Ensuring Compliance with Standards on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

Abstract

Abstract The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has provided unbiased independent verification for over fifty years, within the legal authority granted to it by its member states and the resources which it has been given to carry out that authority and has been able to respond to shifting perceptions of proliferation threats. It has also been engaged in verifying the disarmament of nuclear weapon programmes in Iraq, South Africa, and Libya, and developed ‘black box’ techniques for verifying material dismantled from nuclear weapons in non-nuclear states. To ensure the continued adherence by states to the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to their respective safeguards agreements, and to reduce the risk that additional states attempt to circumvent their non-proliferation undertakings, it is necessary: to strengthen the IAEA's verification capabilities; to minimize the risk of break-out; and to address the underlying motivations of states. A set of concrete steps that could be taken under each of these headings are suggested.