Abstract
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan increased its vote share in each legislative election from 2001 to 2008. Nevertheless, the 2004 and 2008 elections were widely viewed as major defeats for the party. Through an analysis of the DPP’s performance in these elections, this article considers the effects of electoral rules on election outcomes and the perception of those outcomes. In Taiwan, under both the previous single non-transferable vote (SNTV) and the current mixed member majoritarian (MMM) systems, the mechanical effect of how electoral rules translate votes into seats and the psychological impact this has on voter and party behavior have influenced party electoral performance, and the perception of it, by causing vote and seat shares to diverge. In addition, this article analyzes whether recent redistricting in Taiwan structurally disadvantages the DPP.
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