Abstract
What the connection is between the moral evaluation of actions and the moral evaluation of agents is a matter of dispute among philosophers. Marty hold that these two types of evaluation are logically distinct, that there is no conceptual connection between them. Others, though, have claimed that act and agent evaluations are linked together in natural ways; the connection, they argue, is a necessary one. Alan Donagan, in his important book: The Theory of Morality (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977), has written extensively on both the notion of morally assessing actions and that of assessing agents. What he says has implications for the dispute just described. In particular, Donagan articulates three theses concerning the relationship between act and agent evaluations. What I shall try to show is that the conjunction of these three theses is inconsistent
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