Editorial: Governing the EU's climate and energy transition through the 2030 Framework

First and last and always: Politics of the ‘energy efficiency first’ principle in EU energy and climate policy

This article analyses the qualitative changes made to European Union (EU) climate law through the ‘Fit for 55’ legislative package, which aims to implement the EU's upgraded greenhouse gas emission reduction target of at least 55% compared with 1990 levels. The Package consists of 19 pieces of legislation. We investigate the Package's impact on key aspects of EU climate governance, including (a) ambition and stringency, (b) sectoral reach and (c) policy mix. We find that the Package has strengthened and detailed the EU's climate and energy targets and consolidated oversight of Member State implementation (ambition and stringency). The Package has also significantly expanded the reach of EU climate law to new sectors and policy areas. Finally, the Package has enriched the EU's climate policy mix, especially by introducing new economic and regulatory instruments. If fully implemented, the Package should enable the EU to achieve its 2030 emission reduction target. However, full implementation cannot be taken for granted given the current public backlash against climate policies in Europe. This enhances the importance of upgrading the EU framework for procedural climate governance, including with respect to public participation and deliberation. Overall, the Package must be complemented by further development of EU climate law and governance towards 2040 and beyond.

Good things do not always come in threes: On the excess cost of overlapping regulation in EU climate policy

The 2030 European Union (EU) climate and energy policy framework includes for the first time a dedicated instrument concerning greenhouse gas emissions and removals from land use, land‐use change and forestry (LULUCF). The new LULUCF Regulation marks a significant expansion of the EU climate and energy acquis, with ramifications for other sensitive areas, such as agriculture, forestry and renewable energy. The Regulation has had a particularly troubled negotiation history. It has already been at the centre of litigation, and is set to be revisited and amended by 2021. This article assesses the role of the Regulation in the 2030 climate and energy policy framework, trying to make sense of its troubled history, with a view to ascertaining whether the scepticism with which it has been welcomed is justified.

The reduction of energy demand in buildings through the adoption of energy efficiency policy is a key pillar of the European Union (EU) climate and energy strategy. Energy efficiency first emerged in the EU energy policy agenda in the 1970s and was progressively transformed with shifting global and EU energy and climate policies and priorities. The paper offers a review of EU energy policies spanning over the last half century with a focus on policy instruments to encourage measures on energy efficiency in new and existing buildings. Starting from early policies set by the EU in response to the Oil Embargo in the 1973, the paper discusses the impact of EU policies in stimulating energy efficiency improvements in the building sector ranging from the SAVE Directive to the recently 2018 updated Energy Performance of Buildings Directive and Energy Efficiency Directive. The review explores the progress made over the last 50 years in addressing energy efficiency in buildings and highlights successes as well as remaining challenges. It discusses the impact of political priorities in reshaping how energy efficiency is addressed by EU policymakers, leading to a holistic approach to buildings, and provides insights and suggestions on how to further exploit the EU potential to save energy from buildings.

Energy issues are sensitive for the four Visegrad countries as European Union (EU) member states; thus, this area’s convergence might be problematic for these countries. There is a clear research gap concerning the processes of Europeanization of the energy policy in the Visegrad countries. This article aims to identify and evaluate the progress of four Visegrad countries (V4) in implementing the EU energy goals in the context of the Europeanization. The article uses three main methods: Hellwig’s method, Kendall’s rank concordance coefficient, and k-means clustering. These calculations will allow one to study the Europeanization processes, which means checking the gamma convergence. For calculations, we use the available statistical data from Eurostat for the years 2005–2018. Poland and other Central European countries, including Czechia, and Hungary, largely depend on coal for their energy needs. The empirical results have shown that there have been no significant changes in the classification of EU countries in terms of their fulfillment of the EU climate and energy targets in the analyzed period. This is the case in all EU member states, including the Visegrad Group countries, but except for Poland. This means that the level of Europeanization of the energy policy and its effectiveness is similar in all member states except for Poland, which is becoming a kind of the exception. Throughout the investigating period, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia were close to meeting the set targets and could be rated high compared to the EU countries. Poland, especially since 2015, has been noticeably and increasingly distanced from the other V4 countries. It can be perceived as a gradual drift away from Europeanization of the EU climate and energy policy in Poland.

The 2030 European Union (EU) climate and energy policy framework includes for the first time a dedicated instrument concerning greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions and removals from land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF). Regulation 2018/841 (LULUCF Regulation) marks a significant expansion of EU climate and energy acquis, with ramifications in other sensitive areas, such as agriculture, renewable energy from wood biomass and forestry. The Regulation has had a particularly troubled negotiation history and has already been at the centre of litigation before the Court of Justice of the EU. This article analyses the implications of the LULUCF Regulation for the EU’s climate ambition in the next decade, trying to make sense of its troubled history and of its projected impacts, with a view to ascertaining whether the scepticism with which it has been welcomed is justified.

As decarbonization and climate policy are gaining relevance in the European Union (EU) energy policy, the present paper seeks to present both priorities and challenges for of the EU energy transition. As priorities, we outline the key targets and initiatives proposed and set by the European institutions in relation to the energy matters. The EU identifies renewable energy sources, energy efficiency and reduction of the greenhouse gas (GHG) as the three pillars to achieve its carbon neutrality. The final goal for to the EU energy and climate targets is to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. Nevertheless, since given energy policy is being a “shared competence” between the EU institutions and Member States, each Member State plays a critical role for the achievement of the EU energy transition. Different socioeconomic structures and the energy mix across Europe have caused the implementation process of each EU target to develop at a different pace among European countries. We illustrate this drawing on four countries: Italy, the UK, Germany and Poland. We assess their political commitment to the energy transition and their actions regarding energy transformation. These four countries are only an example of the different pace in the implementation of the EU energy and climate targets. The last part of the paper is devoted to the ambitious plan, called Green New Deal, launched by the present Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen. It sets key priorities, reaffirming European commitments to the energy and climate transition. However, the plan faces significant obstacles. For example, division among Member States (North-South and West-East) might be a factor that could undermine the achievement of the European energy transition, due to multiple and divergent interests (also on the future role of the energy transition in the aftermath of COVID-19 and the resulting economic crisis). Another challenge is constituted by popular opposition, especially from those people that see the energy transition — and consequent economic and industrial transformation — as a potential threat to their well-being and jobs, as the French gilets jaunes show. Lastly, we explain that the European energy transition will impact also its external relations, for example with Russia, proposing how the two blocs can preserve their energy relationship in light of the energy transition, notably through the conversion of natural gas to hydrogen and storing/using the resulting CO2.

The awareness of the environment, climate, and nature that emerged worldwide in the 1970s has paralleled the actions taken in the European Union (EU) under the United Nations. In the EU, the environmental title was given a legal basis for the first time with the entry into force of the Single European Act, and action on the environment and climate change became the main priorities of the EU in all areas with the amendments in the founding treaties. This study examines environmental and climate policy in the EU and the process known as the green transition in the EU. The study consists of three sections. The first section discusses the environment and the development of climate change awareness in the world and the EU, while the second section underlines the EU's environmental and climate change approaches and policies. The third and final section highlights the development and green transition strategy adopted by the EU in 2019 and the “Green Deal” strategy paper. The study concludes that the “Green Deal” is at the heart of the so-called green transition process in the EU, that the goals sought by the Deal are very ambitious, that it is almost impossible to achieve the corresponding goals without an effective/coercive political mechanism, and that the EU is planning a green transition rather than a green transformation.

THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL, OR HOW DOES THE EUROPEAN UNION INTEND TO MAKE EUROPE THE FIRST CLIMATE-NEUTRAL CONTINENT? The research aim of the paper is to analyze the objectives of the European Union (EU) climate policy and the instruments for their implementation, as well as to present the challenges on the way to achieving climate neutrality by the EU. In 2015, during the 21st UN Climate Change Conference in Paris, an agreement was agreed, the purpose of which is to limit global warming, aiming, among other things, for limiting the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and preferably to no more than 1.5°C. All EU Member States have ratified the above agreement, while agreeing to take action to make the EU the world’s first climate-neutral economy and society by 2050. To achieve this, the “European Green Deal” strategy was adopted, followed by the European Climate Law and the “Fit for 55” package of legislative proposals. In addition, a more ambitious EU climate target for 2030 has been agreed, namely a reduction of net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% compared to 1990 levels. Based on this, the following research hypothesis should be put forward, assuming that if all initiated projects, climate programs and mechanisms are fully implemented, the EU will become the first climate neutral continent by 2050. The first part of the article focuses on the goals of the European Green Deal and their implementation. The second part discusses the assumptions of European Climate Law and the elements of the “Fit for 55” package, as well as presents the most important financial instruments of the EU climate policy. The third part contains an analysis of the challenges standing in the way of the EU achieving climate neutrality by 2050, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

<p>This paper investigates power dynamics between and within the core institutions of the European Union (EU) in the development of the 2030 EU climate & energy framework. Starting from the widely studied change in the EU’s climate policy from “leadership by example” to “slow motion”, it integrates a specific focus on power dynamics between the core EU institutions and non-state actors. Interestingly, perspectives on power relations between and within EU institutions and the power of non-state actors in EU governance are rarely integrated explicitly in analyses of the EU’s shift in its stance on climate policy. In this article, we aim to draw together the analyses of institutional power dynamics in EU climate policy with analyses of the exercise of power by non-state actors to explain the dynamics leading to the change in EU climate politics. Using data from document research, secondary literature and interviews conducted with members of EU institutions as well as non-state actors, we show that an absence of clear leadership from the European Council in the end furthered an extended influence of business actors via the strengthening of the Commission as well as particular DGs. The results show how inadequate guidance from the Council and divisions within the Commission facilitated the informal passing of the scepter of EU climate policy to business, even as EU institutions retained formal responsibility, thus not passing the buck in a corresponding manner. The analysis further reveals strong reasons for doubt towards future EU ambitions in global climate change politics.</p>

Scenarios meeting the Paris Agreement's temperature targets envisage a major and imminent deployment of technologies to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, of which there has been almost no practical implementation to date. Here we explore the political dimensions and policy implications of expectations for “negative emissions” in the European Union (EU), considering its largely successful leadership role in mitigation action and corresponding low‐carbon technology development and deployment. Carbon dioxide removal and especially Bio‐Energy with Carbon Capture and Storage present significant challenges to the EU's dominant climate policy paradigm and low‐carbon policy experience. Considering this challenge, we assess expectations for widespread implementation of carbon dioxide removal in the EU to be unrealistic, and explore possible pathways for its more limited introduction.This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance The Carbon Economy and Climate Mitigation > Policies, Instruments, Lifestyles, Behavior

Climate policy is a new area of European integration, although there were no exact references to the issue of climate change in the Maastricht Treaty. However, this article draws attention to the interesting coincidence of the creation of the European Union (EU) in the 1990s and the consequences of the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro which started the process of greening the EU Member States’ foreign policies and enhanced the importance of environmental and climate protection issues on the international agenda. The Member States and EU institutions, acting within the institutional framework defined by the Maastricht Treaty, in the face of the limitations resulting from unanimous voting in taxation policy, started to develop climate policy (in particular, the EU Emissions Trading System), mainly based on environmental law, enabling decisions to be taken by a qualified majority. The growing importance of climate policy in the EU was influenced by many factors and the different motivations of individual Member States and other European policy actors. After depicting the main causes and effects of the growing importance of EU climate policy, the article discusses the most important challenges facing the EU with regard to the implementation of an ambitious climate policy. In recent years, one of the main reasons for this increase is the fact that each of the successive overlapping crises (concerning migration, pandemic, Russia–Ukraine war or spiking energy prices) is a suitable opportunity to strengthen EU climate policy.

European Union (EU) climate policy is characterized by significant degrees of differentiated integration. Although the two topics complement each other, differentiated integration and studies of EU climate policy have rarely been studied in conjunction. To address this gap, we develop a threefold conceptualization that makes it possible to explore differentiation during the course of a policy cycle: policy output differentiation, policy outcome differentiation, and policy impact differentiation. Our examination of two key elements of EU climate-policy legislation—emissions trading and renewables policy—shows that differentiated integration is an uneven and multidirectional process that varies over time. We argue that differentiation is an important enabler for concerted action in EU climate policy and that differentiation at the policy output and outcome stages may facilitate greater harmonization at the impact stage. Differentiation at the impact and outcome level of the three (ideal type) policy stages does not automatically reflect differentiation at the output policy stage; it is rather that output differentiation may facilitate both high and low levels of differentiation at these later stages.

BackgroundThe European Union (EU) has committed to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. This requires a rapid reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and ensuring that any remaining emissions are balanced through CO2 removals. Forests play a crucial role in this plan: they are currently the main option for removing CO2 from the atmosphere and additionally, wood use can store carbon durably and help reduce fossil emissions. To stop and reverse the decline of the forest carbon sink, the EU has recently revised the regulation on land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), and set a target of − 310 Mt CO2e net removals for the LULUCF sector in 2030.ResultsIn this study, we clarify the role of common concepts in forest management – net annual increment, harvest and mortality – in determining the forest sink. We then evaluate to what extent the forest sink is on track to meet the climate goals of the EU. For this assessment we use data from the latest national GHG inventories and a forest model (Carbon Budget Model). Our findings indicate that on the EU level, the recent decrease in increment and the increase in harvest and mortality are causing a rapid drop in the forest sink. Furthermore, continuing the past forest management practices is projected to further decrease the sink. Finally, we discuss options for enhancing the sinks through forest management while taking into account adaptation and resilience.ConclusionsOur findings show that the EU forest sink is quickly developing away from the EU climate targets. Stopping and reversing this trend requires rapid implementation of climate-smart forest management, with improved and more timely monitoring of GHG fluxes. This enhancement is crucial for tracking progress towards the EU’s climate targets, where the role of forests has become – and is expected to remain – more prominent than ever before.