European Union arms embargoes: the relationship between institutional design and norms

Abstract

Contrary to other European Union (EU) restrictive measures, arms embargoes have preserved higher levels of member state sovereignty. They not only require members’ consensus to be imposed, but their implementation also is in the hands of member states. How has this affected the operation of EU arms embargoes? On the one hand, and according to the international institutions literature, both consensus and national implementation requirements can undermine the success of multilateral policies. On the other hand, the growth of EU arms export norms suggests that embargoes have become easier to impose and implement. But the relationship among EU arms export norms, institutional design and embargo operation remains under-examined in the literature. Drawing on case studies of the Russia and Uzbekistan embargoes—and on interviews with policymakers and experts—this article analyses this relationship. I argue that growing EU arms export norms have alleviated some, but not all, of the concerns associated with institutional design. Whether or not EU members cooperate on arms embargoes still seems to be determined by national-level considerations, rather than by joint foreign and security policy goals.