Ethnic Tensions in the Successor Republics in 1993 and Early 1994

Interethnic tension and exit claims threaten to become the main problem facing the Federation of Russia, as well as the Newly Independent States. It is well known that in the 1990s Russia, and the post-Soviet space in general, has played host to various forms of tension and open conflict of an ethnic character. As documented by several authors (e.g. Codagnone 1997; Khazanov 1995; Kremenyuk 1994; Olcott et al. 1997; Tishkov 1997) these have ranged from grassroots interethnic clashes and pogroms (as in 1990 in the Ferghana and Osh regions of, respectively Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan) up to outright attempted secession with armed conflict as in Chechnya (Russia), Abkhazia (Georgia) and Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), with countless instances of contentious issues remaining at the level of political disputes and/or social antagonism somewhere in between these two types of violent conflicts. The dissolution of the Soviet Union has led to a large-scale redefinition and creation of ‘boundaries' ‐ here defined in their widest possible concrete and metaphorical sense, that is to include state borders and intra-state administrative ones, the delimitation of citizenship, and the strengthening of the Soviet created cleavage between ‘titular' and non-'titular' nationalities. This means that various instances of conflict/tensions can be identified within all the three clusters of entry (i.e. ethnic Russians' struggle for citizenship in Estonia and Latvia); equity (i.e. demand for cultural rights and more equitable integration by ethnic Germans in some Russian regions); and exit (the countless instances of separatism). This article focuses on the ethnic tension and conflict present in the Russian case by first developing an overview of broadly-defined interethnic tensions. This is followed by a more specific focus on the separatism of the ‘national' republics of Russia.

Due to ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversities, there is potential for ethnic conflicts and ethnic tensions in community, but the emergence and occurrence of ethnic conflicts depend on the state's approach to managing or suppressing ethnic, linguistic, and cultural variations. Federalism is one of the most important mechanisms that governments adopt to manage ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversities. But the function of federalism in reducing ethnic conflicts is not necessarily positive, and in some cases, it has led to an escalation of ethnic conflicts. Accordingly, the central question is to examine whether federalism is a system to resolve or reduce ethnic conflicts? With an emphasis on ethnic conflicts in Iraq. The research hypothesis is that federalism, through the creation of bureaucratic structures, the development of political parties, the identification, and acceptance of cultural and linguistic commonalities, will restrict and reduce ethnic violence and conflict but not necessarily ethnic protest.
 
 Received: 26 December 2021 / Accepted: 28 February 2022 / Published: 5 March 2022

Racist violence in Russia has recently become a subject of interest to scholars and analysts of Russian politics. What are the similarities and differences between racist violence in Russia and the West? How does the level of Russian racist violence compare to other societies? Do racist hate groups in Russia have similar origins to groups in the West? This article considers these questions. I first demonstrate that Russia is indeed the most dangerous country in Europe for ethnic minorities, and argue that such violence is more ‘systematic’ (structured, ideologically coherent, patterned) than in other developed societies. The high level of violence against ethnic minorities in Russia is ‘over-determined’ by a combination of post-Soviet social and economic social changes, the brutalizing consequences of a long counter-insurgency campaign, and government passivity (and sometimes complicity) in the face of racist violence and hate speech. Thus, Russia’s systematic racist violence is analytically closer to outright ethnic conflict than to a form of criminal deviance that could aptly be termed ‘hate crime’.

This note provides an overview of available cross-country data on ethnic conflict, tensions, and protests. First, it documents the steps taken in the selection of 16 different relevant data sources, before they are briefly described, and their distinct aspects are highlighted. Second, it includes some descriptive analysis of selected indicators, as well as comparisons between them. Overall, it suggests that data on ethnic armed conflict is easily accessible, especially through the GROWup – Geographical Research on War, Unified Platform. Moreover, the updated version of the Minorities at Risk (MAR) and accompanying datasets will also provide useful data. However, data on ethnic tensions, protests, and other types of violent and non-violent events (including the actors involved) is currently scattered across different sources, with differences in coverage and in the information provided.

Ethnic tensions and conflicts in Temerin, a town located close to the capital of Vojvodina, Novi Sad, have attracted the attention of both the Serbian public and the public of Hungarian national minority in Vojvodina. The paper relates ethnic conflicts in Temerin with non-ethnic social dimensions. Generally, the author tests modernisation theory, as an example of developmentalist theory, as well as interactionist and instrumentalist theories of ethnicity. Particularly, the paper provides corroboration test of the ethnic competition hypothesis, posed by Sarah Belanger and Maurice Pinard, which specifies conditions that transform ethnic competition into ethnic conflict. Finally, the study has revealed that material status has no influence on national intolerance. However, at the level of ethnic groups, the issues of public usage of language and positioning in the labour market are related to the ethnic conflicts in Temerin.

During the next stage of the Russian-Ukrainian war, started with a full-scale military invasion to Ukraine, the signs of growing xenophobia and ethnic hatred Ukraine has been found, which is the aim of this study. The research methods are based on monitoring of the ethnic and ethnopolitical components of the Russian- Ukrainian war – official and political statements, media reports on crimes based on ethnic hatred, systematic analysis of opinion polls that reflect the ethnicity of the war parties and case studies - analysis of individual situations, which illustrate the rapid degradation of interethnic Russian-Ukrainian cooperation during the Russian war. Despite the high level of xenophobia researching, the convection war waged by Russia against Ukraine has not yet been studied in the current context of total digitalisation, which allows tracking ethnic hatred crimes in real time. Despite the fact that any conventional war is a priori accompanied by an increase in xenophobia and ethnic hatred, as citizens of both states during hostilities in the status of combatants and civilians are being killed, the Russian-Ukrainian war is complicated by a number of circumstances that exacerbate the atmosphere of ethnic hatred and lead to an increase in xenophobia. Although no official increase in xenophobia has been recorded during the Russian-Ukrainian war, as it has not yet been measured, a number of factors analyzed in the article point to an unprecedented rise in Russophobia in Ukrainian society in response to the Russian military invasion. The degree of ethnic hatred is increased by anti-Ukrainian rhetoric and intentions to denationalize Ukraine by the Russian military and political leadership (to destroy the Ukrainian state, the Ukrainian nation), war crimes committed by the Russian military in Ukraine, non-compliance with humanitarian law during the war to intimidate and increase casualties increase civilians, which leads to a humanitarian catastrophe in the settlements of Ukraine. Capture and deliberate destruction of infrastructure, which provides basic needs and livelihoods of people, makes it impossible to maintain normal, decent living conditions in Ukraine. The actions of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine show all the signs of a crime of genocide. Although xenophobia is a destructive phenomenon, an obstacle to democratic development, it has been suggested that defensive Russophobia and ethnic hatred of Russia and Russians are at the core of the consolidation and resilience of Ukrainian society to achieve victory over Russia, a necessary component of preserving the state subjectivity of Ukraine. Key words: Russian-Ukrainian war, xenophobia, genocide.

Addressing racial and ethnic tensions in the United States is a critical issue that requires multifaceted approaches. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) strategies offer a promising avenue for managing and reducing these conflicts by fostering dialogue, understanding, and cooperative problem-solving among diverse groups. ADR mechanisms such as mediation, arbitration, and negotiation provide neutral platforms for addressing deeply rooted racial and ethnic tensions in a constructive manner, emphasizing collaboration over confrontation. These strategies aim to bridge gaps in communication, build trust, and promote reconciliation by engaging stakeholders from various communities in open, respectful discussions. Mediation, as one of the key ADR methods, allows for the involvement of a neutral third party to facilitate conversations and identify mutually acceptable solutions. It is particularly effective in addressing issues of racial and ethnic discrimination, police-community relations, and institutional biases, where trust and open communication are essential for progress. Restorative justice, another ADR approach, focuses on healing and repairing the harm caused by racial or ethnic conflicts, encouraging offenders to take responsibility while empowering victims to voice their experiences. However, the effectiveness of ADR in addressing racial and ethnic tensions depends on cultural sensitivity and the inclusion of minority voices in the process. ADR practitioners must be trained to recognize power imbalances and systemic inequalities that could influence the resolution process. Furthermore, community involvement and continuous dialogue are vital in ensuring long-term success and sustained peace. This abstract highlights the potential of ADR strategies in addressing racial and ethnic tensions in the USA, emphasizing the need for culturally attuned practices and inclusive dialogue. By prioritizing collaboration and understanding, ADR can play a significant role in mitigating racial and ethnic conflicts, promoting social cohesion, and fostering a more just and equitable society.

The subject of the research is criminal law rules that provide for criminal liability for hate crimes and the judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights on hate crimes. The purpose of the article is to confirm or refute the hypothesis that a unified approach to the definition of the legal concept of hate speech and the limits of its application is nec-essary. This approach must be based on the legal positions of the European Court of Hu-man Rights The research methodology includes analysis and interpretation of court decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, as well as a dialectical approach to the analysis of vari-ous points of view to the definition of extremist activity. The main results and scope of their application. The relevance of the research proposed for publication is due to the lack of uniform practice of applying the articles of the Russian Criminal Code on so-called "hate crimes" by Russian courts and the presence of signifi-cant contradictions in the positions of the European Court of Human Rights and the state position of the Russian Federation in defining key concepts in this area that are extremely important for criminal procedure and administrative activities. The paper considers scien-tific and practical attempts to define "hate crimes" in the global and regional human rights systems, basic recommendations of the UN on countering such crimes, and offers an interpretation of the term hate speech in relation to the related criminological concept of hate crime. The text provides statistical data describing the level of such crime and the practice of the ECHR in this area, mentions a list of criteria according to which "hate crimes" can be motivated by language differences, gender, sexual orientation and other characteristics, as well as criteria that distinguish hate speech from freedom of expres-sion, and suggests decriminalization of part 1 of article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code. Conclusions. It is necessary to unify the concepts of "hate crimes" (and the practice of their application) in the direction of, in particular, reducing the number of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights against the Russian Federation and increasing the level of legal protection of both the individual citizen of the Russian Federation and freedom of speech and expression.

The Archival Situation of Georgian Cinema Jerry White (bio) [End Page 10] Although Georgian cinema enjoyed some international attention from the late 1950s to the 1980s, it is no longer a central part of broad arguments about world cinema. That is even more true of the country’s silent-era filmmaking, which, when it is discussed at all, is too often consigned to being a quaint subsection of Soviet cinema. But the archival situation in Georgia is unusual, and moreover, it is rapidly changing: sometimes for the good, sometimes for the bad. As I try to show here, a lot of good work is being done there, but it is impossible to ignore the serious material deprivation that defines most of the country’s cinematic institutions. To put it in a post-Soviet way, this makes the question “what is to be done?” seem nearly impossible to answer. [End Page 11] SOME RECENT HISTORY The republic of Georgia (known in Georgian as Sakartvelo) has a long history of being dominated by neighboring Russia, having been a quasi-imperial possession since 1800.1 In the immediate aftermath of the 1917 revolution, the country enjoyed three years of independence, first as part of the short-lived Transcaucasian Federation (also including Armenia and Azerbaijan, it lasted for a few months of 1918), and then as the social-democratic Menshevist state of the Democratic Republic of Georgia (which lasted until the Bolsheviks invaded in 1921). The successor state was the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, which, like other Soviet socialist republics, lasted until 1991. Among Soviet republics, the cinematic situation of Georgia was quite solid. Its regional film studio (known as Georgian Film Studio or Sakhkinmretsvi) was second only to Ukraine’s in terms of films produced and resources available, and the 1950s saw the emergence of a group of internationally well-regarded auteurs. These included Tengiz Abuladze and Rezo Chkheidze (who often worked together, most famously on the 1955 film Magdana’s Donkey) as well as Mikhail Kalatozov (Mikhail Kalatozishvili, who began making films in Georgia before directing such classics of Soviet cinema as 1957’s The Cranes Are Flying and 1959’s The Letter That Was Never Sent, to say nothing of his film maudit of 1964, I Am Cuba), Otar Iosseliani (whose Georgian films Falling Leaves and Once Upon a Time There Was a Singing Blackbird were widely acclaimed and who has worked in France since 1984), and Sergei Parajanov (who was born in Tbilisi and made films there as well as in Armenia and Ukraine). This sense of international excitement about Georgian cinema persisted well into the 1970s and 1980s; the February 1977 issue of Films and Filming featured Derek Elley’s laudatory article “Light in the Caucasus,”2 and 1988 saw the Centre Georges Pompidou’s publication (as part of its “cinéma/pluriel” series) of Jean Radvanyi’s comprehensive and equally laudatory anthology Le cinéma géorgien.3 Three years later, Georgia would be independent again. The early years of independence, though, were difficult, beginning with a coup that was directly followed by a three-year civil war. That civil war was mostly fought over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where ethnic conflict would also lead to a short but still traumatic war with Russia in 2008 (during this later conflict, Georgian forces had to pull back, and Russian forces continue to occupy these areas). By the time the civil war ended, Eduard Shevardnadze (who had served as Gorbachev’s final foreign minister) was president. The Shevardnadze regime was marked by political instability and continual anxiety about (mostly low-level) corruption; its breaking point came during the 2003 parliamentary elections, which were widely seen as having been rigged in favor of [End Page 12] pro-Shevardnadze parties. This led to the peaceful Rose Revolution, wherein after massive protests, Shevardnadze stepped down and the Columbia-educated Mikheil Saakashvili was elected president in 2004. In the parliamentary elections of 2012, partially because of widespread accusations of (again, mostly low-level) corruption and police brutality, as well as because of lingering anger about the 2008 war (where Saakashvili was seen by some as overly provocative toward Russia), Saakashvili...

Racial and ethnic violence takes many forms. Genocides, ethnic cleansing, pogroms, civil wars, and violent separatist movements are the most obvious and extreme expressions, but less organized violence such as rioting, and hate crimes by individuals or small groups are products of racial and ethnic conflict as well. Also, the distribution of criminal violence within societies, which may or may not be aimed at members of another group, is in some places a by-product of ongoing conflicts between superior and subordinated racial or ethnic groups. Although estimates of the number of deaths attributable to ethnic violence vary widely, range of eleven to twenty million given for the period between 1945 and the early 1990s show the gravity of this type of conflict (Williams 1994, 50). So it comes as no surprise that scholars have paid increasing attention to such conflicts over the last decades.

Keywords: Political Instability, Corruption, Economic Growth, Political Conflict1.IntroductionThe major aim of this paper is to examine the empirical relations between economic growth and a broad group of political instability factors including corruption, government instability, internal and external conflicts, religious and ethnic tensions, democratic accountability and bureaucracy quality. Moreover, one of the main objectives of our paper is to explore the effects of serious problems such as political instability and corruption on economic growth for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries during the period 1984-2012. Thus, most of the countries in our sample are developed countries of the world.The main contribution and distinctive characteristic of this article is to focus not only on the relationship between political stability and economic growth, but also on the relations between some specific categories of political instability and economic growth. It is generally accepted that corruption is an element of political instability as well. In this paper, we employ system GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel data models in order to overcome a potential endogeneity problem.The relationship between political instability and economic growth has been an issue of concern for long. Political instability is one of the conventional themes of the modern political economy theory. Modern theory of political economy suggests that political stability plays a significant role in economic growth of a country. Thus, an unstable political system could seriously hinder economic growth. Within the theoretical framework of modern political economy, a government is considered to be inefficient if policy objectives vary over a short period of time. Thus, coalition governments are a serious threat and to be more prone to the political stability. Moreover, modern political economy theory emphasizes that political instability also affects the level of economic growth in the country as the rates of economic growth are correlated with persistent policies of government and how government perform these policies (Barro, 2013).On the other hand, corruption is a widespread phenomenon in several countries around the world, which are regarded by economists as seriously harmful to economic growth (Aisen & Veiga, 2011). The majority of academic research reveals that corruption impedes economic growth, creates political instability, weakens the state's capacity to tax, undermines spending programs, increases the cost and lowers the quality of public investment (IMF, 2016). Some economists consider that corruption can also have distributional consequences. Corruption increases income inequality and poverty through lower economic growth, biased tax systems favoring the rich, and lower social spending (Gupta, Davoodi & Alonso-Terme, 2002). However, some researchers suggest that the impact of corruption on economic growth is related with factors such as the country's legal and institutional framework, quality of governance and political regime. Thus, in some highly regulated countries, corruption can compensate for red tape and institutional weaknesses and overcome the government failure in the economy (Campos, Dimova & Saleh, 2010). Since there is a large consensus that corruption hinders economic growth and increases socio-economic inequalities, international organizations such as the World Bank and OECD emphasize that corruption is among the greatest obstacles to economic and social development (OECD, 2013).The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review. Section 3 provides information about the data, empirical model, and empirical methodology. Section 4 contains empirical results. Section 5 includes a summary and concluding remarks.2.Brief Literature ReviewAlesina, Ozler, Roubini, & Swagel (1992) define political instability narrowly as the tendency of the change in cabinet either by constitutional or unconstitutional means. …

In modern Russian society, there take place the processes of cardinal transformation of socio-economic, political, spiritual and other spheres of its functioning. This fact conditions an urgent need to study risks and threats to preservation of social stability, sustainable development, strengthening of ties and relations in the Russian society. This aspect is especially important in multinational subjects of Russia, which differ in national heterogeneity of the population, degree of socio-economic development of the territories, variability of ethno-cultural norms and value patterns of social life. The article deals with vital and complex issues related to the phenomenon of “interethnic tension” and ethnic conflicts existing in modern national and foreign science, theoretical and methodological approaches to their study, classification criteria, various concepts of the causes and typologies of these phenomena. The author of the article presents classification of interethnic conflicts according to their stages or forms, to the nature of conflicting parties, which makes it possible to single out conflicts of “psychological stereotypes”, “ideological doctrines”, “political institutions”. In the study of the phenomenon of “interethnic tension”, it is important to establish risks and reasons for deterioration of interethnic relations in multinational administrative entities, the role of the factor of ethnic heterogeneity in the emergence of ethnic conflicts in modern Russian society. National diversity is fraught with various negative consequences, risk of interethnic confrontation and ethnic conflicts as polyethnic communities are more at risk of their appearance than mono-national ones.

The Fergana Valley, a historically and ethnically diverse region in Central Asia, has experienced multiple ethnic conflicts that have significantly shaped its socio-political landscape. This paper investigates the underlying causes of these conflicts, their socio-economic and political ramifications, and their broader impact on interethnic relations. Employing historical analysis and qualitative research methods, the study examines how both past and contemporary ethnic tensions have affected regional stability. The findings underscore the role of economic inequalities, complex border demarcations, and political dynamics in exacerbating interethnic discord. Additionally, the study explores the impact of migration, resource competition, and national policies on ethnic relations. In addressing these challenges, the paper discusses potential conflict-resolution strategies, emphasizing the need for economic cooperation, equitable governance, and policies that promote social cohesion. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of fostering intercultural dialogue and regional collaboration to mitigate ethnic tensions and ensure long-term stability in the Fergana Valley. By providing a comprehensive analysis, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of ethnic conflicts in the region and offers insights into sustainable solutions for peacebuilding. Keywords: Fergana Valley, ethnic conflicts, interethnic relations, socio-political impact, Central Asia, conflict resolution.

THE WAR IN CHECHNYA has forced painful reassessments of the nature of the Russian Federation. Far from enhancing 'stability', it has increased the danger of polarisation that many in Russia's republics wish to avoid. Yet assumptions of an inherent contradiction between various nationalisms and federalism may be premature. When definitions of nationalism and federalism remain flexible, room for negotiation is still possible in the Russian Federation. Some analysts trying to learn lessons from the break-up of the former Soviet Union make analogies to the Russian Federation itself. Will it survive, or is it another large and unwieldy empire whose time has passed? Did the 'parade of sovereignty declarations' begun in 1990 among Russian republics presage the demise of the Russian (Rossiiskoe) state or was it a healthy striving for greater federal balance within Russia? The sovereignty declarations, in the views of many non-Russians, were part of a dynamic of interrelated republic politics. This dynamic occurred not because of conspiracies across republic lines against the Russian centre but rather out of the hunger of many different peoples of Russia for federal rights they felt they had been long denied under Soviet rule. And for some the appetite for greater sovereignty has grown at first taste. Despite similarities, due to legacies of Soviet nationality policies and hierarchical structuring of ethnically-based regions, each case within the Russian Federation requires description and analysis in its own historical and cultural context. Certain strategic cases, for example that of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) of Eastern Siberia (the Russian 'Far East'), can help to reveal the messiness and non-inevitability of secession movements. A social anthropological approach is taken here, to demonstrate why the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) case is particularly significant, how its internal interethnic relations have developed, and what this case demonstrates for larger issues of Russian federation survival. Rather than assuming that Russia is an analogue of the Soviet Union, or that Russia's recent nationality politics consistently resemble the imperial polarising style of past multi-ethnic empires, judgement is suspended.1 We argue that various national bids for sovereignty or even full independence have been

In the previous chapters, our argument was developed in two steps. First, we discussed the challenges arising when public discourse or scientific analysis of political violence takes an ethnic or 'civilisational' turn. We added our voice to those who plead for vigilance such that we avoid taking descriptions of events in terms of (say) 'ethnic conflict', 'ethnic violence' or inferred 'ethnic hatred', as an explanation of these events. We concluded that a non-circular analysis needs to take a step back and, instead of taking ethnic or cultural categories for granted as the primary units of analyses, we need first of all to explain how these categories came into being. Or rather, we need to show what makes people accept such categories as 'real' in the pragmatic sense that they provide a grid for interpreting social experience and for giving a direction to social behaviour.