ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE US DE JURE RECOGNITION OF THE BALTIC STATES IN 1922

As soon as the Baltic states gained independence in 1991, they targeted, in terms of domestic and foreign relations’ development, reorientation to the West and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Whereas NATO (under leadership of the United States) is regarded as the “cornerstone” of their security, the European Union (EU) is viewed as a source of financial assistance and the guarantor of economic stability. The article presents an overview of the transformation processes in the Baltic countries in the past two and a half decades, and the practical component of their membership in the EU is offered in detail. Comparative analysis of the political and socio-economic Baltic transit shows the similarity of their development trajectories. However, the positive effect, which joining the EU brought about, is eclipsed by the social and economic costs that resulted from the tough neo-liberal reforms that were required. Despite the rejection of the role of geopolitical and geo-economic “bridge” between Russia and the West, the Russian factor continues to play a primary role in the political processes and foreign policies of these countries, while at the same time the Baltic states themselves prefer not to call themselves post-Soviet. Confrontational position that the Baltic states undertook in relation to Russia, is determined by political and ideological factors and has long-term destructive impact not only on the bilateral dialogue, but also on relations between Russia and the European Union.

Introduction: The Baltic Question and the Cold War John Hiden, Vahur Made and David J. Smith. The Baltic States and Europe, 1918-1940 Vahur Made. The US, Soviet Russia and the Baltic States: From Recognition to the Cold War Eero Medijainen. Roosevelt and the Dictators: The Origin of US Non-Recognition of the Soviet Annexation of the Baltic States Jonathan L'hommedieu. The Politics of a Principle: US Non-Recognition Policy Before, During and After the Recovery of Baltic Independence Paul A. Goble. Soviet Foreign Policy During the Cold War: The Baltic Factor Konstantin K. Khudoley. Britain and the Baltic States: The Late 1940s and the Early 1990s Craig Gerrard. French Policy towards the Baltic States 1939-1991: From Abandonment to Reunion Suzanne Champonnois. West Germany and the Baltic Question During the Cold War Kristina Spohr Readman. The Estonian Government-in-Exile: A Controversial Project of State Continuation Vahur Made. Emigres, Dissidents and International Organisations Helen M. Morris and Vahur Made. Between Political Rhetoric and Realpolitik Calculations: Western Diplomacy and the Baltic Independence Struggle in the Cold War Endgame Kristina Spohr Readman. The End of the 'Baltic Question'? The Baltic States, Russia and the West in the Post-Cold War Era David J. Smith

We may distinguish internal and external identities. In the context of the Baltic states the external factor was much more dominant in the twentieth century. Certain unity between the Baltic states emerged during these simultaneous fights for their independence and for recognition by the great powers in Europe and the US. Recognition was mostly applied and given separately to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and not commonly to the Baltic states. This article tries to determine when and under what circumstances the Baltic question reached the institutions and leading persons dealing with foreign relations in the US, as being a separate problem, independent of Russia. After the independence of the Baltic states, there followed a repelling attitude from the US and non-recognition until 1922. One of mine objectives was to ascertain to what extent the development of relations between the US and Soviet Russia influenced the change in the international status of the Baltic states in the beginning of the 1920s.

The article examines origins and causes of tensions in relations between Russia and Latvia today, their manifestations, and possible scenarios of their development in the future. The dominant feature of today’s Russian-Latvian relations is their political component. This situation first emerged in 2014, the year of the coup d’etat in Ukraine and the year of the Crimea joining Russia. The spirit of confrontation in Russian-Latvian relations and the increasing degree of tension has been fueled not by Russia but by Latvia, and, in the background of the situation, NATO, and, first and foremost, the United States. In 2005 the Latvian National Security Concept Program underscored “absence of military threat for Latvia or other Baltic states,” in 2015 the new edition changes its focus completely and mentions the “Russian threat.” Latvia does not play an independent role in foreign relations with Russia, but the country is using Russia as playing the role of an aggressor. As Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are fully dependent on the US and the EU, they are forced to comply with foreign policy orders of their Western creditors, even if these demands contradict these countries’ own interests. Considerable changes have taken place in Latvia in the early 1917, when the legal status of US military personnel was changed. Consistently implementing these changes will turn virtually the entire territory of Latvia into the military infrastructure of the United States. As US military bases are being created in Latvia, it is equivalent of having American troops on the border with Russia. Obviously, Russia does not threaten Latvia in any way. An open conflict with NATO and the US could be used only as a last resort. But nothing depends on Moscow’s wishes anymore, and we can only watch the Baltic States being dragged further away from Russia. If previously, hoping to start a major European war, Washington placed its faith in Kyiv, now they find that strategy failing. The Baltic States appear to be an almost perfect testing ground for a major provocation. For now the Russian leadership still has some room for maneuver, but these options are rapidly shrinking. Almost all predictions about the future development of Russian-Latvian relations say that these will not be bilateral relations proper, but will depend on the dynamics of US-Russia relations. Looking at the dynamics of US military presence in Latvia, these predictions are fully justified.

The Baltic States and the Great Powers: Foreign Relations, 1938-1940

The article investigates and compares the contributions of NATO member states to the collective security of the organization, particularly concerning military expenditures over different periods of time. The study examines the ratio of military spending between the United States and other NATO member countries by analyzing NATO's official documentation on the military expenditures of member states across various periods of the Alliance's existence and comparing the obtained results. Open datasets related to the GDP of NATO countries, the ratio of GDP indicators of Alliance countries, and the proportionality of contributions to security through military spending were analyzed. The study compares the GDP ratios of individual NATO member states relative to the total GDP of all NATO countries, demonstrating the disproportionate contribution of the United States to the collective security of the entire Alliance. Publications from think tanks and media outlets, such as the Council on Foreign Relations, Atlantic Council, CNN, and Politico, were analyzed. The study proves the critical security dependence of European NATO members on the military presence and economic power of the United States. Analytical tools were used to construct graphs that clearly illustrate the ratio of military expenditures of NATO states in absolute terms relative to GDP. The research results suggest that European countries are neglecting their obligations to ensure and maintain NATO's collective security, particularly in the matter of financing their own military capabilities. Examples of European countries that have not ignored their NATO obligations regarding military spending—specifically, the Baltic states and Poland—are provided. The article concludes with the fallacy of such policies and the necessity for European NATO members to increase their level of military spending in the face of the threat of military aggression against the Euro-Atlantic region from the russian federation.

The Baltic States and the Great Powers: Foreign Relations, 1938-1940.

This is an account of the diplomatic relations and military steps that led to the absorption of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into the USSR. Making use of recently-opened archival sources, the author traces the Baltic States' relations with one another and with the Great Powers, in particular Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union, from 1917 to 1940. He offers a detailed analysis of the diplomatic manoeuvring that marked Europe's collective slide toward war and resulted in the loss of Baltic sovereignty for the next half-century.

<i>The Baltic States and the Great Powers: Foreign Relations, 1938-1940</i>, by David M. Crowe and, <i>The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War</i>, edited by John Hiden and Thomas Lane

Book review

By 1920 nationalist forces had won independent statehood for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. But they owed their victory to a propitious sequence of world-shaking events: first, the German defeat of Russia followed by the Entente defeat of Germany; second, the subsequent assistance the Entente rendered nationalist Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians in beating back the Red tide. Peter the Great's “window on Europe” was thereby reduced to a Soviet aperture on Europe. Only the narrow Gulf of Finland, flanked by a “White” Finland and a “White” Estonia, afforded the USSR direct access to the Baltic Sea. The resurgence of Germany under Hitler and Soviet Russia under Stalin overturned the configuration of world power that had attended the birth of the Baltic Republics. In treating the fate that befell the Baltic States confronted by the resurgence of German and Soviet power in 1939, this article has three aims: first, to give due attention to German policy towards the Baltic States; second, to assess the efficacy and wisdom of the policies pursued by the Baltic States to avoid being ground between the Hitler and the Stalin millstones; and third, to incorporate pertinent new information published in the USSR since 1989. Even under the “Gorbachev Revolution,” publication of newly declassified diplomatic papers in the USSR has been conducted, so far, by dozirovka; i.e., the measuring out of information in small doses. This previously unpublished material, though exiguous, can at least begin to fill certain glaring “blank spots” in the history of the Baltic Question in 1939.

No DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN ON THE BALTIC STATES AT THE BIG THREE conference at Yalta but silence on the part of the Allies was not reassuring. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were by that time firmly under Soviet occupation and Moscow had renewed its program of forced Sovietization. Wartime “liberalism” and hopes for wider autonomy on the model of Mongolia, which many local communists considered feasible, were quickly dashed into pieces. The decisions of the Orgburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in late October and early November 1944, on the “deficiencies and tasks in the political work of the party-organizations” of the Baltic republics established Moscow’s firm control over the republics’ leaderships and their policies. The uprooting of “bourgeois nationalism” was singled out as the most urgent task. Though developments in the Baltic states in the immediate postwar years can be viewed in the larger context of the expansion of the USSR into Europe, and compared to the simultaneous processes in the “peoples’ democracies” of East Central Europe, changes in the three Baltic states were quicker, deeper, and more violent.1

The paper examines flows of foreign direct&#13;\ninvestment within the Baltic region. The author&#13;\ndemonstrates close investment ties among the&#13;\nEU members, which are of special importance&#13;\nfor Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Transborder&#13;\ncorporate integration in the region is&#13;\ncharacterized by significant imbalances. In&#13;\nmany aspects, it can be viewed as Sweden’s&#13;\neconomic expansion or development of domestic&#13;\nmarkets for northern European companies.&#13;\nAlthough many German, Polish and Russian&#13;\ncompanies are involved in corporate integration&#13;\nin the Baltic region, other vectors of their&#13;\nforeign economic relations are still more important&#13;\nfor them. As a result, the integration of&#13;\nRussian business in the Baltic part of the&#13;\nEuropean integration area is still rather weak&#13;\ndespite Russia’s considerable foreign direct&#13;\ninvestment in the Baltic States.

Economic security is an important factor in the economic development of a country. Though it relates to all countries, it plays a key role in relation to emerging economies in particular. Given this fact, the purpose of the study is to analyse the main indicators of Ukraine’s development of foreign economic activity and to formulate the country’s foreign trade partnership strategy in the context of strengthening its economic security. Based on the analysis of the country’s potential in the sphere of foreign trade activity, the foreign trade strategic partnership matrix for Ukraine was formed. This helped to identify the countries with asymmetric interaction and relatively low potential of partnerships, as wellas the most attractive strategic partner countries. The matrix shows that countries such as Hungary, Italy, China, Great Britain, and the Russian Federation are characterised by relatively lower potential for strengthening partnerships with Ukraine, whereas the USA, France, Canada, Austria, Germany, Poland, Slovakia, the Baltic States, Belarus, Georgia and the Czech Republic are among the priority countries in the context of strengthening foreign trade relations. The results achieved have wide practical implications for politicians and decision-makers.

The author investigates mutual flows of foreign direct investment within the Baltic Region. The article emphasises close investment ties between the EU members, which are of special importance for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. However, transborder corporate integration in the region has significant imbalances. In many aspects, it can be interpreted as Swedish expansion or home markets development for Northern European companies. Although many German, Polish and Russian companies also take part in corporate integration in the Baltic Region, the other vectors of their foreign economic relations are usually more important. As a result, despite significant Russian direct investments in the three Baltic States, the actual integration of Russian business into the Baltic part of the European integration area is still rather weak.