Enhancing the BWC Through Scientific Communities and Networks of New Actors in the Era of Emerging Science and Technology.

Rapid developments in biotechnology, genetics and genomics are undoubtedly creating a variety of environmental, ethical, political and social challenges for advanced societies. But they also have severe implications for international peace and security because they open up tremendous avenues for the creation of new biological weapons. The genetically engineered ‘superbug’—highly lethal and resistant to environmental influence or any medical treatment—is only a small part of this story. Much more alarming, from an arms‐control perspective, are the possibilities of developing completely novel weapons on the basis of knowledge provided by biomedical research—developments that are already taking place. Such weapons, designed for new types of conflicts and warfare scenarios, secret operations or sabotage activities, are not mere science fiction, but are increasingly becoming a reality that we have to face. Here, we provide a systematic overview of the possible impact of biotechnology on the development of biological weapons. The history of biological warfare is nearly as old as the history of warfare itself. In ancient times, warring parties poisoned wells or used arrowheads with natural toxins. Mongol invaders catapulted plague victims into besieged cities, probably causing the first great plague epidemic in Europe, and British settlers distributed smallpox‐infected blankets to native Americans. Indeed, the insights into the nature of infectious diseases gained by Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch in the nineteenth century did not actually represent a great breakthrough in the use of infectious organisms as biological weapons. Similarly, the development of a bioweapon does not necessarily require genetic engineering—smallpox, plague and anthrax are deadly enough in their natural states. But the revolution in biotechnology, namely the new tools for analysing and specifically changing an organism's genetic material, has led to an increased risk of biowarfare due to several factors. First, the expansion of modern biotechnology in medical and pharmaceutical research and …

Major efforts to engage scientists in issues of biosecurity in the United States and internationally began in the early 2000s in response to growing concerns about terrorists using weapons of mass destruction and the mailing of anthrax-laced letters in October 2001. This article draws on the literature about the “science of science communication,” including research on framing, to examine the strategies used to try to raise awareness and create support for policies and practices to address public concerns about biosecurity issues within scientific communities. Engagement strategies framed as an inherent part of the broader social responsibilities of the scientific community have shown the promise of being more effective than those framed in terms of legal and regulatory requirements and an emphasis on security alone. The article draws on the case of the InterAcademy Partnership (IAP), the global network of academies of science and medicine, and its relationship with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), with additional examples from other national and international scientific organizations.

From Healthcare to Warfare and Reverse: How Should We Regulate Dual-Use Neurotechnology?

Marking the 50th anniversary of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), this commentary examines adaptive strategies underpinning the treaty's resilience within an increasingly complex and fragmented global biosecurity ecosystem. By conceptualizing the BWC as an autopoietic subsystem-one that is self-sustaining and yet structurally coupled to its environment-we argue that the BWC's historical effectiveness in preventing large-scale biological weapons use derives from its capacity for normative memory. Its reflexive operation enables the treaty to continuously reinterpret and apply its foundational prohibition amid evolving scientific and technological landscapes. Recent advancements in synthetic biology, bioinformatics, and artificial intelligence intensify risks by blurring boundaries between biosafety and biosecurity, between peaceful and weaponized biotechnology applications, challenging the BWC's ability to differentiate clearly between permissible and prohibited activities. In response, internal structural differentiation through specialized frameworks becomes essential, notably via the proposed science and technology mechanism. This body would function explicitly as a structural coupling device, mediating uncertainty and translating the flux of scientific possibility into legally referable categories without collapsing the normative autonomy of the Convention. Concurrently, the international cooperation and assistance mechanism would enhance global preparedness and interoperability among cross-disciplinary biosecurity communities. The COVID-19 pandemic underscored the urgency for institutional adaptability, heightened preparedness, and proactive engagement across disciplines. Analyzing ongoing diplomatic negotiations within the Working Group on the Strengthening of the BWC, we highlight substantial convergences alongside residual divergences across 7 key topics: international cooperation and assistance; science and technology; compliance and verification; confidence-building measures; assistance, response and preparedness; national implementation; and organizational, institutional, and financial arrangements. Ultimately, we advocate for integration of scientific expertise and diplomatic practice, emphasizing sustained interdisciplinary collaboration and robust institutional commitment as prerequisites for ensuring the BWC's normative vitality and operational efficacy for decades to come.

Strengthening the BTWC: The role of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in combating natural and deliberate disease outbreaks

Metadata refer to descriptions about data or as some put it, "data about data." Metadata capture what happens on the backstage of science, on the trajectory from study conception, design, funding, implementation, and analysis to reporting. Definitions of metadata vary, but they can include the context information surrounding the practice of science, or data generated as one uses a technology, including transactional information about the user. As the pursuit of knowledge broadens in the 21(st) century from traditional "science of whats" (data) to include "science of hows" (metadata), we analyze the ways in which metadata serve as a catalyst for responsible and open innovation, and by extension, science diplomacy. In 2015, the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will formally come to an end. Therefore, we propose that metadata, as an ingredient of responsible innovation, can help achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on the post-2015 agenda. Such responsible innovation, as a collective learning process, has become a key component, for example, of the European Union's 80 billion Euro Horizon 2020 R&D Program from 2014-2020. Looking ahead, OMICS: A Journal of Integrative Biology, is launching an initiative for a multi-omics metadata checklist that is flexible yet comprehensive, and will enable more complete utilization of single and multi-omics data sets through data harmonization and greater visibility and accessibility. The generation of metadata that shed light on how omics research is carried out, by whom and under what circumstances, will create an "intervention space" for integration of science with its socio-technical context. This will go a long way to addressing responsible innovation for a fairer and more transparent society. If we believe in science, then such reflexive qualities and commitments attained by availability of omics metadata are preconditions for a robust and socially attuned science, which can then remain broadly respected, independent, and responsibly innovative. "In Sierra Leone, we have not too much electricity. The lights will come on once in a week, and the rest of the month, dark[ness]. So I made my own battery to power light in people's houses." Kelvin Doe (Global Minimum, 2012) MIT Visiting Young Innovator Cambridge, USA, and Sierra Leone "An important function of the (Global) R&D Observatory will be to provide support and training to build capacity in the collection and analysis of R&D flows, and how to link them to the product pipeline." World Health Organization (2013) Draft Working Paper on a Global Health R&D Observatory.

Development of and prospects for the biological weapons convention

I n the wake of the anthrax attacks over the past few weeks, scientists across the world have the opportunity to unite in a bid to create a less dangerous world. As the Royal Society emphasized in a report last year,[*][1] the international scientific community has a crucial role to play in tackling the threat from biological weapons, and it is essential that this challenge be met directly on many fronts. Scientists need to support policy-makers in negotiations to secure an effective international instrument banning the development, production, and use of biological weapons. This could be achieved almost immediately at the Fifth Review Conference of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), to be held in Geneva between 19 November and 7 December, where the 144 states party to the BWC will be seeking to gain consensus on the most effective means of reinforcing the existing ban. It is vital that all the parties to the BWC, including the United States, find a way forward together to reach a positive outcome. It is not possible for any single nation to protect itself fully from the malign use of biological agents without complementary action by all other countries. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), now in its fourth year of full implementation, demonstrates that international instruments can be put into practice. Unlike the BWC, the CWC provides an elaborate international verification system, which is operated from The Hague by 500 staff members at its headquarters and in its inspectorate at the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The CWC verification system applies both to military facilities for chemical weapons defense and to the civil manufacturing industry, providing insurance against maleficent uses of technologies that have beneficial applications, without at the same time unduly burdening, endangering, or otherwise constraining industry. The key to introducing this system was the involvement of the chemicals industry worldwide in the negotiation of the CWC from the mid-1980s onward. Likewise, full cooperation with the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries is essential to any verification system for an international instrument banning biological weapons. Scientists can play their part in implementing such an instrument by providing the tools for diagnosis and detection through which compliance can be monitored and by the innovation of countermeasures, including novel vaccines and better computer models to elucidate the source and dissemination of infectious agents and their impact in the body. These endeavors cannot be restricted to government research facilities alone. Scientists in industry and academe have expertise that must be engaged in finding the best protection against biological weapons, and concerns about security or commercial confidentiality should not override a concerted effort by the scientific community. An immediate task for scientists is to analyze the global spate of anthrax attacks. There are no confirmed cases previously recorded of a biological agent being used deliberately by terrorists to kill people. There are lessons to learn that should help all nations to rigorously assess the danger posed by anthrax and how it can be countered. Scientists also have a responsibility to engage in a dialogue with the public as well as with each other and with policy-makers. Anxiety has been generated worldwide by the anthrax attacks, sometimes inflamed by ill-judged media coverage. All scientists have a duty to facilitate access to information that is both accurate and comprehensive enough for the public to properly weigh the risks posed to them by biological weapons. The anthrax attacks have demonstrated that the use of biological weapons is no longer a theoretical threat. Coming as they have after 11 September, the world now seems a much more dangerous place. Scientists can and must help to address this fear by working closely with policy-makers to reduce the threat from biological weapons. [1]: #fn-1

The Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists are a set of ten principles designed to promote responsible science and strengthen biosecurity governance. They should be broadly adopted, including being endorsed by the Biological Weapons Convention at its 9th Review Conference in November 2022.

New verification approaches are needed to strengthen compliance and build transparency under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This study considers how blockchain technology could support laboratory oversight by addressing issues like data integrity, traceability, and secure data sharing in facilities handling sensitive biological materials. Low submission rates of confidence building measures currently limit the impact of the BWC. Blockchain's decentralized, tamper-resistant ledger brings security and openness critical for international collaboration in biosecurity. Using blockchain, laboratories can establish unalterable records that build accountability and trust among stakeholders while lowering the risk of data manipulation. This system also supports cooperative investigations under Article V of the BWC by providing a secure platform for sharing sensitive biological data between states. Key benefits include more substantial information reliability, better control over access, and the ability to trace biological materials' origins and uses, helping distinguish lawful activities from illicit ones. These improvements support BWC compliance by allowing for selective and privacy-conscious data sharing. Challenges such as scalability, technical training, balancing data security with transparency, and securing long-term funding must be addressed through thoughtful planning and cooperation. As BWC member states seek stronger compliance measures, integrating blockchain provides a solution that could significantly support global biosecurity over the next 50 years.

This study aims to develop a methodology for designing entrepreneurial networks based on assessing the potentials of actors, which are social and economic groups participating in entrepreneurial relations localized in the territories of the Russian Arctic. The objective is to ensure the reasoned participation of actors in network alliances. Methodological approaches and results of assessing the entrepreneurial potential of actors were previously presented, with the author developing approaches that account for the regional features of Arctic processes and allow for broad interpretation. To achieve this, the potential of various actors, or stakeholders operating in Arctic territories, is evaluated. This involves the use of indicators to integrate data in order to detail entrepreneurial properties. Among the indicators are involvement in creating business infrastructure, the scale of activity, innovative endeavors, professionalism of public organizations, and the efficiency of government administration in fostering a favorable investment climate. Other indicators include population engagement in innovation-driven processes (the degree of integration of local and scientific knowledge achieved by establishing formal and informal institutions and programs for interaction between the population and scientific communities; the degree of development of public institutions as subjects of the transfer of innovative solutions between participants in the territorial innovation system, etc.), the degree of monopolization of the territory's economy, the presence of large venture investors, and the venture policy of corporations indicating the stage of territory development. The article's objective is to lay theoretical foundations and methodological provisions for designing the architecture of Arctic network alliances. The focus is on ensuring maximum entrepreneurial potential, considering Arctic processes and their rapid recombination amid swift changes in the business environment. As a result, the author proposes a methodological approach to identifying actors in entrepreneurial networks and connections that support relationships between central actors. This identification is based on the target function of maximizing and restructuring entrepreneurial potential in the Arctic, whose calculation is automated through the use of the Python programming language. The article introduces the author's version of software for generating management information for network brokers. All data for assessment and design can be obtained from official open sources, ensuring the speed of data collection and processing. Research plans involve developing provisions of a methodology focused on the meso-level of the Russian Arctic macroregion for territorial, production, and socio-economic systems with significant potential for forming relations in the innovation economy.

Recent advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have led to intense debates about benefits and concerns associated with this powerful technology. These concerns and debates have similarities with developments in other emerging technologies characterized by prominent impacts and uncertainties. Against this background, this paper asks, What can AI governance, policy and ethics learn from other emerging technologies to address concerns and ensure that AI develops in a socially beneficial way? From recent literature on governance, policy and ethics of emerging technologies, six lessons are derived focusing on inclusive governance with balanced and transparent involvement of government, civil society and private sector; diverse roles of the state including mitigating risks, enabling public participation and mediating diverse interests; objectives of technology development prioritizing societal benefits; international collaboration supported by science diplomacy, as well as learning from computing ethics and Responsible Innovation.

This study is a focused literature review that looked at scientific papers and books on the link between science diplomacy and global governance in confronting global catastrophic risks and how it was reflected in the development of the contemporary discussion on science diplomacy. Its goal was to contribute to the recommendations on tackling global challenges. To this end, the study focused on the three dimensions of science diplomacy, the nature of the global risks in our hyper globalized world, and the gaps in global governance. The data were drawn from reliable sources and highlighted the qualitative approach to delve into the case. The study (1) defined science diplomacy and outlined its largely unexplored agenda of competition, (2) identified global systemic risks and the weak points in the structure of the complex international system, (3) described the urgent need to fill the gaps in global governance, and (4) explored the roles of both state and nonstate actors in using science in international relations. It thus addressed the interactions between science diplomacy actors and global governance actors. It uncovered aspects of interactions that may clarify the debate about science diplomacy and global governance and may help in tackling global challenges.

The changing organization and nature of biotechnology and bio-innovations have led to the global phenomenon of ‘science at large’. This has given rise to two key trends in global biosecurity governance: the growing role of science diplomacy in addressing biosecurity concerns and the rise of distributed agencies, particularly involving young practitioners from the global South, who are participating in a decentralization of western-dominated biosecurity discourse through Track II science diplomacy. These trends require updated and inclusive regulatory innovations that acknowledge biosecurity and related regulatory-ethical discussions as crucial elements of public diplomacy. There is a particular need to align these efforts with emerging forms of societal funding and to foster novel public–private partnerships in advanced bioscience research. They also call for promoting multitrack science diplomacy by bolstering institutional support for science diplomacy and biosecurity. This could be in the form of dedicated funding, or the establishment of sustained platforms to enable regular mutual learning and interactions between an international group of scientists and policy-makers. These efforts should be complemented by investment to normalize cross-disciplinary and cross-sectoral dialogues, which are essential for building communities among both established and new stakeholders. These dialogues can foster mutual learning, cultural harmonization and the development of joint initiatives to address shared biosecurity concerns. This policy paper advocates for the formal integration of science diplomacy training into university science curriculums, especially at the postgraduate level. This training will equip the next generation of scientists to align scientific visions and enhance biosecurity compliance in an increasingly connected yet ideologically diverse world.

The article considers the forms of development of the concept of public diplomacy, which has become both an effective mechanism for promoting the national interests of states and can be considered as a criterion for stratifying countries by the level of development. It is determined that the high intellectual intensity of scientific and diplomatic activities is the common characteristic that led to their combination at a certain historical stage in the form of science diplomacy as a form of combining the activities of the state and management of national intellectual capital, and which is classified as a leading mechanism for the transmission of soft power by states. The authors demonstrate the relationship between the level of economic development, the volume of expenditures and the effectiveness of efforts to implement the instruments of science diplomacy, the theoretical discourse on which is developing in three key functional dimensions (science in diplomacy, diplomacy for science, and science for diplomacy). It is outlined that the institutionalisation of science diplomacy opens up the possibility of targeted activities to manage the science diplomacy of its actors, as well as to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of this activity. The article summarises the dominant formats of science diplomacy with a focus on the peculiarities of international academic and scientific exchanges, government programmes, international academic mobility, and emergent science and education diplomacy (in the global online education market, world-class universities, international teams of collaborators). The newest institutional forms of competitive interaction between the subjects of science diplomacy are identified, which include platforms for professional cooperation of scientific attaches of different states, scientific, diplomatic and diaspora networks, as well as the institute of technological ambassadors. It is proposed to consider the dominant and newest formats of science diplomacy, as well as joint research infrastructure and practices of hybrid combination of mechanisms and instruments of science diplomacy by states as components of the development of a global model of the international economic order. The authors suggest that developing countries should focus on using the potential of non-institutionalised science diplomats to promote their national interests. It is concluded that the economic potential of science and its international nature are actively manifested in the use of various institutional forms of international academic entrepreneurship and competitive interaction, which are developed and most actively sought to be used by those countries that invest most in research. The article identifies such research subjects as climate diplomacy, food diplomacy and other types of public diplomacy as promising, the development of which is associated with the intensification of research efforts to solve global problems.