Abstract
Abstract:This paper considers the question whether a psychological approach to personal identity can be formulated within an endurantist, as opposed to four‐dimensionalist, framework. Trenton Merricks has argued that this cannot be done. I argue to the contrary: a perfectly coherent endurantist version of the psychological approach can indeed be formulated.
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