Europeanizing the Balkans: Rethinking the Post-communist and Post-conflict Transition

This article analyses regional cooperation between the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) states with particular emphasis on the interplay with EU integration. It argues that regional cooperation is not solely a means of stabilising the SAP ‘five’ (SAP5) in advance of policies to integrate them with the EU but that regional cooperation is itself a vital part of the EU integration process. This applies to both the regional integration/trade liberalisation component, which is a clear functional EU pre‐accession activity and also to the more diverse set of activities which are targeting the regional hard and soft security problems. The latter addresses the more baseline, region‐wide aspects of Europeanisation, and is therefore more of a foundation course for EU accession than integration ‘proper’, but is nevertheless a necessary step in the SAP countries own ‘return to Europe’. With Croatia on the verge of EU candidate status the political conditions for SAP zone regional cooperation should become increasingly favourable and it is important that the practical as well as political contributions of the regional cooperation commitment to the EU integration endeavour of the SAP5 are clearly understood. It is also vital that the actual regional cooperation programme avoids over‐ambitious agendas and is properly adjusted to real needs and evolving circumstances of the SAP region.

The Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) launched by the EU in the aftermath of Kosovo war in 1999 has created a new policy environment for the Western Balkans countries. In exchange for EU assistance, prospect of EU accession, and continuation of preferential access to EU markets, these countries have to upgrade their institutions and governance to European standards and engage in mutual regional cooperation including other Stability Pact member – countries. The 2003 European Council in Thessaloniki reaffi rmed that all SAP countries were potential candidates for EU membership. In July 2017 the EU Trieste Balkans Summit discussed the status of the SAP and unanimously reaffi rmed the importance of providing the European perspective of the Western Balkans. The essay examines of the current status of SAP in the Western Balkans countries (WB6) based on the Copenhagen political, economic and legislature criteria using the international data bases. It argues that among the criteria, the political requirements are the most important as they lay down the framework and administrative and institutional capacity to develop stable democracy and market economy. It concludes that EU SAP has remained consistently linked to compliance with the Copenhagen criteria but the Regional Cooperation Council countries have to create a positive environment for the WB6 to fulfi ll these European standards.

This article analyses regional cooperation between the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) states with particular emphasis on the interplay with EU integration. It argues that regional cooperation is not solely a means of stabilising the SAP ‘five’ (SAP5) in advance of policies to integrate them with the EU but that regional cooperation is itself a vital part of the EU integration process. This applies to both the regional integration/trade liberalisation component, which is a clear functional EU pre‐accession activity and also to the more diverse set of activities which are targeting the regional hard and soft security problems. The latter addresses the more baseline, region‐wide aspects of Europeanisation, and is therefore more of a foundation course for EU accession than integration ‘proper’, but is nevertheless a necessary step in the SAP countries own ‘return to Europe’. With Croatia on the verge of EU candidate status the political conditions for SAP zone regional cooperation should...

This edited volume on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in a comparative perspective aims to draw lessons from the experience of the ‘other neighbours’ of the European Union (EU). Among the policy frameworks or neighbourhood models discussed in this book are multilateral associations, such as the European Economic Area (EEA) and the Energy Community, as well as bilateral associations, such as the customs union with Turkey, the sectoral agreements with Switzerland or the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) with the countries of the Western Balkans. The SAP is essentially bilateral, but within a common framework and encouraging regional cooperation among the (potential) candidate countries. In addition, the EU maintains looser and more pragmatic cooperation schemes, such as the Northern Dimension or the EU-Russia ‘Common Spaces’ in the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The ENP combines bilateral agreements with multilateral cooperation frameworks, as well as project-based cooperation, especially in the two regional dimensions of the Eastern Partnership (thematic platforms and flagship initiatives) and the Union for the Mediterranean.

The theory of the dilemma of simultaneity is empirically based on the transformations of post-socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe. The transformations after the collapse of the socialist bloc were without precedent with regards to breadth and depth. The dilemma of simultaneity consists of three parallel transition processes on three dimensions. The first part of this chapter explores the three dimensions of the transitions: nation building, political transformation, and economic transformation. The second part discusses the three levels of transformation: (1) ethno-national identity and territory, (2) polity, and (3) socio-economic distribution. The third part highlights the complexity and challenges of multidimensional simultaneous transformation processes. The fourth and fifth parts discuss the role of international actors and socio-economic structures on the transitions in Central and Eastern Europe. The chapter concludes with an account of Elster’s and Offe’s critics and their response.

In the course of globalization, the intensity of global interactions between nations, firms, and civil society actors has increased significantly and has led to the creation of transnational norm-building networks. These have an essential, but little-known influence on all aspects of life (business and work relationships, environment, security, law, trust, etc.). Their influence expands to nation-state and market relationships that are also subject to constant reorganization. Transnational networks are leading to a global civil society that is more and more independent of the nation-state. With this relative erosion of state domination, the standard economic perspective, which primarily focused on the nation-state, is eroding as well.In this paper we review economic approaches dealing with different forms of hierarchy and cooperation in the age of globalization. And yet, we focus on the discourse on value creation chains as an essential element of transnational networks and a potential catalyst for technological progress and economic development in developing and transition countries. Moreover, we outline fruitful combinations of different economic approaches that in future may help to achieve a better understanding of global civil society autonomy and transnational networks.

Fragile states will remain the main challenge for the international community to eradicate poverty and to contribute to just and inclusive societies as aimed for in the SDG's (OECD State of Fragility 2015). In the fragile states agenda the focus is on the state building agenda: building institutions and systems to strengthen the state, to make sure that the delivery of security, justice and basic social services is guaranteed. Without questioning the relevance and urgency of this institutional strengthening, there is a need to complement this strategy with a nation-building strategy that focuses on building social cohesion and a sense of belonging in fragmented and conflict ridden countries: what makes people to identify with their nation-state as their community they belong to. People in fragile states identify with and relied on their ethnic, religious, linguistic community and it is important to understand how people can identify with their nation-state as basis for their acceptance of and loyalty to this nation state when it relates to taxation, justice and economic development. Including nation-building into the fragile states discourse and policies is based on the model of fragility that identifies three drivers of fragility: lack of authority, lack of capacity, lack of legitimacy. Whereas state-building focuses on solving the lack of authority and capacity, nation building addresses the lack of legitimacy and supports the process of legitimacy-building that is necessary for stability. Nation-building does not fit the traditional log-frame model for development interventions. Input- output-outcome sequence is difficult to define at the beginning of the process and the role of international actors is less prominent compared to the state building and institution building agenda. In order to break the often vicious cycle of conflict in fragile states, we need to invest in nation-building as complementary to state building. Nation-building is not a magic wand for the solution of conflicts, but it should be part of a comprehensive agenda for the international community. The research to be presented in the presentation is connecting policy, practice and science and it is interdisciplinary, drawing on cultural anthropology, political sciences, religious studies, sociology and social psychology.

Frequency of under- and overweight among children and adolescents during the economic transition in Poland

A MULTINATIONAL SEEKING IN VAIN A UNION as a counterpart in bargaining; another multinational expelling union representatives from the firm; companies with good and bad labour relations; small and medium-size firms with no unions at all-all these may be found in news items, case-studies and episodes from the near past of labour relations in transformation and development in the post-socialist countries. After five to six years of the political, social and economic transformation can we already speak about a new system in the field of labour relations, or is it still in transformation? Is the experience of this half-decade sufficient to identify the features of the new emerging system with any of the already known patterns of labour relations? In the late 1980s and early 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe there were widespread illusions as to the prospects of labour relations and the new role of employees and their interest associations. The international, economic and social conditions of the real processes of social transformation in these countries, however, framed events differently, and the new institutions of labour relations and social cooperation seem to display unexpected patterns. Social scientists and politicians as well as unionists are now seeking to understand the real logic of the transformation process and the motives and intentions of the social partners within it. Since the social and economic context of the current transformation process varies from country to country in Eastern and East-Central Europe, very different strategies and practices of institution building, combined with national and local traditions of interest representation and participation, are creating a rich variety of new autonomous systems of labour relations. Several elements of the political and economic transformation are closely connected to the shaping of the labour relations system in the post-socialist countries. Some of them are supporting its development, while others are unfavourable to its strengthening. Certain factors are unique in the different Central and East European countries, others represent international trends. This article aims to illustrate the characteristics of institution building in the field of labour relations in Hungary. In Hungary the new democratic political order, its laws and institutions, has finally ensured the existence of an autonomous labour relations system after a long period of reforms since the late 1960s aiming at loosening the subordination of labour relations to a monolithic political order. The political transformation was carried out by social actors and organisations that-even if newly created in democratic processes-were

Persistent State Weakness in the Global Age addresses the question of why state weakness in the global era persists. It debunks a common assumption that state weakness is a stop-gap on the path to state failure and state collapse. Informed by a globalization perspective, the book shows how state weakness is frequently self-reproducing and functional. The interplay of global actors, policies and norms is analyzed from the standpoint of their internalization in a weak state through transnational networks. Contributors examine the reproduction of partial and discriminatory rule at the heart of persistent state weakness, drawing on a wide geographical range of case studies including the Middle East, the Balkans, the post-Soviet states and sub-Saharan Africa. The study of state-weakening dynamics related to institutional incapacity, colonial and war legacies, legitimacy gaps, economic informality, democratization and state-building provides an insight into durability and resilience of weak states in the global age.

Following the collapse of the communist regimes, in Central European countries, the belief that collaborative efforts could facilitate both social transformation and European integration, served as a key motivation for establishing of the Visegrad Group (V4), comprising of Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland. In Southeastern Europe, given the war conflicts that occurred during the 1990s, in 1999, the EU Council initiated the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) to encourage Western Balkans countries (WB) to cooperate among themselves and confirmed their eligibility for EU membership. After the V4 countries joined the EU, the Visegrad Declaration on cooperation in 2004 emphasized the idea of supporting the European integration of neighboring regions, including the Western Balkan region. From 2004 to the present day, the WB countries have applied for EU membership, and they have been granted EU candidate country status. In 2014 they became a part of the Berlin process (BP)initiative and for three of them – Albania, North Macedonia (N. Macedonia) and Serbia – accession negotiations with EU have already been opened. These three countries launched the Mini Schengen initiative in 2019, which was transformed into Open Balkan initiative (OB3) in 2021. Since that both Visegrad and Open Balkan in itiatives aim to enhance interstate cooperation and facilitate European integration process for their respective countries, the purpose of this paper is to consider the role of regional organizations and initiatives in accelerating the integration process, to examine whether the OB3 can draw valuable lessons from V4 experience and to elucidate how V4 supports the integration process of OB3.

The European Union’s involvement with and in Kosovo is of three main types. First, it participated in war diplomacy in the late 1990s in an attempt to find a peaceful solution to the Kosovo conflict between Kosovar Albanians and the Serb forces of the former Yugoslavia. This demonstrated of the Union’s limited ability to influence less powerful actors in its backyard through its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This resulted from the difficulty the EU found in attempting to forge a consensus among its member states on a significant matter of regional security with humanitarian implications, the limitations in effectiveness of the EU’s civilian instruments of foreign policy, and the low credibility and influence stemming from the lack of an EU military capability. Second, the EU took a leading role in economic reconstruction and state-building in Kosovo following the end of the conflict. Initially, this was in tandem with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Subsequently, the EU became the lead organization, focusing its efforts not only on the physical and economic reconstruction of the territory but also on building human and administrative capacity and democratic institutions and establishing good governance and the rule of law, especially through its EULEX mission. Third, the EU attempted to help transform Kosovo beyond democratization toward EU integration through instruments such as the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). A significant part of this process has also been linked with EU-led mediation attempts at resolving outstanding issues between Kosovo and Serbia through a process of normalization of relations without which EU accession cannot be envisaged. Throughout the post-war phases of the EU’s involvement in Kosovo, its efforts have been undermined by the most important outstanding issue, the disputed status of Kosovo. Kosovo was set on the path to increasing self-government and autonomy at the end of the conflict in 1999, but it was still legally part of sovereign Yugoslavia. In 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence. While over 100 states recognized Kosovo, it never acquired enough recognitions to be eligible for UN membership: Serbia does not recognize it and, most importantly, neither do five EU member states. This status issue has seriously complicated the EU–Kosovo relationship in all its aspects and slowed down the prospect of “Euro-Atlantic integration” for Kosovo.

One of the EU strategies to address the challenges associated with EU membership, and in itself a precondition for membership, is regional co-operation and good neighborly relations. De facto interdependence and cooperation between neighboring countries in one area (such as infrastructure, transport, energy, free trade) is expected to lead to further cooperation in a wider range of areas, but also to regional stability, reconciliation and ultimately towards European integration. Lessons can be learned from examples of co-operation between Visegrad and the Baltic states, but for the Western Balkans, given their ethnic differences and past armed conflicts, building close regional ties and trust is even more important. Although not all countries in the region have opened membership negotiations, they are all involved in the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), a framework that aims to prepare them for eventual membership. The SAP places particular emphasis on regional co-operation and good neighborly relations. Regional co-operation has advanced and 'taken root' in the Balkans for a number of reasons and has been 'a transformative experience'. In addition to economic arguments (faster economic growth in general and smoother EU integration), there were also political reasons for strengthening regional cooperation. The need to create permanent conditions for security, stability, peace and development has been a major driver. Since the 1990s, numerous formats and initiatives for regional cooperation have been established in the Western Balkans covering a wide range of areas. Starting with the 1999 Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, the Western Balkan countries have joined in a range of formats and initiatives with a wide range, including economic, functional, political and security co-operation . The initiative to create Open Balkan or otherwise known as Mini-Schengen was first proposed by the former Prime Minister of Albania, Fatos Nano in the early 1990s. Nano's idea was to create a common economic zone on the Balkan Peninsula. But this idea was not elaborated due to the start of the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Such an initiative was returned to the table by the Prime Minister of Albania, Edi Rama during the meetings held in the framework of the Berlin Process. In 2018, Rama proposed such an idea to improve political relations between the countries of the region. The successful implementation of the Open Balkans Initiative may be accompanied by several challenges. For example, the abolition of border controls could exacerbate drug trafficking and various criminal activities. The European Commission has already stressed that the so-called Balkan route is one of the main entry points for various types of illegal drugs in the EU. Accompanied by a high level of corruption, with organized crime and officials often involved in acts of corruption with impunity, abandonment of border controls can turn out to be fertile ground for criminal activities. Moreover, in a borderless region, it may be almost impossible to keep track of the entry and importation of citizens' goods by third parties from different markets. Given that the former place the heterogeneous visa regimes of the participating countries under great stress, the latter would be particularly challenging in the light of different customs policies and import duties. If these challenges are not addressed properly, they can be an obstacle to deepening regional cooperation . If the strong commitment to this initiative continues, solutions can be found to the challenges presented. At the Skopje Summit, the troika announced that steps to establish a joint software and information exchange system are already under way. Together with a high level of coordination between interior ministries, the risks of increasing the volume of cross-border criminal activities can be mitigated. On the other hand, the exchange of information alone is not enough to prevent third-country nationals from entering a country without visa restrictions and then simply moving to another where such agreements with the country of origin do not exist. Establishing a joint visa regime may be the only solution. The same logic can be applied to goods entering a borderless market if they are required to pay customs duties of different levels for each country. However, in this case, just harmonizing customs policies would not suffice as countries would inevitably lose border revenues due to the lack of internal borders. Establishing joint regional institutions and external tariffs may be the required action. Otherwise, the participating countries of the Open Balkans endanger the porous borders like those between Norway and the EU, with common violations. It took Serbia nine years to finally fully implement the Integrated Border Management agreement by making the Joint Border Crossing Point operational. The functioning of the border crossing was part of the agreement between Kosovo and Serbia on economic normalization signed at the White House on 4 September. In 2011, Pristina and Belgrade signed the Integrated Border Management (IBM) Agreement as part of an EU-mediated dialogue with the parties agreeing to build permanent border crossings between the two countries, enabling the authorities of both places to work under one roof . When the agreement was signed, the Kosovo side claimed that with the IBM Agreement, Serbia recognized Kosovo's Independence, while the Serbian side insisted that IBM did not mean the recognition of Kosovo and continued to refer to border points as administrative lines. Although the EU-funded Joint Border Crossing Point in Merdare was finalized last year, the Serbian side refused to use the new facility with Serbian police and customs still working on temporary facilities. But the Serbian side finally agreed to relocate its staff to the new facilities. The move was welcomed by the US government and President Donald Trump's Special Envoy for Dialogue, Richard Grenell. A new agreement, part of the so-called "Mini-Schengen Initiative", this new agreement will allow freedom of movement between the two countries for Serbian and Albanian citizens without having to present a passport at border checkpoints: they will simply be able to present a national identity card to gain entry. The Mini-Schengen Action Plan for Freedom of Movement and a Common Regional Market between the Western Balkan countries now has the support of Serbia, Northern Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Montenegro as the only hostage. Between 2021-2024, the action plan aims to implement the four freedoms on which the European Union is based and which EU countries currently enjoy: goods, services and capital, in addition to freedom of movement. During the signing of the agreement, the leaders of the 3 countries present also signed a memorandum of understanding for cooperation in the fight against the new coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19), which includes details about travel restrictions. Under this agreement, Serbia, Albania and Northern Macedonia have agreed that negative PCR tests for COVID-19 will not be required for trips between the 3 countries and that information on coronavirus cases in the 3 countries will be shared between them. This paper will address the initiative taken by the Albanian state for an open Balkans and other cases in the region.
 
 Received: 10 September 2022 / Accepted: 21 October 2022 / Published: 30 November 2022

The expectations of the Western Balkans (WB) on the EU membership perspective could have been ‘undermined’ with the halt in the EU enlargement process as declared by the former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker in 2014. In the meantime, even though the WB countries were part of the EU’s regional approach through the mechanism of Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) working on the implementation of the Acquis Communautaire, the slowing down of the integration process could have economic and political consequences and threaten the regional stability. This paper shows how the Berlin Process (2014) was the proper intergovernmental initiative taken by some EU Member States to keep alive the EU integration perspective of the WB, thus refocusing the EU attention on the challenges the WB was facing on the way towards EU integration.

The problem of this research is how the European Union is a regional organization that is in the European region, has a policy of enlargement, which is a policy where the EU is trying to expand the area of cooperation to do so will be more extensive. Balkan region did not escape the attention of Europe. for this region, the European Union issued a Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) which merupaka a policy that contains the promise of the EU to the Western Balkan countries for the opportunity to become a member. That's why Kosovo had finally become part of the SAP. After becoming a part of SAP, Kosovo received assistance from the EU as a potential candidate candidate. Program assistance provided by the EU is the IPA program which is a program set up to create a single framework to assist candidate countries and potential countries to join the EU premises. Through this IPA, the EU provides financial assistance to Kosovo to build its economy. This type of research is qualitative. The method used is descriptive analysis techniques. Most of the data collected through literature, as well as the search website. The results of this study indicate that the funds provided by the European Union through the IPA program provided through economy of Kosovo has been quite successful with demonstrated through improvements to the economy of Kosovo, the provision of this assistance has resulted in significant improvements in economic growth and development of Kosovo.