Duns Scotus’s Entangled Doctrines of Univocity, Freedom, and the Powers of the Soul

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that that three of Duns Scotus’s most controversial philosophical positions, namely, his doctrine of the univocity of the concept of being, his radical voluntarism, and his formal distinction between the soul and its powers, are related in the following way: The latter two depend upon the former, sometimes in obvious ways that Duns Scotus owns, and sometimes in ways that are not licensed by the doctrine of the univocity of the concept of being as Scotus himself claims to employ it. In particular, I argue that in Scotus’s development of his theory of freedom and his understanding of the powers of the soul, he makes inferences from God to creatures that the doctrine of the univocity of the concept of being does not allow and that, coupled with inferences that are licensed by that doctrine, result in circularity.