Economic performance and the type and method of presidential term limit evasion1

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ABSTRACT We argue that macroeconomic performance shapes the evasion of presidential term limits in two ways: first, by influencing the decision to extend, abolish, or simply avoid term limits, and second, by shaping the choice to rely on judicial decisions, legislative action, or a public referendum for implementation. Drawing on the theory of retrospective economic voting, we argue that strong economic performance increases the likelihood of evasion types and methods subject to voter participation in the process, such as extending and abolishing term limits and employing public referendum. Weak economic performance, by contrast, encourages presidents to avoid term limits altogether or adopt evasion methods that allow them to mitigate public scrutiny. We collect new data that codes details about the methods used in more than 80 instances of presidential term limit violations globally and find robust empirical support for these claims. We find particularly strong evidence that increases in unemployment are associated with a higher risk of avoidance, since this strategy allows presidents to stay in office while evading punishment at the polls. Faster rates of economic growth, by contrast, are associated with greater risk of extending and abolishing term limits, and the use of public referenda that legitimate these changes.