Abstract
We consider the problem of allocating m infinitely divisible commodities among agents with single-peaked preferences. We propose a variation on the Mas–Colell’s Walrasian solution with slacks to characterize the efficient allocations. Our solution allows us to associate with each efficient allocation an income redistribution. We prove that the original solution proposed by Mas–Colell is the efficient selection which requires an income redistribution where the maximum payoff and the maximum subsidy are smallest. This generalizes a derivation of the Uniform Rule by Schummer and Thomson.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
