Elite Cooperation and Affective Polarization: Evidence From German Coalitions

Abstract

Affective polarization is a central characteristic of political competition, but high levels are seen as potentially harmful. In this article, we link the study of affective polarization to that of coalition politics, expecting that by signalling the willingness to cooperate in a coalition, political elites can reduce mutual dislike between political camps. We argue, first, that the impact of coalition formation should depend on the information content (‘surprisingness’) of this signal, and, second, that its effect should spill over to parties outside of the coalition. Combining 20 years of monthly voter-level data from Germany with data on national and regional coalitions, we show that coalitions are most likely to reduce affective distance when participating parties are ideologically distant and when the signals are still recent. Moreover, coalitions have a system-wide impact beyond the specific parties involved. We discuss the implications for the role of political elites in shaping affective polarization.