Embodiment and the Philosophy of Mind

Six hundred three people completed a survey measuring perceptions of traditional areas of philosophical inquiry and their relationship to empirical science. The ten areas studied were: aesthetics, epistemology, ethics, history of philosophy, logic, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and political philosophy. For each area, participants rated whether it is currently central to philosophy (centrality), whether its centrality depends on integration with science (dependence), and whether work in the area is sufficiently integrated with science (integration). Centrality judgments tended to be high. Participants viewed nine of the ten areas as central to philosophy (the exception being aesthetics), although they made this judgment more confidently for some areas. Dependence judgments were more varied, ranging from clear disagreement (for logic and history of philosophy) to clear agreement (for philosophies of science, mind, and language). Integration judgments were also varied but exhibited more uncertainty. Some areas whose centrality depended on integration were judged to be well integrated (philosophies of science and mind), but a central tendency for all other areas was ambivalence. Demographic factors had small but statistically significant effects on all three sorts of judgment. Higher age predicted higher centrality judgments and higher integration judgments. Higher socioeconomic status predicted lower dependence judgments and higher integration judgments. Men recorded higher integration judgments.

In 1792 Dugald Stewart published Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. In its section on abstraction he declared himself to be a nominalist. Although a few scholars have made brief reference to this position, no sustained attention has been given to the central role that it played within Stewart’s early philosophy of mind. It is therefore the purpose of this essay to unpack Stewart’s nominalism and the intellectual context that fostered it. In the first three sections I aver that his nominalism emanated from his belief that objects of the mind—qualities, ideas and words—were signs that bore no necessary relation to the external objects that they were meant to represent. More specifically, it was these signs that were arranged into systems of thought by the ‘operations of the mind’. The next three sections suggest that his treatment of words as signs most probably originated in his views on language and medicine and that his nominalistic philosophy of mind could also be extended to systems that sought to classify the natural world. I conclude by suggesting several avenues of enquiry that could be pursued by future scholars interested in excavating Stewart’s thought.

The philosophy of language and mind plays an important role in language learning, especially in the context of Arabic language learning. However, more in-depth research is needed to understand the implications of these philosophical concepts in Arabic language learning. This study aims to investigate the implications of the philosophy of language and mind in the context of Arabic language learning. The research method used is library research, which involves a review of literature related to philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and Arabic language learning. Analysis of the literature shows that philosophy-based approaches can be an important basis in learning development, including curriculum development, learning methods, and teacher and student skills. The implications of the findings highlight the importance of adopting a philosophy-based approach to Arabic language learning by designing curriculum and teaching methods that take into account the close relationship between language and mind.

This special issue contains a number of papers selected on the basis of presentations of the first Philosophy of Language and Mind (PLM) conference, organized by the PLM network. The PLM network was established in 2010, with the purpose of furthering the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind in Europe. The original members were the Department of Philosophy at CEU, Budapest; Arche at the University of St Andrews; LOGOS at the University of Barcelona (mainly); CLLAM at the Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University; CSMN at the University of Oslo; Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris; ILLC at the University of Amsterdam; IP at University of London, and NIP at the University of Aberdeen. In 2011 PLM was joined by ILCLI at the University of the Basque Country, San Sebastian, and by the Institute of Philosophy II at the Ruhr University Bochum.

In philosophy of mind, Searle contrived two arguments on the impossibility of AI: the Chinese room argument and the one based upon the observer-relativity of computation. The aim of the present article is two-fold: on the one hand, I aim at elucidating implications of the observer-relativity argument to (ontic) pancomputationalism, in particular the quantum informational view of the universe as advocated by Deutsch and Lloyd; on the other, I aim at shedding new light on the Chinese room argument and the nature of linguistic understanding in view of the semantic realism debate in philosophy of logic and language, especially Dummett’s verificationist theory of meaning. In doing so, philosophy of mind turns out to be tightly intertwined with philosophy of logic and language: intelligence is presumably the capacity to reason, and in view of a distinction between statistical and symbolic AI (“AI of sensibility” and “AI of understanding” in Kantian terms), philosophy of logic and language is arguably the part of philosophy of mind that concerns the symbolic realm of intelligence (i.e., the realm of understanding rather than sensibility). More specifically, in the first part of the article, I argue that pancomputationalism cannot be maintained under Searle’s external realism; nevertheless, a radical (external) antirealist position, such as Wheeler’s (“It from Bit”), may allow for a possibility of pancomputationalism. The Searle’s argument and the infinite regress paradox of simulating the universe yield challenges to pancomputationalism and the quantum informational view of the universe, leading us to the concept of weak and strong information physics (just like weak and strong AI). In the second part, I argue that Dummett’s principle of manifestation on linguistic understanding commits Searle to semantic realism due to the nature of his Chinese room argument. Searle’s position must thus be realism in two senses, that is, it has to be external semantic realism. I finally focus upon recent developments of categorical quantum mechanics, and discuss a quantum version of the Chinese room argument. Underpinning all this is the conceptual view that the duality of meaning manifests in different philosophies of logic, language, and mind.

Six hundred and three people completed a survey measuring perceptions of traditional areas of philosophical inquiry and their relationship to empirical science. The ten areas studied were: aesthetics, epistemology, ethics, history of philosophy, logic, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and political philosophy. For each area, participants rated whether it is currently central to philosophy (centrality), whether its centrality depends on integration with science (dependence), and whether work in the area is sufficiently integrated with science (integration). Centrality judgments tended to be high. Participants viewed nine of the ten areas as central to philosophy (the exception being aesthetics), although they made this judgment more confidently for some areas. Dependence judgments were more varied, ranging from clear disagreement (for logic and history of philosophy) to clear agreement (for philosophies of science, mind, and language). Integration judgments were also varied but exhibited more uncertainty. Some areas whose centrality depended on integration were judged to be well integrated (philosophies of science and mind), but a central tendency for all other areas was ambivalence. Demographic factors had small but statistically significant effects on all three sorts of judgment. Higher age predicted higher centrality judgments and higher integration judgments. Higher socioeconomic status predicted lower dependence judgments and higher integration judgments. Men recorded higher integration judgments.

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind is an annual publication of some of the most cutting-edge work in the philosophy of mind. The philosophy of mind has, for at least half a decade, been torn between a traditional, armchair-led approach and a naturalistic, empirically driven approach. The most prestigious general philosophy journals tend to favor the traditional approach, while journals dedicated to the philosophy of mind tend to favor the naturalistic approach. Meanwhile, the history of philosophy of mind gets no play in philosophy-of-mind-dedicated journals, and is of course published mostly in history-of-philosophy journals. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind will publish work from all three sectors: armchair philosophy of mind, empirically driven philosophy of mind, and history of philosophy of mind. As far as invited contributions are concerned, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind will observe a strict gender balance, with exactly half of the invitees being women and half men. It does not control, of course, the ultimate delivery of manuscripts by the invitees, nor the quantity and quality of submissions from each gender. This inaugural volume contains thirteen articles focused on three themes: the value of consciousness, naturalism and physicalism, and the nature of content.

Over the course of the last decade, a strand of feminist science scholarship has come together under the rubric of “neurofeminism”. One of the driving concerns for scholars in this area is to expose and criticize what is sometimes called “neurosexism”. This is a tendency among some neuroscientists, science writers and journalists to exaggerate cognitive, emotional, and behavioural sex differences and to pin gender stereotypes on allegedly innate sex differences of brain structure and function. The standard neurofeminist response has operated largely within the framework of the nature vs. nurture problematic, emphasizing the lack of attention to the role played by experience-dependent neuroplasticity in the development of a gendered brain. I propose to reframe this debate using resources from the philosophy of mind. I argue that several issues driving this debate hinge on the more fundamental question of how the role of the brain in behaviour should be conceptualized. In this regard, I show how neurosexism assumes neurocentrism—which I explicate as the transposition of the Cartesian immaterial soul onto the material brain—as its philosophical foundation, and I develop the case against this assumption, drawing in part on the enactive approach to the philosophy and science of the mind.

In Matters of the Mind , the distinguished philosopher William Lyons presents a popular and authoritative account of the dramatically different ways in which philosophers have thought about the mind over the last hundred years. He sets out the great debate about the nature of mind, focusing on the mind-body 'problem' and exploring the effect of the major turning points in recent western philosophy as well as the influence of the leading figures. In providing this account, the narrative draws also upon work in psychology, neurophysiology and computing. William Lyons explains how towards the end of the nineteenth century the mind was still regarded by most philosophers as a special sort of non-material thing, a soul, that inhabited the body like a ghost in a machine and was able to outlive the death of the bodily-machine. He goes on to narrate how, in the twentieth century, following the upheavals in the new science of psychology, the astonishing advances in the brain sciences, the invention of the computer, and the increasing materialism of modern philosophy, a new view of the nature of mind emerged. Matters of the Mind tells the fascinating and compelling story of the crucial debates about the nature of mind in our time. Key Features Provides a popular, highly illustrated and readable account of philosophy of mind for general readers and students in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, neurophysiology and computing Presents a clear, non-technical overview of the main approaches within recent philosophy of mind, including Cartesianism, behaviourism, mind-brain identity theories, the coming of the computer, functionalism and the relationship of consciousness to brain processing Offers numerous easy-to-understand examples Sets the debates within their historical, intellectual and scientific contexts Gives an up-to-date account of recent developments and issues for the future Includes a Chronology of the philosophy and sciences of the mind in the twentieth century and an extensive Bibliography of references and further reading about the mind

What is meant by holism in quantum physics and what is meant by holism in the philosophy of mind has a substantial common conceptual content. However, we cannot melt these two sorts of holism together in order to reach one comprehensive holism. So what is the significance of this common conceptual content? I propose a mutual enrichment of these two sorts of holism. In particular, the common conceptual content of quantum holism and holism in the philosophy of mind shows that holism in the philosophy of mind fits into a view of the world that bases itself on scientific realism [10.1]. Quantum holism can be used to cut off one aspect of the alleged link between holism, indeterminacy and eliminativism in the philosophy of mind [10.2]. Furthermore, quantum holism and holism in the philosophy of mind both support the same supervenience claim, namely global supervenience in contrast to local supervenience [10.3]. Finally, both quantum holism and holism in the philosophy of mind point at the same new sort of realism which overcomes the opposition between metaphysical realism and relativism or instrumentalism. In conclusion, we can therefore say that both these sorts of holism make a significant common contribution to a contemporary philosophical view of the world and ourselves [10.4].

In this article, I explain the importance of actuality in Wang Yang-ming’s thought, through dealing with the interrelationship between his achievements (shi-gong) and philosophy of Mind (hsin-hsueh). In the chapterⅠ, I describe the process of Yang-ming’s banishment from Beijing to Guizhou, because his argument with the government. Because Yang-ming’s interpersonal relationship, he had no choice to write a memorial to the throne. Then he was punished for the action, and has a question of what is right and wrong in the morally degenerate society. In Longchang, Yang-ming realized that a person of noble character and integrity (jun zi) did not have any private desire. Yang-ming considered that if a person could drive out private desire herself, he was a person of noble character and integrity (jun zi). Yang-ming realized that the key point was the practical direction from the heart oneself. Hence, Yang-ming had a system of practice named the study of being a person of noble character and integrity ( jun-zi-chih-hsueh). In the chapter Ⅱ, I explain the cause and effect of the slogan “sagehood is philosophy of Mind (sheng-jen-chih-hsueh-shi-hsin-hsueh ). When Yang-ming returned from Guizhou to Beijing, due to his own experience of political persecution, he was pained by the realization that social standards of right and wrong were turned upside down at that time. The causes for such condition, he suggested, had to do with people's selfishness. Selfishness subsequently led to various social and national problems. Investigating and reflecting upon Ch’eng-Chu’s philosophy, Yang-ming redefined the concept of sagehood (sheng-jen-chih-hsueh). He proposed that the philosophy of Mind (hsin-hsueh) as a way to attain sagehood in order to regain the political harmony of Three Dynasties (san-dai-chih-zhi). Yang-ming endeavored to promote the study of sagehood whenever he worked in Beijing or Nanking. Since he emphasizes the contents and importance of Mind in his thought, his viewpoints easily fell into the disputes of different approaches between Chu Hsi and Lu Chiu-yuan (Chu-Lu yi-t’ung). This was not Yang-ming’s intention. In order to clarify his ideas, he wrote a book entitled Chu-tzu-wan-nian-ding-lun (The final evaluation on Chu Hsi’s old age). In this book Yang-ming made two arguments. First, he illuminated that the philosophy of Lu Chiu-yuan is not Buddhist Zen. Second, Chu Hsi also paid attention to the philosophy of Mind. After the publication of this book, Yang-ming’s ideas had widespread impacts to the extent that scholars began to rethink the Ch’eng-Chu philosophy. In the chapter Ⅲ, I interpret the emergence of the concept of intuitive ability to know right or wrong (liang-zhi) through the relation between hostilities and thought. In the war of South Kan-chou, Yang-ming slowly realized that understanding of everyone’s hart (ben-hsin-chih-ming) could grasp the private desire herself. Yang-ming believed that everyone could drive out the private desire by the understanding of everyone’s hart. After Yang-Ming penetrated the difficulty of two persons (zhong-tai-chih-bian), he recognized that the understanding of everyone’s hart is the concept of intuitive ability to know right or wrong (liang-zhi). In the other hand, Yang-Ming used the practical methods of Zhou Dunyi (1017-73) and Cheng Hao (1032-85) to bear witness to his idea in the practice.

Is quantum holism limited to more or less the microphysical realm? Or does it touch upon all physical systems? The issue of the scope of quantum holism is linked with the measurement problem [9.1]. When it comes to this issue, we should take the philosophy of mind into account — and in particular the discussion on holism and a revision of Cartesianism in today’s philosophy of mind. All those interpretations that regard quantum holism as universal in the physical realm are committed to epistemic self-sufficiency of intentional states and a representational realism. Consequently, they are incompatible with the revision of Cartesianism that goes with the proposed social holism and holism about beliefs [9.2]. By contrast, if one countenances a transition to a level of macroscopic systems which are not touched by entanglement, one can still regard quantum physics as a universal physical theory. But one can accommodate a macroscopic realm with definite properties. This is a prerequisite for direct realism and externalism (including social holism) in the philosophy of mind. The moral of this chapter therefore is a plea for caution: The arguments for holism and a revision of Cartesianism in the philosophy of mind sharpen up the task for the interpretation of quantum theory, and they constitute a weighty reason against the option for universal quantum holism. There is hence not one comprehensive, substantial holism that includes both the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of mind and that leads to a revision of the Cartesian tradition in modern thought [9.3].

I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant and Back Again

The causal theory of action has been the standard view in the philosophy of action and mind. In the philosophy of mind, it is a piece of orthodoxy that is widely taken for granted and hardly ever questioned. In the philosophy of action, it has always had its critics. In this chapter, I will present responses to two challenges to the theory. The first says, basically, that there is no positive argument in favour of the causal theory, as the only reason that supports it consists in the apparent lack of tenable alternatives. The second challenge says that the theory fails to capture the phenomenon of agency, as it reduces activity to mere happenings (events and event-causal processes). This is often referred to as the problem of disappearing agency. A full defence of the causal theory should address both challenges. In the first part of this chapter, I will present what I take to be the core of the causal theory. In the second and the third part, I will then offer my responses to the two challenges. I will present a positive argument for the causal theory on the basis of considerations concerning the metaphysics of agency, and I will suggest that we own the agency that springs from our mental states and events by default.

The Narrative of Thought Experiments: The Uses and Development of Thought Experiments in Philosophy of Mind, consists of my novel, Love and Other Thought Experiments, along with a critical commentary that examines the relationship between fictional narrative and philosophy of mind in the context of the thought experiment. The novel is a creative response to a selection of thought experiments, in which I reimagine ten of these thought experiments and combine the resulting stories into a composite novel. The selected thought experiments were chosen for their connection to, and impact upon, contemporary developments in the study of human consciousness. Each chapter follows a principle character of the novel, sometimes overlapping with the narratives of the other characters but as a standalone story, while the overall arc of the novel addresses the central theme of the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness, that is, whether human consciousness is an independent entity of non-physical origin, or a manifestation of our physical being. The critical commentary begins with a short history of the context and development of what is now known as the thought experiment. The second chapter charts some of the connections between these philosophical short narratives and short narratives in literary fiction. It is my contention that the connections of narrative structure and philosophic awareness, have served to benefit both philosophy of mind and literary narrative, and that in the use of thought experiments in philosophy of mind, we see a synthesis of our storytelling and philosophic investigations into the qualities and properties of the human mind. The third chapter offers a reflection of my writing method for the novel, and how my research affected the development of the creative process.