Abstract
We will consider repeated two-person, zero-sum games in which the preferences in the repeated game depend on the stage-game references, although not necessarily in a time-consistent way. We will assume that each player's repeated game payoff function at each period of time is strictly increasing on the stage game payoffs and that the repeated game is itself a zero-sum game in every period. Under these assumptions, we will show that an outcome is a subgame perfect outcome if and only if its components are all Nash equilibria of the stage game.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.