Entre a exemplificatividade e a taxatividade do rol de procedimentos e eventos em saúde da Agência Nacional de Saúde: a participação popular como instrumento democratizante

This paper explores hypotheses that could explain both the creation of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in Brazil, and the differences in the design of the Brazilian IRAs in the telecommunications and electricity sectors. To formulate specific hypotheses that make sense of the Brazilian case, the paper critically interrogates the “weak state” hypothesis and the “political bias” hypothesis. The first argues that countries with flawed governance structures, such as Latin American countries, are less likely to establish independent regulators than European countries. The second argues that “political bias” is a determinant factor in predicting the implementation of IRAs in Latin America. The first part of the paper uses these two general hypotheses as a basis to formulate specific hypotheses to explain the creation of IRAs in Brazil. The second part of the paper formulates specific hypotheses that could explain why institutional guarantees of IRA independence are stronger in the telecommunications sector, than in the electricity sector. In particular, the paper argues in support of a revised version of the “political bias” hypothesis to explain sectoral divergence, suggesting that bureaucratic resistance to reform may be the cause for the variations observed in Brazil between regulatory reform in electricity and in telecommunications.

Selected cases of failure analysis and the regulatory agencies in Brazil. Part 1: Aviation, railway and health

"Chapter 14: Presidential Dominance from a Comparative Perspective: The Relationship between the Executive Branch and Regulatory Agencies in Brazil" published on 28 Dec 2010 by Edward Elgar Publishing.

Selected cases of failure analysis and the regulatory agencies in Brazil. Part 2: Electric energy and oil

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to debate on how to achieve, in countries that have invested in the North American model of the regulatory state, the greatest efficiency in creating norms for the organization of public and private activities in order to guarantee the autonomy and technical impartiality required for the proper functioning of regulatory agencies.Design/methodology/approachThis paper describes the development of the legal framework regarding regulatory agencies in Brazil. The research was based on bibliographical data, media reports, and the Brazilian Supreme Court decisions.FindingsThe regulation dissemination through regulatory agencies in Brazil has given rise to a series of controversies concerning the limits of their performance and the extent of their technical discretion. According to the findings, it is concluded that these independent agencies should be guided by the following four pillars: (1) the legal rule of fixed-term in office; (2) the principle of lesser control intensity (deference) of the agency acts; (3) the prohibition of contingency of agencies’ budgetary resources; and (4) the prohibition of agency powers suppression. Otherwise, the institutional capacity of agencies will be diminished and their neutral action in technical matters will be compromised.Originality/valueThis paper shows how enhanced autonomy and technical impartiality can be useful for better regulatory governance in other countries, preventing them from suffering from the same problems that have occurred in Brazil.

This article describes Brazil’s regulatory agencies compared to the United States, emphasizing their similarities and differences and discussing the Brazilian regulatory agencies in detail. After careful content analysis, key findings pointed out a significant disparity within both countries: while in Brazil, the first regulatory agency was created in 1996 – National Telecommunications Agency (ANATEL), in the United States, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was founded 114 years before, in 1887, evidencing a long tradition and expertise regarding the regulatory environment from the North American agencies. There are currently eleven regulatory agencies in Brazil, while in the United States, there are 47. Different types and functions give North American regulatory agencies a higher level of sophistication than the Brazilian regulatory system, meaning that the Brazilian regulatory framework finds an excellent deal for improvement. One of the implications that compile the current work is the discussion about the existence of a political influence in regulating agencies needing to catch up compared to their American counterparts’ pace of innovation.

This article draws on a large survey regarding the appointment of heads of IRAs, which was carried out by the authors in 2016, to explain and illustrate the flawed attempt to implement an infrastructure regulation model based on independent regulatory agencies in Brazil.

### Summary box Regulatory health agencies exist in most public health systems (PHS) and play a crucial role in enacting regulation and overseeing economic activities in order to ensure the...

This paper focuses on evaluating and benchmarking the governance of regulatory agencies in Brazil's water and sanitation sector. Using a unique database obtained through the application of a questionnaire, we developed an index of regulatory governance and ranked all the agencies in Brazil that participated in the study. The index is an aggregate number of the evaluation of four key governance characteristics: Autonomy, Transparency, Accountability, and Tools & Capacity, including not only formal aspects of regulation but also indicators related to actual implementation. Based on 18 different indices, we analyze the positions of agencies with regard to different aspects of their regulatory governance, considering not only performance in each variable but also scores in the different components of each category. This evaluation identifies particular agency shortcomings regarding governance and indicates needed improvements. Although Brazil has strived to consolidate the governance design of its regulatory agencies, implementing the independent regulator model still faces several challenges. Various aspects of governance can be improved to pursue greater efficiency and quality in providing services, particularly in Accountability and Political Autonomy, where the country shows the largest number of regulatory agencies with the lowest scores. Conversely, almost half of the participating agencies show optimal scores in the Regulatory Autonomy aspect of governance. The results, for the most part, corroborate the institutional theory, in which the role of institutions is paramount for greater efficiency in providing public services, as it reduces information asymmetries and transaction costs and maximizes economic incentives.

The adoption of Internet based tools for public consultation had increased in recent years. Regulatory agencies and ministries use such features as a means to broaden and deepen citizen participation, transparency and social engagement in shaping federal public policy. This paper presents a study of all the regulatory agencies and Ministries of Brazil and compares them to identify the level of influence participatory involvement of social actors have on their public policy formulation process.

Validation of a chromatographic method for amoxicillin determination in wastewaters after its degradation by advanced oxidation process

The development of the Third Sector presupposes the overcoming of challenges such as efficiency,collaboration, sustainability, legitimacy, and above all, to guarantee the disclosure of its economic and financialcondition, as well as its performance in the implementation of social projects and programs. However, onemay notice that in Brazil accounting statements prepared by Third Sector institutions are adaptations ofstatements created for private corporations, which can hamper the disclosure process. The various theoriesof Equity (proprietary, entity and funds) highlight the characteristics of organizations, corporate or otherwise,and the different perspectives in relation to the focus of accounting disclosure. Thus, this paper aims atexplaining how such theories influence the formulation of the practical standards by regulatory agencies in Brazil and in the United States, and consequently, the elaboration and release of accounting information byThird Sector institutions. A case study on Fundação Zerbini was developed, which revealed incoherenciesin the adoption of Equity theories. These inconsistencies compromised the access of outsiders to thatinstitution’s accounting data.

Learning is recognized as an important component of environmental impact assessment (EIA) in particular, due to its potential to transform individual, social, and organizational values, standards and practices to support a sustainable development. Nevertheless, only a few models developed to describe learning processes in EIA systems seem to be grounded on the combination of both theoretical aspects and empirical evidence of learning, which requires further investigation. This paper is based on the development of a conceptual model to understand learning processes through the practice of EIA, and evidence-gathering of learning in EIA systems focused on the role played by the leading organization. The outcomes were based on literature review and empirical research using two EIA regulatory agencies in Brazil as case studies. Data collection and analysis were supported by participant observation, personal interviews and qualitative content analysis. Although specific to the context, the evidence produced have corroborated the implicit feature of learning in EIA systems and, we believe, reinforced the relevance of the conceptual model as developed in the paper.

The relationship between public integrity and regulation can be seen through two complementary prisms: regulation as a requirement for public integrity, considering the supervisory role that regulatory agencies play in the public integrity cycle, especially regarding state-owned companies; and public integrity as a foundation of regulation, since, beyond general governance aspects applicable to all public bodies, regulators face specific integrity risks, such as those related to regulatory capture and political interference over technical decisions. This article is dedicated to understanding how this relationship unfolds in the national institutional context, exploring the particularities of governance in regulatory agencies in Brazil. After a theoretical reflection on the relationship between the concepts of regulation and integrity, based on academic debate and the history of Brazilian public administration, a reference framework for understanding the specificity of institutional integrity applied to regulatory agencies is proposed. From this framework, a discussion on the main institutional challenges faced by Brazilian regulatory agencies regarding public integrity is proposed. This discussion is empirically based on the experience of the QualiReg Program, a partnership between UNDP and CGU, aimed at improving regulatory quality and the institutional capacity of Brazilian regulatory agencies. The Program assessed the regulatory governance and institutional capacity of 45 agencies, across all levels of federation. Through the analysis of these assessments, it is possible to identify governance bottlenecks faced by regulatory agencies. Thus, after theoretical and empirical discussion, a public integrity agenda for regulatory agencies is proposed as a conclusion, going beyond integrity programs and codes of conduct, focusing on the intersection between regulatory quality and public integrity.

In this paper we model the process of regulatory agency design, focusing on the role of credibility. The government is constrained in the sense that it must create regulatory institutions that allow it to commit to not administratively expropriate investors. The model explains both the preference of the agency head chosen by the government as well as the optimal level of statutory control. We argue that in Brazil this trade-off between credibility and control of the agencies is key to understanding the specific regulatory institutions that have been chosen. Comparative static results are derived to examine how changes in some key variables affect the design of the agencies, providing us with a set of hypotheses for comparing the design of five different agencies created to regulate industries with very different characteristics. Although these agencies were initially created under very similar designs, they are expected to evolve in ways that accord with our theory.