Abstract
There is today a strong case for engaging Iran. Changes in Iran have made such a process feasible but its success will be constrained by political divisions among Iran's leadership. US policy will have to take these divisions into account in not asking for more than President Khatami can deliver, or setting its objectives beyond what is realistically obtainable. While an improved atmosphere will not substitute for dealing with the hard issues of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, it will make it easier to address such questions. The process of engagement should stir the US to move from slogans to formulating more specific demands on Iran in the sensitive area of security issues. The US should consider what it wants and what it is prepared to give to get it, offering inducements and access to technology in exchange for greater reassurance about programmes causing unease.
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