy. Consequently, substantial effort has been devoted in the literature to examining the link between relative price variability (RPV) and aggregate inflation. Although much of the existing theoretical and empirical literature points to a positive monotonic relationship, newer contributions suggest that the relationship between inflation and RPV is more complicated, particularly in terms of its sensitivity to the inflation regime.1The primary purpose of this study is to investigate whether the connection between inflation and RPV is influenced in an important way by the monetary policy framework chosen by a central bank. Specifically, this article focuses on exploring whether the adoption of an inflation targeting (IT) framework exerts any significant impact on RPV as measured by the standard deviations of sectoral inflation rates relative to the aggregate rate. Since it was first implemented in New Zealand more than two decades ago, the popularity of IT has spread, with some twenty-five countries worldwide implementing the framework to date (Freedman and Laxton 2009). The literature is now replete with studies pointing to reductions in both the level and the volatility of inflation in countries that have adopted IT (e.g., Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 2007).2 While studies of the impact of IT on aggregate inflation performance are plentiful, little attention has been paid to the impact of IT on RPV.The question of whether and indeed how IT affects RPV is an important one for several reasons. First, exploring the potential connection between IT and RPV is a worthwhile exercise given the popularity of IT as a monetary framework and the centrality of RPV to the current generation of macromodels. The importance of RPV is recognized in standard New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, where the variance of relative prices is viewed as a useful summary statistic. As noted by Amano, Ambler, and Rebei (2007), for example, in DSGE models, the optimal rate of target inflation and the optimal variability of inflation relative to output depend on the quantitative effects of price dispersion on macroeconomic equilibrium. Second, answering the question helps us identify the driving force behind the change in RPV, distinguishing between IT adoption itself and its subsequent impact on inflation. If the relationship is monotonically positive, as is often believed in the literature, one should expect that IT adoption would bring about a decline in RPV in the same way as it has led to a decline in inflation. If the relationship is more complex, however, the effect of IT adoption on reducing RPV may hinge on the change in inflation regimes after IT adoption. Third, our answer to the question also sheds additional light on the empirical evidence for the relative effectiveness of IT across different stages of development. While there is strong evidence that developing countries benefit more from IT than industrial countries in combating inflation and its volatility (e.g., Petursson 2004; Lin and Ye 2009), we are aware of no empirical research that has assessed this issue with respect to RPV. …

ABSTRACTThis article critically analyzes inflation targeting (IT) both theoretically and empirically. IT came into prominence in the 1990s and 1 central bank after another adopted this regime in the 1990s and 2000s. Proponents of IT mainly argued that IT regime was successful on the grounds that it resulted in lower inflation rates and hence better economic performances. However, inflation rates in the world were in a downward trend from the 1980s well into the 2000s, and both IT and non-IT regimes managed to decrease their inflation rates. In addition, focusing too much on price stability through IT paved the way for permanently higher than necessary interest rates and disinflationary “tight” monetary policy periods when inflation rate was above an arbitrarily targeted level. Tight monetary policy can and do affect the real economy negatively and overemphasizing price stability may hurt the economy in terms of lower potential output, decreasing investment and more unequal income distribution. Post Keynesians offer valuable alternatives within the framework of parking-it approach to the existing monetary policy paradigm. Our main conclusion is that central banks should set the policy interest rate as low as possible and keep it there, in line with Keynesian “cheap money” policy.

Given the increasing importance of achieving low and stable inflation rate during the last decades, adopting the most suitable practices to implement monetary policies has always been of concern by monetary authorities of different countries. Inflation targeting (IT) regime is the most recent strategy to guide monetary policies that have been introduced following the occurrence of exchange rate targeting and monetary targeting problems. In this respect, in the present research, the performance of a number of IT countries versus that of the non-targeting ones was first investigated employing the difference in difference (DID) method. Then, considering monetary and oil shocks, IT performance in production gap in the economy of Iran was practically examined using smooth transition autoregressive regression (STAR) model. The Results indicated that implementation of IT policy was successful in applying the four main and most influential indicators in the production of treatment countries. In addition, it was revealed that variables such as IT, oil shock, and facility and exchange rates had a statistically negative effect on production shock in the economy of Iran. However, the monetary shock was found to have a statistically positive impact on production shock. Therefore, according to the findings regarding the successful performance of targeting countries, policymakers are recommended to implement IT policy during a long-term interval in order to stabilize it and also provide its prerequisites in the economy of Iran.JEL classification: E31, E58, E52.

Previous articleNext article FreeCommentBennett T. McCallumBennett T. McCallumCarnegie Mellon University and NBER Search for more articles by this author Carnegie Mellon University and NBERPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreI. IntroductionThis is an interesting and challenging paper, in which Atkeson and Kehoe put forth a very strong critique of current mainstream monetary policy analysis. Monetary economists have, of course, been rather pleased with the development of their subject over the past 10–15 years, current U.S. policy difficulties notwithstanding. Indeed, the tone of a prominent recent expository paper by my colleague, Marvin Goodfriend, is somewhat triumphal in spirit.1 The spirit of the Atkeson and Kehoe paper, by contrast, is conveyed by a recent publication of theirs, together with coauthor Fernando Alvarez, which bears the title “If Exchange Rates Are Random Walks, Then Almost Everything We Say about Monetary Policy Is Wrong” (Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe 2007). That paper focuses on exchange rate failures, whereas the current one stresses the term structure of interest rates, but the line of argument is basically the same.The title of the 2007 paper leads me rather naturally to ask myself what it is that I would say in answer to the implied question, “What important things do monetary economists really know—or at least believe—about monetary policy?” My own answer to that question would go along the following lines: (i) We believe that if the monetary authority keeps monetary policy expansionary for a substantial length of time, the main effect will be to generate a higher inflation rate than would have prevailed otherwise, with little or no overall effect on aggregate production and employment. (ii) Nominal interest rates will be higher, also, with real rates being affected very little. (iii) If, however, the monetary authority changes policy unexpectedly and abruptly in an expansionary direction, there will most likely be an expansion in aggregate output and employment—but it will be only temporary. (iv) If these changes are in the direction of tighter policy, the signs of the above‐mentioned effects will be reversed. (v) In particular, the monetary authority has the power to generate a recession, in which output and then the inflation rate will fall. (vi) The precise nature of the mechanism that generates the real effects of monetary policy changes of this type is not very well understood. Then, if my questioner had not wandered away in boredom, I would want to add something like the following: (vii) The foregoing points refer to an expansionary or contractionary monetary policy stance—loose or tight—but how is this measured? Well, a sustained high growth rate of the stock of base money will (under most institutional arrangements) be expansionary, but matters are a little less clear‐cut when the central bank actually carries out its policy by manipulating overnight interest rates. Nevertheless, there are ways in which we can characterize tighter versus looser policy in terms of interest rate rules by reference to the implied target inflation rate, the strength of responses to deviations from target, and so forth.Now, I suspect that Atkeson and Kehoe probably do not disagree with most of these statements as to what monetary economists know (or believe), even on a substantive basis.2 But their title of the current paper, as distinct from the 2007 item, refers to a need for a new approach to monetary policy analysis. So let us turn to a consideration of what today’s mainstream approach is. As it happens there is a short statement of that type, in a paper of mine, that gives the following description. The approach is one in which “the researcher specifies a quantitative macroeconomic model that is intended to be structural (invariant to policy changes) and consistent with both theory and data. Then, by stochastic simulation or analytical means, he determines how crucial variables (such as inflation and the output gap) behave on average under various alternative policy rules. Usually, rational expectations (RE) is assumed in both stages. Evaluation of the different outcomes can be accomplished by means of an optimal control exercise, or by reference to an explicit loss function, or left to the judgment (i.e., loss function) of the implied policymaker” (McCallum 2001, 258). Here, too, I doubt that Atkeson and Kehoe have any major disagreement with this general approach. What they do disagree with, if I understand at all, is the model that is typically used in recent work and taken to be structural.3In a sense my last statement could be regarded as merely quibbling over their title. But the point seems to be one of some importance: if Atkeson and Kehoe can generate an optimizing model that incorporates reliable, quantitative estimates reflecting time‐varying “risk” (i.e., state‐dependent variances and covariances) and endogenously explains inflation and output fluctuations, then monetary economists would presumably be happy to incorporate such features in their models—and would not consider this to reflect any basically new approach. Be that as it may, in what follows I will briefly review their featured empirical regularities, discuss issues concerning their suggested modeling strategy, and provide a brief conclusion.1See “How the World Achieved Consensus on Monetary Policy” (Goodfriend 2007).2They would probably grumble, justifiably, about the vagueness of point vii.3McCallum (2001, 258) goes on to say: “There is also considerable agreement about the general, broad structure of the macroeconomic model to be used.” Atkeson and Kehoe clearly would not share in this agreement.II. Empirical RegularitiesAtkeson and Kehoe begin, in Section I, with “four key regularities regarding the dynamics of interest rates and risk that we use to guide our construction” of a model and its pricing kernel. The first two pertain to a principal components analysis of a collection of interest rates, specifically, a 3‐month T‐bill rate and zero‐coupon yields on U.S. Treasury securities with k‐year maturities for $$k=1,$$ 2, …, 13. Time series observations are monthly over 1946.12–2007.12. The first regularity is that “the first principal component accounts for over 90% of the variance of the short rate [i.e., the 3‐month rate].” The second regularity is that “the second principal component is very similar to the yield spread between the short rate and the long [i.e., 13‐year] rate.” Having demonstrated these facts—and also that the first component is correlated even more strongly with the long rate—the authors henceforth use just the short and long rates.More substantively (and more questionably), the third and fourth regularities pertain to expected excess returns in the context of term structure and international exchange rate contexts. Specifically, movements in yield spreads and exchange rate premia are “associated with movements in risk.” The way in which these regularities might be regarded by some readers as questionable is that, in many studies, “risk” is operationally the name that is given to differentials in expected returns that the analyst’s model is not able to explain.Later in the paper, in Section V.A, Atkeson and Kehoe plot short‐rate and long‐rate time series for the United States over an extended period from 1836 through 2007. In addition, they include analogous plots for the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. In all of these, the fluctuations of the long rate represent “a much smaller fraction of overall fluctuations in the short rate than they are in the postwar period.” Thus, they state: “A central question in the analysis of monetary policy at the secular level then is, What institutional changes led to this pattern?” In the preliminary version of this comment, I responded to a more pointed and strongly emphasized version of this query by stating that, to me, it is no surprise that expectations of future interest rates became unanchored during the post–World War II period, because, to again quote myself,[the] collapse of the Bretton Woods system created, for the first time in history, a situation in which the world’s leading central banks were responsible for conducting monetary policy without an externally imposed monetary standard (often termed a “nominal anchor”). Previously, central banks had normally operated under the constraint of some metallic standard (e.g., a gold or silver standard), with wartime departures being understood to be temporary, i.e., of limited duration. Some readers might not think of the Bretton Woods system as one incorporating a metallic standard, but by design it certainly was, since the values of all other currencies were pegged to the U.S. dollar and the latter was pegged to gold at $35 per ounce. (McCallum 1999, 175–76)All in all, it seems that there is no difficulty in understanding why an altered monetary policy regime generated different expectations regarding inflation and therefore future short interest rates in the post–World War II era. The variability in long rates during the 1960s developed as market participants began to see that the United States was not going to be bound by its commitment to maintain the $35 per ounce price of gold. Then the variability jumps up around the time of the Bretton Woods collapse in 1971—see Atkeson and Kehoe’s figures 6A–6E—and continues to rise into the Volcker disinflation that was painful (with extremely high nominal interest rates) but that ultimately succeeded in restoring some semblance of a nominal anchor.What about the return to stability that may have occurred around 1990? That year is, of course, the year in which the first central bank (New Zealand) officially adopted a monetary policy regime of “inflation targeting” (IT). At that time, this was taken to mean a policy whose only objective was a low and stable inflation rate. Since then, the IT term has come to be applied to regimes that give more weight to output/employment stabilization, but most monetary economists understand it as continuing to emphasize, as the primary goal, inflation control. So again the timing is about right for the possible recovery of anchored expectations that the first empirical regularity is said to reflect.To this general line of argument, Atkeson and Kehoe object: “But this answer is, at best, superficial. In the prewar era, countries chose to be on the gold standard most of the time and chose to leave it when it suited their purposes. Thus, the relevant questions are, rather, What deeper forces led agents to have confidence that their governments would choose stable policy over the long term? And what forces led them to lose this confidence after World War II? Only if we can quantitatively account for this history can we give advice on how to avoid another great inflation.”In this regard it must be said that I consider an explanation of the evolution of beliefs regarding the monetary standard, held by citizens of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and so forth, to be somewhat beyond the scope of monetary policy analysts. To think about this issue, one must recognize that historically “the gold standard” required not just that the monetary authority would stand ready to exchange gold and currency at a specified rate but also that this rate should be unchanged “forever.” That arrangement made it such that severe inflation would not occur—even the major historical gold discoveries did not generate sustained inflation on the order of 10% per year—but it did generate more cyclical instability of real variables than we have had in the postwar era. Could policy of that type win popular support in today’s environment in the United States? If not, which would be my answer, then we need an entire unified social science to provide an explanation at “a deeper level.” And such an explanation—which would need to emphasize enormous developments in the media, extensions of suffrage, evolution of religious beliefs, attitudes toward the role of government, and so on—would not be of much help to central bankers. Let us turn then to monetary policy analysis considered more narrowly.III. Basic AnalysisThe heart of Atkeson and Kehoe’s paper is a recommended response to the third and fourth of the regularities mentioned above, that is, that measured excess returns on multiperiod bonds fluctuate strongly with yield spreads for bonds of different maturities and for international exchange rates. These regularities are translated by Atkeson and Kehoe into an argument that the consumption Euler equation, some version of which (often termed an expectational IS equation) is one basic ingredient of current macro‐monetary models, performs very poorly empirically. This is, of course, true for the simplest versions, but that problem has been widely recognized by monetary economists. A nice overview of empirical weaknesses of so‐called New Keynesian models was provided some years ago in a working paper by Richard Dennis (2003), which is briefly and nontechnically summarized in Dennis (2004). (The weaknesses discussed there relate to the Calvo‐style price adjustment relation, as well as the consumption Euler equation.) Dennis distinguishes between the bare‐bones “canonical model” and a “hybrid” version that adds habit formation in consumption behavior to the basic consumption‐saving relationship and also adds a somewhat dubious dependence on lagged inflation to the basic Calvo price adjustment relation. He recognizes, following Estrella and Fuhrer (2002), that “the problem with the canonical model is that the behavior of output, consumption, prices, and interest rates suggested by the model are fundamentally at odds with observed data” (Dennis 2004, 1). The hybrid model performs better, in terms of matching quarterly data, but “there are a number of areas where the hybrid model’s responses differ importantly from” impulse responses of an identified vector autoregression (VAR; Dennis 2004, 3).The point here is that monetary economists are quite aware that current models, even with elaborations of the type utilized by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2007), have empirical weaknesses, and they have been active in trying to eliminate these problems by improved specification. One pertinent and recent example concerns the discouraging results reported by Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007), that is, that inclusion of habit formation in consumption behavior unrealistically increases the variability of interest rates.4 Subsequent results by Collard and Dellas (2007) indicate, however, that this deterioration obtains when the household utility function is taken to be additively separable in consumption and leisure. If instead consumption and leisure enter the function in a Cobb‐Douglas manner, then inclusion of habit results in an improved—not worsened—match of the model’s interest rate variability to that of the data.I might also remark that Atkeson and Kehoe’s way of considering the empirical failure of the Euler equation seems questionable. Specifically, they discuss the relationship in a manner that would be appropriate if the role of this equation were to explain movements in nominal interest rates of various maturities. In fact, however, the role of this equation in standard monetary policy models is to explain consumption in response to (real) interest rates and expected future consumption (and, in habit specifications, lagged consumption). No mention of the adequacy or inadequacy of the standard model’s properties with regard to consumption is provided.5Be that as it may, it is essential to consider the analytical heart of Atkeson and Kehoe's paper, which is their presentation of “a simple model of the pricing kernel that is consistent with these [observed] dynamics” pertaining to interest rates. For the one‐period nominal interest rate, it in their notation, the pricing kernel mt+1 is an unobservable random variable that is generated by a stochastic process such that the interest rate it can be determined by a relation of the form $$i_{t}=-\mathrm{log}\,E_{t}\mathrm{exp}\,( m_{t+1}) .$$ Assuming conditional lognormality, then, we have (1)it=−Emt+1−0.5Vartmt+1. Except for lognormality, the content of their model for it is then the specification of the stochastic process generating mt+1. They take it to be (2)−mt+1=δ+z1t+σ1ε1t+1=1−λ2/2z2t+z2t0.5λε2t+1+σ3ε3t+1, where $$\varepsilon _{1t},$$ $$\varepsilon _{2t},$$ and $$\varepsilon _{3t}$$ are independent, standard normal, white‐noise innovations and where (3)z1t+1=z1t+σ1ε1t+1. (4)z2t+1=1−φθ+φz2t+z2t0.5σ2ε2t+1. These processes are chosen with an eye to their implications for the term structure via the relation (5)1=Etexpmt+1+pt+1k−1, which characterizes an absence of arbitrage possibilities for k‐period bonds with prices, $$p^{k-1}_{t+1}$$. From these prices the analyst can calculate term structure measures.Finally, Atkeson and Kehoe calibrate the model by assuming that $$\lambda =\sqrt{2}$$, $$\varphi =0.99,$$ and $$\sigma _{2}=0\mathrm{.}\,017$$. This specification suffices, they report, to generate interest rates of different maturities such that the term structure features long and short rates that possess properties that have the general characteristics found in their exploration of monthly data for rates of various maturities in the U.S. data.How does this model compare in specification with the standard three‐equation framework used in recent years to model one‐period interest rates, consumption (and/or output), and inflation by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), McCallum (2001), Woodford (2003, 238–47), and dozens of other monetary economists? That framework, as is well known, consists of (i) a consumption Euler equation (aka expectational IS relation), (ii) a price adjustment relation (usually of the Calvo variety), and (iii) a monetary policy rule that specifies adjustments of the one‐period nominal policy rate it to its determinants, which include the steady state real interest rate, the central bank’s inflation target, departures of inflation from target, and departures of output from its natural (flexible price) rate. (The lagged rate it‐1 is often included as well to represent smoothing.) This framework implicitly adopts the expectations theory of the term structure, which is known to be inconsistent with the data. Notable examples of larger models that include more variables and equations but that have the same basic underlying logic are provided by Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007).One aspect of the comparison is that the Atkeson‐Kehoe model, since it pertains to an “endowment economy,” implicitly assumes that price level adjustments are complete within each period so that output is always equal to its (exogenous) natural rate, flexible price value. Only a degenerate version of the Calvo equation component of the standard model is therefore present. That removes one endogenous variable, output/consumption. For some purposes, a flexible price model can be useful for monetary policy principles, as in Woodford (2003, chap. 2). But Atkeson and Kehoe also treat inflation as exogenous. Thus, there is no possibility remaining for conducting monetary policy analysis, and it is not determined by central bank behavior. Those features are consistent with their expressed view that the central bank “simply responds to exogenous changes in real risk—specifically, to exogenous changes in the conditional variance of the real pricing kernel—with the aim of maintaining inflation close to a target level.” But this seems highly unsatisfactory. It is probably true that a substantial portion of the meeting‐to‐meeting variations in the federal funds rate in the United States represents adjustments that are responses to changes in real rates that are brought about by changes in tastes, technology, shocks from abroad, and even perhaps some random behavioral errors by private agents. In fact, this is implied by much of the analysis that represents today’s mainstream monetary policy analysis—see, for example, Woodford (2003, and But the modeling approach suggested by Atkeson and Kehoe that the its for a random that is it no in a no is provided that their model would do a of matching data on much less two variables as endogenous and by central bank by a policy rule for a variable, the model is not in for monetary et al. (2007) paper is by Atkeson and and Kehoe to believe that standard have Euler equations that include no term reflecting and Kehoe are to say that the Euler equation specification in many monetary models does not well empirically. In addition, their specification of stochastic processes for the and variables that yield a pricing kernel that term structure features that the data in important ways is and They in that models in which conditional variances of returns are variable provide an possibility for improved model specification. This is not of course, and does not of inflation and output as exogenous or to a model that leads to their highly about the nature of monetary policy in the United States (and, other and currency is a of the monetary policy that term structure that pricing with time‐varying risk premia in models along with endogenous price and monetary policy rules. Some leading examples are provided by and and et al. (2007), and These have beyond Atkeson and Kehoe in to models that the term structure regularities maintaining a framework for monetary policy analysis. the approach time‐varying conditional is not the only one of as the Collard and Dellas (2007) example In I by of the Atkeson and Kehoe critique of some features of today’s New Keynesian monetary policy models, but I their current to be in essential their of U.S. monetary policy to be and their critique of current monetary policy analysis to be a brief see Atkeson, and 2007. “If Exchange Rates Are Random Walks, Then Almost Everything We Say about Monetary Policy Is and in Cumby, and T. 2007. and of Monetary in Eichenbaum, and and the of a to Monetary of in Gali, and of Monetary A New Keynesian of in and 2007. and Monetary paper, of in Keynesian Empirical of in Keynesian and to the of in and of a of in and 2007. with of in and McCallum and the of of Monetary in 2007. “How the World Achieved Consensus on Monetary of in T. in Monetary Policy The of and of in of in Monetary Policy to and in 2007. and Monetary paper, of University of in and in and 2007. and in A in and of a of Monetary University in Previous articleNext article by NBER by the of on this by the of no articles this

This paper investigates the relationship between the level of inflation and regional price-level convergence utilizing micro-level price data from Turkey during two clearly distinguishable periods of high and low inflation. The results indicate that higher persistence and slower convergence of price levels are evident during the low-inflation period, which corresponds to the inflation-targeting (IT) regime. During the low-inflation IT regime, inflation convergence across regions appears to occur more quickly and may be responsible for the slower pace of convergence in price levels. Overall, IT in Turkey, which was successful in lowering and maintaining inflation at acceptable levels, also appears to be associated with faster convergence in inflation rates at the expense of slower convergence in price levels.

Whether the adoption of an inflation targeting (IT) regime reduces exchange rate volatility has been a heated debate and a subject of intense research. On the one hand, exchange rate volatility can be addressed by managing the inflation rate. On the other hand, exchange rate volatility cannot be manipulated by interest rates as the main instrument in the inflation targeting regime. This article aims at examining the impact of inflation targeting regime on exchange rate volatility. Taking the case of Indonesia over the period 2000(1)–2022(12), we found that the targeted inflation lowers inflation rate instability. However, our two-stage generalised autoregressive heteroskedasticity conditional model estimation concludes that inflation volatility induces exchange rate volatility. Accordingly, announcing higher inflation targets may not be costly to reduce inflation uncertainty, resulting in a decline in exchange rate volatility. Furthermore, market intervention can symmetrically mitigate exchange rate volatility. Accordingly, market intervention is needed as an additional instrument for macroeconomic stabilisation. In other words, the optimal stock of foreign reserves (FR) management might avoid Indonesia’s monetary authority to impose dual goals of inflation and exchange rate stability. JEL: E31, E58, F31, F41

Mohan (2008) presents a comprehensive review of the macroeconomic policy developments in India over the past four decades with a particular emphasis on the last two decades. India transformed from a tightly controlled socialistic economy to one of the emerging market economies with accelerating growth. Before the transformation, the Indian economy was characterized by many regulations and controls, the nationalization of banks, and fiscal deficits that were financed by the central bank. The economy was in a low growth state, and the inflation rate was high. After the transformation, fiscal deficits have been reduced, and their direct financing by the central bank is banned. Monetary policy has been geared towards achieving a low and stable inflation rate. The critical regulatory changes took place after the balance of payments crisis of 1990 ‐1991. My comments are mostly directed to the current challenges rather than to India’s historical experience. The growth acceleration from 3% in the 1960s to 1980s, to 5% in the 1990s, to 8% after 2003, as shown in Mohan’s Table 1, is impressive, but still not perfect. It is impressive because it shows steady improvement as various reforms were taking place. It does not seem perfect because, first, the growth rate did not jump to a high range, say 8 ‐10%, immediately after the critical set of reforms in the beginning of the 1990s, and, second, in the near future, the growth rate does not seem likely to climb up to the 10% level that China has been able to achieve in the last decade. Why couldn’t India achieve doubledigit growth, if China could do it? The frustration is understandable but it may be important to recall some of the other growth experiences in Asia. Japan achieved double-digit growth in the 1950s and 1960s. South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore achieved near 10% growth in the 1980s and 1990s. They all relied upon manufactured exports and climbed up the ladder of sophistication as they grew. Sustained 10% growth was possible only because those countries enjoyed export booms and their export items went from low-tech to middle-tech, and eventually to high-tech goods, as they chased the country just ahead of them. This view is known as the flying geese pattern of Asian growth. In a sense, 10% gross domestic product (GDP) growth was helped by very high (much higher than 10%) growth in the exports of toys and shoes followed by motorcycles and TVs, and then petrochemicals, steel, and automobiles.

There is a puzzle in U.S. bond yields. The FOMC’s statement after its October 25 meeting included some concern over future inflation: “Readings on core inflation have been elevated, and the high level of resource utilization has the potential to sustain inflation pressures.” Participants in the long-term bond market do not seem to be worried, though. Should they be? Comparing the U.S. inflation experience with that in the United Kingdom may provide some insight. The Fed does not have an explicit inflation target, but does have an implicit goal of price stability; and, like the inflation targeting countries, it has had a low and stable inflation rate. The Bank of England has had an inflation target since 1992. The U.K. target was 2.5 percent until 2004, when it was lowered to 2 percent after they changed the price index that was used to define the target; actual and expected U.S. inflation rates have centered on 2.5 percent since about 1996. The chart shows U.S. consumer price index (CPI) and U.K. retail price index (RPI) inflation rates during the past decade and illustrates the simple idea that the U.S. CPI inflation rate has behaved as if the Fed did have an inflation target. The actual deviations of the U.S. CPI from a 2.5 percent trend are not noticeably different from U.K. deviations. At times, there were large differences between U.S. and U.K. inflation, but the amplitude and frequency of the deviations are approximately the same in both countries. Some analysts are concerned about what this chart shows: that U.S. CPI inflation has been higher than trend for the past two years. Has something changed? This increase is attributed to the worldwide oil price shock, and yet the same increase does not show up in the U.K. data. Proponents of explicit inflation targeting have argued that a target would help concentrate expectations and encourage pricing behavior that would lessen and shorten deviations from trend. This comparison with the U.K. experience suggests that any improvement in observed deviations from trend probably would be small, but an interesting question arises: Even if it makes no difference in observed inflation dynamics, would the adoption of an explicit target make it easier to achieve any given target with a less aggressive interest rate policy?

OVER THIRTY YEARS ago, in his presidential address to the American Economic Association, Milton Friedman asserted that in the long run the Phillips curve was vertical at a natural rate of unemployment that could be identified by the behavior of inflation.(1) Unemployment below the natural rate would generate accelerating inflation, and unemployment above it, accelerating deflation. Five years later the New Classical economists posed a further challenge to the stabilization orthodoxy of the day. In their models with rational expectations, not only was monetary policy unable to alter the long-term level of unemployment, it could not even contribute to stabilization around the natural rate.(2) The New Keynesian economics has shown that, even with rational expectations, small amounts of wage and price stickiness permit a stabilizing monetary policy.(3) But the idea of a natural unemployment rate that is invariant to inflation still characterizes macroeconomic modeling and informs policymaking. The familiar empirical counterpart to the theoretical natural rate is the nonaccelerating-inflation rate of unemployment, or NAIRU. Phillips curves embodying a NAIRU are estimated using lagged inflation as a proxy for inflationary expectations. NAIRU models appear in most textbooks, and estimates of the NAIRU--which is assumed to be relatively constant--are widely used by economic forecasters, policy analysts, and policymakers. However, the inadequacy of such models has been demonstrated forcefully in recent years, as low and stable rates of inflation have coexisted with a wide range of unemployment rates. If there were a single, relatively constant natural rate, we should have seen inflation slowing significantly when unemployment was above that rate, and rising when it was below. Instead, the inflation rate has remained fairly steady, with annual inflation as measured by the urban consumer price index (CPI-U) ranging from 1.6 to 3.0 percent since 1992, while the unemployment rate has ranged from 6.8 to 3.9 percent. In this paper we present a model that can accommodate relatively constant inflation over a wide range of unemployment rates. Another motivation is a recent finding by William Brainard and George Perry.(4) Estimating a Phillips curve in which all the parameters are allowed to vary over time, they find that the coefficient on the proxy for expected inflation in the Phillips curve has changed considerably, while other parameters of that model have been relatively constant. In particular, Brainard and Perry found that the coefficient on expected inflation was initially low in the 1950s and 1960s, grew in the 1970s, and has fallen since then. The model we present can explain both why the coefficient on expected inflation might be expected to change over time and, to some extent, the time pattern of changes observed by Brainard and Perry. Our paper also allows an interpretation of the findings of Robert King arm Mark Watson and of Ray Fair.(5) Both find a long-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment. In addition, King and Watson find that the amount of inflation that must be tolerated to obtain a given reduction of unemployment rose considerably after 1970. Our model allows a trade-off, but only at low rates of inflation such as those that prevailed in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1990s. At higher rates of inflation, the trade-off is reduced, and at high enough rates of inflation, it disappears. Much of the empirical controversy surrounding the relationship between inflation and unemployment has focused on how people form expectations. This may be neither the most important theoretical nor the most important empirical issue. Instead, this paper suggests that it is not how people form expectations but how they use them--and even whether they use them at all--that is the issue. Economists typically assume that economic agents make the best possible use of the information available to them. But psychologists who study how people make decisions have a different view. …

T HE micro-economic foundation for most analyses of price and wage decisions is based on the optimizing behavior of familiar objective functions; employers maximizing profit and workers optimizing utility. The functions typically contain variables that measure opportunity cost (the unemployment rate), real income, and price-deflated wages. But neither objective function contains any variable that measures the situation of other actors in the economic system. Behavior in the real world, however, frequently depends on relative wages, profit margins, and so forth. There is a body of literature on the relationship between relative wages and the macro-economic variables of inflation and unemployment. Wachter (1970), finds that low wage workers tend to get relatively larger wage increases in periods of low unemployment, and thus, the interindustry spread among manufacturing wage-rates diminishes with low unemployment and increases with inflation. Wachter deals with the influence of the macro-economic variables on the relative wage structure. number of studies (1962, 1967, 1968, 1969) have been directed to the effect of relative wages on the general wage or price level.1 It is the latter subject that is the primary focus of this paper. Our micro-economic hypothesis is that wage and price behavior is influenced by both general and relative factors. Therefore, we added a measure of the relative wage structure to the typical Phillips curve relationship. This formulation will reflect the idea that under a given set of overall demand conditions, an individual will attempt to obtain a larger wage increase if he feels relatively underpaid. Our second hypothesis is that rapid inflation is unanticipated and leads to the distortions in the relative wage structure. These two hypotheses lead to the following dynamics. given Phillips curve exists at any point in time. If the economy operates at a point of low unemployment and high inflation rates, then distortions are created which move the Phillips curve to the northeast, i.e., the tradeoff is worsened. If the economy operates at a point of high unemployment and low inflation rates then the distortions tend to diminish and the trade-off improves.2 Thus, while a Phillips curve exists, there is only one point on it (i.e., one unemployment and inflation rate) that is stable; moreover, the stable point is determined by the previous historical experience which has created the distortions in the economy. This series of stable points defines a long-run trade-off that is steeper than the shortrun curve but is still less steep than the vertical line hypothesized by the accelerationists. These dynamics suggest that the absence of unanticipated inflation in the early 1960's brought about the stable wage structure of the 1963-1965 period and, with it, the favorable trade-off. The unanticipated inflation of the late sixties, however, again distorted relative wages and produced the worsened trade-off of 1969-1971. The short-term relationships will then take the general form: DP = f (1/U, DST) T ( ) Received for publication May 12, 1972. Revision accepted for publication August 17, 1972. * This work was performed as part of the CED project entitled A Reconsideration of Policies for Economic Stabilization. The authors thank Frank Schiff for his suggestions in the initiation of this work and George Perry, Charles Schultze, Arthur Okun, William Branson, Gary Fromm and the referee for their comments on preliminary drafts. The errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the authors. The views expressed are our own and not necessarily those of the officers, trustees or other members of the Committee for Economic Development. ' See Eckstein and Wilson (1962), Perry (1967, 1968) and Throop (1968). 2 One of the factors that gives an inflationary bias to our economy is the asymmetrical nature of the distortion process; that is, larger than average wage increases cause the distortion and the return to the normal structure is also achieved by larger than average increases.

Previous articleNext article No AccessConfirmations and ContradictionsA Confirmation of the Relation between Inflation and Relative Price VariabilityConstantine Glezakos and Jeffrey B. NugentConstantine Glezakos Search for more articles by this author and Jeffrey B. Nugent Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 94, Number 4Aug., 1986 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/261415 Views: 3Total views on this site Citations: 11Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1986 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Hiranya K. Nath, Jayanta Sarkar , Empirical Economics 56, no.66 ( 2019): 2001.https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-018-1422-yMonir Uddin Ahmed, Md. Moniruzzaman Muzib, Md. Mahedi Hasan Inflation, inflation uncertainty and relative price variability in Bangladesh, Eurasian Economic Review 6, no.33 (Sep 2016): 389–427.https://doi.org/10.1007/s40822-016-0055-8Deniz Baglan, M. Ege Yazgan, Hakan Yilmazkuday Relative price variability and inflation: New evidence, Journal of Macroeconomics 48 (Jun 2016): 263–282.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2016.04.004Christopher Hajzler, David Fielding Relative price and inflation variability in a simple consumer search model, Economics Letters 123, no.11 (Apr 2014): 17–22.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.018Christophe Muller THE MEASUREMENT OF POVERTY WITH GEOGRAPHICAL AND INTERTEMPORAL PRICE DISPERSION: EVIDENCE FROM RWANDA, Review of Income and Wealth 54, no.11 (Mar 2008): 27–49.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4991.2007.00258.xMarcio de Oliveira Júnior Inflation and Price Dispersion: Evidence from the Brazilian Stabilization Program, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 1999).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.159584Constantine Glezakos, Jeffrey B. Nugent Relative Price Variability, Inflation Rate Uncertainty, and Postwar Investment of the United States, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 19, no.22 (Nov 2015): 181–194.https://doi.org/10.1080/01603477.1996.11490104Rajeev K. Goel, Rati Ram Inflation and relative-price variability: the effect of commodity aggregation, Applied Economics 25, no.55 (May 2006): 703–709.https://doi.org/10.1080/00036849300000017NATHANIEL H. LEFF, KAZUO SATO Homogeneous Preferences and Heterogeneous Growth Performance: International Differences in Saving and Investment Behavior, Kyklos 46, no.22 (May 1993): 203–223.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1993.tb02421.xNathaniel H. Leff, Kazuo Sato Modelling the demand for foreign savings in developing countries: Testing a hypothesis with Latin American data, Journal of Development Studies 25, no.44 (Jul 1989): 537–549.https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388908422128Constantine Glezakos, Jeffrey B. Nugent The relationship between the rate of inflation and its unpredictability in high inflation Latin American countries, World Development 15, no.22 (Feb 1987): 291–293.https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(87)90084-2

Indicators of a country's economic well-being include the unemployment rate and inflation rates. The empirical relationship between inflation and unemployment in Ghana's economy is explained and analyzed in this paper. It appears that the most hotly debated statistics in Ghana are the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment, yet there is lack of knowledge about the connection between unemployment and inflation, it is imperative that we gain this understanding. In addition, the tax rate, compensation for employees, participation in the labor force, and enrolment in tertiary education are all indicators of unemployment. A quantitative framework is used to explain the empirical relationship between inflation and unemployment in Ghana and determine the sensitivity of unemployment to changing inflation levels using co-integration regression, causality, correlation, and sensitivity analyses. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test of stationarity was adopted, after which the Granger causality method was used to determine causation between inflation and unemployment The study relied on World Bank data from 1990 to 2014 and found a strong correlation between unemployment and inflation in the Ghanaian economy which is also consistent with Haug and King (2011), whereas Onwioduokit (2006) found a negative correlation. The model's variables are stationary, and the findings of the causality test point to a link between Ghana's high unemployment rate and its high inflation rate. The unemployment will rise by 3.2795 percent if inflation rises by 1 percent. I therefore recommend that the Ghanaian economy maintain a low and stable inflation rate in order to reduce unemployment, equivocally, thanks to the findings of this research. There is evidence to suggest that inflation has a long-term positive impact on and is a direct cause of unemployment in Ghana, so policymakers and the government should put more effort into keeping inflation low in order to address this problem. Since inflation levels can be used to measure unemployment levels to some extent and the R-squared is significantly low in the regression result, the measurement of inflation should be done more accurately to avoid errors. Ghana's Statistical Service must devote more resources to ensuring that the CPI basket includes only relevant items and should be given the appropriate weights. Real-world impact should be reported in relation to other indicators or factors to make it more comprehensible. For example, an increase in unemployment of z percentage points could be explained by an increase in the price of an item purchased on the market rising by y percentage points. Finally, the researcher recommends that other economic indicators, such as employee compensation, tax rate, labor force participation rate, and tertiary school enrollment, be taken into consideration as potential indicators of unemployment in African economies.

It has long been popularly believed that the relationship between inflation and relative price variability (RPV) is positive and stable. Using disaggregated CPI data for the United States and Japan, however, this study finds that the relationship is neither linear nor stable over time. The overall relationship is approximately U‐shaped around a nonzero threshold inflation rate. RPV therefore changes not with the inflation rate per se, but with the deviation of inflation from the threshold inflation rate. More importantly, the relationship is by no means stable over time but instead varies significantly in a way that coincides with regime changes of inflation or monetary policy. The relationship was positive during the period of high inflation of the 1970s and the early 1980s, as has been documented by a number of previous studies, whereas it takes a U‐shape profile during the Great Moderation. The results are robust to the use of core inflation, which excludes the traditionally volatile prices of food and energy. This paper then presents a modified version of the Calvo‐type sticky price model to describe the observed empirical regularities. Simulation experiments show that the modified Calvo model fits the data well, and that the underlying relationship hinges upon the degree of price rigidity, which is systematically related to inflation regime. For countries and periods with low inflation rates, the relationship takes a U‐shape as price adjustment is more sticky. In a high‐inflation environment, when price setting becomes more flexible, the U‐shaped profile vanishes.

Understanding the price dynamics is always at the heart of studies on monetary policy. If prices are flexible, there is no need for monetary policy as a stabilization tool. If not, central banks should offer some nominal anchor so that welfare costs stemming from relative price dispersion should be reduced. Watanabe and Watanabe (2018) conduct careful analyses using micro data. Two main conclusions are: a simple menu cost model can explain the price developments in Japan well in that “there is a negative correlation between trend inflation and the share of items whose rate of price change is near zero,”1 and the “inflation norm” is too low in Japan. Watanabe and Watanabe provide comprehensive empirical facts to support these two conclusions. It also merits attention that the observed empirical regularities are replicated with simulations using a simple menu cost model. Structural interpretations of the empirical findings are offered albeit indirectly via model simulation. Not only do Watanabe and Watanabe offer convincing facts in understanding the Japanese economy from the view point of positive analysis, but also the findings in their paper have an immediate policy implication: It is not easy for Japan to attain an inflation target of 2%. Papers with important facts and significant policy implications are always good and highly appreciated. Watanabe and Watanabe's paper is one of these good papers. Thus, I do not have any particular comments to oppose their main conclusions. Let me comment on what we do not know from the data, and the policy implication. We do not know the markups in individual goods. In their menu cost model, nominal rigidities are favored as the way to explain price developments in Japan. This conclusion is mainly supported by the analyses in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 about the flattening of the reduced-form Phillips curve. However, we still cannot conclude that this less clearer relationship between inflation and unemployment rates is as a result of higher nominal rigidities possibly due to menu costs, since we cannot observe marginal costs. The relationship between inflation and unemployment rates can be just a reduced-form one. In the language of the New Keynesian model, unemployment or the output gap must be structurally related to markups. Otherwise, a causal argument is not possible. I am not fully sure whether such a relationship is stemming from menu costs or higher real rigidities around zero inflation rates. Real rigidities arise when marginal costs are sticky or marginal revenues are flexible. The former can be caused by habit formation in consumption, endogenous capacity utilization or investment growth adjustment costs as included in the canonical dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model a la Christiano et al. (2005), while the latter can emerge with a kinked demand curve as examined in the first-generation New Keynesian Model a la Kimball (1995). In order to identify the causes of the less clearer relationship between inflation and unemployment rates, it would be ideal if we can use the marginal cost data as examined in Eichenbaum et al. (2011). The inability to observe markups means that a careful interpretation of the analyses in Watanabe and Watanabe's section 4 is required. If the relationship between unemployment and markup is not stable nor structural, increasing real rigidities around zero inflation rates can explain the fact that “price stickiness as measured by the share of unchanged items increases as the inflation rate declines from a positive value to zero.” More stickiness around lower inflation rates should imply higher welfare costs stemming from relative price dispersions. On the other hand, menu costs are small near zero inflation rates. Besides the problems due to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, should the central bank really care about inflation developments near zero inflation rates? This point is related to the conclusion made by Nakamura et al. (2016) that “the main costs of inflation in the New Keynesian model are completely elusive in the data. This implies that the strong conclusions about optimality of low inflation rates reached by researchers using models of this kind need to be reassessed.”

Japan’s encounter with deflation and near‐zero‐interest short‐term interest rates in the 1990s led to a surge in research on the implications of the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates for monetary policy around the end of that decade. Based on model simulations, the literature at that time identified a number of key implications of the ZLB (see Orphanides and Wieland [2000], Reifschneider and Williams [2000, 2002], Eggertsson and Woodford [2003], and references therein). First, with low inflation targets of the kind followed by many central banks, the ZLB will frequently be a binding constraint on monetary policy. That is, Japan’s example is not an outlier but rather a harbinger for the future. Second, at inflation targets of 1% or lower, lowering the inflation target comes at a cost of higher variability of output and inflation, although the effects on inflation variability are relatively small. This analysis provides an argument for maintaining a positive inflation target cushion above 1%. Third, in rare instances of severe prolonged recessions accompanied by deflation, standard open market operations will be insufficient to bring the inflation rate back to target, andalternative sources of stimulus to the economy, such as fiscal policy, will be needed. Fourth, central banks can significantly reduce the effects of the ZLB onmacroeconomic stability by modifying their policy actions and communication to the public when the ZLB threatens to constrain policy. Specifically, policies that cut rates aggressively when deflation is a risk and promise to temporarily target a higher rate of inflation following episodes where the ZLB binds were found to greatly reduce the effects of the ZLB in model simulations. In the decade since this researchwas initiated, the ZLB has gone froma theoretical issue applying to Japan to one that plagues many industrialized economies. Indeed, an era of overwhelming confidence in monetary policy’s power to tame the business cycle while delivering low and stable inflation has been replaced by fears that the global economy could