Ethics Found in Rhetoricity: Toward a Levinasian Vision of Bioethics

On April 14th, 2014, at about 11:35pm, 276 girls were abducted by the insurgent group Boko Haram from their boarding house in Government Girls College, Chibok in Northeast Nigeria. Nigerians, joined by the rest of the world, began to demand that the Nigerian government rescue the abducted girls. This agitation birthed the tagline Bring Back Our Girls. What started as a simple hashtag on Twitter would later become a global campaign tagged Bring Back Our Girls. Rhetorical spaces—virtual, material, and agential— have contributed to the escalation, amplification, and sustenance of the Bring Back Our Girls campaign. In this paper, I argue that social campaigns connect disparate spaces, virtual, material, and agential to propel, amplify and sustain conversations about their causes. This paper looks at the different spaces that added and continue to add agency to the Bring Back Our Girls movement. I conceptualize rhetorical space by drawing upon divergent views from rhetorical scholars and social scientists. To answer the research question—how did rhetorical spaces lend credence to the virality and sustenance of the Bring Back Our Girls movement? — the paper looks at Twitter, the media, public personalities and groups, and offline demonstrations as virtual, material, and agential spaces. This paper concludes that the 'spaces' examined gave credence to the virality of the Bring Back Our Girls campaign by using platforms, positions, and features as social capital to influence the conversation about the campaign. Twitter has been the most fundamental agential and virtual space in the virality and sustenance of the campaign.

For evangelicals, the allure of mass media evangelism has always been the potential to reach ever-more-distant “unsaved” populations across the globe. However, as the print and broadcast revolutions quickly revealed, targeting individuals’ needs and developing a sense of personal intimacy between evangelists and audience via these media proved a perpetual challenge. The digital revolution transformed this relationship: the interactive capabilities of the Internet and the ability to inexpensively target niche audiences re-shaped mass media evangelism. However, a close examination of evangelistic practices online reveals that, in fact, this latest “revolution”—rather than representing entirely novel ground—actually more closely approximates the type of evangelism that has taken place in brick and mortar churches and non-virtual environments since Christianity’s origins. The concept of “rhetorical space”—drawn from rhetorician Roxanne Mountford’s work on how the design of pulpits and church buildings directly impacts the types of pastoral and congregational behaviors promoted—helps us to see why. Using Global Media Outreach’s Jesus2020.com and The Billy Graham Evangelistic Association’s PeacewithGod.net websites as exemplars, I explore how, by conceptualizing evangelistic websites as rhetorical spaces with architectural features functioning persuasively in a manner similar to physical spaces, scholars of digital religion gain a theoretical framework for effectively describing the unique draw of these sites. Three elements of design in particular reveal how web design works imperceptibly to create a personalized, intimate, and interactive experience, while quickly moving users to make the decision to convert: the rhetorics of interface, navigation, and virtual relationship design. Understanding evangelistic websites as rhetorical spaces thus allows scholars of digital religion to see ways in which Internet evangelism has many similarities with evangelism in non-virtual spaces, pushing us to view it as a more familiar and historical strategy than is commonly recognized.

A Distinctly Rhetorical Space;<i>Eusynoptos</i>and the Greek Council-House

Editors' Introduction I. JEWISH ETHICS A. Literature and Context of 1. Menachem Kellner, The Structure of Ethics: B. Theoretical Issues in 1. Louis Newman, as Law, Law as Religion. 2. David Novak, Natural Law, Halakah, and the Covenant. 3. Harold Schluweid, The Single Mirror of Images. 4. Elliot Dorff, Covenant: Transcendent Thrust in Law: C. Reconceptualizing Ethics in Modern Times: 1. S. Daniel Breslauer, Modernizing American Liberal Dilemma. 2. Eugene Borowitz, The Self. 3. Richard J. Israel, Jewish Tradition and Political Action: D. Methodological Problems: Case of Medical 1. David Elleson, How to Draw Guidance from a Heritage: Moral Choices. 2. Louis Newman, Woodchoppers and Respirators: Problem of Interpretation. 3. Elliot Dorff, Methodology for Medical Ethics. 4. Aaron Mackler, Cases and Principles in Bioethics: E. Alternative Visions of 1. Michael Morgan, Jewish Ethics After the Holocaust. 2. Laurie Zolof-Dorfman, An Ethics of Encounter: Public Choices and Private Acts. 3. Annette Aronowicz, Emmanuel Levinas' Talmudic Commentaries: II: Morality Introduction A. Traditional Virtues and Values: 1. Alfred Jospe, The Meaning of Existence. 2. Sol Roth, Towards a Definition of Humility: B. Perspectives on Sex and Family: 1. David Novak, Some Aspects of Sex, Society and God in Judaism. 2. Arthur Waskow, Down-to-Earth Judiasm: Sexuality. 3. Martha Ackelsberg, Jewish Family Ethics in Post-Halakhic Age. 4. Blu Greenberg, The Theoretical Basis of Women's Equality in Judaism: C. Perspectives on Social Problems: 1. Robert Gordis, Ecology and the Judaic Tradition. 2. Seymour Siegel, A View of Economic Justice. 3. Elie Spitz, Jewish Tradition and Capital Punishment: D. Perspectives on Medical 1. Fred Rosner, Euthanasia. 2. Byron Sherwin, Euthanasia: View. 3. David Feldman, This Matter of Abortion. 4. Sandra Lubarsky, Judaism and the Justification of Abortion for Non-Medical Reasons.: E. Perspectives on Politics and Power: State of Israel: 1. Irving Greenberg, The Ethics Of Power. 2. Judith Plaskow, Feminist Reflections on the State of Israel. 3. David Hartman, Living with Conflicting Values. 4. Einat Ramon, The Ethics of Ruling a State with a Large Non-Jewish Minority: Epilogue: Future of Ethics and Morals

The Objectùm-Sexuality Internationale (OSI) website is the largest source of information representing a community who experiences emotional and romantic desire towards objects. This chapter presents a queer rhetorical analysis of OSI to understand how queer communities that must negotiate multiple taboos (en)counter the public. The author argues that OSI reveals two things about taboo communication: 1) the discursive and material boundaries that constitute the taboo and 2) the rhetorical work required to disrupt these boundaries. The author's analysis reveals how OSI engages in complex rhetorical practices to lay the groundwork for a queer-posthuman counterpublic—a rhetorical space that disrupts the heteronormative moral divisions and anthropocentric paradigmatic distinctions that constitute certain lived experiences as taboo. Such a move exposes the possibilities and ethical implications at stake in communicating the taboo while outlining an analytic framework for understanding the rhetorical processes that facilitate (en)countering the taboo in public communication.

ABSTRACTThrough the extended analysis of my documentary film ABC Colombia (86 min. [2007]), the article discusses the premises of my way of seeing – a filmmaking practice conceived as a cognitive and relational process – and explores the space between the filmmaker and the subject, looking in particular at the centrality of the camera, as a catalyst and a conduit. Addressing notions of proximity and the encounter between the filmmaker and the subject, the article critically engages with a notion central to my practice, that of the ethical encounter – the face-to-face with the film subject – addressed through an engagement with Emmanuel Levinas’ phenomenology of the other and the perspective of moral philosophy. What lessons can be learnt for the construction of the subject in documentary filmmaking? The article also retraces man’s relationship with the camera from its inception via Rouch’s seminal text ‘Camera and Man,’ further articulating the camera’s crucial role within a certain tradition of participatory and self-reflexive ethnographic filmmaking, which has been very influential to my film practice.

Part 1 What is bioethics?: ethical and clinical research, Henry K. Beecher bioethics, science of survival, V.R. Potter medical ethics and etiquette in the early Middle Ages - the persistence of hippocratic ideals, L.C. McKinney. Part 2 Bioethics and law: bioethics and law - a developmental perspective, W. Van der Burg. Part 3 Bioethics and religion: religion and the secularizarion of bioethics, D. Callahan religion and moral meaning in bioethics, C.S. Campbell can theology have a role in public bioethical discourse?, L.S. Cahill bioethics and the contemporary Jewish community, D. Novak what can religion offer bioethics?, J.P. Wind. Part 4 The principle-based approach: principles and particularity - the role of cases in bioethics, J.D. Arras moving forward in bioethical theory - theories, cases and specified principlism, D. DeGrazia specifying norms as a way to resolve concrete ethical problems, H. Richardson the tyranny of principles, S. Toulmin a critique of principlism, K.D. Clouser and B. Gert. Part 5 The absolute rule approach: action, intention and effect, E. Anscombe is entitled to double J. Boyle moral absolutism and the double effect exception - reflections on Joseph Boyle's who is entitled to to double effect?, A. Donegan. Part 6 Utilitarianism and bioethics: consequentialism, reasons, J. Savulescu justice and equal opportunities in health care, J. Harris. Part 7 Virtue ethics: varieties of virtue ethics, J. Oakley euthanasia, P. Foot virtue theory and abortion, R. Hursthouse methods of bioethics - some defective proposals, R.M. Hare. Part 8 The ethics of care: two perspectives on self, N. Lyons the role of caring in a theory of nursing ethics, S. Fry. Part 9 The case approach: getting down to cases - the revival of casuistry in bioethics, J.D. Arras casuistry - an alternative or complement to principles?, A.R. Jonsen the priesthood of bioethics and the return of casuistry, K. Wildes. Part 10 Cultural diversity and bioethics: can ethnography save the life of medical ethics?, B. Hoffmaster intersections of western biomedical ethics and world culture -problematic and possibility, E. Pellegrino judging the other -responding to traditional female genital surgeries, S.D. Lane and R.A. Rubinstein. Part 11 Sociology and medical ethics: the contributions of sociology to medical ethics, R. Zussman moral teachings from unexpected quarters, J.L. Nelson.

This article aims to elaborate on how Emmanuel Levinas' discourse on the ethics of responsibility applies to the humanitarian crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Levinas offers a concrete ethical concept for addressing humanitarian issues, distinguishing himself from earlier ethical philosophy experts. The research method employed is qualitative, utilizing a literature review approach. The findings and discussion reveal that Levinas' perspective on the ethics of responsibility emphasizes concrete responsibility in encounters with the 'Face of the Other'. Furthermore, responsibility represents a form of human identity from a humanitarian perspective when facing the COVID-19 pandemic. According to Levinas, unconditional responsibility is not something we receive or a rule we agree to bind ourselves to, but rather something that exists before we make any decisions. Unconsciously, we already have unlimited responsibility towards others. The conclusion drawn is that adhering to health protocols is a concrete manifestation of Levinas' ethics of responsibility in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, as it is oriented towards the safety of others. Levinas' ethics of responsibility is asymmetrical. The ethical discourse on responsibility discussed in this study is limited to the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, thus it has limitations in broader explanations. Although Levinas' grand ideas may not suffice to solve all the ethical issues we face, their strength lies in reminding us of the inherent nature of ethical demands that should underpin all moral theories. Levinas invites us to reconsider the essence of ethical responsibility, which transcends formal rules and agreements, towards a deeper understanding of our relationships with others

Interpreting from the IntersticesThe Role of Justice in a Liberal Democracy—Lessons from Michael Walzer and Emmanuel Levinas Nicholas R. Brown (bio) 1 As anyone who is familiar with more recent theological debate can attest, the appraisal of the liberal democratic tradition has undergone a radical reevaluation in the wake of Stanley Hauerwas’s and Alasdair MacIntyre’s scathing critiques. As a result of their blistering assault, religious ethicists and philosophers now find themselves operating within a discursive milieu that is almost the photo negative of the one they previously inhabited. For what has followed After Virtue and After Christendom is a situation in which compliance with liberal democratic norms is now perceived as actively inveighing against justice rather than as an integral prerequisite to its pursuit. There are cracks, however, beginning to emerge in the MacIntyre/Hauerwas edifice. For what is becoming disputed and increasingly so among a growing chorus of religious ethicists and philosophers is whether their critical reading of liberal democracy offers the most [End Page 155] helpful or even the most biblical way to think through its own moral dimensions as well as those undergirding its relationship with justice. It is the emergence of these criticisms that forms the basis for this essay. For the thesis that I wish to advance below is that liberal democracy offers religious ethicists and philosophers alike a moral framework and vocabulary from which it is possible to comprehend and enact the normative precepts encapsulated within a biblical understanding of justice. Accordingly, some aspects of my argument will build upon the rhetorical trajectories that have been already charted by the ethicists and philosophers I mention above. What distinguishes my approach, however, is that I will proceed from a more focused examination of some of the ethical and political undercurrents found within contemporary Jewish thought. More specifically, I want to probe the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and the political philosophy of Michael Walzer, for I believe the juxtapositional methodology of interpretation which informs each of their perspectives is illustrative of an interstitial hermeneutic that helps further illuminate the moral compatibility between biblical and democratic accounts of justice. 2 By now, MacIntyre’s and Hauerwas’s critiques of the liberal democratic tradition have been so thoroughly documented, discussed, and dissected that a review of their perspectives cannot help but have a certain pleonastic quality. Probably the most significant and disturbing problem that MacIntyre and Hauerwas see belying the liberal democratic tradition stems from its conception of time and space, or more precisely, its lack thereof. For what they discover upon a more careful probing of its moral and epistemological underpinnings is a pursuit of transcendence not dissimilar to Gnostic metaphysics. In the case of liberalism, however, the existential encumbrances to be excised are not corporeal and carnal in nature, but historical and social. [End Page 156] Such conditionalities, surmise liberal theorists, are so shot through with conceptual prejudices that they comprise an interpretative straight-jacket that vitiates against the kind of objectivity necessary to engage in a nonparochial process of moral and political discernment. For it is precisely this ability “to be able to stand back from any and every situation in which one is involved, from any and every characteristic that one may possess, and to pass judgment on it from a purely universal and abstract point of view that is totally detached from all social particularity” which MacIntyre sees as constituting “the essence of moral agency” of modern liberalism (AV 31–32). Therefore, “liberalism is successful,” maintains Hauerwas, “exactly because . . . [it] provide[s] that philosophical account of society designed to deal with” the moral and political implications such a social and historical denuding portends, namely “a system of rules that will constitute procedures for resolving disputes as they pursue their various interests.”1 However, what liberalism defines as success MacIntyre and Hauerwas see as anything but. Instead, both judge its “system of rules” to be an insidious prescription for a particularly virulent form of moral nihilism and political bankruptcy. For by stripping moral and political discourse of their historical and social referents, liberalism, ironically and tragically, eviscerates itself of the very heuristic and discursive practices necessary to make those...

Contra those bioethicists who think that their cases based on events and thus not motivated any particular ethical theory, Chambers explores how case narratives constructed and thus the extent which they driven particular theories. Why do those of us who write about often feel it necessary reassure our readers that the cases which presented or Tom Beauchamp and Laurence McCullough, in the preface Medical Ethics The Moral Responsibilities of Physicians, state that each of the cases they discuss is based on actual events.[1] In Cases in Bioethics, Carol Levine and Robert Veatch note in their introduction that the cases presented are based on events.[2] And in the acknowledgments Mortal Choices, Ruth Macklin mentions that all material taken from actual cases.[3] These declarations of authenticity, I suspect, merely reflect a general distrust in the discipline of the or fictional case. If there any strongly held article of faith within the discipline, it that bioethicists deal with the Aristotelian messy real world and that academic philosophers spend their time in a Platonic domain of unclouded abstraction. Bioethicists confront actual cases; academic philosophers contemplate imagined ones. This distinction has been explicitly considered and justified scholars who analyze how cases should be used in the discipline. Dena Davis, for instance, acknowledges that fiction can provide a useful source for studying ethical problems, but she maintains that the daily bread of bioethics the case.[4] Furthermore she insists that these cases keep the bioethicist honest, for by describing experiences ethicists can make points and draw conclusions while inviting their readers make their own independent judgments (p. 13). Similarly John Arras, in his discussion of the pedagogical value of casuistry, counsels against using fabricated cases because hypothetical cases, so beloved of academic philosophers, tend be theory-driven; that is, they usually designed advance some explicitly theoretical point. Real cases, on the other hand, more likely display the sort of moral complexity and untidiness that demand the (non-deductive) weighing and balancing of competing moral considerations and the casuistical virtues of discernment and practical judgment (phronesis).[5] William Donnelly also cautions against using the hypothetical case, for, Such histories usually constructed illustrate the application of theory concrete situations. The plot and characters begotten of theory, not life, and exist demonstrate and confirm theory.[6] For these ethicists, hypothetical cases biased, theory driven, and constructed, and cases implication impartial, theory-free, and guileless. The danger of made up cases, they suggest, resides in the teller's intentions illustrate a prior theory; cases because of their origin in actual events can question rather than support a philosopher's moral analysis. Real cases from this perspective something akin to what Charles Taylor calls brute data,[7] that is, they objective and empirical. Yet for the ethicist present the data received from life situations, he or she must present those events in a narrative; a story must be constructed. Every telling of a story--real or imagined--encompasses a series of choices about what will be revealed, what will be privileged, and what will be concealed; there no artless narrations. All stories shaped a particular teller for a particular purpose, for narratives infected their situatedness. Consequently the ethics case, even though it may be based on a life event, mediated and thereby interpreted through narrative discourse. In presenting a case, situations must be plotted, people characterized, a narrative persona assumed, and a point of view adopted. …

Maintaining the Other Kelly Pender Review of: Simon Critchley, Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas, and Contemporary French Thought. London: Verso, 1999. In his latest collection of essays, Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity, Simon Critchley extends and modifies the discussion of deconstruction and ethics that he put forward in his earlier book, The Ethics of Deconstruction. Like that earlier work, Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity examines the nature—or rather, the possibility—of ethics and politics after (or during) deconstruction in relation primarily to the work of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas. In contrast to his position in the earlier book, however, Critchley’s reading or assessment of Levinasian ethics in Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity is, as he puts it, “a critical reconstruction” (ix). Specifically, he extends, deepens, and modifies his arguments about the “persuasive force” of Levinasian ethics in regard to deconstruction. One way of reading Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity (a way that Critchley seems to encourage in the preface) is to see the culmination of this consideration of the subject in his affirmation of the political possibilities of deconstruction (chapter 12). However, because Critchley investigates subjectivity outside the issues of deconstruction and politics, it would be unfortunate to read his essays strictly in terms of such a culmination. For instance, his discussions of subjectivity, ethics, sublimation, and art in “The Original Traumatism: Levinas and Psychoanalysis” (chapter 8) and in “Das Ding: Lacan and Levinas” (chapter 9) provide a reconstruction (or an additional reading) of Levinasian ethics outside of the question of politics. In addition, and more importantly in regard to the aims of this review, Critchley’s careful treatment of subjectivity distinguishes Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity from a number of “postmodern” treatises on the subject. It is, I think, this carefulness (which is enacted as much as it is expressed) that makes the strongest case for the political possibilities of deconstruction. When I say “postmodern” treatises on the subject, I am referring to the work in a number of fields (e.g., literary theory, rhetoric and composition, and cultural studies) that takes for granted the dissolution of the humanist subject, declares its epiphenomenal status, and then celebrates postmodernism’s victory over the Enlightenment, or homo rhetoricus’s victory over homo seriosus, often taking for granted the ascendancy of ethics over politics. Often these arguments contend that politics are based on the assumption that humans are free to deliberate on issues, to express opinions, and take collective action. However, since the means of reaching consensus are always already predetermined by hegemonic, capitalistic forces, the political endeavor—as traditionally understood, for example, in terms of various ideologies of the Enlightenment—is a doomed endeavor. It is on this basis that some scholars attempt to distinguish the ethical from the political, and in doing so advocate new modes of subjectivity or post-subjectivity—for instance, following Deleuze and Guattari, the schizophrenic or rhizomatic modes; following Baudrillard, the seductive mode; and following Gorgias, the sophistic mode. In fact, it is the question of subjectivity that seems to drive these arguments; that is, the exigency for their discussion of ethics and politics is the dissolution of the humanist subject. While I do not want to imply that such arguments are simplistic or unwarranted (since Quintilian’s “good man speaking well” is indeed alive and thriving), I do want to suggest that this exigency potentially leads to totalizing conceptions of the subject, or, conversely, of the dissolution of the subject, as well as problematic conceptions of the relationship between ethics and politics. It is precisely this exigency that Critchley problematizes in his third chapter, “Post-Deconstructive Subjectivity.” By turning Heidegger’s critique of Husserl (and Descartes) back onto Heidegger, Critchley explores the possibility of a conception of the subject outside of metaphysics. Specifically, he argues that the very grounds that distinguish Dasein from a contemplative subject (the openness to the call to Being) can be read metaphysically, which is to say that they can be read as modes of authentic selfhood. “It is Dasein,” he claims, “who calls itself in the phenomenon of conscience, . . . and the voice of the friend that calls Dasein to its most authentic ability to be . . . is a voice that Dasein carries within it” (58). Based...

This chapter explores the affinities between the Gothic mode and Emmanuel Levinas's account of alterity, absolute otherness, responsibility and the ethics of the face-to-face encounter. Commencing with a theoretical discussion of Levinas's conceptualisation of the face of the Other, it proceeds to show how, in numerous Gothic fictions and films, the face serves as the site of absolute otherness. But if this implies a simple convergence between the Gothic and the ethics of Levinas's revisionist phenomenology, the chapter goes on to highlight how, in Gothic, the ethical encounter is seldom if ever unaccompanied by horror, terror, and unspeakable acts of violence that Levinas does not emphasize. It turns out, the argument concludes, that the Gothic already seems to have thought through the same problems, paradoxes and difficulties of Levinas's ethical encounter as those are theorised in Jacques Derrida's later work on the ethics of hospitality.

The rise of virtual healthcare presents new ethical challenges, particularly regarding the quality and nature of patient-provider relationships. French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas' ethics of the face, which centers on the ethical responsibility of encountering the Other, offers a profound lens for examining these challenges. This philosophical exploration explores how the digital mediation of patient interactions in virtual healthcare affects the ethical encounter described by Levinas. We argue that while virtual healthcare can enhance accessibility, it risks diminishing the relational depth critical to healthcare ethics. As a proposal, this study outlines strategies for integrating Levinasian principles into virtual healthcare practices to emphasize empathy and attentiveness and acknowledge the patient's irreducible humanity, even through technological interfaces. Lastly, this paper calls for rethinking virtual healthcare to preserve the ethical command of responsibility toward the Other.

This book offers a provocative rhetorical approach to one of the defining medical debates of our time.Michael J. Hyde's pathbreaking study considers the relationship between the phenomenon of conscience and the practice of rhetoric as it relates to the controversial issues of euthanasia. Hyde investigates how the practice of rhetoric becomes a voice of conscience and influences the moral standards of individuals and communities. In doing so, he offers the first extensive treatment of Martin Heidegger's and Emmanuel Levinas' philosophical investigations of conscience and an in-depth analysis of the justifiability and social acceptability of euthanasia.Hyde establishes the theoretical basis of his study by discussing and critically assessing the phenomenological theories of conscience set forth in the works of the two philosophers. To illustrate how the relationship between the call of conscience and the practice of rhetoric shows itself in everyday existence, Hyde surveys the moral discourse that informs ongoing debates over euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. He focuses on a cluster of related topics that emerge from his discussion of the work of Heidegger and Levinas, including the phenomena of deconstruction and acknowledgment, emotion and the reconstructive power of language, and the discursive creation of heroes.

ABSTRACTThis article assesses the ethical discourse on and practice of ‘responsible provision’ adopted by the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and the ADMM-Plus and their member countries. Despite their ambivalence towards the ‘responsibility-to-protect’ (R2Protect) norm advocated by the United Nations, Southeast Asian countries have in fact been developing a brand of sovereign responsibility that could be termed a ‘responsibility-to-provide’. Though less exacting in requirements compared to the R2Protect, this provision-based ethic – the ‘R2Provide’, if you will – still embryonic and patchy in its materialisation, is no less important as it reflects Southeast Asian states’ maturation as political communities and as responsible stakeholders in the international community. In contrast to the longstanding debate between communitarianism and liberalism as the appropriate normative and strategic foundations on which Southeast Asian countries ought to build political community, I propose that Emmanuel Levinas’ ethical concept of ‘responsibility to the other’, notwithstanding its demanding suppositions, offers a plausible basis on which to conceptualise the regional obligation of Southeast Asian countries as responsible providers.