Abstract
Assuming that all firms have rising marginal costs, merger between a dominant firm and one of the firms in the competitive fringe is considered. The effects on market price and output, profits and market power are shown when the dominant firm operates as a two-plant firm after merger and output arises from both plants. It is proved that if merger offers no efficiency gain, then market price always rises; and if merger results in efficiency gain, then market price falls if and only if there are sufficiently large number of firms in the fringe. In any case, there is profit incentive for merger to take place. [611]
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