ECONOMIC POWER OF THE BRICS GROUP AND PARTNER COUNTRIES

Russia’s Transition to Capitalism: The Rise of a World Power?

Correspondence: The Profitability of Primacy

China's 'COVID-19 Diplomacy' and Geopolitics in Oceania Tarcisius Kabutaulaka (bio) The COVID-19 pandemic started at a time of intense geopolitical competition; consequently, global powers have used pandemic-related assistances to enhance their influence. This has been dubbed "COVID-19 diplomacy," a variant of global health diplomacy that involves the provision of assistance to address a health crisis while simultaneously enhancing and strengthening a country's geopolitical alliances and influence. The countries at the center of this ongoing geopolitical contest are the People's Republic of China (hereafter referred to as China) and the United States (U.S.) and its allies. Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Oceania1 has become an arena where global powers have jostled to assert their influence. This paper discusses how China has used the pandemic to assert its influence in Oceania and the responses from traditional powers in the region, led by the U.S. and Australia. In the past decade-and-a-half, China has become increasingly influential in Oceania. Most Pacific Island governments welcome this, as demonstrated by the fact that ten of the fourteen Pacific Island countries now recognize the one-China policy. This threatens the dominance that the US and its allies have had in the region since World War II, hence triggering the aforementioned geopolitical competition. Since the beginning of the pandemic, metropolitan powers have used COVID-19-related assistance to increase and affirm their influence. But while the US and its allies portray China as a threat, island governments view a relationship with China as an opportunity. Although China's COVID-19-related assistance has so far been smaller in monetary value compared to aid from Australia and the U.S., it has been more visible because of Beijing's concerted efforts in public relations. It is, however, uncertain if this will result in long-term geopolitical gains for Beijing, especially given the fact that Western countries are strengthening their influence. Furthermore, while Pacific Island governments each value their respective relationship with Beijing because they see it as an additional source of assistance to address the economic, social, and health-related impacts of the pandemic, their citizens are more cautious, if not skeptical, about their government's relationship with China. The paper is divided into three parts. First, it provides a broad overview of Beijing's global response to the pandemic, focusing especially on its attempts to create alternative narratives about its handling of the virus and to use its assistance to craft an image of China as a responsible and benevolent country and global leader. Second, it discusses China's response to the pandemic in Oceania and the reactions of traditional development partners and Pacific Islanders. Third, it provides concluding remarks, highlighting the geopolitical implications of China's COVID-19 diplomacy. China's COVID-19 diplomacy The SARS-CoV-2 virus or novel coronavirus, which causes COVID-19, originated in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China in late 2019. On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared it a pandemic. By the end of March 2021, over 2.8 million people world-wide [End Page 254] had died from the virus, with over 128 million infections and rising. The U.S. became the epicenter with 550,000 deaths and over 30 million cases.2 By the beginning of May 2021, the epicenter of the pandemic had shifted to India, which had more than 4,000 daily fatalities and 400,000 daily infections.3 By mid-July 2021, there were over 186 million confirmed cases and over 4 million deaths worldwide.4 The economic, political, and social fallouts were also devastating. China found itself in a negative spotlight as the origin of the virus and for its lack of transparency in sharing information that could have helped contain it. The COVID-19 pandemic and its adverse social and economic impacts tarnished China's image as a global economic power with an increasing geopolitical influence, threatened President Xi Jinping's and the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) domestic reputation, and raised questions about the brand of economic development that Beijing exports globally, especially through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).5 Internationally, the U.S...

1. The Diverse Dimensions, Capabilities and Sustainability of China's Power: An Introduction Keun Lee, Joon-Han Kim and Wing Thye Woo Part 1: Perceiving and Measuring the Power of China 2. Reflections on China's Power Kwang Ok Kim 3. Assessing China's Economic Power and Science and Technology Power in a Comparative Perspective Angang Hu 4. Assessing the Tacit Dimension of China's Science and Technology Power Jong-Hak Eun Part 2: Assessing the Capabilities of the Chinese State 5. Assessing China's Capability to Manage the High-Probability Risks to Economic Growth: Fiscal, Governance and Ecological Problems Wing Thye Woo 6. Assessing the Fiscal Power of the Chinese State: Assessing the Central Government's Capacity to Implement National Policies Christine Wong Part 3: Assessing International Dimension of China Power 7. Assessing China's Power Reflected in Foreign Trade Wei Zhang 8. Assessing the Diplomatic Power of China Zhongying Pang Part 4: Party-State-Society Relations and Sustainability 9. Globalization and the State Power in China Alvin So 10. Can the Communist Party Sustain its Rule in China? Yongnian Zheng

What is the fate of middle powers during the transition of great powers in the international system? In particular, what happens to middle powers that are tethered to a declining unipolar power? Virtually every close ally of the United States is asking this question today against the backdrop of a rising China. The question is particularly acute for the middle powers of Asia that are aligned with the US - especially South Korea but also the Philippines, Taiwan, and Australia.The reconfiguration of the economic and political environment resulting from the rise of China is less acute for Canada, whose external environment will continue to be shaped far more by the geographically contiguous United States than by distant China. Nonetheless, the new global context that is being created by China's rise has uncertain implications for Canada-US relations. China's rise will affect Canada-US relations and the way that Ottawa and Washington respond to China's rise will affect their foreign policies towards one another.I will make the empirical claim that Canada is more likely to reassert its traditional close ties with the US in a period of growing tensions with China than to bandwagon with China. Canada has neither the nor normative incentives to bandwagon with China. This is especially the case because a rising China will reduce Canada's international influence far more than that of the US, adding to the need for Canada to leverage its relationship with the US.The paradox that emerges, then, is that a successful integration of China into world order will likely weaken Canada-US ties by highlighting growing divergences within liberal internationalism. But this is true only in a narrow, technocratic sense. In a larger sense, such an outcome would reinforce the shared liberal commitments of both nations, commitments that ultimately underlie their strong bilateral relationship.CHINA'S RISE AND LIBERAL NORMSChina's rise can be measured using both traditional hard (material capabilities) as well as soft (human and social capabilities) data. China's share of global economic output (13 percent in 2010 using the International Monetary Fund's purchasing-power equivalent-based estimates) has closed in quickly on that of the United States (20 percent in 2010), while its military spending (US$98.8 billion in 2009 using midrange estimates), while only 15 percent of the US level, exceeds the combined spending of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. The correlates of war composite of national material capabilities, which uses economic, military, and population data, gives China a 20-percent share of international power in 2007, compared to 14 percent for the US (in part because of its somewhat archaic emphasis on steel production). RAND gave China a 14 percent share versus 20 percent for the US in 2005, but predicted that China would close that gap by around 2015.1 An Australian measure concurs that China's power will surpass that of the US by 2015.2China's soft-power capabilities lag far behind its hard-power capabilities, although this is normal for rising powers. Kim calculates that China's structural network power ranked only 24th in the world in 2000 (the US was first and Canada an impressive fifth) behind even South Africa and Poland.3 However, a common finding is that China's soft-power capabilities are improving rapidly. For instance, The Economist's index of innovation for 2009 ranked China 54th out of 82 countries, but forecast it would climb to 46th position by 2014, the fastest riser among nations. The shifting allegiance of middle powers like Canada may be one of the best indicators of a power transition in the international system.Moreover, China is today widely perceived to be a rising power. Among the 22 countries other than China and the US in the 2008 Pew global attitudes survey, the mean country score of decided respondents who believed that China had already or would eventually replace the US as the world's leading superpower was 51 percent (versus 49 percent who believed it would not). …

China and India are being widely recognized as rising powers in the 21st century. With its track record of fast economic growth in the last two decades, China is already a global economic power. Based on India's more recent growth performance, India is steadily catching up with China as an economic power. Despite fundamental differences in their political systems, both countries have acquired rising economic power due to open market economy-oriented reforms. China has the advantage of an earlier start than India in this respect. China started its economic reforms in 1978 and India in 1991. These economic reforms have miraculously transformed China into a global economic power. Although politically constrained, economic reforms have helped India to improve its growth trajectory and to further integrate with the global economy. China and India have been following different paths for managing their rising power: China has been credited with carefully evolving a grand vision and a grand strategy for transforming it into a ‘global power’ by the year 2020 (or so). Pragmatism and effective political will have been the hallmarks of the ‘calculated strategy’ adopted by China to achieve this objective. India's economic power has been rising more due to the impulses generated by its entrepreneurs especially in the knowledge-intensive services and industries than due to its government's pursuit of a well-thoughtout grand vision and grand strategy for becoming a global power. Currently, China is nearly two decades ahead of India in moving towards acquiring significant global power. The author's analysis of the existing and projected strengths and weaknesses of both countries in this paper leads him to the conclusion that both the countries have the potential to become global powers — China most probably by the year 2020 and India by the year 2050. Further analysis of the existing and potential complementarities and competition in the economies of China and India indicates that there is a tremendous scope for forging mutually beneficial strategic partnership between them. A very useful beginning can be made in this direction by establishing mutually rewarding strategic alliances in these two countries at the business-to-business level. Progress in this direction can be expedited by supportive government policies and procedures. Despite the existing deficit of political trust between India and China, the two countries have recently agreed to become strategic partners. Concrete moves towards operationalizing this strategic partnership can be initiated in two areas identified in this paper. These are: strengthening cooperation at the international level for enhancing national energy security further cooperation in negotiations at the World Trade Organization and other multilateral forums for collectively promoting the interests of all developing countries in the emerging new international trade and investment order.

COVID-19 pandemic is tremendously impacted by socioeconomic and health determinants worldwide. This study aimed to determine factors associated with COVID-19 fatality among member states and partner countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). An ecological study was conducted using COVID-19 data of 48 countries for the period between 31 December 2019-31 December 2021. The outcome variables were COVID-19 case fatality rate (CFR) and years of life lost to COVID-19 (YLLs). Countries' sociodemographics and COVID-19-related data were extracted from OECD website, Our World in Data, John Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and WHO. In the first year of the pandemic (December 2019-January 2021), highest CFR was observed in Mexico, 8.51%, followed by China, 5.17% and Bulgaria, 4.12%), and highest YLLs was observed in Mexico, 2,055 per 100,000. At regional level, highest CFR was observed in North & central America, 4.25 (3.71) %, followed by South America (2.5 (0.1) %); whereas highest YLLs was observed in South America region 1457.5 (274.8) per 100,000, followed by North & central America, 1207.3 (908.1) per 100,000. As of 31 December 2021, Mexico (7.52%) and Bulgaria (4.78%) had highest CFR; on the other hand, highest YLLs was observed in England, 26.5 per 1,000, followed by the United States, 25.9 per 1,000. At regional level, highest CFR (3.37(3.19) %) and YLLs (16.7 (13) per 1,000) were both observed in North & central America. Globally, the analysis of the 2-year cumulative data showed inverse correlation between CFR and nurse per 10,000 (R = -0.48; p < 0.05) and GDP per capita (R = -0.54; p < 0.001), whereas positive correlation was observed between YLLs and elderly population rate (R = 0.66; p < 0.05) and overweight/obese population rates (R = 0.55; p < 0.05). This study provides insights on COVID-19 burden among OECD states and partner countries. GDP per capita, overweight/obesity and the rate of elderly population emerged as major social and health determinants of COVID-19 related burden and fatality. Findings suggest that a robust economy and interventions designed to promote healthy longevity and prevent weight gain in at-risk individuals might reduce COVID-19 burden and fatality among OECD states and partner countries.

The Global Outlook

Global Outlook

Despite the US official statement that the purpose of its pivot to Asia is to rebalance the foreign policy towards Asia, it is also known that it aimed for the US to “rebalance” growing China's power in economy and military. Prospectively, the pivot to Asia aims to create a more balanced economy, security and diplomacy. However, it risks creating Chinese perceptions and suspicions that lead to a more competitive acquisition of the position of “superpower” in the region, especially in the economy. So how did the US implement the strategy concerned with China's economic growth in the region? Thus, this article aims to discuss the strategy of the pivot to Asia in facing the rise of China's economic activities in Southeast Asia. The study was qualitative by conducting library research, and the data were analysed using a thematic approach. The study highlights four strategies of economic elements, i.e. reducing the defence budget, new defence plans, engagement in Southeast Asia multilateral and regional institutions, and promoting the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). This article confirms that despite the aim to rebalance the policy to the Asia Pacific, all the economic strategies implemented concerned the rise of China as an economic power in the region. Overall, this study concludes that the pivot to Asia strategy only created another continuous rivalry between US-China and balanced the hegemonic superpower in Southeast Asia.

Two decades of globalization has led to many changes in the economic status of countries. Countries of the European Union have faced stagnation and recession, while several southern countries have shown high growth and economic development. The fast-growing economies of China, India and Brazil stand out in this regard. These changes have impelled changes in the international system, which shifted after the end of the Cold War bi-polar system, where one superpower – the United States (US) – dominated international politics. The international forums and institutions, both formal and informal, like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and G-8 and G-20, respectively, continued to be dominated by the Western countries, especially the US and European Union. Even though Europe faced economic crises, and the economic strength of others increased, this domination did not change. The need for new formations resulted in the formation of the group called BRICS. Particularly, the global affairs drastically changed after Donald Trump became president of the US and his administration adopted draconian policies in the international economy, trade and politics. And this has led to the arrival of trade wars in international relations. In this context, the BRICS group is pushing for more global governance reforms to make global order more pluralistic and democratic. The BRICS is an association of major regional and global powers like China, India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa. Due to its inter-continental representation and positive growth, it became a more significant entity in present global politics. The BRICS group has given space for India-China to huddle together once again in world politics. However, the role of India and China in the group has become a debating point on a regular basis due to their bilateral skirmishes. In this scenario, the chapter analyzes the changing dimensions of world politics. The chapter explores whether the rise of the BRICS is inevitable or is a myth. This chapter tries to seek out the significance of the BRICS role in the changing world order and the India-China role in shaping it.

China's power in international relations has been growing in the last two decades, particularly following the handover of Hong Kong in 1997 and of Macau in 1999. Beijing's current political agenda is to unify Taiwan with China. A realist would argue that a Great Power like China can set its agenda for dialogue, that the idea of political equality is irrelevant in settling the Taiwan question, and that the United States will also cease its support of Taiwan if China becomes still more powerful in the next two decades. A realist would also be pleased to note that all major political parties in Taiwan except the DPP went to Beijing in 2000 to express their 'loyalty' in the face of the increasing military, political and economic power that China enjoys. All the above views share one key idea's it is power that matters, power that decides Taiwan's fate, and power that settles the Taiwan question. This chapter does not endorse this view of power politics, instead it argues for the politics of responsibility.

Rapid changes in power relativities inevitably aggravate security fears among smaller, weaker states and those in relative decline. The closer these states are to the major power and the deeper their historical relationships with it, the more this is true. It is preponderant on rising or remerging major powers to assuage these worries in word and action. If not, the rising or reemerging power will face resistance. Under Xi Jinping, Chinese foreign policy has embraced China's status as the leading power in East Asia and one of two major powers globally. Acceptance and support for China's new major power status and corresponding regional initiatives like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and a "new Asian security order" face three particular challenges in East Asia. The first challenge is increasingly public concerns about possible future Chinese hegemony with the East and South China Sea disputes, in particular aggravating these worries among the non-Chinese disputants. The second challenge is the disruption of the liberal virtuous cycle between growing economic interdependence and more aligned strategic interests and greater strategic trust. The third is the strengthening of alliance and security partnerships between the United States and a growing number of East Asian states from Vietnam and Singapore to the Philippines and Japan. Chinese foreign policy under and after Xi Jinping will have to respond to these concerns and reassure its East Asian neighbours in order to succeed.

PROTOCOL: Participation, inclusion, transparency and accountability (PITA) to improve public services in low- and middle-income countries: a systematic review.

Closing the Implementation Gap