Abstract
In “Giving the Treaty a Purpose,” Julian Nyarko distinguishes between treaties and executive agreements and argues that treaties signal a higher level of commitment to our partners in cooperation than do executive agreements because treaties are more durable. Nyarko uses survival-time analysis to demonstrate that treaties last longer than executive agreements—that is, treaties are less likely to drop out of the Treaties in Force (TIF) series in any given year. The longer life of treaties is Nyarko's proxy for their greater durability. Nyarko argues that his result holds “even after controlling for a number of covariates that could influence the durability of the agreement,” like particular presidents, subject areas, and partner countries as well as the degree of divided government. Nonetheless, Nyarko's list omits the most important variable affecting durability as he defines it: intended duration. Sometimes the intended duration of a piece of formal international law is finite. Indeed, as I will explain in this response, under certain (and common) conditions, this choice of a finite duration is what makes the commitment credible (or, in Nyarko's language, reliable).
Highlights
Nyarko uses both the jargon of failure/death and the statistical methods most often employed in medicine regarding time to death for terminally ill patients
The longer life of treaties is Nyarko’s proxy for their greater durability. Nyarko argues that his result holds “even after controlling for a number of covariates that could influence the durability of the agreement,” like particular presidents, subject areas, and partner countries as well as the degree of divided government
To describe an agreement that appears in Treaties in Force (TIF) one year and not the as a failure/death ignores the possibility that the parties never intended the agreement to last forever
Summary
In “Giving the Treaty a Purpose,”[1] Julian Nyarko distinguishes between treaties and executive agreements and argues that treaties signal a higher[2] level of commitment to our partners in cooperation than do executive agreements because treaties are more durable. The first lists cotton, dairy products, tobacco, and inedible tallow as the approved commodities,[13] but tobacco and tallow are removed in some of the subsequent agreements.[14] The total export market value in each agreement fluctuates, increasing in the second agreement, decreasing in the third, and increasing again in the fourth.[15] Cotton is a significant export in all four agreements Another noticeable trend is the increasing precision in agreement conditions over time, with the fourth agreement adding specific supply periods for the commodities, limits on maximum quantities of exports, and requirements for shipping payments. This set of agreements demonstrates that the cooperation between the parties is quite durable, despite the fact that any particular agreement governing that cooperation may be finite. South American states, such as Brazil and Colombia, wanted to lock in their dominance at the time, whereas many African states, which were witnessing rapid growth in their production capabilities as well as increased demand for their coffee, wanted a
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