Dynamics in Central–Local Division of the Authority of EIA Approval in China

Abstract

Abstract In comparison with the dominant ‘consideration model’, the veto arrangement of environmental impact assessment (EIA) in China is a substantive regulatory feature that empowers environmental authorities to impinge on development activities. However, the anticipated efficacies thereof are compromised by the central–local division of EIA approval. The mismatch between high enforcement rates and prevalent non-compliance shows that EIA approval can be easily circumvented, especially at local levels. Recent mass, blanket devolution in a hasty manner, coupled with enthusiastic local responses in watering down EIA approval, raises serious concerns about its appropriateness and effectiveness. The tendency to deregulate by loosening environmental scrutiny and the reinvention of EIA procedures in light of project licensing processes impairs the veto effects of EIA approval. Without formal legislative empowerment in the central–local framework and individualised regulatory impact analysis, the current devolution approach is bound to endanger environmental quality and undermine the legitimacy of the veto arrangement.