Abstract
AbstractMany countries have constitutional rules, granted to prime ministers, presidents or cabinets, that govern early parliamentary dissolution. Although there are sharply divergent theoretical expectations about the consequences of such powers for both democratic representation and accountability, there have been no empirical examinations of these arguments. Using data from the European Social Survey (2002–16) in 26 European countries, we test whether such provisions for early election calling affect citizens' satisfaction with democracy, and if so, which rules and how. While it appears that no form of constitutional rules for early election is directly related to citizen satisfaction with democracy, when early elections are called by prime ministers or presidents, democratic satisfaction drops significantly, and this effect is more pronounced the later in the term the early election is called. These findings have important implications for academic and policy debates about the desirability of constitutional change designed to limit early election calling for opportunistic purposes.
Highlights
Many countries have constitutional rules, granted to prime ministers, presidents or cabinets, that govern early parliamentary dissolution
Model 1 includes the key variables of interest, namely, the constitutional rules for early election calling by type and the actual calling of election by type
Model 3 reintroduces the constitutional rules for early election calling by type to the fully specified standard model
Summary
Many countries have constitutional rules, granted to prime ministers, presidents or cabinets, that govern early parliamentary dissolution. If citizens’ abilities to use elections to secure representation and accountability are moderated by constitutional rules that permit prime ministers, cabinets and presidents to call early elections, this has an implication for the quality of democracy.
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