Egypt and Israel — Was There a Peace Opportunity Missed in 1971?

Abstract

In Israeli and American publications it has been stated that in the early Sadat years, notably in 1971, a peace process between Egypt and Israel could have been launched but was not. For this default Israel is mostly blamed. The assertion is made that when Sadat became president after Nasser's death (28 September 1970), Egypt was ready for a new start in its relations with Israel, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War could have been averted.' Sadat is supposed to have signalled his readiness to break the stalemate between Egypt and Israel in an address he made to the National Assembly of Egypt on 4 February 1971. That speech was soon to become a key element in what followed. It is argued that Israel failed to take note of the supposed signals contained in Sadat's speech and its slow and unimaginative response caused the failure of American diplomatic efforts. The present article does not focus on the US and Israeli moves in the wake of Sadat's speech.2 Instead, it concentrates on the Egyptian positions. The reason for this, as will be shown, is that Sadat was not yet willing in 1971-3 to make any compromise whatsoever, insisting on every detail of the collective Arab stand. The implication of this is that the diplomatic moves of the USA or Israel in 1971 had no real chance of success. It is puzzling that researchers have not paid any attention to what the Egyptians themselves say about their moves in that period. This is all the more extraordinary since the relevant Egyptian memoirs, interviews and speeches have all been in the public domain for a decade or more. The Egyptian sources consist specifically of the memoirs of three of Sadat's foreign ministers Mahmoud Riad, Ismail Fahmy and Mohamad Ibrahim Kamel.3 The Israeli and other researchers have not explained why they ignored this important body of evidence and why they have not even acknowledged its existence.