Environmental Markets: A Property Rights Approach, by Terry L.Anderson and Gary D.Libecap. Published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2014, pp. 240, ISBN: 978 0 5212 7965 9, AUD$ 37.59 (paperback) AUD$ 94.03 (hardcover).

PRICE or rent control is but one of many forms of legislative action which interfere with private contracting in the market place. To delimit the scope of my analysis, I shall use the term "price control" to refer only to any set of regulations which satisfies the following three conditions. First, the control must fix the price (or income)' terms of private contracts; this categorically excludes any laws which regulate the distribution of income among the contracting parties on a share or percentage basis.2 Second, the control must involve no appropriation of proceeds to or from the government; taxation and subsidization are thus excluded. Finally, the fixing of price must not be associated with direct government sales, purchases, or manipulation of resources so as to maintain the regulated price;3 by this stipulation, price "support" is also excluded. Even on such terms, legal regulations to control price are still many and varied. To evaluate our understanding of the class of phenomena which we seek to explain it is essential that we discover implications refutable by facts. By this criterion the available body of economic theory pertaining to price control is deficient indeed: the massive literature on the subject offers few such implications.4 An alternative approach to analyzing the observable effects of price control is presented here.

In this report the property right structures surrounding tropical forest management are analyzed with a specific case study presented on tropical forests in Honduras. In order to adequately understand the set of property rights in place surrounding tropical forests, the applicable sets of property rights are laid out and explained (private, common, state, and open access). It is argued that the current property rights regimes in place surrounding tropical forests are inadequate and are the issue leading to high levels of deforestation. Conflicts and controversies surrounding the issue are presented for a counterargument and separate view of the issue. It was found that the current property rights regime in Honduras is inadequate for effective resource management as it lacks enforceability along with structure and is the prominent issue surrounding tropical deforestation. Private property rights were the most effective form of property rights found for maintaining natural resources, and it is therefore recommended that private ownership be instilled upon tropical forests to reduce the rate of deforestation. Free Market Environmentalism (FME) is offered as a solution to the current methodology for the management of tropical forests, as it advocates for private ownership and an enforceable set of rights. Therefore, it is recommended that a private property rights regime following the FME methodology replace existing state property rights in order to stem the tide of tropical deforestation.

Natural resources, agriculture and property rights

This Article models private property rights as a conflict resolution mechanism and shows that for the Coase Theorem to be consistent on its own terms, private property rights must generate the Pareto-optimal allocation of scarce resources among all feasible conflict resolution mechanisms. This conclusion is termed the Fearon Corollary. Equating the imposition of private property rights to conflict/war, the following question is considered: if pre-conflict common ownership is socially-optimal, under what conditions will disputing parties fail to bargain around the conflict? In addition to the explanations identified by Professor Fearon, the present article offers an additional behavioral explanation evidenced in the institution of private property rights itself, and, in particular, in state “Castle Doctrine” laws that permit the use of lethal force in defense of real property. To promote the socially-optimal shared use of contested scarce resources, a role for the courts is suggested where de facto common property rights are established by rendering private property rights random or unclear — judicial behavior that stands in sharp contrast to the commonly understood normative implications of the Coase Theorem. This uncertainty weakens private property rights, reducing the expected spoils of costly conflict, and, in turn, creates an incentive for disputing parties to cooperate in the form of negotiated settlement agreements. In this way, less secure claims to private property promote social cooperation.

The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West

This article argues that public property rights should be recognised as a separate category of property interest, different and distinct from private and common property interests and conferring distinctive rights and obligations on both “owners” and members of the public. It develops a taxonomy to differentiate private, public and common property rights. The article concludes that it is a mistake to think in terms of “private property”, “common property” or “public property”. The division and allocation of resource entitlements in land can result in private, common and public property rights subsisting over the same land simultaneously, in different combinations and at different times. The categorisation of property interests in land (as private, common or public) may also shift and change from time to time. The article considers the importance of distinguishing between private, common and public property interests for developing new strategies for environmental governance, and for implementing the effective protection of natural resources.

This paper, prepared for a Lincoln Institute conference on Evolution of Property Rights Related to Land and Natural Resources, and the forthcoming book Property in Land and Other Resources (D.H. Cole and E.Ostrom, eds, forthcoming 2011, Lincoln Institute), argues that, contrary to both the suppositions of some legal scholars and the theoretical underpinnings of Regulatory Takings doctrine, government regulations do not only impose on existing private property rights but also vindicate, and sometimes even create, public, private, and/or common property rights. After examining conflicting common law and Roman law rules relating to property rights in the atmosphere, the paper focuses on how assertions of state sovereignty and regulations combine to create Hohfeldian rights and duties respecting the atmosphere, where none previously existed or were unclear. An explicit (but hardly novel) claim is advanced that acts of sovereignty themselves amount to assertions of public property. The claim is supported by evidence from both civil aviation regulation and air pollution control. The paper also addresses how regulations have created private property rights to pollute in emissions trading programs (regardless of congressional assertions to the contrary). In some cases, assertions of public property via acts of sovereignty are a prerequisite to the allocation of private property rights, and not just in the atmosphere but in other natural resources, such as marine fisheries. The paper concludes with a discussion of normative implications for property theory generally and Regulatory Takings doctrine in particular. A more dignified treatment of public regulations that are designed to protect public rights would raise a serious question about which set of property rights should prevail in the several Regulatory Takings cases where privately-owned lands meet publicly-owned waters. That question cannot, however, be answered reasonably until a theory (or multiple theories) of public property are better developed to complement existing theories of private and common property. So, the paper ends with a call for more research into the theory and empirics of res publica (beyond equally naive public interest and public choice models).

Market value is the most common compensation basis for expropriation of both private and customary property rights. Private property rights are generally exchangeable while customary property rights are conceptually not as exchangeable. It is hence critical to analyse the applicability of current compensation theories, which are founded on private property rights, to different property rights and in different social settings. By using existing literature and empirical evidence from Africa and other countries where customary property rights dominate, this paper undertakes a theoretical analysis of the applicability of existing compensation theories and the methodologies used to achieve the desired compensation goals. The analysis concludes that whilst current compensation theories are broadly applicable to customary property rights as they aim to protect property rights and prevent expropriatees from impoverishment, various ontological and methodological factors limit the realisation of these goals in settings dominated by customary properties. Such factors include ontology and dominance of customary property rights, use of market value as a compensation basis, and capacity of compensation assessors. Broadly, these factors lead to inadequate compensation and impoverishment of affected people.

We address a debate over the effects of private versus customary property rights on external investment. Despite political economists’ claims that external investors favor private property rights, other experts argue that customary systems enable large-scale “land grabs.” We organize these competing claims, highlighting trade-offs due to differences in legibility versus the ability to displace existing landholders under both systems. We study a natural experiment in Liberia, where law codifies parallel private and customary property rights systems. We use this institutional boundary and difference-in-differences methods to isolate differential changes in external investment under the different property rights systems following the global food crisis of 2007–08. We find a larger increase in land clearing where private property rights prevailed, with such clearing related to more concession activity. Qualitative study of a palm oil concession reveals challenges external investors confront when navigating customary systems.

Ecological compensation is an important means to maintain the sustainability and stability of ecosystem services. The property rights analysis of ecosystem services is indispensable when we implement ecological compensation. In this paper, ecosystem services are evaluated via spatial transferring and property rights analysis. Take the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) as an example, we attempt to classify the spatial structure of 31 categories of ecosystem services into four dimensions, i.e., local, regional, national and global ones, and divide the property rights structure into three types, i.e., private property rights, common property rights and state-owned property rights. Through the case study of forestry, farming industry, drainage area, development of mineral resources, nature reserves, functional areas, agricultural land expropriation, and international cooperation on ecological compensation, the feasible ecological compensation mechanism is illustrated under the spatial structure and property rights structure of the concerned ecosystem services. For private property rights, the ecological compensation mode mainly depends on the market mechanism. If the initial common property rights are “hidden,” the implementation of ecological compensation mainly relies on the quota market transactions and the state investment under the state-owned property rights, and the fairness of property rights is thereby guaranteed through central administration.

ABSTRACT. It is often presumed that a free market economy (by this meaning a system in which can be found exclusive private property rights on the means of production) fails at (always) providing social welfare. This is a no-turning point into discussion and it is also a point where the seeds of government intervention seep in. The criterion used for this type of presumptions is what we generally acknowledge as utilitarianism. However, utilitarianism is only one particular criterion from many others, or only one side of the coin. The present paper is focused on the other side of the coin, namely the private property rights criterion (as developed by Murray Rothbard and Hans Hermann Hoppe). Using this analytical and ethical tool, I will try to develop the social character of a free market economy. From the very beginning the paper will summarize the basic elements of free markets. After this, a short journey into the economic and ethical problems of the social welfare concept will prepare the reader for the section where I state the case for a social market economy from a purely private property rights approach.JEL Classification: B53, D6, I3, P14Keywords: free market economy, private property rights, social welfare, ethicsIntroductionThe central idea of this paper is that markets fail. They fail in delivering what consumers need, fail in reducing enough prices for different goods and services, fail in stopping anticompetitive practices etc. In a word, they fail. And because they fail, from a social perspective this means that free markets let alone are not the best economic systems for the individuals. They must be somehow regulated by the power of the state. Only this power can ensure equilibrium on the market and can satisfy the needs of the society. Thus government policies can be interpreted as a reaction to the damages that free markets leave behind them, or to those which may occur in the future. This is a rational supposition since they come to substitute a natural state of things, a state where individuals voluntarily cooperate for maximizing their utility. For if all would have been good by having free markets, why should there be any government policies at all?Although this idea is not a new one, it is nevertheless arguable. It can be found (among many others) mainly in the political philosophy of ordoliberalism (affiliated with the FreiburgSchool1). According to this philosophy, free markets are the best alternatives for allocating resources with only one condition: they must give positive feedback to any state institutions in the name of public good or social welfare. For this reason, the translation of ordoliberalism philosophy into practical political program was baptized as social market economy. Markets must be free, but they also must fulfil society's needs. There is of course, an important issue to discuss here, which for the moment will be resumed to the following question: What elements can possibly exist in the nature of free markets which inflict on fulfilling society's needs?One may argue that this type of problems can be solved by simply picking up an economic theory which satisfies the interests of the researcher or just offers the most comprehensive answers. But as soon as you pick up the economic theory that you have considered it as the best tool for your analysis, you will discover that it necessarily or implicitly contains some epistemological or methodological suppositions, routed perhaps in the most notorious or, on the contrary, most obscure philosophical theories. For example, when neoclassical economists (Marshall, Samuelson, Baumol etc.) argue that utility functions express a real process with real consumers, they implicitly make the assumption that utility - as a concept - can have cardinal magnitudes. In contrast with neoclassical economics, the marginal revolutionaries (Menger, Jevons, Walras) had demonstrated that utility refers to individual preferences which are always subjective (cannot be easily observed by an outside observer) and ordinal (I-st is apples, II-nd is cranberries, III-rd is cinema tickets etc. …

This chapter examines the effect of occupation on private property and contract rights within the context of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. In doing so, I examine how the treatment of private property in the Iraqi occupation compares and contrasts with Japanese, Italian, and German occupations after World War II. Furthermore, I show how non-European occupations have been characterized by a disregard of occupation rules safeguarding private property as opposed to European occupations. This disregard of the private property under occupation is similar to the disregard with reference to territorial acquisitions of a much earlier period, which I addressed in Chapter 2. In this chapter, I also demonstrate the importance placed on the private property of Europeans in non-European contexts and the lack of focus on the private property rights of non-Europeans. It is therefore not surprising that, following the U.S.-led conquest of Iraq in early 2003, most scholarly and press coverage focused on the status of foreign corporations’ property in Iraq before the war.

The Real Right Law of the People’s Republic of China is the basic law for regulating and protecting the property rights. The Constitution, as the fundamental law, adjusts the property right relationship too. The protection from Constitution is the precondition and base for protecting property right. The Real Right Law is to fulfill the principle of Constitution that ensures citizen’s private property right. To protect the property right, Constitution mainly aims at defending the country against outside. Its basic function is to define the country activity. As for the Real Right Law, it is to protect the property right by defining the property in case of invasion of other civil subjects. Both Constitution and Real Right Law offer protection for private property right and also impose restrictions on private property right. That is the national requisition system. This system imposes strict restrictions to private property right. Therefore, it is necessary to set up firm restrictions and constraints on the requisition system. According to the legislation of other countries, we can restrict and constrain this system from three aspects, namely the intention of requisition, the complement standards, and the process, driving the government to realize lawful administration, and protecting the private property right properly.

Because of the market failures private property rights not always are such to obtain socially acceptable outcomes through the exchange. To guarantee social welfare the policy maker usually limits the property rights. Such limitations concern: the existence of the private property rights in itself; the right of transferring and exchanging the above mentioned; the right of discretionary use of the private property. The restrictions to private property rights are motivated by efficiency and equity. On the efficiency side the public policy can be set up by three reasons: presence of externalities; existence of imperfect information; difficulties to coordinate economic activity and exchange. Efficiency and equity are obviously affected by any restriction of the property rights. We face the fact that often the equity aim is not a universal aim but instead a particular one restricted to some social group. On the equity side public policy claims its right to intervene particularly when the right holder earns pure profits limitative of the consumer welfare and exploits his market power. Any restriction to private property rights is either a source of benefits for people not paying the relative cost or a cause of cost for people not enjoying any benefit. Ideally it would be necessary either to levy a tax or to give a subsidy in order to bring back the initial welfare conditions. This rarely happens above all because of tangled effects and transaction costs.

As weather patterns across the globe change in response to global warming, we should expect more strain on existing institutions. This paper demonstrates how weather risk induces farmers into a risk-pooling equilibrium whereby private property rights are voluntarily relinquished. We find that as the spacial variability of rainfall increases, rising investment and increased subplot dispersion are complementary hedges against weather risk. With subplot dispersion, the cost of preserving private property rights rises, incentivizing farmers to develop a system of common property rights. In contrast, investment and subplot dispersion become substitute hedges as weather risk diminishes. We provide a dynamic theoretical model which complements previous empirical work on the impact of weather risk on property rights.