Einfühlung: Overview of Theory Components and Test in Advertising Settings

One of the currently assumed causes of impaired social interaction exhibited by children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) is dysfunction of the mirror neuron system (MNS), which is responsible for imitation, understanding the intentions and emotions of other people. Desynchronization of sensorimotor rhythms is considered to be the indicator of MNS activation. This study aimed to analyze the specific patterns of reactivity of the μ-rhythm in an individually determined frequency range and β-rhythm on the EEG in children with ASD during independent movements, observation, imitation and auditory perception of similar movements performed by another person. The data collected were compared to those describing normally developing children. The study involved right-handed children with ASD aged 5–10 (n = 10) and normally developing children (n = 10). In the independent movements exercise, β-rhythm desynchronization was more pronounced in children with ASD, with difference becoming significant in the P4 locus (p = 0.03). In the movements imitation exercise, the groups showed significant differences in the EEG μ-rhythm in the locus C3 (p = 0.03). Auditory perception of movements revealed significant differences in the ranges of both μ-rhythm (loci F3 and Fz (p = 0.02), F4 (p = 0.04), Cz (p = 0.009)) and β-rhythm (loci Fz (p = 0.01), F4 (p = 0.02)). In these situations, children with ASD exhibited synchronization of sensorimotor rhythms, while normally developing children showed desynchronization. The assumption is that the specific patterns revealed are the consequences of disruption of functions of MNS and anti-mirror system. The data obtained can be used in development of EEG biofeedback training protocols for children with ASD.

Editorial: What can we make of theories of embodiment and the role of the human mirror neuron system?

Psychological and Neurobiological Mechanisms of Pathological Internet Use

This article reports a comparative analysis of two methods of presenting stimulus material in studies of the mirror system of the brain (MSB) in person by the experimenter and using video clips on a monitor screen. The mirror system of the brain plays major roles in a variety of social interactions and supports understanding of the actions, motivations, and emotions of other people. Decreases in the power of the EEG μ rhythm in the central areas of the brain are linked with activation of the MSB and are used in research studies as an indicator of activation of the MSB. In the present study, two groups of subjects were initially shown clenching of the fist and were then asked to imagine and then perform the same movement themselves. The first group of subjects was shown clenching of the fist performed live by the experimenter, while in the second group the same motor movement was demonstrated on a monitor screen. Our study showed that decreases in μ-rhythm power were seen in all three MSB-activating tasks, but only in the upper part of the frequency range 10.5–13 Hz and only in the group of volunteers shown live demonstrations. This group of subjects also displayed an increase in the EEG β2 rhythm in the motor and sensorimotor areas. There were no significant changes in power in the μ or β rhythms in the second group, shown the action on a monitor screen. The results obtained here suggest the hypothesis that activation of the MSB is more significant in the situation of live social interactions.

Why and How is the Self-Related to the Brain Midline Regions?

There are two types of theories for emotional elicits when watching movies: Seeing Theory, which is based on the plot or characters finding similar references in the real world, and Thinking Theory, which is based on direct empathy for the plot of a movie or additional emotions caused by external factors. Thinking Theory is used to analyze the parallel mothers of the film and to find the factors that lead to the audiences emotions. The article presents a detailed analysis of the way emotions are evoked in three parts of the film: emotional stimulation, emotional imitation, and involuntary response, respectively, in order to focus on the influence of Central Imaging on emotions in Thinking Theory, which It includes an analysis of why emotional imitation is a non-conscious emotion reproduced through the facial or physical expressions of the characters in the film through mirror neuron theory, and an analysis of the impact of several sequences on emotion through the language of the camera, such as color and long shots. In addition to an analysis of the narrative and footage of the film itself, the essay will discuss the immediate and rapid moral emotions (primarily community ethics) generated from an external perspective and explore why viewers change their emotions about the people around them while watching the film, and why the film generates deeper emotions.

In this paper, a working hypothesis is proposed that a nervous system for pain sensation is a key component for shaping the conscious minds of robots (artificial systems). In this article, this hypothesis is argued from several viewpoints towards its verification. A developmental process of empathy, morality, and ethics based on the mirror neuron system (MNS) that promotes the emergence of the concept of self (and others) scaffolds the emergence of artificial minds. Firstly, an outline of the ideological background on issues of the mind in a broad sense is shown, followed by the limitation of the current progress of artificial intelligence (AI), focusing on deep learning. Next, artificial pain is introduced, along with its architectures in the early stage of self-inflicted experiences of pain, and later, in the sharing stage of the pain between self and others. Then, cognitive developmental robotics (CDR) is revisited for two important concepts—physical embodiment and social interaction, both of which help to shape conscious minds. Following the working hypothesis, existing studies of CDR are briefly introduced and missing issues are indicated. Finally, the issue of how robots (artificial systems) could be moral agents is addressed.

Fronto-parietal mirror neuron system modeling: Visuospatial transformations support imitation learning independently of imitator perspective

The striking diversity of psychological and neurophysiological models of 'time perception' characterizes the debate on how and where in the brain time is processed. In this review, the most prominent models of time perception will be critically discussed. Some of the variation across the proposed models will be explained, namely (i) different processes and regions of the brain are involved depending on the length of the processed time interval, and (ii) different cognitive processes may be involved that are not necessarily part of a core timekeeping system but, nevertheless, influence the experience of time. These cognitive processes are distributed over the brain and are difficult to discern from timing mechanisms. Recent developments in the research on emotional influences on time perception, which succeed decades of studies on the cognition of temporal processing, will be highlighted. Empirical findings on the relationship between affect and time, together with recent conceptualizations of self- and body processes, are integrated by viewing time perception as entailing emotional and interoceptive (within the body) states. To date, specific neurophysiological mechanisms that would account for the representation of human time have not been identified. It will be argued that neural processes in the insular cortex that are related to body signals and feeling states might constitute such a neurophysiological mechanism for the encoding of duration.

During the long evolution history, the human brain has evolved to understand other person’s state of mind, feelings, perspectives, and intentions. Such an understanding has survival value and facilitates empathic relationships. Evidence suggests that there exists a neurophysiobehavioral substructure in human beings that serves as a precursor and facilitator for understanding others, evident by a newborn’s reactive crying, inborn capacity for mimicry and imitation, physiological synchronicity in interpersonal interactions, perception–action coupling, propensity to understand other’s state of mind reflected in the theory of mind, and findings of a new line of research on the mirror neuron system. Empirical findings from brain imaging studies, brain lesion research, empathy deficiency in neurological disorders (e.g., autism, Asperger’s syndrome, alexithymia), and pain research suggest that certain brain areas can be implicated in forming or failing to form empathic connection. A search for neurological underpinnings of empathy is highly desirable for better understanding of neurological factors that contribute to the development or otherwise to the arrest of the capacity for empathy. Outcomes of such research will have important educational as well as medical implications. From brain imaging research, it can be speculated that certain cortical areas of the brain (e.g., region for cognitive processing in the medial prefrontal cortex, dorsolateral, and mirror neuron region in the premotor areas) could be implicated in cognitive empathic responses. Findings also suggest that the regions for emotional processing, the orbitofrontal cortex and older structures of the brain such as the limbic system, and specifically areas known as the pain matrix (e.g., amygdala, insula, anterior cingulate cortex) could be implicated in emotional empathic reactions. However, these speculations await further experimental verification.

Chapter 9 discusses the psychodynamic concept of the self and its relationship to that of the ego within the neuropsychodynamic context. Different concepts of the self in neuroscience and psychoanalysis are directly compared with each other with regard to their plausibility and compatibility with the current empirical (i.e. neuronal) findings with regard to the self. I then develop and discuss what I call the “relational concept” of the self, as distinct from the concepts of the ego and the id.

Simulation during observation of human actions – Theories, empirical studies, applications

This essay explores the evolving relational dynamics between human clinicians and artificial intelligence systems through the lens of psychoanalytic theory. Drawing on Winnicott’s concept of the false self, Bion’s theory of thinking and emotional truth, and contemporary research on mirror neurons and affective contingency, it interrogates the forms of attunement, idealisation, and relational unease that arise in AI-assisted clinical and reflective work. The essay blends live dialogue, theoretical reflection, and clinical vignettes to articulate the complex asymmetries and seductions of artificial companionship.

Mihaly Csikzentmihalyi’s flow, mirror neurons and the mirror system, and Antonio Damasio and V.S. Ramachandran’s neuroscience held up against Viola Spolin’s theories on the effects her improv games have on the mind. Spolin’s concepts of a true self and outward focus or point of concentration lay the groundwork for a new theory on improv’s effects on consciousness and cognition.

There are important structural similarities in the way that animals and humans engage in unreflective activities, including unreflective social interactions in the case of higher animals. Firstly, it is a form of unreflective embodied intelligence that is ‘motivated’ by the situation. Secondly, both humans and non-human animals are responsive to ‘affordances’ (Gibson 1979); to possibilities for action offered by an environment. Thirdly, both humans and animals are selectively responsive to one affordance rather than another. Social affordances are a subcategory of affordances, namely possibilities for social interaction offered by an environment: a friend’s sad face invites comforting behavior, a person waiting for a coffee machine can afford a conversation, and an extended hand affords a handshake. I will review recent insights in the nature of the bodily intentionality characteristic of unreflective action. Such ‘motor intentionality’ can be characterized as “our direct bodily inclination to act in a situated, environmental context” (Kelly 2005, p. 106). Standard interpretations of bodily intentionality see grasping an object as the paradigmatic example of motor intentionality. I will discuss the implications of another, novel perspective that emphasizes the importance of unreflective switches from one activity to another (Rietveld 2004) and understands bodily intentionality in terms of adequate responsiveness to a field of relevant affordances. In the final section I will discuss some implications for cognitive neuroscientists who use empirical findings related to the ‘mirror neuron system’ as a starting point for a theory of motor intentionality and social cognition. Keywords: embodied cognition; enaction; motor intentionality; affective cognition; field of affordances