Abstract
Game theory has been extensively applied to elucidate the evolutionary mechanism of cooperative behaviour. Dilemmas in game theory are important elements that disturb the promotion of cooperation. An important question is how to escape from dilemmas. Recently, a dynamic utility function (DUF) that considers an individual's current status (wealth) and that can be applied to game theory was developed. The DUF is different from the famous five reciprocity mechanisms called Nowak's five rules. Under the DUF, cooperation is promoted by poor players in the chicken game, with no changes in the prisoner's dilemma and stag-hunt games. In this paper, by comparing the strengths of the two dilemmas, we show that the DUF is a novel reciprocity mechanism (sixth rule) that differs from Nowak's five rules. We also show the difference in dilemma relaxation between dynamic game theory and (traditional) static game theory when the DUF and one of the five rules are combined. Our results indicate that poor players unequivocally promote cooperation in any dynamic game. Unlike conventional rules that have to be brought into game settings, this sixth rule is universally (canonical form) applicable to any game because all repeated/evolutionary games are dynamic in principle.
Highlights
IntroductionThe evolution of cooperation in human and animal societies is enigmatic because a non-cooperative agent (defector) can obtain an evolutionarily selective advantage by taking the benefits of social contributions of other cooperators while avoiding the costs of cooperation [1]
The evolution of cooperation in human and animal societies is enigmatic because a non-cooperative agent can obtain an evolutionarily selective advantage by taking the benefits of social contributions of other cooperators while avoiding the costs of cooperation [1]
dynamic utility function (DUF) is a dynamic version of the utility function, whereas the traditional utility function assumes the independence from current wealth, that is, a static model
Summary
The evolution of cooperation in human and animal societies is enigmatic because a non-cooperative agent (defector) can obtain an evolutionarily selective advantage by taking the benefits of social contributions of other cooperators while avoiding the costs of cooperation [1]. Game theory has been extensively studied to explain how cooperation is promoted in human and animal royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsos R. One of the main foci of studies in game theory is the kind of reciprocity mechanisms that can 2 resolve social dilemmas that disturb the promotion and evolution of cooperative behaviour and how the reciprocity mechanisms can allow players to escape from dilemmas [9,10,11]. We can denote the pay-off matrix of pairwise games with two strategies: cooperation (C) and defection (D). The rewards of players are determined by the pay-off matrix and the strategies that the players choose (equation (1.1))
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