Elite Capture in Local Fishery Management Post-Socialist Experiences from Albania

Abstract

Local self-governance based on institutions for collective action can help overcome social dilemmas in the management of complex Common Pool Resources, such as fish. A common path towards local self-governance is decentralization, and within this context, a transfer of property rights from central government to local resource users. Yet, despite the well-documented successes of many decentralization policies in support of local common property regimes, the phenomenon of elite capture remains a risk. This paper investigates elite capture in Albania’s Lake Ohrid fishing region. Our empirical findings draw onto an in-depth case study on local consequences of 2002’s decentralization efforts by the Albanian fishery administration. We show how ‘blueprint’ approaches, top-down implementation, and weak institutions led to further empowerment of privileged locals. Our findings further indicate how those privileged locals realize significant personal gains at the expense of distributional inequity within the community. Specifically original insights are derived from our analysis of implications from the post-socialist context, which we show to facilitate capture because of a common susceptibility for destructive leadership and a lack of confidence in collective action. We believe that to understand those contextual peculiarities - and to act upon this understandingrepresents a pivotal prerequisite to the functional and equitable governance of common property regimes in any transitional society.