Entrepreneurship as Method: Open Questions for an Entrepreneurial Future

S ir Francis Bacon (1561-1626), the Lord Chancellor of England, was the first to provide a documented philosophical method for investigating a natural phenomenon. This method later became known as “the scientific method.” Unlike many before him, he suggested that our understanding of the world should be based on data, rather than faith or dogma. Moreover, his method required that our understanding of the world be provisional, with the hope that our current understanding of natural phenomena would eventually be replaced by better science. The events that have transpired over the past 2 years regarding the clinical relevance of xenotropic murine leukemia virus–related virus (XMRV) have shown that the method of scientific investigation first described 400 years ago is very much alive and well today. The scientific method, as envisioned by Sir Francis Bacon, starts with observation. Urisman and colleagues first observed that XMRV is associated with human disease in 2006, finding that 40% of men with prostate cancer and a low activity variant of RNase L, an enzyme involved in the interferon-induced antiviral response, were infected with this virus. Subsequently in 2009 and 2010, two groups of investigators also described finding XMRV or related sequences of polytropic murine leukemia viruses (MLVs) in association with chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS), a disease characterized by severe fatigue and other related symptoms lasting more than 6 months. XMRV is currently understood to be a retrovirus, but is unrelated to other well-described retroviruses such as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and human T-cell lymphotropic virus (HTLV). XMRV specifically is a member of the family Retroviridae, subfamily Orthoretrovirinae, and genus Gammaretrovirus (see AABB XMRV Fact Sheet http://www.aabb.org/resources/bct/ eid/Pages/default.aspx). XMRV is the first gammaretrovirus to be found in humans, and data indicate that it originated in mice after the recombination of two murine proviruses. Virions are 80 to 100 nm in diameter, consisting of an envelope, nucleocapsid, and a nucleoid with a linear dimer of positive-sense, single-stranded RNA. From these initial observations, it was hypothesized that this virus could be causally related to both prostate cancer and CFS. Moreover, the finding of viral sequences in the blood of healthy controls in two studies led to the concern that this virus could be transfusion transmitted, and thus the national blood supply could be at risk. Specifically, on June 18, 2010, the AABB issued a bulletin to its membership from its Interorganizational Task Force on XMRV that patients diagnosed with CFS be discouraged from donating blood. Consequently, the American Red Cross and a number of other blood donor centers started to offer educational information about CFS and have requested voluntary deferral of donors who ever have had a medical diagnosis of this debilitating condition. While the risk of transmission of XMRV by blood products was unknown at the time of release of this bulletin, the recommendation of the AABB Interorganizational Task Force was reasonable based on the initial hypothesis that CFS could have an infectious origin. First, XMRV is a gammaretrovirus, a genus that contains known animal pathogens (see AABB XMRV Fact Sheet). As other retroviruses, such as HIV and HTLV, are transfusion transmitted, it was plausible that an emerging retrovirus, such as XMRV, could also be transmitted by blood. Second, studies indicated that XMRV was physically present in blood. A rhesus macaque model of XMRV previously demonstrated that the virus can infect lymphoid cells, several tissues, and organs even though circulation of free virus was minimal. Moreover, Lombardi and colleagues found XMRV infection in the lymphocytes of the CFS patients From the Department of Pathology, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland; and the Scientific Support Office, American Red Cross, Gaithersburg, Maryland. Address reprint requests to: Susan Stramer, Scientific Support Office, American Red Cross, 9315 Gaither Road, Gaithersburg, MD 20877; e-mail: stramers@usa.redcross.org. Received for publication November 28, 2011; accepted November 28, 2011. doi: 10.1111/j.1537-2995.2011.03518.x TRANSFUSION 2012;52:222-225.

The experimental method is a most powerful means of the empirical sciences that combines the theory-based asking of questions with the readiness to register surprises. From the days of Galileo (1564-1642) and Francis Bacon (1561-1626) various models have conceptualized the tension between doing something with nature and observing it, between deductive reasoning and inductive experience, between modeling artificial set-ups and being in complex environments, between control and understanding. For a long time, the philosophy of science made experimentation subservient to theory. Recent studies from history (Gooding, 1990), sociology (Pickering, 1995), and the philosophy of science (Hacking, 1983 ; Rheinberger, 1997) have strongly modified this view. It is now widely accepted that experimentation has a living space of its own with strikingly different relations to conceptual work in various fields of research. But in each case the tension that the experimental method constitutes between intervening into reality and understanding it is what makes experimentation an uniquely powerful learning strategy, even if the tension itself is still open to philosophical reflection. If it is so successful, why then is it restricted to the artificial world of the laboratory? Obviously, because the method is paved with surprises, failures, errors, and exceptions that people most likely do not want to experience in real life. The institutional set-up of the laboratory confines all outcomes to a special world, making it easy to start anew if something bad happens. If new knowledge is achieved, the costs of trial and error can quickly be forgotten. But mistakes imply no dangers for anyone in real life. No one except the "mad scientist" movie star would accept the risks associated with this kind of knowledge production. The laboratory symbolizes an exclusive social reality where these risks are welcome. For nature too, the laboratory provides a degree of control, of boundary and initial conditions, of the instrumentation of observation and measurement of effects, so that the causal analysis of surprises can be much better accounted for than those experienced in nature at large. It would be pointless to deny these social and epistemic advantages of laboratory science. But the argument can be made that these advantages are achieved by ideals of constraint, abstraction, simplicity, and purity at odds with the course of nature and society. Moreover, these ideals have given rise to a world-view that interprets the space, time, things, and people of the world as faint approximations of the abstractions that make up the laboratory world. Philosophers of science have only started to deconstruct this worldview (cf. Cartwright 1999; Frodeman, 2003). Contemporary society increasingly faces research strategies that, despite their experimental features, cannot be restricted to the special world of the laboratory. Release experiments with genetically modified organisms, which are paradoxical in character, are a good example. The question as to whether the risks of releasing GMOs are acceptable can only be answered by releasing them. Even if small scale and simulation studies serve to restrict the risks, they eventually can only serve to sharpen the hypotheses surrounding experimental action in the open field. (For an interesting example see Levidov, 2003.) An even more extreme case occurs with the analysis of high-risk technologies such as nuclear power plants. They are built and run according to carefully developed safety measures and security plans. But whether or not these cover all relevant factors of potential technological and organizational malfunctioning is an open question, to be answered only by putting the installations into operation (Krohn and Weingart, 1987; Weyer 1994). An almost opposite ensemble of cases can be made of landfills. These have been built more or less carelessly, with the only goal being to get rid of waste as cheaply as possible, only to discover that they are "wild bio-chemical reactors" (expert opinion) nobody can control. …

To the extent that two scientific schools disagree about what is a problem and what a solution, they will inevitably talk through each other when debating the relative merits of their respective paradigms. [Kuhn, 1970, p. 109]. [1] Alila et al. [2009] did not intend to present the frequency paired (FP) method for analyzing altered peak flow frequencies after logging as stated by Lewis et al. [2010]. Such a technique is well established in the wider hydrology [e.g., Howe et al., 1966] and climatology [e.g., Wigley, 1985] communities; and the concepts on which it is based are not new to the forest hydrology community [e.g., Troendle, 1970]. Alila et al. [2009] expose a set of flaws of the most fundamental construct in methods that dominated decades of research in forest hydrology and as a result, cast serious doubts on the current state of science on the relation between forest land use and floods. Alila et al. [2009] illustrate, using philosophical, conceptual, physical and empirical arguments, how our prevalent scientific perception of the forests and floods relation is shaped by an invalid experimental design and irrelevant research hypotheses that focus on a change in magnitude between preharvesting and postharvesting floods when paired by equal meteorology or storm input. This type of chronological event pairing (CP) leads to incorrect changes in flood magnitude because it fails to account for the physical reality of changes in frequency of peak flows caused by harvesting, and further reaffirms decades of irrelevant research outcomes through the use of inappropriate statistical methods referred to as the analysis of variance and covariance (ANOVA and ANCOVA). Since many paired watershed studies published earlier did not have a sufficient record length to apply a frequency paired analysis, their outcomes may have been a manifestation of the "expediency" of the moment rather than a substantiation of "scientific facts" [Yevjevich, 1968, p. 1174]. [2] Lewis et al. [2010] choose to remain vague by neither fully denying nor admitting to the fundamental flaws in CP-based analyses but insist that CP can be modified to account for a change in frequency. Lewis et al. [2010] avoid the main question at hand by raising secondary questions of interpretive nature, the answers to which can only serve to further articulate (and not correct or invalidate) our FP method: How do we adjust observed peak flows for hydrologic recovery? How do we correct for the loss of variability caused by a calibration equation? How do we estimate uncertainty in a flood frequency relation? How do we increase statistical power to predict the effects on larger floods? These questions are important but must be considered as a part of a new era of research in forest hydrology guided by the new paradigm of pairing events by equal frequency. Since scientists can only be guided by one paradigm at a time, we contend that the main and real question at hand that we must confront head on remains; which of the two paradigms should guide the future science of forests and floods, CP or FP? The answer may lie in Francis Bacon's maxim: "Truth emerges more readily from error than from confusion." [3] In this response, we explain why continuing the use of CP-based methods for evaluating the relation between forests and floods will reinforce the misconception, confusion and misinformation that are prevalent in the science literature, as opposed to increasing our understanding of land cover influences on hydrologic response. In our reply, we classified the major discussion points raised by Lewis et al. [2010] under the following six general headings. [4] Lewis et al. [2010] state that "we agree that analyses of changes in flood frequency are useful for evaluating the effects of watershed disturbance" (paragraph 1) and "…attention to flood frequencies is merited and may shed light on the issue" (paragraph 29). Let there be no confusion that flood frequency distributions are not just a "useful" dimension that simply "merits attention"; they absolutely must be included in any evaluation of the relation between forests and floods. If the inextricably linked frequency and magnitude of a flood are not simultaneously invoked, as conducted in the convenient but irrelevant CP-based analysis of variance and covariance, not only we end up with the incorrect change in magnitude but equally important we obscure the most critical facets of the relation between forests and floods, namely, (1) small changes in the magnitude of floods can translate into larger changes in their return periods and (2) the larger the flood, the more dramatic the change in its return period. This is a direct consequence of the highly nonlinear and inverse relation between the magnitude and frequency of floods, which can only be represented by the flood frequency distribution and not a regression fit of any level of complexity. [5] These arguments are easy to demonstrate. Under a stable climate, a flood event may be assumed to occur when, say, a peak flow magnitude, Q, falls above some critical threshold, QT. The probability of occurrence, P, of such a flood is given by the area under the tail of the frequency distribution when Q is larger than QT. This area also defines the return period or recurrence interval, T in years, which is the inverse of the probability of occurrence P. Shifting the mean of the distribution toward QT causes increases in the area under the tail in a highly nonlinear manner. Figure 1a shows how a 30% change in mean would change roughly a 20 year into a 7 year event, and a 100 year into a 20 year event. The frequencies of larger floods are even more sensitive to changes in the variability around the mean of the frequency distribution. Figure 1b shows how a 10% change in the mean combined with a 20% upward shift in the standard deviation will change a 100 year into a 25 year flood event, which amounts to quadrupling the flood risk. Although highly idealized, these rather "pedagogical" illustrations [Wigley, 2009, p. 67] serve to emphasize the importance of the overlooked frequency distribution conceptual framework in decades of forest hydrology literature. [6] Climatologists have long recognized the significance of a frequency distribution framework, hence the critical aspects of extreme event theory such as return period and risk, for understanding and quantifying the effects of climate change on weather extremes [e.g., Wigley, 1985]. In forest hydrology, however, over 40 years of ANCOVA and ANOVA studies stripped the "risk" out of what was meant to be an evaluation of the relation between forests and flood risk. This created a perception based on the conclusions of irrelevant research which claimed that there is 'no evidence' that forests affect larger flood events, albeit that those events were ambiguously defined (i.e., ranked by storm input or control watershed peak flows). The time has come for the forest hydrology community to put an end to working in isolation on the topic of forest land use effects on floods. The conclusion that only the frequency paired approach revealed that "all peak flows save the largest event were shifted upward" (AKSH, paragraph 29) reflects the fact that the AKSH procedure itself shifted the peaks used in the FP analysis upward. Figure 7b, showing the unadjusted analysis, is the appropriate figure for comparison to Figure 3a; both reveal a more modest upward shift converging at the two largest events. [8] The quote "all peak flows save the largest event were shifted upward" was truncated and should have been reported as: "all peak flows save the largest event were shifted upward and the largest peak flows on the observed record became more frequent (Figure 3b)." An interpretation of Figure 3a, constructed with or without recovery adjusted peak flows, not only leads to incorrect estimate of a change in magnitude but equally important cannot be used to make inference about changes in frequency of any events, let alone the larger floods, because the CP-based analysis is not designed to reveal changes in event frequency. Figure 3b, however, reveals what Lewis et al. [2010] appear unwilling to admit; that forest harvesting may have increased the frequency of larger events. "Novelty emerges only with difficulty, manifested by resistance, against a background provided by expectation" [Kuhn, 1970, p. 64]. [9] Alila et al. [2009] state that interpretation of the FP analysis displayed in Figure 7b cannot be scientifically defensible because it was constructed using a nonstationary time series. Also, any analysis based on Figure 7 would be invalid because it does not distinguish between the effects of forest harvesting and recovery. These issues cannot be overemphasized and our Figure 7 was included to avoid such highly anticipated misinterpretations. While Figure 7b is admittedly wrong, Figure 3a is "not even wrong" (i.e., its interpretation is irrelevant to whether forest harvesting is affecting floods). We decided to use raw (unadjusted for recovery) data for constructing one of our plots in Figure 3 (i.e., Figure 3a) because it is this convergence of two regression lines that has shaped our prevailing perception: namely forests affect small and medium but not necessarily larger floods. [10] The use of paired watershed data to illustrate the difference between chronological and frequency pairing is not possible without employing a calibration equation to estimate the expected peak flows. The empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of these peak flows may have been affected by a loss of variability associated with the use of such equation. As explained in our methods, we corrected for this loss of variability and the outcomes were discussed by Alila et al. [2009, section 4.2]. The calibration equations that we employed at WS1 and WS3 used log-transformed peak flows. Prediction using these regression equations produces a small downward bias in the estimate of the expected discharge. We have not made any adjustment for such downward bias and Lewis et al. [2010, paragraph 12] are correct when they state that "The required bias correction is typically small, but given the sensitivity of upper quantiles to a shift in both mean and variance, the differences reported cannot necessarily be attributed to logging." [11] Using the proposed bias correction technique, we indeed found the effect to be quite small (in the order of 1–2%) and therefore not substantial enough to change any of our results and conclusions. We find it remarkable that Lewis et al. [2010], on one hand, recognized how changes in mean and variance can have substantial effects on the upper quantiles of a frequency distribution, and are concerned about this small downward bias in the expected discharges, but are still defending the chronological pairing which, as we illustrated, leads to an equivocally incorrect and irrelevant change in magnitude. [12] Our adjustment for recovery of peak flows is also based on chronological pairing; this may introduce uncertainty in our estimated changes in the magnitude and frequency of floods. We have explicitly acknowledged this in section 3.5 of our original article. While it is possible that our recovery adjustment may have affected our results, we think such effects are minimal, in part because of the naturally slow recovery of the cold snow environment at Fool Creek and the even slower recovery of road effects at WS3. Nonetheless, we would like to see the results of an FP analysis on the same data sets, adjusted for recovery using a model that is accepted by the forest hydrology community. [13] Lewis et al. [2010] suggested that a valid analysis of uncertainty would require that potentially overlapping confidence limits be estimated for frequency distributions of both the expected and observed peak flows. The outcomes of statistical hypothesis tests cannot be used to justify a CP-based invalid research hypothesis, which we illustrate to be irrelevant to the forests and floods relations. Our conclusions that the prevalent perception of forests and floods relation is scientifically indefensible will not be invalidated by attempting to impose more stringent statistical tests of significance. Nevertheless, we have used in our original article two nonparametric tests which specifically test whether the two (pretreatment and posttreatment) sample distributions are "far enough apart" that they can be considered to be derived from different populations [Alila et al., 2009, Tables 1 and 2]. [14] Our approach to estimating uncertainty using Monte Carlo simulations and our position on the concept of null hypothesis statistical testing are well documented in our methods. Regardless, since chronological pairing does not lead to estimation of correct changes in magnitude and provides no information on changes in frequency, it is irrelevant whether the two pairing methods provide changes in magnitude that have similarly high type 1 error probabilities. [15] We agree with Lewis et al. [2010] that the lack of statistical power may continue to be a challenge in detecting changes in unusual events and we agree with their suggestion of conducting metastudies to investigate whether analogous changes have repeatedly been measured but declared insignificant in the absence of sufficient statistical power. However, this is outside the scope of our article and should be a recommendation for future research on this topic guided by the FP- and not CP-based paradigm. [16] Lewis et al. [2010, paragraph 19] suggested that "[i]f the available data are uninformative, the reader should avoid conclusions of any kind." The amount and relevance of information contained in experimental and observational data depends on the appropriateness of the method used to analyze such data. Our FP event analyses revealed how profound the implications of overlooking changes in flood frequency could be in evaluating the relation between forest harvesting and floods. For the first time, Alila et al. [2009] revealed how forest harvesting not only causes a 3 year to become 2 year event, but may also change a 30 year (Fool Creek) and a 40 year (WS3) into a 15 year event. We have acknowledged the uncertainties in the upper tail of flood frequency distributions [Alila et al., 2009, section 4.2] but simultaneously articulated plausible physical explanations for such changing patterns of magnitude and frequency [Alila et al., 2009, paragraphs 28 and 38], which cannot simply be ignored. [17] Blocking is used in chronological pairing and the paired before-after control-impact (BACI) design to create the sort of controlled experiment that will allow for the isolation of the system response of interest. However, the system response of interest in our case is a flood, which has two inextricably linked attributes: magnitude and frequency. Therefore, the frequency distribution is the only framework that allows the control of one of the two attributes in order to calculate the change in the second. This is the only correct method of answering the purely stochastic research hypothesis: What is the change in magnitude (frequency) for an event of a specific frequency (magnitude) of interest? Given a paradigm, interpretation of data is central to the enterprise that explores it…But that interpretive enterprise…can only articulate a paradigm, not correct it. Paradigms are not corrigible by normal science at all. [19] Lewis et al. [2010, paragraph 22] suggested carrying out paradigmatic comparisons using "data sets reflecting the shorter record lengths more typical of those generally available, such as those from WS1 and WS3, and for the 27 year Fool Creek data set" and not just Fool Creek 48 year data. The intriguing differences between the outcomes of the two pairing methods are best illustrated using a long record in a hydroclimate regime with a naturally slow recovery rate. Our analysis of the Fool Creek results at 27 and 48 years indicates that we need longer and not shorter records. Besides, WS1 and WS3 data sets of varying length have already been analyzed by three research groups using CP analyses and their outcomes have been summarized and compared to the outcomes of our FP analysis [Alila et al., 2009, paragraphs 49–51]. [20] Lewis et al. [2010, paragraph 23] state that the CDFs are smoother than the CP-based regression analyses because "the data are sorted to create a nondecreasing display." The "nondecreasing display" is the result of using order statistics as opposed to CP-based estimates. Order statistics, which comprise a direct estimate of the CDF, afford a more powerful measure of frequency-based changes. The variability around a postharvest regression fit of ANCOVA is an artifact of the inappropriate type of event pairing [e.g., Alila et al., 2009, Figure 3a]. Such variability must affect the statistical power of the CP-based methods and impedes the ability to detect a change caused by forest harvesting [e.g., Alila et al., 2009, Figure 3e and paragraph 59]. Our point is that artificiality in the variability is introduced when one forces the treatment and control CP peak discharges to have the same frequency of occurrence; they do not. Furthermore, there may be a case-specific threshold return period beyond which a forest cover does not affect floods, but that threshold flood can only be identified with a frequency-paired approach. In some rain regimes, for instance, the effects of antecedent soil moisture on large floods may decrease with increasing return period [Wood et al., 1990]. In such regimes, however, an open question is where "large" begins or how rare must floods be for antecedent soil moisture to have no effects on floods? [Sturdevant-Rees et al., 2001, p. 2161]. In other regimes, snow accumulation and melt processes can be more important than evapotranspiration, and their effect on flood response can increase with increasing return period [Schnorbus and Alila, 2004, Figure 9; Harr, 1981, p. 297]. [21] Lewis et al. [2010, paragraph 23] state that "Hypothesis tests for CP and FP have entirely different null hypotheses, so direct comparisons of statistical power may not be possible." "CP and FP have entirely different null hypotheses" was the argument we use to build our case against the CP-based paradigm, and we found it remarkable that Lewis et al. [2010] are now using the same argument against our attempt to compare the statistical power of CP and FP methods. [22] Lewis et al. [2010, paragraph 24] state that "FP cannot be easily used to evaluate recovery." Our point is that recovery will occur when the preharvest and postharvest frequency distributions are identical. Therefore, FP should be used to assess recovery in this context; that it cannot be done as easily is irrelevant. [23] Lewis et al. [2010, paragraph 26] argue that CP-based regression analysis "(Figure 3a) does reveal that the frequency of large peaks increased after logging." We categorically disagree because CP-based analysis of covariance was not designed for such purpose. Lewis et al. [2010, paragraph 26] suggested that "[a]dditional calculations could be used to quantify those changes [in frequency]. Frequencies and the conversion of medium peaks to large peaks may indeed deserve more attention, but there is no reason to abandon methods utilizing CP." What Lewis et al. [2010] are suggesting is an indirect and convoluted way of achieving what can be done directly and with elegance under our FP-based paradigm. Hewlett made the same suggestion three decades ago when, facing the challenge of an apparent harvest-induced increase in the "variability" of peak flows collected in Japan, he stated that "…a large increase in the variance of peaks and volumes…..would be worth reanalyzing by more advanced regression techniques…" [Hewlett, 1982, p. 533]. Hewlett and Helvey [1970, p. 779] were aware that the question of forests and floods cannot be settled without invoking the dimension of frequency. Note that Hewlett's last paper on this topic was his 1982 paper quoted above. [24] We recognized that Lewis and coworkers were among the few who invoked the frequency dimension under the CP-based framework [e.g., Lewis et al. 2001, Figure 29]. However, we see no linkages, in terms of physics or statistical theory, between the outcomes of CP and FP analyses. This type of linkage between the outcomes of CP-based methods and the frequency of floods, which does not necessarily preserve the all-important nonlinear and inverse relation between the magnitude and frequency, is not only ambiguous but projects a state of confusion. We need to recognize that since CP-based methods yield the wrong change in magnitude, there is no guarantee that they yield the correct change in frequency, and even if they do, it would be for the wrong reason. [25] Alila et al. [2009] maintained all along that inferences about forest harvesting effects using the analyses of variance and covariance are invalid for flood events smaller and larger than an average peak flow. Lewis et al. [2010] claimed that we have not given any statistical justification for such argument. Our argument against the old paradigm of CP and the analyses of variance and covariance is about "statistical physics" and not pure "statistics" [Koutsoyiannis, 2010, p. 598]. Decades of peer reviewed research on the topic of forest harvesting and floods that used the old paradigm of CP and associated analyses of variance and covariance didn't account for the physical reality of changing flood frequencies and as a consequence stripped the physics from the research question at hand. [26] Lewis et al. [2010] in another "straw man" type of argument implied that we are drawing support for our case against the flawed CP-based methods from a single claim by Harris [1977]. On the contrary, our article drew support for the case against the CP-based methods from decades of literature in several disciplines (hydrology, ecology, climatology, and statistics). Our extensive after-the-fact forest hydrology literature review revealed that a few hinted at the flaws that we exposed in CP-based methods when used to evaluate the relation between forests and floods: Hewlett and Helvey [1970], Harris [1977]; and most importantly Harr [1986, p. 1096], who explicitly referred to the convergence of two regression fits as "irrelevant" to whether or not forest harvesting affects floods. To the best of our knowledge, Harris and Harr have also written little, if anything, on this topic since then. Although we have been "tied up in irrelevancies" [Platt, 1964, p. 347] for decades, it is never too late to act on past cues from the luminaries of Forest Hydrology [Hewlett and Helvey, 1970, p. 779; Berris and Harr, 1987, p. 141]. In light of these past which continue to be the of literature review over the outcomes of decades of irrelevant CP-based paired watershed peak flow studies the only of our forests and floods theory which cannot be cannot be by p. have been by the in the and frequency of floods to among we must to in order to and information about causes and flood Forest could be to any of a because our confusion about the processes and their in forests and for and its In in of our FP-based paradigm, Lewis et al. [2010] arguments against it are simply We to that CP-based methods are scientifically Although science is in general cumulative and this is one of these rare where on the past would not be the of CP-based of the forests and floods relation have our of the rather than and are We must open to the that our current perception of forests and flood is We the for of this and by the forest hydrology scientific p. is only a of time it is that the CP-based paradigm has been a convenient We one for his on an earlier We and for We are to and for We and for in the of Figure

“The Scientific Revolution” in high school world history textbooks (1949-2014) Yuer-Hsing Chi Heng-An Chen Department of History & College of Liberal Arts SUMMARY This study mainly investigated how the world history textbooks in high school have presented “Scientific Revolution” since the national government moved to Taiwan. That is, we looked into the changes and features of “Scientific Revolution” in high school world history textbooks. Through the development of world history education in Taiwanese high schools, the study first analyzed the curriculum guidelines of the middle school history. We found that since the abolishment of martial laws in 1987, because of the educational reform, the guidelines have gone through several changes. They turned to focus on cultivating the students’ world view and eliminating “European Centrism.” The concept of “Scientific Revolution” has become popular in historical studies since the end of WWII. The related studies nowadays have also started to review and rethink critically on this issue. In the world history textbooks of the Taiwanese high school, the term of “Scientific Revolution” was from nothing to something. In Taiwan, most of the world history textbooks adopted the traditional methods on describing “Scientific Revolution.” Centering on the scientists, the major axis is the revolution of Astronomy and scientific methods. In the future, regarding the introduction on “Scientific Revolution,” in addition to basing on traditional descriptive methods, we suggested to incorporate more reflections, and integrated more political and social backgrounds in the high school world history textbooks. In this way, the students can understand the history from different aspects, holding multiple historical views. Key words: textbooks, history education, high school education, the Scientific Revolution, world history INTRODUCTION Because of the technical improvements brought about by the new technology, the trends globalization were triggered, which forced us to cultivate more profound world view as well as the understanding and tolerance on multi-cultures. Therefore, recent education and learning of world history in high schools have been centered on cultivating macro world view as the primary learning objective. Among the world history textbooks, although the chapter of “Scientific Revolution” does not take up major printed pages, it is one of the very few chapters that lead students to understand the required scientific subjects from a historic perspective. For this reason, it has its value for investigating. The study mainly explored how the world history textbooks in high school have presented “Scientific Revolution” since the national government moved to Taiwan, and how historical studies and perspectives have influenced on the presentations. MATERIALS AND METHODS The present study focused on the “Scientific Revolution” presented in the world history textbooks used by Taiwanese high schools. We investigated the textbooks published from the time that the national government moved to Taiwan to the latest version of textbooks. Because these textbooks were compiled based on the curriculum standards and guidelines set up by MOE, this research also analyzed the changes of the standards and guidelines in this years. By literature review and analysis, we collected related literature on middle school history education. Moreover, we generalized and analyzed based on the main subject of the study “Scientific Revolution” in order to learn the formation, appearance, reflections and rethought on the concept “Scientific Revolution” in the academic field. Afterward, we adopted content analysis method to analyze how “Scientific Revolution” is presented in the textbook chapter. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION After 1987, because of educational reform, the purpose of Taiwanese history education had transformed from enable students to learn the position of “Our Nation” from the learning of “Foreign Countries” to equipped students with “World View.” The content had also changed from political-history-focused to cultural-history-focused, hoping to eliminate “European Centrism” and centering on the present rather than the past. Recently, there have been less political constraints on middle school world history textbooks. However, it is still a big challenge to incorporate historical study results and multiple perspectives properly in the textbooks. “The Scientific Revolution,” from the historical perspective, indicates the period from 16th to 18th century in Europe (Especially 17th century; the year 1543 is viewed as the index of its outset.) There were revolutionary developments in the scientific theories and experiments in these years, which thoroughly changed the scientific approaches. It meant the appearance of modern science. Also, thanks to these scientists, there are tremendous changes in Europeans Universal View. The concept of the term “Scientific Revolution” was originated from Jean le Rond D’Alembert in the 18th century. It was after 1939 that Alexandre Koyre formally brought up the concept. Then, Herbert Butterfield popularized the concept, so the concept became very popular in historical field in the western world. Recently, the academics have had profound reflections and rethought on it. However, “Scientific Revolution” is still a widely-used concept in history. The early versions of curriculum guidelines and textbooks in Taiwanese high school world history did not include the issue of “Scientific Revolution.” The term of “Scientific Revolution” in Taiwanese history education could be said to be from nothing to something. The related content of “Scientific Revolution” in these textbooks that appear the most often in the attached pictures is the revolution-related figures, especially scientists. There is high reappearing and continuing rate of the revolution-related attached pictures. However, the explanations on these pictures have been changing constantly, causing the phenomenon of “one picture, multiple explanations.” Beginning from Nicolau Copernicus through Galileo Galilei,and Johannes Kepler and finally Isaac Newton represented a generalization of views. The presenting approach of traditional “Scientific Revolution”, from astronomy physics, was always included as the center of content. In addition, the inductive method by Francis Bacon and the deductive method by Rene Descartes were the must-mentioned “Scientific methods.” CONCLUSION From the “Scientific Revolution” in the middle school world history textbooks, we can see that the Taiwanese world history teaching material has been renewed with the current academic research. However, the textbooks obviously revealed “fixation.” Once appearing, many fixed terms tend to reappear in the following versions, which are difficult to change, even relive. However, it is apparent that the descriptions in the textbooks still focused too much on the contribution of “Scientific Revolution,” which might be too heroic-oriented. Recently, there is only a few reflection and rethought on “Scientific Revolution” in the academic field. So far, the related content only appeared the Han-Lin Senior High School History based on the latest 2011 curriculum guideline. In the end of the research, we gave some suggestions on the future introduction of “Scientific Revolution” in the middle school world history textbooks. From the junior high school textbooks, we can still focus on introducing traditional concepts of “Scientific Revolution,” but more clear definition, time scope and background information and other related contents should be presented. In the senior high school stage, in addition to the original contents on “Scientific Revolution,” we can discuss the scientific activities at that time through the political perspectives and social background. Also, we should incorporate some reflections and rethought by the academics in the textbook. In this way, students can not only learn the historical knowledge, but also cultivate the ability to think critically at the same time.

It was Francis Bacon (1561-1626) who was commonly credited with the first attempt to formulate a ‘scientific method’. To understand nature it was first necessary to purge the mind of preconceptions. Truth was to be sought by inductive reasoning, by maintaining rigorous scepticism, and devising experiments to test all inferences. It was Bacon’s dedication to the experimental approach that did for him in the end. Francis Bacon was a wily politician, who was ennobled for his services to the Crown, but he attracted enemies, in part at least for his too-zealous investigations into the workings of nature—for ‘being too prying into the then receiv’d philosophy’, as Robert Hooke [63] later wrote. And so he fell from grace; accused of corruption, he was stripped of his public offices and banished from London. After the death of King James, Charles I relaxed the restrictions and permitted Bacon to visit London. On such an occasion one snowy day in March of 1626, Bacon was travelling in a coach with the King’s physician; the conversation turned to the effect of cold on the preservation of food. Could meat be preserved in ice as effectively as in salt? Bacon and his companion resolved to try an experiment: at Highgate, then a village north of London, they stopped the coach and purchased a chicken from a woman, who killed and gutted it. The two men stuffed the carcass with snow and packed it in more snow.

Scientific research has many approaches to reaching correct knowledge and actual sciences. The most prominent approach was the experimental approach, which helps in build civilisations, using observation and experimentation to reach accurate results and to know the proper ways to deal with and explain phenomena. Therefore, this research includes the most crucial method which is the experimental method. Specifically, the most important modern theories are the four delusions of Francis Bacon and their criticism through an Islamic vision based on evidence and proof. As a result, it was found that the most essential theories of Francis Bacon are the mind’s criticism theory, the four delusions theory, which is based on the mind’s criticism theory, and the theory of material understanding of nature. The latter is closely related to the four delusions that Bacon fought because they hinder the mind from achieving the truth, which are the illusions of the tribe, the illusions of the cave, the illusions of the market, and the illusions of the theater, and by looking at them from a legal perspective, it is clear that ignorance and whim are the basis for man’s deviation from the truth. It is recommended to conduct scientific studies between Ibn Taymiyyah as an Islamic thinker and Francis Bacon as a Western thinker. Also, more research and studies should be conducted on the curricula of Western thinkers.

The present paper stakes out the destiny of certain ideas on scientific methods and epistemic and ontological representations that spread in 17th century Europe like a cultural epidemiology of representations against a deist, theosophical, empiricist and occult maze-like background. Our intellectual history study evaluates the family resemblances of auctoritas of three polymaths: Francis Bacon, Jan Baptist Van Helmont and Demetrius Cantemir along the cultural corridors of knowledge. If Francis Bacon was a theoretical founder of doctrines and Jan Baptist Van Helmont was a complex experimenting spirit, Demetrius Cantemir was an able disseminator of philosophy in South Eastern Europe and a creative synthetic spirit bridging the Divan ideas of Western and Eastern minds caught up in the busy exchange of ideas of the Republic of Letters.

This article aims to analyze the Modern Rationality and Legal Method in the light of Plato's Myth of the Cave. The structure of the Myth of the Cave presents the awakening of common sense to science. The journey made by the prisoner symbolizes the changing historical context: the Christian Middle Ages to modernity. The modern rationality emerges with new philosophical and scientific perspective. In this context, thinkers such as Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, Gaston Bachelard and Karl Popper, thinking that contributed to the scientific method arise. His ideas allow us to think the legal method. In this perspective, the jurist must abandon the dogmatic right shadows and meet new dynamic to think openly and legal dialectic method in the light of reason, a critical dynamic.

Much has been written on the origin and originators of the Royal Society, since 1662 the most effective body ever assembled for the true advancement of science and scientific method. There are two aspects of this climacteric event to be con­sidered in relation to the history of our civilization. The first is, how was the atmosphere, or climate of opinion, created for the blossoming and consolidation of the resulting conquests of science? The second is the identification of the indi­vidual human beings whose minds were first set to envisage the vast problems presented to them and what exactly did they do. Thomas Sprat, the first historian of the Royal Society, in his book published in 1667 only five years after the Society received its Charter, had no doubt about the answer to the more general question as to the climatic origin. He was discussing the old philosophy based on Aristotle and the new sort of philosophers ‘who have not only disagreed from the Antients, but have also proposed to themselves the right course of slow and sure Experimenting’. Of these, Sprat said, he would ‘mention only one great Man, who had the true Imagination of the whole extent of this Enterprize, as it is now set on foot, and that is the Lord Bacon’. There should be, he wrote, no preface to theHistory of the Royal Societyother than some of Bacon’s writings. He was a man of strong, clear and powerful imagination, with a vigorous and majestical style, a bold and familiar wit. In fact Sprat seemed to answer both my questions by reference to a single name. Nevertheless, he had to admit that no one mind, not even Bacon’s, could grasp the whole design, for he tried to take all that comes, and to ‘heap rather than to register’. He might have added, as we shall see, that Bacon was no advocate of ‘the slow and sure experi­menting’ he had just mentioned. From that time to the present, Bacon as the Great Originator has received the lip-service of many people, few of whom have read his works. It would be well to examine a little more closely the role filled by Bacon. It is perhaps fair to say that he was the human mouth-piece of that impalp­able thing, theZeitgeist, a presence which would have made itself felt even if Bacon had never been born. The scientific revolution was in the air. It had been slowly gathering force in Europe through the sixteenth century and questions of the old dogmatism were beginning to be asked. It fell to the lot of Bacon to be the voice of this spirit in England as the first statesman of science. His main interest, it has been said, was in ‘the science of science’. His grand idea was to establish a view of scientific possibilities so all-embracing that it would restore mankind to his position as it was before his fall in the Garden of Eden. Man was to re-establish his conquest of the universe and Bacon was to be his prime agent; but in order to organize science for the benefit of the human race he needed power, a thing only obtainable through politics.

Modern natural science does not deal with nature as a whole but is still based on the Cartesian dualism of mind and body ('res cogitans' and 'res extensa'), as well as on Francis Bacon's motto “dissecare naturam”. Moreover, Bacon restricted science to the investigation of material and efficient causes and refused to admit the use of final causes. The metaphysics of Baconian science is based on the confidence that nothing can be known about nature except what can be proved by experiments, that is by interventions which require artificially produced, deliberately controlled, and reproducible conditions. However, empirical science does not intrinsically require the invasive experimental interrogation of nature, called for by Francis Bacon. The Baconian mode of explication seems to be so effective since it sets its own well established normative standards of judgement we often tacitly adopt for our research, so that we only see what we look for. – There is a growing recognition of the inadequacy of Cartesian and Baconian conceptions as the only basis for our understanding of nature. The Baconian method is specialized in experimental manipulations and in predictions, but the aim of science is not to manipulate nature but to create insight. Moreover, modern science, specifically quantum mechanics, has rendered obsolete the Cartesian duality, reductionism, and atomism. Furthermore, the Baconian rejection of finality does not follow from the first principles of quantum theory. There are good reasons for the view that methods of contemporary science are unnecessarily limited by many tacit preconceptions and blind fascinations. In order to secure the continuation of our culture it is important to make our tacit preconceptions and driving motivation explicit. A full-grown science cannot any longer be one-eyed. We have to admit that nature contains both rational and irrational elements, that it includes physis and psyche as complementary aspects of the same reality. We are at the bare beginning to understand reality, but we may have reached a turning point, a way of thinking is developing which is very different from that which has been dominant in the past decades, and which recognizes the repression of the irrational as incongruous.

This article examines the interpretation of nature from the perspective of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), highlighting how his ideas influenced the development of modern science. Francis Bacon proposed a revolutionary approach to scientific and philosophical investigation, emphasizing empirical observation and controlled experimentation. His main work, Novum Organum, published in 1620, introduced the inductive method as a means of discovering truths about nature, criticizing the Aristotelian deductive approach. Furthermore, Bacon emphasized the importance of experimentation as a way to avoid biases and distortions in human thought, introducing the theory of idols to explain the pitfalls of thinking. His contributions to modern science include the promotion of the scientific method and the valuing of experimentation as pathways to seeking truth. It is concluded that the philosopher left an indelible mark on the history of science, reminding us of the importance of empirical observation, experimentation, and the systematization of knowledge, which ultimately influenced the development of science in the following centuries.

Is our title as paradoxical and unrealistic as it sounds? More than a little argument and persuasion would no doubt be necessary to convince anyone that a world wracked by economic conflict and distress, by the aftermath of war and by war itself was on the verge of any kind of Golden Age. But it is not Utopia that is in the making, nor, whatever it is, will it be born suddenly. What we are aware of in the significant changes of direction in human affairs is not the infant's first wail but the first shocking deed of what is already a youth, who strides to the center of the stage and will not thereafter be silenced. The Renaissance is a classic example. We do not know the ultimate origins of that change which is already mature in Sir Francis Bacon's Novum Organum. In hindsight it reads like something already far advanced and in fact like a protocol of conspiracy by scientists to make over the world in a new image, a world in which the pursuit of knowledge will be justified by its being a pursuit of power. To achieve this “I have submitted my mind to things,” says Bacon.

The Scientific Method: An Evolution of Thinking from Darwin to Dewey

Francis Bacon, long considered a minor figure in the founding of modern political thought, is now recognized as one of its foremost thinkers. Bacon not only championed a new type and method of scientific inquiry, he also developed a plan for how modern society could be re-ordered to accommodate and promote scientific progress. Bacon’s scientific writings cannot be wholly understood apart from his political writings, and many of his works combine the two topics so subtly that it is difficult to even place them in a definitive category; in this book, Kimberly Hurd Hale identifies the thread in Bacon’s body of work that links modern science and liberalism. Hale provides a detailed analysis of New Atlantis, examining Bacon’s place in the founding of modern political philosophy and the ways he relates to Plato, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. Hurd argues that Bacon’s demonstration of scientific rule in the New Atlantis is not meant as a blueprint for modern society; rather it shows us the dangers of a scientific society devoid of liberty. By examining what is troubling about the New Atlantis, this book explains what problems lead to the emergence of Atlantean societies, i.e. societies that are prosperous, ambitious, and doomed. It shows that Bacon’s portrait of Bensalem may provide the light necessary to guide those of us living in a world shaped by modern science through the dangerous seas.

THE Royal Society for the Improving of Natural Knowledge was chartered in London in I662. Its membership was made up of gentlemen who were interested in the new philosophy of Bacon and Descartes. Many of the members were Professors, Masters and Fellows of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge; others were physicians and clergymen, and some, like Robert Boyle and Samuel Pepys, were private individuals or courtiers who had no scholastic or professional connections. The Fellows were elected, not, as nowadays, for their attainments in science, but for their interest in the sciences and scientific method. These early members of the Royal Society were anxious to add to the general store of knowledge about everything connected with their natural environment. The breadth of their interests now makes them appear credulous and even superstitious, but actually they were radically objective for their day. They boldly discarded the traditional outlook and methods of scholasticism and began anew with a determination to wrest the truth from nature for themselves. For this reason they overlooked nothing that might add to the sum total of their knowledge. The early Society followed the pattern set forth by Sir Francis Bacon in his description of Solomon's House in the New Atlantis. The members and correspondents were intelligencers, who contributed observations and facts. At first these facts were circulated among interested people by Henry Oldenburgh, but as his correspondence grew too large, he decided to choose from among the contributions and publish selected items in journal form.' The full title of this worthy publication shows the ambitious scope of the Royal Society: Philosophical Transactions giving some Accompt of the Present Undertakings, Studies, and Labours, of the Ingenious in Considerable Parts of the World. This journal was usually published in London. Among the many considerable parts of the world represented in the Philosophical Transactions was Latin America. All of Latin America, with the exception of Brazil, belonged to Spain. The Carib-