Abstract
Great enthusiasm is attached to the emergence of cross-border regions (CBRs) as a new institutional arrangement for dealing with local cross-border environmental resource management and other issues that remain too distant from national capitals and/or too expensive to be addressed in the traditional topocratic manner requiring instead local adhocratic methods. This study briefly discusses the perceived value of CBRs and necessary and sufficient conditions for the successful and sustainable development of such places. Then, assuming that necessary conditions can be met, the study investigates an intriguing hypothesis concerning the catalyzing of sustainable consensus for cross-border resource management based on a game theoretical approach that employs the use of dilemma of common aversion rather than the more traditional dilemma of competing common interests. Using this lens to investigate a series of events on the Pacific northwestern Canadian-American border in a part of the Fraser Lowland, we look for evidence of the emergence of an active and sustainable CBR to address local trans-border resource management issues. Although our micro-level scale fails to conclusively demonstrate such evidence, it does demonstrate the value of using this approach and suggests a number of avenues for further research.
Highlights
Cross-border security policies can raise competing and contradictory agendas especially when viewed through the lens of environmental resource management and sustainability
Great enthusiasm is attached to the emergence of cross-border regions (CBRs) as a new institutional arrangement for dealing with local cross-border issues that remain geographically, financially, or politically too distant from capitals to be addressed in the traditional topocratic manner [9]
This paper proposes to explore this question using aspects of game theory that Ali [8] has suggested in his national level study for “catalyzing sustainable consensus” in borderlands for resource management which draws on the work of Stein [14]
Summary
Cross-border security policies can raise competing and contradictory agendas especially when viewed through the lens of environmental resource management and sustainability. Betsill [4] has suggested that no multi-lateral institution such as the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) is currently fully capable of addressing this situation in part due to the fact that solutions will require a multi-level approach [5] Under these circumstances it is common that what is deemed beneficial to one border partner might prove to be injurious to the other [6]. Two promising avenues will be investigated and intertwined These are Cross Border Regions (CBR) as the institutions that further local level Cross Border Cooperation [7], and second the catalyzing of sustainable consensus for cross-border resource management based on a game theoretical approach that employs the use of dilemma of common aversion rather than the more traditional dilemma of competing common interests [8]
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