Early American Sources (review)

Research Article| December 01 1936 The Flea in California History and Literature: As Revealed by Extracts from Spanish, French, English, German and American Sources between the Years 1769 and 1878 California Historical Society Quarterly (1936) 15 (4): 329–337. https://doi.org/10.2307/25160670 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation The Flea in California History and Literature: As Revealed by Extracts from Spanish, French, English, German and American Sources between the Years 1769 and 1878. California Historical Society Quarterly 1 December 1936; 15 (4): 329–337. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/25160670 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentCalifornia History Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1936 The California Historical Society Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

The Journal of Popular CultureVolume 27, Issue 4 p. 195-209 Cross-Cultural Appropriation: Seven Wolves and Its American Sources (Levels of Imitation in Popular Chinese Cinema) Brian David Phillips, Brian David Phillips Brian David Phillips teaches in the Department of English at National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China.Search for more papers by this author Brian David Phillips, Brian David Phillips Brian David Phillips teaches in the Department of English at National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China.Search for more papers by this author First published: Spring 1994 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-3840.1994.2704_195.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume27, Issue4Spring 1994Pages 195-209 RelatedInformation

After the World War I the armistice day was celebrated for a few years on Nov. 11th. But again the world played a foolish game (World War II) only after 20 years. Now we have passed 35 years since the Hiroshima atom bomb disaster, and there are such atmosphere as it is out of date to speak of the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan is now being pursuaded to promote military renovation from U. S. A., some Japanese financiers and goverment officials are crying to raise military enterprise against the menace of U. S. S. R.Japan had abolished old militarism to keep her peace institution. Why we must go back to the height of folly once more ? Citizens at Hiroshima are very delicate to be touched their miserable disaster, Mr. Matsumura, the commissioner of our general convention, advised me not to speak on this item.But I dared to appeal the members of our Society in defence of peace of the world and next generation, as I thought it is our duty to be responsible to the world, though not directly but through some English and American sources on the Hiroshima atom born disaster.

Most oceanic lead (Pb) is from anthropogenic emissions into the atmosphere deposited into surface waters, mostly during the past two centuries. The space‐ and time‐dependent emission patterns of anthropogenic Pb (and its isotope ratios) constitute a global geochemical experiment providing information on advective, mixing, chemical, and particle flux processes redistributing Pb within the ocean. Pb shares aspects of its behavior with other elements, for example, atmospheric input, dust solubilization, biological uptake, and reversible exchange between dissolved and adsorbed Pb on sinking particles. The evolving distributions allow us to see signals hidden in steady‐state tracer distributions. The global anthropogenic Pb emission experiment serves as a tool to understand oceanic trace element dynamics. We obtained a high‐resolution (5° station spacing) depth transect of dissolved Pb concentrations and Pb isotopes from Alaska (55°N) to just north of Tahiti (20°S) near 152°W longitude. The sections reveal distinct sources of Pb (American, Australian, and Chinese), transport of Australian style Pb to the water mass formation region of Sub‐Antarctic Mode Water which is advected northward, columnar Pb isotope contours due to reversible particle exchange on sinking particles from high‐productivity particle veils, and a gradient of high northern deep water [Pb] to low southern deep water [Pb] that is created by reversible exchange release of Pb from sinking particles carrying predominantly northern hemisphere Pb. 208Pb/206Pb versus 206Pb/207Pb isotope relationships show that most oceanic Pb in the North Pacific is from Chinese and American sources, whereas Pb in the South Pacific is from Australian and American sources.

Turkish-American diplomatic relations experienced a decade-long hiatus at the time of the Great War and its immediate aftermath, until the ties were eventually restored in 1927. Subsequently, the United States discovered that there had been a radical change between the Ottoman Empire which Ambassador Elkus had left in 1917, and the Turkish Republic when Ambassador Grew arrived, a decade later. This significant transformation had been expedited by the progressive, secularist and nationalist path set by Mustafa Kemal, by sweeping political, social and economic reforms. The main argument of this article is that these changes, combined with the efforts of prominent individuals, not only had a favourable impact on the course of Turkish-American relations which resulted in a rapprochement, but also significantly challenged the prevailing 'Terrible Turk' stereotype commonly held in the United States. Although there are numerous studies on Turkish-American relations in the Cold War era, and its aftermath, during which strategic and security concerns resulted in extensive ties between the two countries,1 there are very few penetrating studies on the formative stages of this relations-building process during the inter-war period. Moreover, the limited number of existing works which embrace the period chronologically, such as Roger Trask's The United States' Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform (1914-1939), are based almost exclusively on American sources, and produce an Amero-centric perspective of the process.2 This study intends, therefore, to contribute to scholarship in this field by making extensive use of both Turkish and American sources, including some hitherto unused archival documents. A thorough and balanced analysis of relations during the interwar period enables us to achieve a better understanding of this crucial formative phase, setting the stage for the Cold War era from the viewpoints, and historical interpretations, of both nations. Moreover, from that platform emerges a more complete understanding of Turkish-American relations in the post-Cold War period, during which the relations are no longer defined by the parameters of the bipolar power structure of the Cold War years. Within this context, this article examines the factors that helped to mitigate negative stereotypes against the Turks in the United States in the inter-war era focusing on the period starting with the reestablishment of diplomatic ties in 1927 and terminating at the beginning of the Second World War. More importantly, as both Americans and Turks are currently

Reviewed by: Puccini and the Girl: History and Reception of “The Girl of the Golden West.” Ruth A. Solie (bio) Puccini and the Girl: History and Reception of “The Girl of the Golden West.” By Annie J. Randall and Rosalind Gray Davis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 248 pp. This book tells two stories: one is the most conventional musicological type (newly available documents), and the other is an up-to-date cultural analysis (gender, class difference, imperialism, and cultural Others). The authors tell us which of them wrote which chapters, and it seems to me that the book's most noticeable weakness is that the two voices are very distinct and seem to have different goals for the project as a whole. To put it another way, there remains some question as to the real topic of the book: Rosalind Gray Davis wants to introduce us to some documents, while Annie Randall wants to write critically about the opera, and the two do not fit together into an entirely coherent whole. This is not to deny, however, that each part is of interest in its own right. The early, expository chapters of Puccini and the Girl are mostly provided by Davis; her voice, unfortunately, is not only musicologically naive but saturated with that hagiographic tone that used to be common in writing about Great Composers. Nonetheless, she has an unusually interesting story to tell. Davis inherited from her father, journalist Marvin Gray, twenty-nine letters from Puccini to his librettist, Carlo [End Page 82] Zangarini, concerning the conception and realization of La fanciulla's libretto. Gray had purchased the letters from a New York autograph dealer and had intended to publish them but did not do so before his death. Now his daughter, collaborating with musicologist Annie Randall, takes the opportunity to present them as entirely unknown sources and at the same time to write a larger study of the opera, interweaving information from other documentary sources and adding critical interpretation. As the two authors tell us, "no study of La fanciulla had yet brought together many of the most important Italian and English sources concerning the opera's genesis, premiere and critical reception," and therefore "our objective is to blend the historical with the critical in ways that will invite fresh readings" (8). The letters themselves have considerable intrinsic interest, as Davis presents them to us in the third chapter; it's fascinating to watch Puccini trying to decide whether he can make anything operatic out of David Belasco's play, how to deal with its innate Americanisms, how to cope with "the California-disease" that the opera became in his own mind (quote from a letter, 59). As Davis explains, "the present discussion . . . adds new information to the standard chronology in the form of newly available letters and other documents from Italian and American sources" (17). She lays out the argument's place in the current state of knowledge about the opera, emphasizing especially the reinstatement of Zangarini as its principal librettist, reclaiming the place frequently credited to Guelfo Civinini, who finished up the work in its last stages. Davis might have been just a bit more critical, however, and presented us with more context for reading Puccini's letters. For instance, it would be helpful for readers to know whether the cycle of behavior we see here (jolliness, increasing impatience turning to anxiety, carping, threatening with a lawsuit, insisting on a collaborator) is typical for Puccini—or typical for opera composers in general—or whether this is an extraordinary story, and if the latter, why? More disturbing is the attitude Davis seems to exhibit in her discussion of the greatest tragedy of this period, which became one of the notorious scandals of Puccini's career. Doria Manfredi, a servant in the Puccinis' home, poisoned herself, apparently in response to Elvira Puccini's suspicion that she was involved sexually with Giacomo and to consequent harassment. Davis's narrative rests upon a conventional morality untainted by any feminist insight or sympathy. In her account (76–81), the Genius retains his privilege throughout the affair, which is introduced to the reader in terms of "Elvira Puccini's violent...

There’s much else that could be said; but for our purposes, there are two things to stress. The first is that it was here, in the institution known as “Concert and Dance”, that South African jazz culture was incubated. And the second is that this institution derived its repertoire from two principal sources - the one mainly American, the other mainly local. In a paper at a previous Symposium (the Seventh), I talked about the former - the American source. Today I want to focus on the latter, and look at some of the ways that local music (or certain kinds of it) were incorporated into the Concert and Dance between the 1920s and the early 1940s.

Anyone reading this book should begin on page 318, where the reader will find the statement that ‘in the time between his death and the publication of this monograph, Dr Ian McLaine's footnotes cardfile was lost. The [nineteen] notes below are either the results of archival crosschecks by a posthumous editor or marginal notes that could be confirmed’. This is a great pity because Ian McLaine clearly consulted a wide range of British and American sources—the only major gap being the valuable diary of Kenneth Younger, the Minister of State at the British Foreign Office throughout the period covered by the book—and, as his fellow-Australian, Robert O'Neill (author of the official history of Australia's role in the Korean War), justifiably states in the blurb: ‘This is an extremely well-written and important book on a major episode in international relations’. This is not a strictly chronological study; the book is divided into seven often chronologically overlapping chapters, each one dealing with a particular theme. Indeed, the first chapter, which covers events until the end of 1950, does not concentrate on the Far East at all, but deals mainly with American suspicions of Britain's ‘socialist’ government and pressure for increased British and west European rearmament. There is no discussion of the communist insurgencies in Malaya or Indochina, which were an important backdrop to the decisions taken when the Korean War broke out.

294 SAIS REVIEW II, which concludes with a chapter on European financial integration, but it, too, is useful reading for students of banking and finance. Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relationsfrom Nixon to Reagan. By Raymond Garthoff. Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1985. Reviewed by Jonathan Haslam, Associate Professor of Soviet Studies, SAIS. It is difficult to conceive of a subject as controversial yet as important as the history of relations betwen the United States and the Soviet Union from Nixon to Reagan. The preponderant weight of orthodox analysis here in the United States tells us that détente was shipwrecked on the Angolan coastline as contingents of Cubans arrived in Soviet transports, or that it was "buried in the sands of the Ogaden." The purveyors of this orthodoxy hold the Russians responsible. If it was not Angola or the Horn of Africa, it was the decision to deploy the SS-20. The "I-was-there" brigade customarily casts condescending glances if not verbal abuse at those so foolish to question such sacred truths. Dr. Raymond Garthoff—refugee from government, iconoclast, and dissentient—is an exception. GarthofFs volume, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, is enormous: more than one thousand pages, for the most part densely packed (yet only the Afghan chapter exhausts one's concentration) and heavily footnoted from both published and unpublished Soviet and American sources. Unlike his rivals on the anti-Soviet Right, who ape Soviet practice by using their writing as a continuation of the Cold War by other means, Garthoff insists on the importance of scholarship in the study of the most recent past. Not that he is neutral, however. On the contrary, for all his even-handedness, Garthoff takes a firm position on the liberal wing of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, emphasizing the reactive nature of Soviet foreign policy, stressing perceptions above interests, and harmony over conflict. He is also partisan with respect to the dramatis personae: His loathing for Kissinger is evident throughout the text. Yet he is always meticulously careful in matching his interpretation of events to the available evidence, and the evidence he has unearthed is impressive. Garthoff retraces the steps of American and Soviet diplomacy from 1969. What he demonstrates is that under Nixon and Kissinger, the public rhetoric about détente existed not only in Washington but also in Moscow, that Brezhnev had to fight a battle at home in order to establish relations with the United States on a new basis, and that the pursuit of old-fashioned geopolitics by the Nixon administration continued unimpaired by grand declarations of principle. The U.S. government seized every opportunity to oust Soviet influence (the Middle East was the best example) and Brezhnev was in no position to behave otherwise when similar opportunities arose to weaken American influence (as in the Horn of Africa). Garthoff is at his best when dealing with the day-to-day flux of U.S.-Soviet relations. He is unbeatable at unweaving the tangled web of arms control issues. But he is somewhat at sea with ideology, as one might expect from a practitioner suspicious of political rhetoric. GarthofFs own experience gives these pages an extraordinary solidity and completeness. He has made exhaustive use of Soviet and American sources. Even members of the Soviet Communist Party Central BOOK REVIEWS 295 Committee have been interviewed and Garthoff has had either direct or indirect access to classified material on the American side of the relationship. However, for all the insights Garthoffs personal experience has afforded, it has also produced its own limitations. His attitude toward ideology is captured in the following assertion: "While ideological conditioning and belief do influence policy, they do not determine it." Politics is unfortunately not so simple. Consider, for instance, the "Failure to Define a Code of Conduct" between Moscow and Washington. Why were the powers unable to define a mutually acceptable and practicable code of behavior? The United States, Garthoff tells us, refused to "concede political parity." But this begs the question, why? Was it not because the ideological differences between the two powers ran too deep and ultimately determined policy? Garthoff consistently underrates...

Book Review| August 01 1948 Review: The Marines' War: An Account of the Struggle for the Pacific from Both American and Japanese Sources, by Fletcher Pratt The Marines' War: An Account of the Struggle for the Pacific from Both American and Japanese SourcesFletcher Pratt Robert J. Parker Robert J. Parker Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Pacific Historical Review (1948) 17 (3): 360–361. https://doi.org/10.2307/3634280 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Robert J. Parker; Review: The Marines' War: An Account of the Struggle for the Pacific from Both American and Japanese Sources, by Fletcher Pratt. Pacific Historical Review 1 August 1948; 17 (3): 360–361. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/3634280 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentPacific Historical Review Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1948 The Pacific Coast Branch, American Historical Association Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Works on the Cuban Missile Crisis generally pursue one of two objectives: conveying events with the greatest accuracy and using the crisis to examine or illustrate a related issue. Works written before the mid-1980s suffer from an absence of important primary sources. The release of American and Soviet sources has made substantiating arguments easier, has overturned a couple of tropes, and has introduced new and startling information. Major topics and questions include why the Soviets installed ballistic missiles in Cuba, the Kennedy administration’s strategy for forcing their removal, reasons the Soviets removed the missiles, assessments of individuals, the extent to which the crisis could have escalated into general nuclear war, the roles of allied states such as Cuba and the United Kingdom, gaps between political actors’ perceptions and the reality of what was actually taking place, and key moments and actions. Among the greatest revelations resulting from the expansion of available sources was the Soviet installation of dozens of short-range nuclear rockets and cruise missiles for incinerating an American seaborne invasion force. The Americans were unaware of these weapons in 1962. One Soviet submarine commander considered using a nuclear-tipped torpedo against US Navy warships that were hounding the submarine. While American forces, nuclear and conventional, were at a very high state of alert, operational plans for attacking the missile sites relied solely on conventional weaponry. Attorney General Robert Kennedy favored military action; it was Secretary of State Dean Rusk who first made comparisons between American military options and the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Soviets put the ballistic missiles in Cuba primarily to deter an American invasion; reconfiguring the nuclear balance in favor of the Soviet Union was a secondary goal. Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson was no appeaser. Cuban president Fidel Castro encouraged Premier Nikita Khrushchev to initiate a war against the United States. Termination of the crisis began when President John F. Kennedy promised to not invade Cuba and also to remove the sixteen Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles the United States still had in Turkey, as long as the Soviets successfully kept the promise of a missile swap an absolute secret. Administration officials insisted this never took place. Understanding of the events during the crisis is good, but new revelations from the Soviet Union and Cuba leave room for additional synthetic works. Since 1962 three kinds of scholars have produced most of the literature: presidential historians, historians of foreign relations, and political scientists. The first group set the narrative, and the central question has been “How well did John F. Kennedy respond to the crisis?” Students of the crisis should be aware that the initial examinations celebrated Kennedy and had almost no access to historical records. Indeed, Kennedy’s friends wrote the first histories. Presidential biographers have become more nuanced and balanced as records have been declassified. Political scientists have made great contributions by assessing questions beyond what happened and why. Starting with Graham Allison, these scholars have attempted to wrest practical lessons for policy makers. Scholars of diplomatic history have written at the pace at which archives have opened and adjusted to the revelations that American, Soviet, and Cuban sources have made. Later scholars have attempted to raise the visibility of participants other than the elites in the United States and the Soviet Union. Scholars of the history of war and warfare soon find only a history of the mobilization of military forces; approaches from diplomatic history and international relations produce fruit that is more well developed. (The views in this bibliography are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy of the US government, the Department of Defense, or Air University.)

Journal Article “In the Nam” and “Back in the World”: American and Vietnamese Sources on the Vietnam War Get access Ronald H. Spector Ronald H. Spector director of the Naval Historical Center in Washington, D.C., and serves as historian of the United States Navy Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of American History, Volume 75, Issue 1, June 1988, Pages 209–214, https://doi.org/10.2307/1889668 Published: 01 June 1988

The Model for Integrated Research on Atmospheric Global Exchanges (MIRAGE) modeling system, designed to study the impacts of anthropogenic aerosols on the global environment, is described. MIRAGE consists of a chemical transport model coupled online with a global climate model. The chemical transport model simulates trace gases, aerosol number, and aerosol chemical component mass (sulfate, methane sulfonic acid (MSA), organic matter, black carbon (BC), sea salt, and mineral dust) for four aerosol modes (Aitken, accumulation, coarse sea salt, and coarse mineral dust) using the modal aerosol dynamics approach. Cloud‐phase and interstitial aerosol are predicted separately. The climate model, based on Community Climate Model, Version 2 (CCM2), has physically based treatments of aerosol direct and indirect forcing. Stratiform cloud water and droplet number are simulated using a bulk microphysics parameterization that includes aerosol activation. Aerosol and trace gas species simulated by MIRAGE are presented and evaluated using surface and aircraft measurements. Surface‐level SO2 in North American and European source regions is higher than observed. SO2 above the boundary layer is in better agreement with observations, and surface‐level SO2 at marine locations is somewhat lower than observed. Comparison with other models suggests insufficient SO2 dry deposition; increasing the deposition velocity improves simulated SO2. Surface‐level sulfate in North American and European source regions is in good agreement with observations, although the seasonal cycle in Europe is stronger than observed. Surface‐level sulfate at high‐latitude and marine locations, and sulfate above the boundary layer, are higher than observed. This is attributed primarily to insufficient wet removal; increasing the wet removal improves simulated sulfate at remote locations and aloft. Because of the high sulfate bias, radiative forcing estimates for anthropogenic sulfur given in 2001 by S. J. Ghan and colleagues are probably too high. Surface‐level dimethyl sulfide (DMS) is ∼40% higher than observed, and the seasonal cycle shows too much DMS in local winter, partially caused by neglect of oxidation by NO3. Surface‐level MSA at marine locations is ∼80% higher than observed, also attributed to insufficient wet removal. Surface‐level BC is ∼50% lower than observed in the United States and ∼40% lower than observed globally. Treating BC as initially hydrophobic would lessen this bias. Surface‐level organic matter is lower than observed in the United States, similar to BC, but shows no bias in the global comparison. Surface‐level sea salt concentrations are ∼30% lower than observed, partly caused by low temporal variance of the model's 10 m wind speeds. Submicrometer sea salt is strongly underestimated by the emissions parameterization. Dust concentrations are within a factor of 3 at most sites but tend to be lower than observed, primarily because of neglect of very large particles and underestimation of emissions and vertical transport under high‐wind conditions. Accumulation and Aitken mode number concentrations and mean sizes at the surface over ocean, and condensation nuclei concentrations aloft over the Pacific, are in fair agreement with observations. Concentrations over land are generally higher than observations, with mean sizes correspondingly lower than observations, especially at some European locations. Increasing the assumed size of emitted particles produces better agreement at the surface over land, and reducing the particle nucleation rate improves the agreement aloft over land.

Introduction to the American Official Sources for the Economic and Social History of the World War, Compiled by Waldo G. Leland and Newton D. Mereness. [Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.] (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1926. Pp. xlvii, 532, 18. $5.25) Get access Introduction to the American Official Sources for the Economic and Social History of the World War, Compiled by Leland Waldo G. and Mereness Newton D.. [Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.] (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1926. Pp. xlvii, 532, 18. $5.25.) Frederic L. Paxson Frederic L. Paxson Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 32, Issue 2, January 1927, Pages 343–344, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/32.2.343 Published: 01 January 1927

IN THE first list which follows are set out a number of earlier examples, from 1745 onward, of words of naval and military significance, excluding inland waterways. The second list suggests for inclusion in the DAE Supplement a number of such words, from 1676 onward, at present unrecorded. In those examples relating to the siege of Louisbourg in 1745, which was a combined Anglo-American operation, only words from American sources have been included.