Economic Cooperation Between the European Union and Brazil

Received 05.11.2020. The research focuses on the participation of Latin American states in the South-South cooperation (SSC) against the background of the contradictions of the current stage of globalization. Analyzing the official documents, leaders’ speeches, using quantitative data, the authors consider three factors that model such involvement today: (a) a new context in Latin America, i. e. the growing popularity of the right-wing forces, financial and economic difficulties after the end of the commodities boom in the 2000s, (b) the rise of China and its deepening confrontation with the United States, (c) today’s global coronavirus crisis. According to the authors, all the mentioned factors affect the process of Latin America taking part in SSC in the following ways. First, due to internal and international changes, the foreign policy agendas and the way of self-identification of the Latin American countries in the global world are in transformation. While the cooperation with other developing nations, within the region and beyond, seems less relevant for the New Right, the South-South vector is still in demand as a foreign policy diversification tool. Second, the strategic partnership with China remains an indicator of the region’s actors’ commitment to the ideas of multilateralism, openness, and globalization as such, but at the same time, it goes against the principles of SSC as equal and horizontal by its nature and also because of the tensions between China and the US. As for the pandemic, although in discourse it revives the importance of international cooperation, including SSC, in practice it rather catalyzes the disconnecting trends that have developed in recent years in Latin America. Acknowledgements. The reported study was funded by RFBR, project number 19-014-00042 А “Latin America in the new world order: prospects and challenges”.

The article identifies the main trends in the development of trade, economic and investment cooperation between Spain and China, especially after the establishment of a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2005. The authors assessed the potential of economic cooperation that has developed over 50 years of diplomatic relations, and considered new directions: interaction both within individual regions and cities, and in the markets of third countries, which include Latin America, North Africa and Asia. The article also shows negative market-driven factors that make it difficult to deepen these ties, which include Spain’s membership in NATO, the EU’s adherence to an aggressive anti-Chinese policy, and Beijing’s evasion of anti-Russian sanctions. The authors conclude that the growing deficit in Spain's trade with China, the decline in Madrid's interest in the Belt and Road project, and the intensification of Chinese policy in Latin America indicate that the likelihood of the formation of a China-Spain-Latin America triangle has decreased.

PurposeThe purpose of this article is to discuss the characteristics of China’s strategic partners in Latin America, emphasizing the foreign policy orientations of these nations towards China.Design/methodology/approachThe first part is a theoretical analysis of the foreign economic policy orientations of the Chinese strategic partners in South America. In the second part, attention is paid to the empirical regularities of economic cooperation between China and its South American strategic partners.FindingsChina seeks to diversify the profile of its strategic partnerships, as long as they increase Chinas complexity in the orientation of cooperation, using a multidimensional approach, based on three strategic cooperation networks (partners based on ideological affinities, geo-economic partners and trade partners).Originality/valueThis article increases the understanding of how new strategic partnerships take a more active position in the new great geo-economic game in which China is involved. China increases its facilitation role in Latin American Pacific rim countries, as well as its influence in countries historically close to the USA.

This article is dedicated to the study of economic, political, and strategic cooperation between China and the Central Asian countries. The geostrategic significance of Central Asia has significantly increased within the framework of the "Belt and Road" initiative, which has facilitated the establishment of close economic ties with China. The novelty of the article lies in the systematic analysis of the strategic importance of the "Belt and Road" initiative for Central Asia, as well as in the study of its economic and political consequences. The article also discusses the prospects and potential challenges of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The objectives of the research include determining the role of the "Belt and Road" initiative in Central Asia, assessing trade, economic, and investment cooperation between the countries of the region, analyzing trends in the development of strategic partnerships between China and the Central Asian countries, as well as key achievements and challenges in cooperation. The aim of the research is to analyze the main directions, results, and prospects of cooperation between China and the Central Asian countries. The research employed general scientific methods (analysis, synthesis, comparison, generalization) and specialized scientific methods (content analysis, evaluation of statistical data). The results of the study showed that economic ties between China and the Central Asian countries are expanding, large projects are being implemented in transportation, logistics, energy, and manufacturing sectors, manufacturing capacity and investment cooperation are strengthening, and significant funds are being allocated to infrastructure projects. China has become one of the main trading partners of Central Asia, especially in the areas of natural resources, transportation, and logistics. In addition to economic achievements, successes have also been made in the fields of culture, education, and healthcare. However, threats related to political instability, ethnic issues, and the influence of external powers remain relevant. In conclusion, it can be stated that the relations between China and the Central Asian countries are developing dynamically. Cooperation within the framework of the "Belt and Road" initiative brings mutual benefits and contributes to regional development. In the future, to ensure sustainable development, the parties should strengthen strategic partnerships and enhance cooperation based on common interests.

In recent years, Russia-China economic and trade cooperation has enjoyed a good momentum of development. During the pandemic and complex international situation, Russia-China economic and trade cooperation is moving forward against the trend. Bilateral trade relations are becoming closer, the scale and fields of investment cooperation are expanding, energy, agricultural, scientific and technological cooperation is steadily advancing. This shows that the economic and trade cooperation between Russia and China has a solid foundation and broad space. However, there are still problems that cannot be ignored. The scale of bilateral trade is relatively small, the trade structure is not reasonable, and the depth of cooperation in the spheres mentioned above is insufficient. Russia-China economic and trade cooperation needs to develop in the direction of high quality and realize the unity of "increasing volume" and "improving quality". From the Chinese perspective, China's economic and social development strategy in a medium or long term will have a positive impact on bilateral economic and trade cooperation with Russia. It will help deepen the scientific and technological cooperation, accelerate the development of cross-border e-commerce, elevate investment cooperation to a higher level, further unleash the potential of energy cooperation, boost the agricultural cooperation, and upgrade Russia-China economic and trade cooperation as a whole.

During President Donald Trump’s tenure (2017–2021), Indo-US relations witnessed unprecedented growth, marked by deeper strategic and economic cooperation. The Trump administration considered India as a crucial partner in its Indo-Pacific policy, boosting bilateral defense accords, intelligence-sharing systems, and military collaboration. India was classified as a Major Defense Partner, permitting high-end military purchases and bilateral military exercises, such as the Malabar Naval Exercise. This alignment was not merely limited to security; economic collaborations also expanded, with both nations working to enhance trade relations, reduce tariffs, and increase investment flows. The rising convergence between Washington and New Delhi was primarily motivated by mutual worries about China's development, promoting stronger connections in technology, commerce, and regional security frameworks. The strengthening of Indo-US relations had direct implications for Pakistan, as the strategic balance in South Asia tilted further in India’s favor. The Trump administration took a harder attitude against Pakistan, notably on its counterterrorism efforts and suspected backing for terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Consequently, military aid to Pakistan was significantly reduced, and Islamabad faced diplomatic isolation in several international forums. Additionally, India’s growing economic and military ties with the United States empowered New Delhi’s regional influence, which heightened Pakistan’s security concerns. These developments forced Pakistan to seek alternative alliances, deepening its strategic and economic partnership with China, especially through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Pakistan’s response to these shifting geopolitical dynamics was multifaceted, as it sought to reposition itself in the evolving power structure of South Asia. To counterbalance India’s rising influence, Islamabad intensified its engagements with China, Russia, and Turkey, forging stronger economic and defense collaborations. Additionally, Pakistan worked to strengthen its position within multilateral platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to diversify its diplomatic and economic dependencies. Furthermore, the Pakistani leadership initiated counterterrorism measures and policy reforms to improve its global standing and avoid economic sanctions. Despite these efforts, the Indo-US strategic alignment continued to present challenges for Pakistan, forcing it to navigate an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape while safeguarding its national security and economic stability. Keywords Indo-US Relations , Trump Administration , Strategic Partnership , Defense Cooperation , Economic Engagement , Pakistan Foreign Policy , Geopolitical Shifts , CPEC

Abstract. Broadening the scope of economic interests, together with the involvement of the strategic partner to resolve security issues, brings the dialogue between Ukraine and Turkey to a new level. This intensified negotiations on the establishment of a free trade area and the implementation of joint projects in the defense industry, cultural and humanitarian spheres. Thus, the study of priority areas of cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey in the Black Sea region for the effective realization of Ukraine’s geostrategic interests is becoming topical. The purpose of the article is to study the peculiarities of the economic partnership between Ukraine and Turkey, to calculate the impact and to determine the advantages and prospects of a deeper bilateral trade liberalization. The methodology is based on assessment of export specialization; the characterization of the relative advantages by the RXA coefficient; the impact assessment of bilateral trade on economic development through a descriptive gravity model. The study found that high tariff barriers are now applied to Ukrainian exporters in the Turkish market. Total exports from Ukraine to Turkey declined by more than 30 per cent from 2011 to 2019, while the low value-added products dominate in the highly concentrated structure of export flows. On the contrary, Turkish exports to Ukraine are quite diversified. The top ten exports include machinery, electrical equipment, vehicles and knitwear. Ukrainian grains, oilseeds and oils, iron and steel, ore and rail transport have comparative advantages in the Turkish market. The military-industrial sector and IT are promising areas for export development and investment cooperation in the Ukrainian economy. Bilateral trade surpluses are in favor of Ukraine. The economic development of Ukraine significantly influences the volume of bilateral trade, according to the results of the descriptive gravity model. A $1 increase in Ukraine’s GDP will lead to an increase in bilateral trade by $0.8. This makes Ukraine much more interested in entering the Turkish market. Keywords: strategic partnership, free trade area, international trade, exports, customs tariffs, liberalization. JEL Classification F13 Formulas: 3; fig.: 4; tabl.: 2; bibl.: 21.

India–US relations have witnessed diverse trends ranging from estrangement to engagement followed by strategic partnership. They have signed various agreements, such as DPA, CND, LEMOA, COMCASA and BECA, to institutionalize their strategic partnership. However, real-time challenges have continuously shaped the trajectory of strategic alignment as their national interests occasionally converged and often diverged. Their notions of world order sharply contrast. New Delhi stands for a multi-polar world order, whereas Washington advocates uni-polar world order. The US–Pakistan alliance partnership has further proved an impediment to the Indo–US strategic partnership. Hence, much claimed natural partnership has not been able to make much headway as their national interests diverge on core issues such as trade, immigration, joint and co-production, and world order. The mainstream literature advocates that these are the teething problems of evolving strategic partnerships, but the in-depth analysis indicates that issues confronting their relationship are structural and deep-rooted. Realism, neorealism and social constructivism prove appropriate tools to grasp the dynamic of Indo–US natural and strategic partnerships by locating them in the global, Asian and regional power structure.

Over the past century, the United States has built and sustained relationships of varying hierarchy over states in Latin America, Western Europe, and Northeast Asia. In recent decades, it also has attempted to expand its authority over other states into Eastern Europe, which has been met with a measure of success, and the Middle East, which has been far more problematic. The authority wielded by the United States over its subordinates, despite occasional abuses, provides security both internally and externally and permits unprecedented prosperity. Americans, in turn, gain from writing the rules of that order. The key foreign policy task today is not to diminish US authority, but to preserve its benefits into the future. To rule legitimately, however, requires tying the suzerain's hands. To secure the international order that has been so beneficial in the past century and to succeed in extending that order to countries that do not yet enjoy its fruits requires a new, more restraining, multilateral solution that binds the hands of the United States far more tightly than in the past. KEYWORDS: authority, hierarchy multilateralism, new world order, US foreign policy. THE UNITED STATES IS NOT AN EMPIRE. OVER THE PAST CENTURY, HOWEVER, it has built and sustained informal empires over states on the Caribbean littoral, spheres of exclusive political and economic influence over countries in South America, and after 1945 protectorates over allies in Western Europe and Northeast Asia in which it controls key segments of their foreign policies. In pursuit of a new world order, the United States has in recent decades attempted to expand its authority over other states into Eastern Europe, which has been met with a measure of success, and the Middle East, which has been far more problematic largely because its attempted rule there is not seen as legitimate. (1) Diplomats acknowledge the authority of the United States through deeds, but engage in a conspiracy of silence. Newly empowered leaders in the developing world champion the principles of sovereignty and national self-determination to secure their rule. (2) To speak publicly of the authority of the United States would gravely weaken their hold on power. Even in established democracies, leaders are loath to challenge the myth of unbridled popular sovereignty or to admit to themselves and their citizens that they are, in part, under the authority of the United States. US leaders have understood that to claim authority over others would force their counterparts in subordinate states to deny this fact and thus undermine the legitimacy of US rule. As a result, US authority has been cloaked in the euphemisms. Analysts talk of hegemony, soft power, and recently the declining legitimacy of US power. (3) Diplomats describe the United States as the leader of the free world that maintains special relationships with strategic partners. Only critics of the United States give voice to its authority in describing it as a neoimperialist or neocolonial power, concepts that are rejected by the mainstream precisely because they threaten to reveal the authority that dares not speak its name. (4) The authority wielded by the United States over its subordinates, despite occasional abuses, has been enormously beneficial. Much like individuals in Thomas Hobbes' state of nature who give up personal autonomy for the benefits of a civil society, subordinate states give up a measure of sovereignty for a political order created and enforced by the United States. (5) This order provides security both internally and externally and permits unprecedented prosperity. The United States, in turn, gains from writing the rules of that order and, especially, from turning possible rivals into reliable subordinates that largely comply with its rules. (6) The so-called Western international order has actually rested on US authority and its accompanying social contracts. It has also produced very real benefits. …

La cooperación Sur-Sur se ha consolidado como una modalidad complementaria a la tradicional cooperación Norte-Sur que, en la práctica, se ha materializado como un instrumento para el intercambio de ideas, políticas y experiencias, que se ejecuta entre países en desarrollo que tienen, o creen tener, elementos políticos, históricos y socioeconómicos afines. Sus orígenes se remontan a la década de los cincuenta, y desde entonces, la estructura ideológica que le ha dado forma ha estado influenciada por ideas y hechos que se interrelacionan a partir de distintas narrativas construidas por los estados, subrayando intereses comunes sobre el lugar que ocupan dentro de la arquitectura de la cooperación al desarrollo. A lo largo del siglo XXI, dicha modalidad ha ido ganando mayores espacios de concertación y negociación como un instrumento político de los países en desarrollo que se sustenta en los principios de horizontalidad, solidaridad, reciprocidad e independencia. Desde un enfoque regional, América Latina, por ejemplo, ha favorecido la creación de instrumentos técnicos que, desde la conceptualización hasta el registro de datos, han llevado a la creación de estructuras normativas para la ejecución de la cooperación Sur-Sur. En esa línea argumentativa, desde un enfoque social constructivista de difusión de ideas, normas y prácticas, este artículo analiza de manera descriptiva y explicativa cómo la región ha fortalecido la práctica de la cooperación Sur-Sur a partir de la identificación de problemáticas comunes y discursos encaminados a definirla desde las estructuras ideacionales. El objetivo de este artículo es entender el proceso de formación de la gobernanza regional de la cooperación Sur-Sur en América Latina, para lo cual, se analiza el rol de la Secretaria General Iberoamericana desde cuya institucionalidad, los países de la región fortalecen la difusión de prácticas e ideas que podrían significar avances para la construcción de una gobernanza global de la cooperación Sur-Sur.

This study examines how China has developed a diplomatic mechanism to expand its international influence through the establishment of strategic partnerships. These strategic partnerships have sparked a debate among analysts. On the one hand, some optimistic studies applaud the win-win objective of China’s foreign policy and portray China as a successful model for developing countries. On the other hand, more skeptical studies depict China as a rising imperial power that represents a competitive threat to Latin America. This book focuses on China’s strategic partnerships with Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela within the oil sector. It stresses how Chinese strategic partnerships with each of these four countries have diverged across cases over time (1991–2015). The study finds that the strategic partnerships are asymmetrical in which China benefits more than four Latin American countries in a variety of aspects. I suggest Latin American countries to push for greater diversification of export agenda toward China, to develop new productive partnerships beyond traditional sectors and to increase the competitiveness of firms. Meanwhile, China’s diplomatic actions toward Latin America are more than likely to result in forms of change, particularly across my four country cases, and where strategic partnerships are concerned.

In 2003, the EU and China established a strategic partnership intended to deepen their bilateral relationship not only economically, but also strategically. However, the EU-China relations are still challenged by several ideological and strategic issues. This paper will evaluate the EU-China’s strategic partnership by presenting a case study of the EU’s arms embargo against China since the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. This paper will argue that although the EU-China’s strategic partnership has a strong foundation of bilateral economic and strategic cooperation, the relationship between the EU and China is still very weak: (1) ideologically, the EU is still unsatisfied with China’s human rights record and political reform process; and (2) strategically, the United States (U.S.) still plays an influential role the EU’s external decision-making process.

In the wake of a few critical intersecting global issues, such as the Russia-Ukraine crisis, the Israel-Hamas conflict, and the rise of China along with middle powers and power diffusion into many actors, the argument revolves around the emerging world order–the multipolar world already on its way. However, the epistemological underpinning of the central question that finds a broader scholarly debate lacks clarity. Is the world unipolar, bipolar, or transitioning? to a multipolar? While methodically reviewing various published literary documents and scholarly papers accessed through open sources and data triangulation, this article attempts to qualitatively examine key global strategic issues and scenarios to draw an analogy of the world's various polarity conditions. Furthermore, it intends to drive a critical discourse on the contemplated world order, especially the multipolar world. It also dwells on other crucial aspects, such as strategic partners, alliances, and minilateralism. It argues that, on the one hand, there remains a continuing friction in defining the world order in bipolarity and multipolarity discourses; on the other hand, these conditions will be challenging to resonate in reality. While offering policy contours, the article concludes by advancing a strong assertion that the world order will continue to remain unipolar, constructed on the very core of established conditions such as the knowledge economy, democratic power, and values of human freedom and open dialogue for peace and stability, as well as prearranged rules that are widely inherited in a democratic culture. Moreover, the debate on defining the world order will continue to hinge on the actor who significantly possesses these qualities, values, and characteristics. However, the world order will experience the complexities of middle and small powers, finding dilemmas in their alignment and realignment between established unipolar and emerging powers. Meanwhile, Nepal, wedged between two emerging powers, China and India, and the increasing interest of world powers in the region can no longer ignore global events and ongoing power competitions. While maturing its democratic practices, skillfully designed and carefully balanced diplomacy, and a closer look at ‘strategic hedging’ in its foreign policy, Nepal should support a rules-based international order that contributes to preserving its territorial integrity and national unity In the wake of a few critical intersecting global issues, such as the Russia-Ukraine crisis, the Israel-Hamas conflict, and the rise of China along with middle powers and power diffusion into many actors, the argument revolves around the emerging world order—the multipolar world already on its way. However, the epistemological underpinning of the central question that Finds a broader scholarly debate lacks clarity. Is the world unipolar or bipolar, or transitioning to a multipolar? While methodically reviewing various published literary documents and scholarly papers accessed through open sources and data triangulation, this article attempts to qualitatively examine key global strategic issues and scenarios to draw an analogy of the world's various polarity conditions. Furthermore, it intends to drive a critical discourse on the contemplated world order, especially the multipolar world. It also dwells on other crucial aspects, such as strategic partners, alliances, and minilateralism. It argues that, on the one hand, there remains a continuing friction in defining the world order in bipolarity and multipolarity discourses; on the other hand, these conditions will be challenging to resonate in reality. While offering policy contours, the article concludes by advancing a strong assertion that the world order will continue to remain unipolar, constructed on the very core of established conditions such as the knowledge economy, democratic power, and values of human freedom and open dialogue for peace and stability, as well as prearranged rules that are widely inherited in a democratic culture. Moreover, the debate on defining the world order will continue to hinge on the actor who significantly possesses these qualities, values, and characteristics. However, the world order will experience the complexities of middle and small powers, finding dilemmas in their alignment and realignment between established unipolar and emerging powers. Meanwhile, Nepal, wedged between two emerging powers, China and India, and the increasing interest of world powers in the region, can no longer ignore global events and ongoing power competitions. While maturing its democratic practices, skillfully designed and carefully balanced diplomacy, and a closer look at ‘strategic hedging’ in its foreign policy, Nepal should support a rules-based international order that contributes to preserving its territorial integrity and national unity.

Many observers were casting doubts about the existence of a strategic partnership between Russia and the European Union long before the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent strained relations between the two blocs. Nevertheless, the main challenge of this article is to prove that there was indeed a positive effect regarding the strategic partnership on bilateral trading – together with such factors as the growth of the Russian and EU GDPs per capita, the devaluation of the Russian currency and the oil price increase – by applying the Gravity Model. Based on this model, it was also confirmed that there was a negative effect of the geographical distance and sanctions between parties on the EU–Russia trade flow. Moreover, we tried to predict by means of the Error Correction Models how EU–Russia bilateral trade would have changed according to a scenario wherein the parties continued being strategic partners, and had the sanctions not been imposed. As such, and by the method described, not only was it empirically confirmed that the major partners would have received the most benefit from the strategic partnership with Russia but even Russia’s smaller trading partners are incurring significant welfare losses from sanctions, along with Russia itself.

The People’s Republic of China, along with the United States, the European Union, and the Russian Federation, is one of the four powers seeking to increase and maintain its influence in the Republic of Serbia. Since the decision was made in 2016 to establish a bilateral strategic partnership, political and economic cooperation between Serbia and China has been steadily strengthening. This article outlines the scope and basis of the political partnership and the most significant joint investments of the two countries, which, as a result, allows for an answer to be provided to the following research question: What are the benefits and risks for the Republic of Serbia from its strategic partnership with the People’s Republic of China? Thanks to the descriptive and exploratory values of this text, it is possible to conclude that strategic cooperation between Serbia and China contributes to the growth of Serbia’s economic potential and is reflected in the dynamics of the Republic of Serbia’s political relations with the European Union.