Abstract
This chapter provides an overview of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations of the Reagan administration. It explains how the zero option was President Reagan's way of getting the Soviet intermediate-range missiles out of Europe. To enhance US bargaining leverage, American policymakers planned to implement the basing program. The chapter cites how the Reagan administration remained mindful of European politics amidst the negotiation process. However, President Reagan typically stuck to his principles of distrusting the Soviet leadership and demanded a global INF agreement with stringent verification provisions. The chapter then highlights how the INF Treaty with Moscow remained in a deadlock.
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