Egypt's efforts to unite the Nile Valley: Diplomacy and propaganda, 1945–47

Abstract

In August 1946 Egypt and Britain signed an agreement that, on the one hand, was supposed to grant the former with a relatively higher degree of sovereignty, and, on the other, to defend the latter's major interests in Egypt. Successive Egyptian governments, particularly the Wafdist led by Mustafa al-Nahhas (1942-44), exploited the narrow breathing space provided by the Anglo-Egyptian treaty in order to begin carving out an independent foreign policy. Indeed, from early 1943, until almost the end of the Second World War, the Wafdist government conducted several significant moves which were to have long-term implications for Egypt's foreign policy in the coming years. For instance, in March 1943 it initiated and carried out significant steps that subsequently led to the formation of the Arab League in 1945, and to Egypt's success in securing for itself the leading role within the newly established inter-Arab system.' In August 1943 Egypt established diplomatic relations with the USSR, a rising international power. Its utilitarian aim in doing so was to be supported by the Soviets in the struggle against Britain a move which, indeed, bore political dividends shortly thereafter.2 Soon after the conclusion of the Second World War, successive Egyptian governments launched a large-scale propaganda campaign designed to promote Egypt's interests in the Sudan a campaign which the British tried to thwart in every manner possible. The British exploited their substantial advantages as the dominant power in both Egypt and the Sudan in order to reduce Egyptian influence in the Sudan to a minimum. A case in point was Britain's activity in the educational field it nurtured, improved and developed the Sudanese educational system in order to promote Sudanese national identity and encourage anti-Egyptian separatist tendencies.3 British manoeuvres in Sudan were angrily received by Egyptians. As Gershoni and Jankowski showed in their study Redefining the Egyptian Nation, there was a consensus among Egyptian nationalists of various schools regarding the unity of the Nile Valley and the integrity of Egypt and the Sudan. To quote them, 'a consistent demand of Egyptian nationalists of all stripes through the first half of the twentieth century was Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan ... for territorialists and supraEgyptianist spokesmen alike, the unity of the Nile Valley was a given'.4 Gershoni and Jankowski, however, stressed that each nationalist group approached the issue differently. For instance, Egyptian Islamic nationalists maintained that the Sudan, like any other Muslim territory, was an integral part of the umma. Territorial nationalists, on the other hand, maintained that the factors making Egypt and the