East Timor, René Girard and neocolonial violence: scapegoating as Australian policy

In a new historical interpretation of the relationship between Australia and East Timor, Susan Connelly draws on the mimetic theory of René Girard to show how the East Timorese people were scapegoated by Australian foreign policy during the 20th century. Charting key developments in East Timor’s history and applying three aspects of Girard’s framework – the scapegoat, texts of persecution and conversion – Connelly reveals Australia’s mimetic dependence on Indonesia and other nations for security. She argues that Australia’s complicity in the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor perpetuated the sacrifice of the Timorese people as victims, thus calling into question the traditional Australian values of egalitarianism and fairness. Connelly also examines the embryonic conversion process apparent in levels of recognition of the innocent victim and of the Australian role in East Timor’s suffering, as well as the consequent effects on Australian self-perception. Emphasising Girardian considerations of fear, suffering,

For a generation, the East Timorese independence struggle was ignored by Southeast Asian nations and by Australia. However, Indonesia's annexation never gained full international recognition, and with the failure to win the allegiance of the majority of the population and in the context of national political uncertainty; the crisis in the territory led to United Nations (U.N.) intervention. However, the U.N. mandate will be difficult to execute, given the material and political problems in the territory Indonesia's record has already generated unprecedented domestic and international scrutiny of the role of the military. The contribution of Australian diplomacy and military power to the resolution of the East Timor issue has brought into question longstanding Australian regional policies. In the case of ASEAN, which had previously supported Indonesia on the issue, the East Timorese independence movement has also raised difficulties for the grouping. Introduction Developments over the past year in East Timor have constituted a watershed for Southeast Asia, comparable in importance to the resolution in 1992 of the Cambodian conflict. Southeast Asia now has a new nation, one whose historical experience marks it out as diverging somewhat from the prevailing regional consensus. The size and scale of the United Nations-sponsored multinational INTERFET (International Force for East Timor) operation introduced into the territory- in September 1999 as well as the manner of its introduction also set new precedents. The UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor) authority that succeeded it ensured that the United Nations will have a direct role in the region for some time to come. The consequences for individual nations have also been significant. On the one hand, the Australian Government has considerably reinterpreted a longstanding policy of regional engagement which may yet portend a different future response to the problems of Southeast Asia and beyond, and will certainly entail a new approach to such issues as military force configuration and expenditure as well as to diplomacy. On the other hand, the integrity of Indonesia has been challenged. These events have encouraged separatist trends in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and elsewhere, and they have already led to re-evaluations at home and abroad of the Indonesian military and its political role and aspirations. This article reviews the background to the East Timor issue, considers the interventions of 1999 in the territory, and seeks to identify the sources of Indonesian and Australian policy, paying particular attention to the new challenges posed for policy-makers by the East Timorese independence struggle. It then concludes with a consideration of the impact of these events on ASEAN and on regional dynamics. The Failure of Indonesian Policy East Timor was formally incorporated into Indonesia as the nation's twenty-seventh province on 17 July 1976, after the invasion of the territory by elements of the Indonesian military on 7 December 1975, and intervention in the politics of the emerging nation from October 1974, On 27 September 1999, the Indonesian commander in Dili, Major General Kiki Syahnakri formally transferred authority for security in the territory to the INTERFET command, and the final elements of his force departed on 27 October. Between these dates Jakarta expended, given East Timor's insignificant size and population, prodigious amounts of blood and treasure in pursuit of a policy of integration. Yet this policy was evidently a failure. The reasons for this failure are a matter of considerable debate. They may be sought in the assumptions fundamental to Indonesia's conduct. They may also be attributed to particular dynamics within East Timor in the last decade, a time in which external pressures have played an important role. As to the former, it is clear that in the first few years Indonesian military policy was incoherent, producing widespread alienation of the population and many fatalities while being incapable of finally extinguishing the guerilla resistance of FALINTIL (Forcas Armadas de Libertacao de Timor-Leste Independente), the military arm of FRETILIN (Frente Revolutionaria de Timor-Leste Independente). …

East Timor, Rene Girard and Neocolonial Violence: Scapegoating as Australian Policy. By SusanConnelly. London: Bloomsbury, 2022.

The relationship between Australia and East Timor (Timor-Leste) from 1941 to 1999 is analysed in this dissertation. It focuses on the Australian-Japanese conflict in East Timor in World War II, the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975, the Indonesian occupation of East Timor (1975-1999), and the Timorese independence process culminating in 1999. Various studies have explained the history of the Australian relationship with East Timor by examining the political forces that influenced the events. This dissertation applies the Christian anthropology of Rene Girard's mimetic theory to interpret those forces and provide a new historical and theological interpretation of the relationship. The dissertation shows that East Timor occupied the place of the scapegoated victim during the events discussed. It argues that there were particular crises - addressed by scapegoating East Timor - which arose from the Australian government’s desire to ensure security through alliances with larger powers. Through this policy position, the well-being of the Timorese people was actively ignored in the pursuit of Australian safety and protection. In World War II the threat of the Japanese thrust southward impelled an Australian invasion of the then Portuguese Timor. Australia later complied with the Indonesian invasion Timor in 1975 and upheld the consequent 24-year occupation as part of a strategy to retain a positive relationship with Indonesia, and thus fortify Australian security. The relationship is analysed by using Rene Girard's mimetic theory. As a theologically-informed anthropology, mimetic theory culminates in an explanation of human society and relationships interpreted through Christ's life, death and resurrection. Three aspects of the theory are applied to the Australian-Timorese relationship: the scapegoat, of persecution, and Girard presents certain features of the scapegoat process applicable to this study: the existence of a social crisis; a crime which is believed to have caused the crisis; an entity (the victim) which is arbitrarily accused of the crime and which displays certain criteria common to scapegoats; and finally, the violence done to the victim that restores harmony and peace. In Girard's analysis, human stories or myths invariably contain some or all of these features in order to justify scapegoating violence. Girard claims that modern-day attempts to obscure the victimisation of the powerless perform the same functions as myths and he describes them as texts of persecution. Official Australian documentary records of historical links with East Timor are demonstrated in the dissertation to be of persecution that evade responsibility for the Australian policies which contributed to the violence done to the Timorese people. In Girard's view, scapegoating as a completely effective basis for human culture has been undermined as a result of the biblical tradition, particularly the Christ-event. The Bible shows that the victim is not guilty of bringing threat to the group, but rather is innocent. In particular, Christ's identification with victims and his own death and resurrection reversed the efficacy of the scapegoating structure by demonstrating that it is a lie. Scapegoating victims is therefore a fundamentally unstable means of attaining social harmony. Girard describes the recognition of the lie of scapegoating as a conversion. The conversion towards the victim East Timor which occurred in Australia in the late 1990s is argued in the dissertation as a moment of national recognition of the innocence of the victim. It resulted from the inspiring resistance of the Timorese to their oppression and culminated in overwhelming Australian support for Timorese claims to independence. The dissertation shows that claimed Australian traits (such as fairness and independence) did not characterise official Australian policies during the historical periods discussed. Instead, it was the courageous resistance of the Timorese people that exemplified prized Australian values. The dissertation thus allows considerations of fear, suffering, nonviolence, forgiveness and conversion to form a different yet comprehensive analysis of the relationship.

Before 30 August 1999, East Tim or had been for a long time an unfinished issue on international agenda. This situation resulted from Indonesia's decision in December 1975 to proceed with a military and political incorporation without an act of self-determination recognized by Portugal and United Nations. In different ways, during past twenty-five years foreign policies of Australia and Portugal had to deal domestically and internationally with Indonesian fait accompli. As time went by, it became clear that the question of East would only disappear with end of Indonesian authoritarian regime itself. On 27 January 1999, President B.J. Habibie opened a political window of opportunity, when he decided to allow a popular consultation in East Timor. Canberra and Lisbon could finally correct mistakes committed in past. Introduction The reference by former Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, to East Timor as a pebble in Jakarta's shoe is -- despite fact that Alatas did not realize size of pebble -- also a good metaphor for diplomacies of both Australia and Portugal on this issue. For twenty-five years, question of East Timor would resurface from time to time and remind politicians in both countries of their responsibilities in Indonesian annexation. In Australia, issue was more divisive. The primacy given to closer economic and security relations with Indonesia implied a clash between policies adopted by politicians, constrained by a realist assessment of national interests, and views held by many among public at large, influenced as they were by their perception of national values. In Portugal, East Timor would remind politicians how Lisbon had been no help when assistance was most needed. In order to overcome national feelings of guilt and shame -- and without any real economic or political interest in relations with Indonesia -- Portugal pursued a policy of international activism in favour of right of East Timorese to self-determination. Each human rights violation committed by Indonesian military only strengthened further views of Portuguese politicians and public opinion on this matter. After initial decisions taken between 1974 and 1976 by Australia and Portugal, there was no turning back. Australia had to accept de facto and then de jure incorporation of East Timor as a province of Indonesia, and Portugal had to keep advocating East Timor's right to self-determination. Without losing face or damaging their respective national interests, only option available to each country was to wait until a window of opportunity would present a chance to overcome stalemate. This opportunity came only with regime change in Indonesia itself. This article will review cycle of Australian and Portuguese foreign policies related to question of East Timor. It begins with a description of what is called here Portuguese long wait and Australian long sore. It then takes into account end of stalemate and diplomatic shifts that occurred since new Indonesian President, Bachuriddin Jusuf Habibie, took office on 21 May 1998. [1] Portugal and East Timor: The Long Wait There were two steps in Portuguese approach to East Timor. First, Portugal made political efforts to accommodate demands of East Timorese for self-determination, while recognizing Indonesia's national interests. This occurred between Portuguese democratic transition in April 1974 and Indonesia's full-scale military invasion of East Timor on 7 December 1975. Secondly, after failure of first strategy, and in order to reverse Indonesian fait accompli, Portugal aimed to keep question politically alive and to raise as far as possible political costs to Jakarta of East Timor's incorporation. The achievement of final goal was to wait until appearance of a political window of opportunity, which could possibly allow an irreversible act of self-determination. …

For over twenty years Australia has recognized the legitimacy of Indonesia's illegal and brutal occupation of East Timor. The decisive influence of the Jakarta lobby, a group of bureaucrats, academics, politicians, and journalists, ensured that “good relations” between Australia and Indonesia were maintained despite Jakarta's egregious human rights record in the territory. A distorted history of Suharto's rise to power, de jure recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty in East Timor, a secretly negotiated security agreement, and strident opposition to East Timor's independence were indicative of the Jakarta lobby's success in framing Australian foreign policy. However, after encouraging the Habibie government to resolve the East Timor issue in late 1998, the Howard government subsequently committed itself to supporting a UN-sponsored ballot in August 1999, when the East Timorese were given a choice of independence or continued integration with the Republic of Indonesia. The escalation of violence orchestrated by the Indonesian military and their militia proxies in response to an overwhelming vote for independence shocked the international community and encouraged the Howard government to organize and lead a UN-sanctioned multilateral peace enforcement mission in East Timor. The success of this deployment in pacifying the territory led to the departure of Indonesian forces from East Timor and the formal revoking of Indonesia's sovereign claim to the territory. It also signaled a break with past Australian diplomatic orthodoxy towards Indonesia and the declining influence of the Jakarta lobby on Australian public policy.

This chapter explores the interplay between globalization, ethnic conflict, and the enforcement of norms in the international system. It shows how the shift from the bipolar system to what Robert Paster called the ‘Liberal Epoch’ delegitimized Indonesia’s hold on East Timor. In Indonesia, concerns the continuing crackdown in East Timor mixed with the Asian economic crisis of 1997–1998 to prompt Australia and the United States to abandon Suharto in hopes of political change and economic reform. The independence of East Timor was a portentous outcome of this process. The chapter explores the evolution of US and Australian policies over the years and its impact on Indonesia’s policy regarding East Timor. Complex linkages among Indonesian domestic politics and its foreign policy accounted for the country’s behavior toward East Timor. The chapter also examines these linkages. Since capturing East Timor, Indonesia’s official policy stated that the East Timorese joined Indonesia of their free will.

Between 1975 and 1983, Indonesia's handling of the integration of East Timor caused a decline in Australia–Indonesia relations. This article argues that Australian foreign policy to isolate East Timor from its bilateral relationship with Indonesia failed because it conflicted with the activities of interested Australians who exposed Indonesia's military campaigns in East Timor. Activists created a powerful counter‐narrative about the conflict that mobilised public opposition to the official policy, and complicated Australia's co‐operative policies towards Indonesia. To demonstrate the challenge of public opinion to Australian foreign policy, the article examines a brief prepared by the First Assistant Secretary at the Department of Defence, William Beale Pritchett in October 1975, which warned that Indonesia's integration of East Timor would involve “force on a scale that could not be hidden from the Australian public eye”. Applying Pritchett's brief to three case studies — Balibo (October 1975), invasion and occupation (1975–76), and humanitarian crises (1977–82) — the article demonstrates the conflict between public and official policy to illustrate why the official Australian policy failed, and how the East Timor issue had become inseparable from Australia–Indonesia relations by 1983.

This article will explain Australia's attitudes and views on the East Timor issue which caused conflict with Indonesia. But on the other hand, Australia cannot ignore Indonesia's interests in East Timor. In 1978, Australia recognized East Timor "de facto" as part of Indonesia. Then, the question arises why Australia supports the integration of East Timor with Indonesia. What are the underlying interests. The Timor Gap Treaty was ratified on 11 December 1989, strengthening Indonesia's position with Australia. Indonesia is considered more accommodating when compared to Portugal in the matter of maritime boundaries in the Timor Sea region. Indonesia is the most important neighbor country for Australia. In terms of Australian defense, the Indonesian archipelago is a stronghold in northern Australia. This is based on Australia's interest in regional security free from the intervention of other hostile countries. Therefore, the importance of efforts to create government stability in Indonesia. The purpose of this study is to determine the dynamics of Australian foreign policy as seen from the Australian security and defense framework in looking at the East Timor issue. In addition, this research will discuss the Opposition to the Balibo Declaration and the Indonesian military intervention in East Timor which invites Australia's ambiguous attitude in addressing the integration of East Timor with Indonesia. Even though it was always at odds with Indonesia, Australia continued to prioritize its national interests in dealing with Indonesia.

Australia's intervention in East Timor in late 1999 caused a major rupture in the country's relations with Indonesia, which are currently the worst they have been in three decades. Rebuilding a stable partnership with Jakarta remains imperative, given the Republic's proximity to Australia and the key role that the archipelago plays in wider Southeast Asian multilateralism. Achieving this will not be easy, given the absence of the sentimental ballast that had come to characterize government-to-government relations for much of the 1990s. Any policies that are instituted will have to build on those diplomatic openings that do exist while moving to ensure that potential pitfalls -- of which there are many -- do not escalate to assume unwarranted significance and importance on the bilateral agenda. Introduction In late 1999, Australia undertook a commitment to one of the country's most significant external military operations since the Vietnam War -- the intervention to stem the violence and bloodshed that was unleashed following East Timor's August vote to separate from Indonesia. The action represented a major shift in Canberra's traditional accommodationist policy towards Jakarta, undermining a key relationship that for much of the 1990s had been emphasized as the crucial linchpin for Australia's wider engagement with Southeast Asia. This article analyses the current impasse between Australia and Indonesia, and assesses the future prospects for relations between the two countries. It considers what sort of partnership is realistically feasible under present conditions and outlines basic building blocks to further bilateral co-operation and interaction. The potentially explosive issue of defence ties is also discussed and gauged in terms of the extent that these can (and, indeed, should) be re-instituted. The central theme running throughout the article is that despite several very real challenges, a renewed Canberra-Jakarta partnership built on practicalities (rather than sentiment) is certainly possible. Provided this is carefully managed, relations between the two countries may yet recover and, indeed, prosper. Background to the Breakdown in Australian-Indonesian Relations: The East Timor Intervention The main priority that has guided Australian foreign and security policy for most of the 1990s has been to shape and consolidate a partnership with Indonesia -- Canberra's most important regional partner and the state upon which its wider Southeast Asian engagement policy depends. During the Paul Keating era (1991-96), Indonesia became the principal focus of Australian foreign policy. Between April 1992 and December 1995, the Prime Minister made no less than six visits to the country, achieving the unprecedented Agreement on Mutual Security (AMS) in 1995, which committed both states to consult one another and, if necessary, implement joint measures to meet common challenges. [1] Although perhaps not as explicit in his overtones towards Jakarta, the current Liberal-Nationalist coalition led by John Howard has been equally cognizant of the need to manage a stable relationship with Indonesia. In 1997, the government secured an important Maritime Delimitation Treaty (DMT), which settled all frontiers between the two countries in the Arafura and Timor Seas and eastern Indian Ocean. [2] This was then followed by a period of intense diplomatic activity aimed at lobbying the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to relax the conditions attached to the restructuring of Indonesia's loans at the height of the Asian financial crisis. [3] Rationalizing the policy in New York, Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, made the point, being seen through the IMF to bully and cajole [Jakarta] into a particular political paradigm will [merely]... invite a negative and lasting backlash from Indonesians [to the complete detriment of our regional engagement effort]. [4] East Timor has functioned as something of a test for Canberra's longstanding policy of seeking closer relations with Indonesia. …

The Howard government's foreign policy objectives concerning East Timor remain the subject of intense historical debate. Given that some Indonesians harbour suspicions about Australia's role in East Timor's independence, it is important to reflect on Australia's diplomacy throughout this period. This article draws on 15 interviews with former politicians and officials—including Prime Minister John Howard and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer—to argue that in 1998, Australia's foreign policy was focused on supporting Indonesia's democratisation process and maintaining the bilateral relationship. It was only when Indonesia moved towards a ‘special status’ of autonomy for East Timor that Australia reconsidered its own position. Although rarely acknowledged, Australia's policy shift actually precipitated outcomes that it had sought to avoid. As such, Habibie's decision to allow self-determination in East Timor can only be viewed as an unintended consequence of Australian diplomacy—independence was never the objective of Australian foreign policy.

(1995). Australian foreign policy and East Timor. Australian Journal of International Affairs: Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 207-222.

The world changed for Australia after the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001 and the Bali bombings of 2002. Security became the dominant theme of Australian foreign policy. Australian military forces remained in Afghanistan years later, opposing the terrorist threat of the Taliban, while hundreds of Australian troops and police worked with public servants to build the state in Asia-Pacific countries such as East Timor and Solomon Islands. The world changed for Australia, too, when the global financial crisis of September 2008 threatened another Great Depression. Meantime the international community made slow progress on measures to stem climate change, potentially Australia's largest security threat.In a newly revised and updated edition, Australia in International Politics shows how the nation is responding to these challenges. The book describes how Australian foreign policy has evolved since Federation and how it is made. It examines Australia's part in the United Nations, humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping. It analyses defence policy and nuclear arms control. It explains why Australia survived the global financial crisis and why the G20 has become the leading institution of global economic governance. It charts the course of Australia's climate change diplomacy, the growth of Australia's foreign aid, human rights in foreign relations and the rise of China as a great power.Written by one of Australia's most experienced teachers of international relations, Australia in International Politics explains Australian foreign policy for readers new to the field.'. one of the best books on Australian foreign policy that I have read in recent years' - Samuel M. Makinda, Australian Journal of Political Science

This thesis considers the ways in which Australia has been publicly represented in ten Asian societies in the twentieth century. It shows how these representations are at odds with Australian opinion leaders’ assertions about being a multicultural society, with their claims about engagement with Asia, and with their understanding of what is ‘typically’ Australian. It reviews the emergence and development of Asian regionalism in the twentieth century, and considers how Occidentalist strategies have come to be used to exclude and marginalise Australia. A historical survey outlines the origins of representations of Australia in each of the ten Asian countries, detecting the enduring influence both of past perceptions and of the interests of each country’s opinion leaders. Three test cases evaluate these findings in the light of events in the late twentieth century: the first considers the response in the region to the One Nation party, the second compares that with opinion leaders’ reaction to the crisis in East Timor; and the third presents a synthesis of recent Asian Australian fiction and what it reveals about Asian representations of Australia from inside Australian society. The thesis concludes that Australian policies and practices enable opinion leaders in the ten countries to construct representations of Australia in accordance with their own priorities and concerns, and in response to their agendas of Occidentalism, racism, and regionalism.

Under the Labor government of 2007–10, Australian policies towards the Pacific island states, East Timor and Indonesia showed a large measure of continuity with the policies pursued by the previous conservative Coalition government. This continuity is to be explained by the fact that the problems in the region did not change significantly; there was a large degree of consensus in Australian politics about Australian objectives in the region, but there were some differences as to means, particularly in relation to the South Pacific. This study highlights the impact of proximity and regional variations in international politics on Australian policies in relation to neighbouring countries.