Economic Transition and Political Legitimacy in Post-Mao China: Ideology and Reform, by Feng Chen

Abstract

desire to regain their status as great powers, an objective that neither could achieve alone. The strategies by which they sought to achieve this objective, however, differed fundamentally and were only partially incompatible. Whereas France has sought to increase its room for maneuver in international affairs by seeking strategic autonomy vis-a-vis the superpowers, Germany has pursued power and influence by binding itself into an expanding network of international institutions. These strategies committed both nations to the project of European integration and in retrospect seemed to have served them well. At the same time, they also set sharp limits to the level of strategic and military cooperation that the two countries could achieve. As result, Kocs argues, we are likely to see neither renationalization of European security policies nor breakthrough to some grand European confederation. What we are likely to witness, he contends, is an uneasy perpetuation of the status quo. While I find myself in substantial agreement with Kocs's main thesis, I have some quibbles with the use he makes of his own data in making this argument. Kocs argues that the divergent strategic perspectives of the two countries are a function of the evolution in the evolution in the strategic international context (p. 12). Yet, he repeatedly suggests that these differences in fact derive mainly from their historical differences and factors of domestic politics. This stubborn insistence to restrict his analysis in systemic explanatory scheme leads to puzzling neglect of the domestic political debates in both countries. So for instance, this narrow analytical framework led the author to mention only in passing (in one page) the famous Atlantic-Gaullist debate inside the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union during the 1960s and 1970s. Likewise, only scant attention is paid to the heated domestic controversies in France over European integration in connection with the French referendum on Maastricht. The book also suffers from number of minor flaws, such as uneven editing and some debatable characterizations. For instance, Konrad Adenauer's famous pledge that Germany would forgo the production of weapons of mass destruction is described as having been voluntary (p. 17), when in fact Adenauer had been coerced by the United States and provided only provisional acceptance. Likewise, it is somewhat odd to see Helmut Schmidt's defense minister, Hans Apel, described as dedicated pacifist, when at the time he was castigated by the peace movement as crazed war monger (p. 139). Despite these flaws, Stephen Kocs has produced valuable study that should be of interest to broad audience. It is sure to be read widely and will be of great use to those working on issues relating to European security and the politics of alliance. It could also serve well as supplementary text for courses touching on West European security and interstate relations.