Erico Verissimo humanismo, ideologia política e representação cultural na União Pan-Americana (1953–1956)

Case Studies on Developments of the Internet in Latin America: Unexpected Results

The preamble of the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter is explicit about a commitment to representative democracy as indispensable condition for the stability, peace and development of the region. (1) However, in the four decades after inception in 1948, the OAS failed to develop a consistent policy regarding the promotion of democracy in the hemisphere. For instance, while the Cuban government was suspended from the OAS in 1962 for incompatibility with inter-American principles and objectives, the (anticommunist) authoritarian regimes that emerged in South America in the 1960s and 1970s were passively condoned. Many observers came to view the OAS as a facile extension of the Cold War security interests of most powerful member, the United States. With the end of the Cold War, however, the OAS has come to play an increasingly significant role in Western-hemispheric relations. (2) With the approval in June 1991 of the Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System and the adoption of OAS Resolution 1080, the organization renewed pledge to protect democracy in the region and established the institutional mechanisms for doing so. In particular, Resolution 1080 pledges the OAS secretary-general to convene an immediate emergency meeting of the OAS Permanent Council following any sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process. (3) It is then the task of the Permanent Council to examine the situation and recommend whether or not a special meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs or of the General Assembly is warranted--all within ten days of the democratic crisis. In amending the charter through the adoption of the Washington protocol, the organization established that the General Assembly c ould, with a two-thirds vote, suspend any member state from the OAS in the event that its democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force. (4) The OAS also created a specific organization arm, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), to develop programs reinforcing the hemispheric trend toward democracy. Moreover, with the recent adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter on 11 September 2001, the QAS broadened conception of what constitutes a democratic crisis to include any unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime. (5) In short, the OAS now appears to spearhead a vigorous international regime for the defense of democratic rule in the hemisphere. Indeed, Heraldo Mufioz, a former chairman of the OAS Permanent Council, recently claimed that there is now a right to democracy in the Americas in the sense that a concern for the promotion and defense of democracy in the inter-American system has evolved into a normative obligation and, most important, is being implemented through collective action. (6) This new commitment by the OAS, in turn, raises several key questions for the study of international politics. First and foremost, is OAS action in relation to the defense of democracy motivated primarily by strategic or by normative factors? Second, under what conditions would the OAS actually intercede to protect and/or restore democracy in a member state? Finally, what type of OAS action would we expect to see if the OAS were to intervene? Two competing theories in international relations, realism and normativism, offer different explanations for the existence and behavior of international organizations (IOs). Realists view IOs as reflections of the underlying balance of power within the international system; as such, IOs are thought to have no real autonomy of their own. Normativists, in contrast, see IOs as reflections of a normative consensus shared by member states and the wider population of epistemic communities. IOs, for normativists, may develop considerable autonomy from member states. In order to assess the purported normative obligation to democracy in the Western Hemisphere, this essay examines the predictions that realist and normativist theories make regarding IOs and evaluates them against the evidence of OAS practice since the Santiago declaration. …

Peter Hakim is the acting president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based center for policy analysis and exchange on Western Hemisphere relations. He authors a regular column for the Christian Science Monitor on international affairs. This essay draws heavily on Chapter H of the Dialogue's recent policy report, Convergence and Community: The Americas in 1993. The notion that violations of democratic practice and human rights in any one country of the Americas should be the concern of all countries is not a wholly new concept in inter-American affairs. This idea, as the preceding article by Heraldo Mufioz explains, has a long history and, indeed, is embedded in the legal framework of the Organization of American States (OAS). In one form or another, it has served to justify a variety of OAS actions. Over the past few years, the OAS has become a far more active and influential institution. During the 1970s and 1980s, it had been largely irrelevant and ignored in inter-American relations. Stymied by continual friction and mutual suspicion between the United States and Latin America, the prevalence of military rule in much of the region, and Washington's unilateralist impulses and Cold War preoccupations, the OAS sat on the sidelines as the major issues played themselves out in other forums. Called upon to help resolve the Panama crisis in 1989, the Organization suffered a humiliating setback when it was unable either to end General Manuel Noriega's rule or to prevent the United States from invading in order to depose him. Only a few months later, however, the OAS began a remarkable turnabout, starting with the Nicaraguan presidential elections of February 1990. At first, the nations of the hemisphere appeared to confirm the impotence of the OAS by recruiting the United Nations to take the lead role in monitoring the elections. Yet in a show of surprising resilience, the OAS joined forces with the UN in Nicaragua and ended up playing

The long-standing relations between the United States and Latin America rest on a firm foundation. Yet, cer tain misunderstandings have arisen which seem to cloud the relations in the Western hemisphere. Nonintervention in the internal affairs of another state is the fundamental principle that has guided the relations in the hemisphere. Since World War II, this doctrine has been supported by the principle of collective security agreed upon at Rio de Janiero in 1947 and enforced by the Organization of American States. The mis conceptions which exist relate to various subjects in military, political, and economic affairs. In military relations misunder standings arise over the extent of the United States military assistance to the Latin-American countries and over the United States export-of-arms policy. In the political sphere, the United States is condemned for its continued support of the doctrine of nonintervention with respect to dictatorial governments in Latin America. The contentious subjects in economic affairs relate to United States development assistance programs and to commerce in primary products. It is indeed necessary to clear up these misunderstandings so that the channels can be open to continued constructive relations between the twenty-one republics.—Ed.

The issue of international protection of women’s rights has gained relevance in recent years. However, the Inter-American mechanisms are underestimated by scholars of international law. This research represents an overview of academic articles, books, documents of international organizations, and court decisions that create an image of the genesis of Inter-American mechanisms of women’s protection and expand on the current situation with women’s rights in the Americas. When we talk about the Inter-American system, we deal with all the member states of the Organization of American States (OAS), including the United States, Canada, and the thirty-three Latin American states. It is important to mention that Nicaragua withdrew from the OAS in November 2023; however, the state did not denounce any regional human rights treaties. While Cuba, whose government was excluded from the OAS in 1962, remains a dejure member of the Organization, since it has never denounced the OAS Charter and is bound by its international human rights obligations. These legal and political features need to be mentioned to accurately understand the real number of the OAS member states (at the current date, thirty-four), which may vary in different normative acts and research papers. However, in this article the author mostly focuses on the latter, considering the proactivity of Latin America and the Caribbean in establishing gender agenda and the accession of these states to the core regional human rights treaties, including the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women (the Belém do Pará Convention). The Inter-American system has offered a unique regional set of mechanisms for the protection of women from gender-based violence and discrimination. Thanks to the efforts of the Inter-American Commission of Women and the Follow-up Mechanism for the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women (MESECVI), it has become easier to hold the states accountable and monitor their compliance with international obligations. The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court and its advisory jurisdiction have allowed it to enshrine such notions as “feminicide” in regional legal practice and prompted the states of the region to undertake steps toward the criminalization of domestic, sexual, psychological, and physical violence against women. While the region is on its path to adopting laws that penalize these crimes, Latin America is still known to be one of the most dangerous places for women. Although the OAS and its special bodies have done a lot to improve the life of women in the Americas, Latin American women are still a long way off from calling their home a safe place.

The Honduran coup d'etat of 28 June 2009 triggered a series of measures by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the international community to restore ousted President Manuel Mel Zelaya to office and return the country to its previous democratic constitutional order. These international actions included forms of diplomatic isolation, such as the suspension of Honduras's membership in the OAS, as weU as economic sanctions imposed by the luces ofthe European Union, the Inter- American Development Bank, the World Bank, the Central American Integration System, and the Central American Bank of Economic Integration, in addition to individual countries such as the United States. Nonetheless, international efforts failed to dislodge the interim government headed by former President of Congress Roberto Micheletti and installed by the coup conspirators. Indeed, Micheletti and company were so successful at resisting international pressures that they were able to hand over power with impunity to President-elect Porfirio Lobo seven months later, on 27 January 2010. Michelletti enjoyed congressionally approved political amnesty to boot.Almost predictably, analysts criticized the OAS for yet another seemingly dismal defence of democracy in the Americas. According to some critics, Honduras represented a resounding failure of the inter-American democratic charter. To others, Honduras signified the triumph of realism over principles in international relations. Moreover, the incident seemed to prove once again that external actors had a negligible influence on domestic processes of political change. Honduras was also deja vu with regard to the OAS' s repeated failure at preventive diplomacy.1The Honduras debacle, however, was more nuanced than it seems at first glance. Certain elements of the international intervention were praiseworthy. For one thing, there was an international effort at preventive diplomacy, albeit a belated one. For the first time ever, a head of state - Zelaya - invoked article 17 of the inter- American democratic charter, the so-called self-help clause, to trigger an emergency meeting of the OAS permanent council just days before the 28 June coup. In contrast to past crises, such as in Bolivia (2003, 2005), Haiti (2001, 2004), Venezuela (2002), or Ecuador (2004-05), there was also little or no hesitation in the Honduran case to resort to the democratic charter. In fact, Venezuela and its allies put aside their prior resistance to endorse strongly the use of the democratic charter. The residual tensions in US-Latin American relations inherited from the Bush presidency (2001-09) did not impede a rapid response by the OAS once its member states decided to act. The diverse array of isolation measures and sanctions imposed by the OAS and the international community is likely the most formidable set of punitive measures adopted against any coup government in the two-decade-long history of the inter- American collective-defence-ofdemocracy regime. And lest we forget, the response to Honduras, at least initially, was also an unprecedented display of international consensus vis-avis the pariah Micheletti government.Accordingly, the OAS's efforts in Honduras were not a total disaster. Instead of dismissing international efforts to defend democracy outright, and in the interest of getting it right next time round, it is more fruitful to seek to understand the paradox of why the Micheletti de facto government did not buckle despite the rapid, determined, united, and powerful international response. Micheletti and his supporters held on for seven months even though international sanctions took a punishing toll on them. According to Honduras's new president, Porfirio Lobo, the sanctions took effect to the tune of US$2 billion dollars in a country notorious for its aid dependence.2In this article, I identify six lessons that, in combination, help explain the Honduran paradox, as well as where the OAS and the international community need to improve their efforts in order to defend democracy more successfuUy in the future. …

From its 893d through its 895th meetings the Security Council considered, with a view to determining its own course of action in that connection, the decision of the Organization of American States (OAS) taken on August 26, 1960, to apply limited sanctions against the Dominican Republic for acts of aggression in Venezuela. In addition to the Final Act of the OAS meeting communicating the decision, the Council had before it the following items: I) a letter from the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union requesting consideration of the decision by the Council; 2) a draft resolution, sponsored by Argentina, Ecuador, and the United States, taking note of the report and resolution of OAS; and 3) a draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union approving the decision of OAS. In pointing out that Article 53 of the UN Charter provided for the authorization of the Security Council as a prerequisite to enforcement action by regional agencies, Mr. Kuznetsov (Soviet Union), the opening speaker, declared it to be the duty of the Council to approve the decision of OAS, thereby imparting legal force to it. In reply, the Argentine delegate, Mr. Amadeo, expressed doubts concerning the Soviet interpretation of Article 53, pointing to arguments in support of the idea that measures taken on a regional basis were subject to ratification by the Security Council only if they entailed the actual use of armed force. Mr. Wadsworth (United States) concurred in rejection of the Soviet contention, and the following speaker, Mr. Correa (Ecuador), in discussing the possibilities of interpretation of Article 53, urged the retention of flexibility in relations between the Security Council and regional agencies, in order to allow effective action for the maintenance of international peace and security without the necessity of bringing all such questions of a regional nature before the world forum.

Insufficient scholarly attention has been accorded Canada's relationship with the Organization of American States (OAS), notwithstanding the fact that it has been a full-fledged member for almost ten years now. Not surprisingly, then, even less attention has focused on the nature and extent of the Canada-U.S. dynamic within the hemispheric bode.(1) Furthermore, this important and complex relationship, especially within a body long considered to be dominated by the United States (even more so than the United Nations), goes to the heart of much of the literature on Canadian foreign policy. And given the importance of this bilateral relationship for Canada, not to mention its often-controversial nature and its sensitivity to most Canadians, one would have expected otherwise. This is all the more striking in light of the fact that most of the opposition to Canada's decision to join the Organization was premised on a belief that it would unnecessarily harm and complicate Canada's overall relations with its superpower neighbor. There is no doubt that the issues on the OAS policy agenda create a number of potential opportunities for sharp disagreement--as well as cooperation and collaboration--between the two countries. In fact, with difficult and integral hemispheric questions about democracy, human rights, hemispheric free trade and the environment, there is certainly no shortage of possible policy areas in which to increase bilateral tension. The thorny question of Cuba (particularly in light of the Helms-Burton law) and the early 1990s constitutional crisis in Haiti stand out as two obvious examples, which clearly had (and continue to have) negative implications for the wider Canada-U.S. relationship.(2) Having said that, there also exist a number of issues areas in which both countries tend to share a common approach and similar objectives, while perhaps disagreeing over the appropriate mix of tactics and strategy to achieve these same inter-American goals. One needs to be careful, of course, about drawing too many firm conclusions about Canadian sovereignty or national independence from any evaluation of its behavior or record of performance within the OAS. In fact, how Canada has conducted itself within the body--including a tendency to take similar positions to that of the United States--may tell us very little about Canada's political independence, or lack thereof. Similarly, when Canada has adopted an opposite or different position from that of Washington, one should not automatically assume that this is a sure sign of autonomy or foreign policy independence. Still, few can question the fact that the United States plays a central role (an understandably so) in the formulation of Canada's overall foreign policy thrust--and this is no different in the case of Canada's conduct within the OAS. What is important to remember, however, is not the inescapable presence of the United States (and thus an important foreign policy or external determinant), but how and why Canadian officials--given the centrality of the U.S. factor--arrive at their policy decisions and positions within the hemispheric body. Accordingly, this article sets out to examine the Canada-U.S. dynamic within the context of the OAS--an area of Canadian foreign policy virtually ignored by the academic community. By doing so, it attempts to make a meaningful contribution to the extant literature on Canadian-American relations by grappling with two important questions. First, what exactly is the nature and extent of interaction between officials from both countries within the OAS? Secondly, and more important, has Canada's behavior or actions within the hemispheric body reflected policy independence or subservience vis-a-vis the United States? Thus, this article seeks to build upon previous ground-breaking research by Kal J. Holsti on diplomatic culture and adds a new and interesting layer of empirical analysis by focusing on the Canada-U. …

Since 2017, CARICOM member states have been divided in the positions they take on Organization of American States (OAS) resolutions addressing political instability in Venezuela. This article uses a neorealism framework to determine whether or not the provision of energy investments by Venezuela and the United States to CARICOM member countries is an attempt on their part to skew the OAS voting mechanism in their national interests. The article also examines the extent to which CARICOM member states’ response to Venezuela’s and United States’ interest in the OAS demonstrates a pattern of rationality. The findings suggest that though the OAS provides a medium for states to negotiate mutually beneficial solutions, states are rational actors and even where they do corporate, dominant states may try to manifest their self-interest.

The Organization of American States (OAS) clearly played a constructive role in Peru’s recent return to democracy, and Andrew Cooper and Thomas Legler provide an interesting and useful account of its involvement. At the same time, I believe that they overstate the importance of the OAS contribution to bringing down the regime of President Alberto Fujimori. Furthermore, a consideration of the factors that limited the OAS’s effectiveness can yield some useful lessons for the future. OAS involvement in Peru in 2000 began with the Election Observation Mission led by former Guatemalan foreign minister Eduardo Stein. From its arrival in Peru on March 2 until its withdrawal before the presidential runoff between Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo scheduled for May 28, the mission carefully evaluated campaign conditions and the ballottabulation process. Working with other observer delegations, the OAS mission urged the Fujimori government to level the electoral playing field and to ensure the transparency of the computer systems at the National Electoral Processes Office. In particular, the OAS mission asked that the runoff be postponed so that improvements could be made. When more time was not allowed, the OAS mission (and all other major election-observation missions) declined to observe the May 28 exercise, which was boycotted by Toledo. The mission’s final report concluded that, “with respect to international standards, the Peruvian electoral process is far from being considered free and fair.” 1 For the first time in the history of OAS election observation, a Latin American election had clearly and carefully been judged illegitimate.

Inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) have vastly different capacities for intervening in conflicts in their member states. The Organization of American States (OAS), a regional IGO in Latin America, has the capacity to intervene diplomatically to defend democracy in the hemisphere. This article examines how well the OAS applied these diplomatic tools in defense of democracy in Haiti following the 2000 political crisis. I argue that the OAS achieved some success in Haiti, particularly the Electoral Technical Program. However, the bulk of the evidence suggests that the OAS missed key opportunities to invoke their strongest diplomatic tools in defense of democracy in Haiti.

INTRODUCTIONWhen Canada became a Member of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1990, most of Latin America was at a crossroad in a post-cold war transition from authoritarian regimes to democracies. The Canadian government played a fundamental role in the creation and development of the organization's unit for the promotion of democracy, as well as of other similar initiatives, in this period. This mark of leadership would have an important impact on the organization later on, including regarding the adoption of the 2001 Inter- American Democratic Charter, which attests to the importance of human rights for democracy and vice-versa. In fact, the promotion of democratic processes and the consolidation of democratic institutions, as well as the promotion and protection of human rights, are certainly among the OAS's most significant successes in the institution's recent history.1By joining the OAS,2 Canada also joined the inter-American human rights system. While Canada has certainly been an important ally of the system, it has often been criticized for its timid membership. This article will discuss Canada's policy towards the OAS human rights regime, touching upon the regime's successes and weaknesses. It will also try to contextualize the discussion in light of Canada's broader policy towards human rights and Latin America.THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMThe inter-American system of protection of human rights is generally considered to be composed of the norms and institutions created by the OAS to promote and protect human rights within the hemisphere. The main normative instruments dealing with human rights are the OAS charter, several human rights treaties, including the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as of other instruments, including the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.3The inter-American commission on human rights, composed of seven elected independent experts (commissioners), is the principal organ of the OAS charged with ensuring the protection of human rights in the hemisphere. It also serves as a consultative organ of the organization on this matter. It promotes human rights in the region, formulates recommendations to member states, observes human rights situations, including via in loco visits. It publishes reports on thematic issues or the human rights situation in a specific country, etc. In recent years, the commission's main activity has been to process petitions lodged against member states by individuals and groups alleging violations of inter- American human rights norms. (In order to do so, complainants must first exhaust domestic remedies nationally, or be unable to do so). The inter-American commission on human rights can refer cases to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and, in serious and urgent cases that may cause irreparable harm to persons, it can adopt precautionary measures. The commission reports annually to the OAS general assembly.The Inter- American Court of Human Rights, composed of seven elected independent judges, rules on contentious cases between the commission and member states regarding allegations of violations of the rights contained in the inter- American instruments that grant it jurisdiction to do so. To be subject to the court's jurisdiction, a state must first have ratified the convention and expressly recognized the jurisdiction of the court. The court can issue an order or judgment, which is binding for states as a matter of public international law. The court can also adopt advisory opinions regarding the interpretation of the convention, or any other instrument related to human rights in the Americas, at the request of the commission or any member state. The court can also be consulted by member states regarding the compatibility of one of its laws with the convention. In serious and urgent cases, the court can also adopt provisional measures. The court reports annually to the OAS general assembly. …

Subject Election of a new Organization of American States secretary-general. Significance Luis Almagro is standing for re-election as secretary-general of the Organization of American States (OAS). Under his mandate, the OAS has shifted from consensus-building in favour of hostility towards left-of-centre governments in Latin America. His candidacy is being challenged by two other candidates, one from Ecuador and one from Peru, who point to his divisive impact on the organisation. Impacts Caracas will seek to encourage opposition to Almagro among states over which it still exercises some influence. An Almagro victory would be seen as a policy success for Washington. Divisions will remain among member states as to whether the OAS should endorse a more active response in seeking to remove Maduro.

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