ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND GOVERNANCE IN THE ARAB REGION — A REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE TO PRIORITIZE POLICY CHALLENGES

The present paper summarizes the finding of the survey on competition policy strength in Arab countries. For this first of a kind analysis, UNESCWA used the established OECD instrument to complement the existing global dataset on competition policy and to provide decision-makers in the Arab countries a reference measure for achievements and gaps related to competition policy, legislation and institutional structures. Building on the 2013 OECD study on Competition Law and Policy, the UNESCWA survey applies the same indicators, seeking to assess the scope, legal framework and enforcement capability of competition regimes in the Arab region.The results of the survey discussed in the previous chapters highlight that there is a clear push towards the development of competition regimes in the region and that the efforts in the Arab region are strong in comparison with the OECD average. The legal and procedural frameworks underpinning national competition policy have seen multiple reforms in the past decade, increasing the scope of activity, the investigative and enforcement powers of competition authorities in the region. Spearheaded by reforms in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, other countries are beginning to re-evaluate the role of antitrust regulation.Nonetheless, the survey also shows the need for improvement in terms of independence of competition authorities, procedural fairness as well as enforcement concerns. With the exception of Tunisia, all other countries have not investigated or imposed sanctions on some or all antitrust infringements related to mergers, horizontal and vertical agreements, or exclusionary conducts. Most competition authorities surveyed are nominally independent, though subject to government interference in certain aspects of the decision-making, investigative and sanctioning process. Furthermore, issues of transparency and fairness in the application of antitrust measures are observed. Decisions on antitrust infringements are often not disclosed, while the publication of investigative and decision-making processes is limited in a number of countries. In the broader context of economic governance in Arab countries, the paper testifies to the commitment of some Arab countries towards establishing better policies and the authors hope the paper contributes towards building a sustainable and fair “competition culture” to the benefit of all people in the Arab region.

For many years, Hizballah was perceived as a success story by many in Lebanon and, indeed, throughout the Middle East and the Arab and Muslim world, and even beyond. The organization seemed to succeed in whatever it attempted to achieve. It was active in several arenas at once—in the Lebanese Shiʿi community, in the Lebanese political arena in general, on the front with Israel, and even in the regional arena at large—and in each sphere, it seemed to grow ever stronger.What was the precise nature of Hizballah's success and to what in particular should it be attributed? Should the focus be on the organization's ability to defy Israel, to “needle” and “wound” it over and over again, and even to create a degree of deterrence capability such as the Arab states over the years had found it difficult or impossible to develop? Or perhaps one should focus on Hizballah's success in turning the Shiʿi community in Lebanon into a cohesive political entity striving for a leading role in the state, perhaps even the predominant role? Or perhaps the focus should be on another front altogether, that is, Hizballah's unprecedented achievements in advancing Iran's interests while serving as Tehran's vanguard in penetrating to the shores of the Mediterranean?Whatever answer one gives to these questions, one thing is clear: Hizballah's perceived success relied in no small degree on its ability to make itself seem more powerful than it really was and on its skill in creating, via the communications media, a modern “David and Goliath” story with the roles reversed. This process was greatly aided by today's modern media that blur the lines between the real and the virtual worlds. Hizballah discovered how to use digital media and communications in a sophisticated way and turned media into one of its main instruments for consolidating its standing and building its image of success.However, it is important to separate reality from fantasy; Hizballah's aura of success turned out to be fleeting, and it has shown clear signs of fading altogether. For some time now, it seems that the organization has lost its magic touch and is no longer moving from success to success. When did the damaging reversal take place?Was it the Second Lebanese War in the summer of 2006? Hizballah emerged from that conflict acting as if it were the victor, while in reality, once the fighting ended, the organization's supporters in Lebanon, if no one else, were compelled to see the difference between a virtual victory in the media and the reality on the ground. All around them, Hizballah's supporters were confronted with a reality of destruction and devastation that Hizballah had brought down upon them because of the war it carried out against Israel.Or perhaps the moment of transition began in May 2008, when Hizballah turned its weapons against its fellow Lebanese, members of the Sunni community, and thus revealed its true face, not as an organization of resistance to Israel, but as a Shiʿi political force in Lebanon seeking to advance its own narrow sectarian political agenda.March 2011, when the Syrian revolution broke out, might also be considered as marking a critical juncture for Hizballah. It now found itself on the wrong side of the political equation. In the eyes of many observers, Hizballah allowed itself to be drafted into the service of Shiʿi Iran in support of Syria's cruel dictator, who had resorted to slaughtering his own people, especially members of the Sunni majority who were seeking liberty and freedom.These developments influenced the way many people perceived Hizballah, especially those in the Arab world, but also those in the West as well. Nevertheless, for the masses of Shiʿis in Lebanon, Hizballah was and remains a significant factor in their daily lives, regardless of the state of the organization's image and media gimmicks. Hizballah won the support of the local Shiʿi communities—thanks to the financial, educational, social welfare, and other services it provides to these communities—and these services are what guarantee the continued support of the Shiʿi population in Lebanon.The book under review, The Hizbullah Phenomenon: Politics and Communication, focuses on Hizballah's pre-2011 glory days. The book appears at a difficult time for Hizballah. This difficulty is evident from Hasan Nasrallah's nervous and overwrought speeches in recent years, in which he is clearly apologetic as he strives to justify Hizballah's unpopular intervention in the Syrian civil war. Many Lebanese Shiʿi families are paying the price with the lives of their sons in that war. Nasrallah has also given speeches revealing real anxiety, not necessarily in regard to Israel, but particularly in regard to the Islamic State (is), which is perceived as the up-and-coming star in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Indeed, the is not only threatens Hizballah physically, but also, and mainly, seeks to remove the organization from its position as the media darling of the Arab and Muslim worlds.The authors of The Hizbullah Phenomenon undertake to examine the connection between politics and the media, or, in other words, the connection between the Hizballah's political activities—its policies, ideological principles, modes of action affecting the public, and so on—and its communication strategies—the clever ways it uses the media to make itself appear more powerful and promote the “Hizballah phenomenon” as something unique in the region. In the introduction to the book, “Hizbullah's Communication and Political Evolution,” the authors succinctly characterize the organization and argue: Hizbullah, the Lebanese ‘party of god’, is a late twentieth-century phenomenon, the outcome of a series of socio-historical and political junctures marked by domestic political upheaval and regional conflicts. Hizbullah is a by-product of regional geostrategic alignments: the group is ideologically and politically connected to Iran, and its capabilities, weaponry and operations are influenced by Iranian patronage. It is also has long-term strategic links with Syria, which has acted as a conduit for the supply of arms and personnel from Iran and serves as an important ally in domestic politics. In the space of thirty years, Hizbullah has established itself as the most powerful political force in Lebanon and as a dynamic actor in the broader region through its use of a sophisticated political communication strategy which blends military, social, economic and religious elements while remaining adaptive to changing socio-political contexts. This strategy, as the book will show, has been a central tool that the group has used to disseminate its image and ideology. (p. 1)And the book's central argument is stated a few pages later: This book argues that Hizbullah's communication strategy has served as the foundation for its political evolution and endurance as a movement. Ever since its inception, Hizbullah has paid constant attention to its image, seeking to manage and institutionalize it in order to achieve legitimacy, to reach out to different constituents and to implement its political goals. The starting point for this book is that Hizbullah's political evolution and its success within particular contexts cannot be appreciated without understanding the methods, tools and practices it has employed since its formation in 1982, and the relationship between agency and structure—i.e., the activism of its elites and ideologues functioning within organized and deeply rooted structural arrangements, and the relationship between this activism and political contexts. Indeed, it is Hizbullah's highly organized structure that has allowed it to develop and reproduce authority in popular culture, and to devise and implement communication strategies in line with changing political, economic and social contexts…. (Furthermore), This book argues that Hizbullah's political, economic, military and cultural mobilization and activism cannot be seen as natural or taken-for-granted responses to accumulated grievances, or as a reactionary product of a cultural essence. Rather, Hizbullah's activism and mobilization have resulted from the agency of its elites and ideologues and their implementation of a political communication strategy designed to widen its support base and increase its influence. (p. 5)Thus, in the various chapters of this collection of essays, the authors deal with the familiar story of the development of Hizballah, but they do so from unique perspectives. Among the book's chapters are “Hizbullah's Political Strategy,” by Lina Khatib; “From the Invasion to the Liberation: Communicating Hizbullah's Political Repertoire, 1982–2000,” by Dina Matar and Atef Alshaer with Lina Khatib; “Hizbullah in the Twenty-First Century: The Struggle for Political Survival, 2000–2012,” by Lina Khatib; and the particularly interesting article, “The Poetry of Hizbullah,” by Atef Alshaer; as well as Dina Matar's important article, “Hassan Nasrallah: The Central Actor in Hizbullah's Political Communication Strategies.”Matar's article focuses on Hasan Nasrallah, Hizballah's Secretary General and supreme leader. For good or for bad, for two decades now, the fate of Nasrallah and the fate of Hizballah have been intimately bound together. This close connection between the identity of the leader and his organization enables scholars to analyze them through the prism of charisma. True, charisma is usually thought of as an attribute of a political personality, but it can also carry over to his (or her) organization insofar as the latter has a life of its own.It will be recalled that “charisma,” from the Greek meaning “gift of the gods,” refers to a personal quality or charm that gives an individual exceptional interpersonal communication skills and the ability to influence or exert authority over people. The charismatic person is able to use his charm, which includes more than the ability to speak persuasively and think rationally, to reach people's hearts and influence their opinions, and sometimes he is able to attract the masses to his cause and organization. The modern use of the word “charisma” was introduced by the German sociologist Max Weber. He used the term to describe the influence of a leader whose followers attribute his influence to his supernatural or divinely conferred traits. Weber thus defined “charisma” as “a certain quality of an individual personality, by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.” The most significant point is the recognition of these traits. “This recognition is a matter of total personal devotion resulting from enthusiasm or despair and hope…. Charisma can be bound up with subjective or internal redirection that emerges from suffering, conflict, or enthusiasm,” a process that can occur at times of “spiritual, physical, economic, ethical, or political crisis.”However, as is well known, charisma also depends on success and fades away when political, economic, military, or any kind of failure takes place. Charisma cannot be preserved without success.The successes achieved by Nasrallah's charisma, and consequently his organization, depended on the ability of both of them to maximize their achievements under favorable circumstances. At home, these circumstances included the weakness of Hizballah's rivals in both the Shiʿi community and the Lebanese social and political system in general. On the regional level, Hizballah's power inside Lebanon was limited by the restrictions forced upon it by both Israel and Syria. At the same time, Hizballah enjoyed the unlimited and disproportionate support of Iran, in the form of billions of dollars supplied annually and weaponry enough to satisfy a whole state.However, these circumstances, with regard to both Iran and the region in general, were destined to change, and not necessarily in Hizballah's favor. In Iran, the changes taking place were made manifest when Hassan Rouhani was elected president in June 2013. Dina Matar alludes to this in her chapter entitled, “Hizbullah in the Twenty-First Century: The Struggle for Political Survival.” This chapter deals with the organization in the shadow of the “Arab Spring,” and in face of the revolutions spawned by that phenomenon throughout the Arab world. Matar argues that, “With dignity and heroism having come within the reach of the average Arab citizen as a result of the Arab Spring, the narrative of victimization was the only way in which Hizbullah would now be able to stand out in a region that was witnessing a rise in individual agency beyond the umbrella of political organizations, a factor that Hizbullah's communication strategy had never had to address before. The Arab Spring, then, put Hizbullah at a crossroads, not only stealing its limelight but also testing its credibility in the Arab world, and consequently, its longevity. Thirty years after Hizbullah came into existence, the group's communication strategy appears to have come full circle” (p. 118).The summation presented in the final chapter of the book, “Conclusion: Hizbullah at a Crossroads,” makes the following three points: The trajectory of Hizbullah's communication strategy offers a number of important lessons for scholars of social movements, activism and political communication: first, communication strategy succeeds when a group can bridge the gap between the way it perceives itself and the way others perceive it, rather than remaining focused on the validity of its ideologies vis-à-vis those of others—the smaller the distance between these perceptions, the higher the degree of the communication strategy's success. Second, no communication strategy can succeed if it lacks credibility. Hizbullah has consistently relied on notions of justice and liberty to prove its legitimacy to its audiences, claiming to represent the voices of the people, to speak for the oppressed and to seek “justice” for victims of Israeli aggression while branding itself as a “liberator” and “defender” of land and people. But this image was threatened when the Assad regime in Syria turned its weapons on its own people during the Arab Spring, as opposed to directing them towards the Israeli “enemy” in the occupied Golan Heights. Finally, in order to be successful, there is a need for a dynamic relationship between communication strategy and changing political contexts. Hizbullah's evolving communication strategy is part of the party's place within a larger political opportunity structure where “fixed or permanent institutional features combine with more short-term, volatile, or conjectural factors to produce an overall particular opportunity structure. (p. 189)Before the Arab uprisings, and particularly before the Syrian rebellion, Hizballah had been largely successful at taking advantage of changes in the political environment to carve a favorable image, and simultaneously, to adapt its image according to changes in the environment. This highlights the fine balance that exists between political adaptability and reliability and between structure and agency. However, the uprisings, coupled with a significant shift in the visible performance of politics by ordinary citizens in the Arab world, thus far constitute the main obstacles to maintaining the credibility of Hizballah's familiar communication framework, and consequently its ability to capture the imagination of its intended audiences.However, with all due respect to communications, publicity, and propaganda, it should be noted that Hizballah's ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, observed in March 2011 that the glorious aura of the struggle with Israel, and even the halo of an Arab “David” fighting the Israeli “Goliath,” were not enough to save one at the moment of truth brought about by a broad-based popular uprising. At this point, we should also recall that for the masses of Shiʿis in Lebanon, Hizballah is not merely a virtual entity, but rather a very tangible and important factor in their daily lives. At every step it is there, beginning in kindergarten, then in school, and on to the health clinic and hospital, including all aspects of economic life and social relations. Thus, it would seem that as long as Hizballah continues to meet the practical needs of the Lebanese Shiʿis and fulfills their political desires and aspirations, its continued existence is assured.

For many years, Hizballah was perceived as a success story by many in Lebanon and, indeed, throughout the Middle East and the Arab and Muslim world, and even beyond. The organization seemed to succeed in whatever it attempted to achieve. It was active in several arenas at once—in the Lebanese Shiʿi community, in the Lebanese political arena in general, on the front with Israel, and even in the regional arena at large—and in each sphere, it seemed to grow ever stronger.What was the precise nature of Hizballah's success and to what in particular should it be attributed? Should the focus be on the organization's ability to defy Israel, to “needle” and “wound” it over and over again, and even to create a degree of deterrence capability such as the Arab states over the years had found it difficult or impossible to develop? Or perhaps one should focus on Hizballah's success in turning the Shiʿi community in Lebanon into a cohesive political entity striving for a leading role in the state, perhaps even the predominant role? Or perhaps the focus should be on another front altogether, that is, Hizballah's unprecedented achievements in advancing Iran's interests while serving as Tehran's vanguard in penetrating to the shores of the Mediterranean?Whatever answer one gives to these questions, one thing is clear: Hizballah's perceived success relied in no small degree on its ability to make itself seem more powerful than it really was and on its skill in creating, via the communications media, a modern “David and Goliath” story with the roles reversed. This process was greatly aided by today's modern media that blur the lines between the real and the virtual worlds. Hizballah discovered how to use digital media and communications in a sophisticated way and turned media into one of its main instruments for consolidating its standing and building its image of success.However, it is important to separate reality from fantasy; Hizballah's aura of success turned out to be fleeting, and it has shown clear signs of fading altogether. For some time now, it seems that the organization has lost its magic touch and is no longer moving from success to success. When did the damaging reversal take place?Was it the Second Lebanese War in the summer of 2006? Hizballah emerged from that conflict acting as if it were the victor, while in reality, once the fighting ended, the organization's supporters in Lebanon, if no one else, were compelled to see the difference between a virtual victory in the media and the reality on the ground. All around them, Hizballah's supporters were confronted with a reality of destruction and devastation that Hizballah had brought down upon them because of the war it carried out against Israel.Or perhaps the moment of transition began in May 2008, when Hizballah turned its weapons against its fellow Lebanese, members of the Sunni community, and thus revealed its true face, not as an organization of resistance to Israel, but as a Shiʿi political force in Lebanon seeking to advance its own narrow sectarian political agenda.March 2011, when the Syrian revolution broke out, might also be considered as marking a critical juncture for Hizballah. It now found itself on the wrong side of the political equation. In the eyes of many observers, Hizballah allowed itself to be drafted into the service of Shiʿi Iran in support of Syria's cruel dictator, who had resorted to slaughtering his own people, especially members of the Sunni majority who were seeking liberty and freedom.These developments influenced the way many people perceived Hizballah, especially those in the Arab world, but also those in the West as well. Nevertheless, for the masses of Shiʿis in Lebanon, Hizballah was and remains a significant factor in their daily lives, regardless of the state of the organization's image and media gimmicks. Hizballah won the support of the local Shiʿi communities—thanks to the financial, educational, social welfare, and other services it provides to these communities—and these services are what guarantee the continued support of the Shiʿi population in Lebanon.The book under review, The Hizbullah Phenomenon: Politics and Communication, focuses on Hizballah's pre-2011 glory days. The book appears at a difficult time for Hizballah. This difficulty is evident from Hasan Nasrallah's nervous and overwrought speeches in recent years, in which he is clearly apologetic as he strives to justify Hizballah's unpopular intervention in the Syrian civil war. Many Lebanese Shiʿi families are paying the price with the lives of their sons in that war. Nasrallah has also given speeches revealing real anxiety, not necessarily in regard to Israel, but particularly in regard to the Islamic State (is), which is perceived as the up-and-coming star in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Indeed, the is not only threatens Hizballah physically, but also, and mainly, seeks to remove the organization from its position as the media darling of the Arab and Muslim worlds.The authors of The Hizbullah Phenomenon undertake to examine the connection between politics and the media, or, in other words, the connection between the Hizballah's political activities—its policies, ideological principles, modes of action affecting the public, and so on—and its communication strategies—the clever ways it uses the media to make itself appear more powerful and promote the “Hizballah phenomenon” as something unique in the region. In the introduction to the book, “Hizbullah's Communication and Political Evolution,” the authors succinctly characterize the organization and argue: Hizbullah, the Lebanese ‘party of god’, is a late twentieth-century phenomenon, the outcome of a series of socio-historical and political junctures marked by domestic political upheaval and regional conflicts. Hizbullah is a by-product of regional geostrategic alignments: the group is ideologically and politically connected to Iran, and its capabilities, weaponry and operations are influenced by Iranian patronage. It is also has long-term strategic links with Syria, which has acted as a conduit for the supply of arms and personnel from Iran and serves as an important ally in domestic politics. In the space of thirty years, Hizbullah has established itself as the most powerful political force in Lebanon and as a dynamic actor in the broader region through its use of a sophisticated political communication strategy which blends military, social, economic and religious elements while remaining adaptive to changing socio-political contexts. This strategy, as the book will show, has been a central tool that the group has used to disseminate its image and ideology. (p. 1)And the book's central argument is stated a few pages later: This book argues that Hizbullah's communication strategy has served as the foundation for its political evolution and endurance as a movement. Ever since its inception, Hizbullah has paid constant attention to its image, seeking to manage and institutionalize it in order to achieve legitimacy, to reach out to different constituents and to implement its political goals. The starting point for this book is that Hizbullah's political evolution and its success within particular contexts cannot be appreciated without understanding the methods, tools and practices it has employed since its formation in 1982, and the relationship between agency and structure—i.e., the activism of its elites and ideologues functioning within organized and deeply rooted structural arrangements, and the relationship between this activism and political contexts. Indeed, it is Hizbullah's highly organized structure that has allowed it to develop and reproduce authority in popular culture, and to devise and implement communication strategies in line with changing political, economic and social contexts…. (Furthermore), This book argues that Hizbullah's political, economic, military and cultural mobilization and activism cannot be seen as natural or taken-for-granted responses to accumulated grievances, or as a reactionary product of a cultural essence. Rather, Hizbullah's activism and mobilization have resulted from the agency of its elites and ideologues and their implementation of a political communication strategy designed to widen its support base and increase its influence. (p. 5)Thus, in the various chapters of this collection of essays, the authors deal with the familiar story of the development of Hizballah, but they do so from unique perspectives. Among the book's chapters are “Hizbullah's Political Strategy,” by Lina Khatib; “From the Invasion to the Liberation: Communicating Hizbullah's Political Repertoire, 1982–2000,” by Dina Matar and Atef Alshaer with Lina Khatib; “Hizbullah in the Twenty-First Century: The Struggle for Political Survival, 2000–2012,” by Lina Khatib; and the particularly interesting article, “The Poetry of Hizbullah,” by Atef Alshaer; as well as Dina Matar's important article, “Hassan Nasrallah: The Central Actor in Hizbullah's Political Communication Strategies.”Matar's article focuses on Hasan Nasrallah, Hizballah's Secretary General and supreme leader. For good or for bad, for two decades now, the fate of Nasrallah and the fate of Hizballah have been intimately bound together. This close connection between the identity of the leader and his organization enables scholars to analyze them through the prism of charisma. True, charisma is usually thought of as an attribute of a political personality, but it can also carry over to his (or her) organization insofar as the latter has a life of its own.It will be recalled that “charisma,” from the Greek meaning “gift of the gods,” refers to a personal quality or charm that gives an individual exceptional interpersonal communication skills and the ability to influence or exert authority over people. The charismatic person is able to use his charm, which includes more than the ability to speak persuasively and think rationally, to reach people's hearts and influence their opinions, and sometimes he is able to attract the masses to his cause and organization. The modern use of the word “charisma” was introduced by the German sociologist Max Weber. He used the term to describe the influence of a leader whose followers attribute his influence to his supernatural or divinely conferred traits. Weber thus defined “charisma” as “a certain quality of an individual personality, by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.” The most significant point is the recognition of these traits. “This recognition is a matter of total personal devotion resulting from enthusiasm or despair and hope…. Charisma can be bound up with subjective or internal redirection that emerges from suffering, conflict, or enthusiasm,” a process that can occur at times of “spiritual, physical, economic, ethical, or political crisis.”However, as is well known, charisma also depends on success and fades away when political, economic, military, or any kind of failure takes place. Charisma cannot be preserved without success.The successes achieved by Nasrallah's charisma, and consequently his organization, depended on the ability of both of them to maximize their achievements under favorable circumstances. At home, these circumstances included the weakness of Hizballah's rivals in both the Shiʿi community and the Lebanese social and political system in general. On the regional level, Hizballah's power inside Lebanon was limited by the restrictions forced upon it by both Israel and Syria. At the same time, Hizballah enjoyed the unlimited and disproportionate support of Iran, in the form of billions of dollars supplied annually and weaponry enough to satisfy a whole state.However, these circumstances, with regard to both Iran and the region in general, were destined to change, and not necessarily in Hizballah's favor. In Iran, the changes taking place were made manifest when Hassan Rouhani was elected president in June 2013. Dina Matar alludes to this in her chapter entitled, “Hizbullah in the Twenty-First Century: The Struggle for Political Survival.” This chapter deals with the organization in the shadow of the “Arab Spring,” and in face of the revolutions spawned by that phenomenon throughout the Arab world. Matar argues that, “With dignity and heroism having come within the reach of the average Arab citizen as a result of the Arab Spring, the narrative of victimization was the only way in which Hizbullah would now be able to stand out in a region that was witnessing a rise in individual agency beyond the umbrella of political organizations, a factor that Hizbullah's communication strategy had never had to address before. The Arab Spring, then, put Hizbullah at a crossroads, not only stealing its limelight but also testing its credibility in the Arab world, and consequently, its longevity. Thirty years after Hizbullah came into existence, the group's communication strategy appears to have come full circle” (p. 118).The summation presented in the final chapter of the book, “Conclusion: Hizbullah at a Crossroads,” makes the following three points: The trajectory of Hizbullah's communication strategy offers a number of important lessons for scholars of social movements, activism and political communication: first, communication strategy succeeds when a group can bridge the gap between the way it perceives itself and the way others perceive it, rather than remaining focused on the validity of its ideologies vis-à-vis those of others—the smaller the distance between these perceptions, the higher the degree of the communication strategy's success. Second, no communication strategy can succeed if it lacks credibility. Hizbullah has consistently relied on notions of justice and liberty to prove its legitimacy to its audiences, claiming to represent the voices of the people, to speak for the oppressed and to seek “justice” for victims of Israeli aggression while branding itself as a “liberator” and “defender” of land and people. But this image was threatened when the Assad regime in Syria turned its weapons on its own people during the Arab Spring, as opposed to directing them towards the Israeli “enemy” in the occupied Golan Heights. Finally, in order to be successful, there is a need for a dynamic relationship between communication strategy and changing political contexts. Hizbullah's evolving communication strategy is part of the party's place within a larger political opportunity structure where “fixed or permanent institutional features combine with more short-term, volatile, or conjectural factors to produce an overall particular opportunity structure. (p. 189)Before the Arab uprisings, and particularly before the Syrian rebellion, Hizballah had been largely successful at taking advantage of changes in the political environment to carve a favorable image, and simultaneously, to adapt its image according to changes in the environment. This highlights the fine balance that exists between political adaptability and reliability and between structure and agency. However, the uprisings, coupled with a significant shift in the visible performance of politics by ordinary citizens in the Arab world, thus far constitute the main obstacles to maintaining the credibility of Hizballah's familiar communication framework, and consequently its ability to capture the imagination of its intended audiences.However, with all due respect to communications, publicity, and propaganda, it should be noted that Hizballah's ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, observed in March 2011 that the glorious aura of the struggle with Israel, and even the halo of an Arab “David” fighting the Israeli “Goliath,” were not enough to save one at the moment of truth brought about by a broad-based popular uprising. At this point, we should also recall that for the masses of Shiʿis in Lebanon, Hizballah is not merely a virtual entity, but rather a very tangible and important factor in their daily lives. At every step it is there, beginning in kindergarten, then in school, and on to the health clinic and hospital, including all aspects of economic life and social relations. Thus, it would seem that as long as Hizballah continues to meet the practical needs of the Lebanese Shiʿis and fulfills their political desires and aspirations, its continued existence is assured.

This study focuses on the Arab literature published by researchers from all 22 members of the Arab League during the last 5 years before Arab Spring (2006–2010) and the 5 years after Arab Spring (2011–2015), in order to identify effects of the Arab Spring on research in the Arab world both performance and Productivity, based on bibliometrics analysis of the data extracted from Web of Science and InCites Essential Science Indicators provided by Thomson Reuters, and by using the statistical software package SPSS. The total productivity of Arab researchers before the Arab Spring was (103,917) document. Countries that witnessed revolution and government overthrown produced the largest productivity (42.5%). The Arab countries’ production doubled after the Arab Spring (214,864 document). Countries that witnessed Minor protests advanced to second place (30%) as a result of the leap that occurred in Saudi Arabia publications. The extent of collaboration among Arab countries before the Arab Spring was twice the number of publications in which they collaborated with the rest of the world. The number of citations was positive after the Arab Spring for 12 countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, Egypt and United Arab Emirates, while it was negative for 10 countries such as Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon. There is no significant difference between Arab countries exposed to different levels of protests of Arab Spring, and between Counties’ performance after and before Arab Spring. However, counties’ productivity after Arab Spring has increased higher than before Arab Spring.

Governance, capital and economic growth in the Arab Region

This article looks at the literature on democratization in the Arab world, and links it to the ongoing political change since the ‘Arab Spring’. Whereas assessing the ongoing events in the Arab world as an ‘Arab Spring’ or revolution is still a matter of speculation, there is a need to re-examine the literature on democratization which is dominated by the hypothesis of Arab and Islamic exceptionalism. This article aims at presenting possible explanations for these theoretical perspectives in light of the ongoing debate on definition, characterization and interpretation of what is actually happening in the Arab world, amidst contradicting representation of facts and data. The study concludes that defining the ‘Arab Spring’ as democratic transformation is a premature judgement. What is happening, instead, can be considered a ‘transition from authoritarianism’. Democratic transition depends on a number of factors that allow for building democratic political institutions and at the same time, diminishing the possibilities of renewal of autocracy and authoritarianism in the Arab world.

The Second Arab Awakening: Revolution, Democracy, and the Islamist Challenge from Tunis to Damascus

While the events of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ constitute movements of vast social significance within the Arab world, they have at the same time raised as many questions as they have hopes and expectations. Among the most pressing causes for concern and further research are the roles that Arab audiovisual media and satellite broadcasting have played in not only covering events, but also in possibly even fomenting them through selectivity, timing, high-technology decoupage of images culled from the internet and new forms of social media, as well as the introduction of themes and slogans into various Arab public arenas even before the locals have taken such up themselves. The connection of Arab media to the political agendas of their sponsors as in the case of Aljazeera, for instance, has also been brought to the fore and writ large, leading to questions over whether or not media discourse is dialogic and genuinely responsive to multiple voices in the sense envisioned by Habermas or whether it is a Machia...

63 Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. XXXVI, No.1, Fall 2012 The Arab Spring and the Indian Urdu Press Mohamed Muddassir Quamar* The Arab world is going through a kind of churning for more than one year. Several social, economic, cultural and political factors including corruption, unemployment and bad governance have been cited as the underlying reasons for this unrest.1 The changes might not result in shortterm political stability or long-term ushering in of democracy to the Arab countries. While the outcome remains uncertain, rulers and governments in the region have to become more accountable, have to pave way for reforms or face being overthrown. The developments in the region began after the self-immolation of Tunisian street vendor Muhammad Bouazizi in December 2010. It triggered a massive protest against the Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The “Jasmine Revolution”, as it was termed by many, had a domino effect on other countries and is collectively known as the Arab Spring.2 The events were widely covered by Arab, regional and international media. How was Arab Spring reflected in the Urdu media in India, where there lives the third largest Muslim population in the world after Indonesia and Pakistan?3 Historically, India has strong political, economic, cultural and *Md Muddassir Quamar is a Doctoral Candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. 1 Sean Foley, “The Arab Awakening and the New Disorder of Hope”, Occasional Paper, Middle East Institute, New Delhi, October 3, 2011, http://mei.org.in/front/cms/ publicationsDetail.php?id=MzA3&cid=Ng==. 2 There are criticisms over the expression Arab Spring. For example see, Rami G. Khouri, “Drop the Orientalist term “Arab Spring””, August 17, 2011, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ Article.aspx?id=146410#axzz1v74UhBNx. 3 “The Future of the Global Muslim Population: An Interactive Feature, Sortable Data Tables: Muslim Population by Country”, The PEW Forum on Religion & Public Life, January 2011, http://features.pewforum.org/muslim-population/. 64 energy relations with the region.4 The presence of an estimated six million Indian expatriate population in the region makes it strategically very important for India. Seen in this wider context this research looks at the Urdu press in India and their coverage and responses to the “Arab Spring”. Urdu Media in India The Muslim-Urdu linkage is highly debated within India.5 Many leaders see this as the communalization of language and culture and periodically warn against such tendencies.6 According to the preliminary 2011 census figures, India’s Muslim population stands at 150 million and that of Urdu speaking population at 55 million.7 In other words, Urdu is not the lingua franca of every Muslim in India. At the same time, it is necessary to recognize that over time, especially since the partition of the sub-continent, popular perceptions about the linkage has strengthened. While it is not the exclusive language of the Indian Muslims, a significant majority of Urduspeaking population are Muslims. This Urdu speaking population is spread all over the country from Kashmir in the North to Tamil Nadu in the South and from Assam in the East to Gujarat in the West. The nature and extent of influence of this population upon India’s policy is debatable but political developments in the Middle East generate considerable interest, attention and at times protest from the Muslim community. India’s policy towards the Arab world as well as towards the three non-Arab countries of the region, namely, Iran, Israel and Turkey, are widely debated within the community. Therefore, the Urdu press can be seen as one of the most important medium of expression for the Indian Muslim population. There are more than a dozen major national and regional Urdu dailies/periodicals published from different parts of the country. These newspapers in comparison to other regional language dailies devote more attention to the developments in the Middle East. The Arab Spring has also been 4 For details see, S. Maqbul Ahmad, Indo-Arab Relations: An Account of India”s Relations with the Arab World from Ancient up to Modern Times (New Delhi: ICCR, 1969); and Prithvi Ram...

The article explores the core components of Iran’s politics in the Middle East and its latest developments achieved in the region since the 1990s. The author focuses on the Iranian activity in some Arab countries, mainly in Syria, showing why and how Iranian influence managed to ground so deeply in the social fabric of the Syrian society. The author briefly characterizes historic background of Arab-Iranian relations, showing the place and role of Iranian politics in Arab society and political institutions on the eve of ‘Arab Spring’. The article studies the influence of ‘Arab Spring’ on Arab-Iranian relations and shows the challenges, caused by this popular uprising on its early stages in some Arab countries, for Iran and its relations with Middle Eastern states. The stand of the Arab authorities with regards of the given situation and its ability to influence its development are demonstrated as well. The author explores the latest actions of IRI to create structures under Iranian control in some Arab countries, showing the latest developments of Iranian penetration into Arab countries, first of all into Syria. The author analyzes the actions of Iranian diplomacy in concerning the above mentioned goals to strengthen Iranian positions in the Middle East. The article shows the main spheres of Iranian, Israeli, Turkish and Russian contradictions in some Arab countries, first of all in Syria, paying special attention to the development of Russian-Iranian relations in the Middle East. The author estimates Iran’s chances to safeguard its present position in the Middle East in the contexts of latest developments in the region and with regards to Iran’s relations with Russia and Turkey. The author tries to predict transformations in Iran’s Middle Eastern politics in view of further political developments in the region, sharing his views about reconsidering Russian-Iranian relations aiming to improve it, considering the upcoming challenges in the region, where Moscow pursues today an active policy.

Rapping the Arab Spring

The events of the Arab Spring have had a significant impact on the world stage, extending its influence beyond the Arab region, leading to dramatic changes in the political landscape of the Middle East. This article analyses assessments of the Arab Spring and its impact on French foreign policy. The paper examines the key factors that shaped France's approach to the Arab Spring events, including geopolitical interests, economic ties, historical relations with the Arab world, and domestic political considerations. The aim of the paper is to analyse the key assessments, approaches and interpretations of the French expert community in relation to the Arab Spring events. The object of the study is French foreign policy in the context of the Arab Spring events and its impact on France's relations with Arab countries. The subject of the study is the assessment of the ‘Arab Spring’ by the French expert community. The methodological basis of the article is based on the system approach. The scientific novelty of the work is due to the fact that it treats the events of the Arab Spring as a turning point for French foreign policy in the Middle East, leading to a revision of previously established approaches. The authors concluded that the events of the Arab Spring have become a serious challenge for France's foreign policy, requiring a flexible response and adjustment of previously established approaches. The results of the study contribute to the understanding of the peculiarities of France's foreign policy course in the Middle East region, and also make it possible to assess the impact of the Arab Spring on the transformation of foreign policy priorities of one of the leading states of the European Union.

The popular mobilisations of 2010-11, known as the ‘Arab Spring’, have had a global resonance well beyond the Arab world, affecting the lives of migrants with Arab- Mediterranean background living in Europe. Drawing on qualitative analysis, this article explores the impact of the Arab Spring on second generation’s young people of Egyptian origin living in Italy. This study shows that research participants have a diverse assessment of the outcomes of the uprisings, that they have participated in them in different ways, and that they have contributed to the construction of common or contested narratives around them, both in the public and private discourse. Moreover, the research discusses the impact of these key historical events on young people’s identity and sense of belonging, as well as on their transnational ties and practices. The transnational political engagement of research participants is examined to investigate how second generations experience a transnational life and build transnational identities. This study contributes to the debate on the relationship between transnationalism and second/third generations.

The present report focuses on the importance of effective antitrust and competition laws, and the need for well-functioning market regulators in the Arab region to enhance the business environment, foster investments, improve economic performance and drive growth. It takes into consideration that the issues of competition and regulation are linked. Shortcomings in the past have aggravated challenges associated with inefficient market structures and governance systems (e.g. heavily concentrated and inefficient economies, collusion, centralization of economic power among a few elites and general rent-seeking behaviour in Arab countries). Overall, the report discusses competition and regulatory policies and institutions in the Arab region and, taking into account the impact of the Arab Spring, examines the delayed implementation of competition and regulatory policies, the reasons for market failure, the overall benefits of competition policy and regulation, and the deficiencies specific to the region.Based on comprehensive analysis, the report outlines substantive policy recommendations in view of recent initiatives and considers the different development stages of Arab countries vis-a-vis their competition and regulation policy.

Barriers and Facilitators in Physical Rehabilitation for Parkinson's Disease in the Arabian World.