Does the tail wag the dog? Directional information effects of options trading on earnings management

Book Reviews

Purpose: The Ministry of Finance issued the new China accounting standards on February 15, 2006(CAS2006), which require the listed companies to use the balance sheet liability method for the income tax accounting. Thus, it give us an opportunity to investigate the earnings management of listed companies from the perspective of income tax. Under the balance sheet liability method, because conforming earnings management strategies and nonconforming earnings management strategies have different income tax cost and the current income payable will also vary, the listed companies need to choose conforming earnings management and nonconforming earnings management. Our research just try to investigate the relationship between the listed companies’ income tax planning and earnings management on the background of this new system. Design/methodology/approach: Our research approach combines theoretical analysis and empirical analysis. This paper first make a deep theoretical analysis on the listed companies’ choice between pretax earnings management activities that have current income tax consequences (book-tax ‘conforming earnings management’) and earnings management activities that do not have current income tax consequences (book-tax ‘nonconforming earnings management’),and then we exemplify our theory. Next, we come up with two hypotheses based on the theoretical analysis, build up a restatement model and conduct the empirical examination. The empirical analysis employs the method of descriptive statistics and logistic regression. Findings: When engaging in earnings management, listed companies will trade off conforming and nonconforming earnings management from the perspective of income tax cost. We find that managers’ motivations and purposes will influence the choice. On the one hand, when companies are facing the punishment of the suspension or termination of the listing for three consecutive losses, they will have a great incentive to manage earnings in order to turn losses into gains. In this case, companies can’t wait to manage earnings to increase incomes and won’t consider income tax cost too much. And if they employ nonconforming earnings management bringing greater book-tax differences, it may increase the probability of being detected and earnings management behavior may also be found. Thus, in this motivation, listed companies will employ more conforming earnings management. On the other hand, when companies engage in fraudulent activities, they will avoid the use of earnings management strategies which bringing greater book-tax difference to avoid penalty cost associating with fraud being found, since greater book-tax difference will possibly attract regulatory agencies’ and auditors’ attention therefore lead to the fraud being found. In this motivation, listed companies will employ more conforming earnings management. In summary, the main conclusion is when the company has motivations to turn losses into gains and has the motivation to avoid penalty cost associated with fraud being found, the company prefers to employ more conforming earnings management strategies. Research limitations/implications: The limitation in our research is as follows. First, we mainly focus on the conforming and nonconforming earnings management when the listed companies restate their financial statements. However after the issue of CAS2006, many listed companies still not disclose income tax account, which restrict our sample. Second, without the acquisition of private companies’ data, our empirical results may have some errors. We will solve these problems in our future study. Practical / social implications: Based on the sample of restatement companies, our research explores the listed companies’ choice of conforming and nonconforming earnings management under different motivations, which provides our study with new perspective and theoretical evidence. Meanwhile, because this paper focuses on restate firms’ earnings management, the results are helpful for regulators to strengthen the administration of listed companies’ restatement, as well as decrease the damage of restatement on our capital market. Finally, our results indicate that when the company has motivations to turn losses into gains and has motivations to avoid penalty cost associated with fraud being found, the company prefers to employ more conforming earnings management strategies. It will help us to deeply understand the impact of the accounting processes of income tax under the balance sheet liability method on the listed companies, therefore provide companies’ income tax planning with essential empirical and theoretical evidences. Originality/value: So far, earnings management researches in academia mostly focus on the cost, motivations, means and results of earnings management, there are few studies discuss the choice of earnings management strategies and how different purposes and motivations affect the choice from the perspective of income tax. The issue of CAS2006 offers an opportunity for this research. This paper use restatement as sample to investigate the choice of conforming earnings management and nonconforming earnings management under different motivations and purposes for the first time. And not only study the effect that earnings management have on income tax, but also study the effect of different earnings management motivations on the choice of earnings management strategies.

Research on Earnings Management from the Perspective of Innovation and Market Competition

This article examines earnings management, as well as the presentational format of graphs (impression management) in the financial reports of sixty-three Australian listed public companies that changed chief executive officers (CEOs). Prior U.S. evidence generally suggests downward earnings management in the year of senior management changes and upward earnings management in the following year (Pourciau, 1993). We argue that new managers not only have incentives to manage earnings but also have similar incentives to manipulate the impressions created by graphs in financial reports. Examining earnings and impression management at the same time also provides an opportunity to distinguish between alternative explanations for any observed earnings management. In the year of CEO change, we hypothesize and find evidence of downward earnings management and some limited evidence of unfavourable impression management of the key financial variables (KFVs) graphed. As posited, we find evidence of upward earnings management and some evidence of favourable impression management in the year after a CEO change. These results are strongest for the subsample in which the CEO change was prompted by a resignation rather than a retirement.

PurposeThis study aims to examine the impact of political stability and political rights on firm-level earnings (both accrual-based and real) management.Design/methodology/approachThe authors develop models that link political stability, political rights, and the interplay between the two and earnings (both accrual-based and real) management. The authors analyze 63,872 firm-year observations of publicly listed, non-financial, firms drawn from 39 countries, for the period 1995 to 2016.FindingsThe authors find that political stability (political rights) attenuates (accentuates) accrual-based earnings management; political rights (political stability) accentuates (have no effect on) real earnings management; and the association between political rights and real earnings management is more pronounced in countries with better political stability.Practical implicationsThe findings imply that users of financial statements should take cognizance of a country’s ambient political environment in assessing the potential for earnings management by firms.Originality/valueNo prior research examined the role of political forces in shaping firm-level earnings management behavior in a cross-country setting.

This paper studies the impact of intelligent tax supervision on the decision of corporate earnings management. Companies determine earnings management strategies by weighing the marginal benefits and costs of accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management. Existing literature finds that managers prefer real earnings management than accrual-based earnings management because of regulatory pressure. This paper takes tax costs into consideration and adopts that tax will affect the substitution relationship between different earnings management methods.Accrual-based earnings management is realized by accounting methods. But real earnings management has a direct cash flow effect. Compared with accrual-based earnings management, real earnings management is subject to a higher level of book-tax conformity. Real activity manipulation is more costly due to tax incentives. Intelligent tax supervision represented by Golden Tax-III can effectively realize information integration and reduce information asymmetry between taxpayers and tax authorities. It can help to identify companies whose tax burdens deviate from the industry average. So Golden Tax-III can strengthen tax supervision and significantly increase the tax costs of real earnings management. Then, it can affect earnings management strategies. The higher the degree of tax non-compliance, the greater the impact of the implementation of Golden Tax-III.We use the implementation of Golden Tax-III as an exogenous event to construct a DID test. The results show that: Tax-noncompliant companies have a higher level of accrual-based earnings management after Golden Tax-III; tax-noncompliant companies have a lower level of real earnings management after Golden Tax-III; the substitution relationship between the two earnings management strategies in tax-noncompliant companies is mainly reflected after Golden Tax-III.The main contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) It directly examines the impact of tax costs on earnings management strategies, and finds that companies prefer accrual-based earnings management to real earnings management under strong tax supervision. It also expands the previous earnings management model. The research enriches and supplements the literature on earnings management. (2) It constructs a DID test to examine the impact of tax regulation on earnings management based on the implementation of Golden Tax-III. It can help to solve the problem of self-selection and endogeneity and supplement the relevant literature on tax and earnings management. (3) It finds that the intelligent supervision represented by Golden Tax-III can effectively distinguish tax-noncompliant companies and achieve precise supervision. The results help to understand and evaluate the economic consequences of Golden Tax-III, and also provide enlightenment for the development of intelligent tax supervision and taxation regulatory policy.

The purpose of this study was to determine and analyze the effect of institutional ownership on earnings management. To find out and analyze the effect of managerial ownership on earnings management. To find out and analyze the effect of the size of the board of commissioners on earnings management. To find out and analyze the effect of the proportion of independent commissioners on earnings management. To find out and analyze the effect of the size of the audit committee on earnings management. To find out and analyze the effect of firm size on earnings management. To find out and analyze the effect of leverage on earnings management. To determine and analyze the effect of institutional ownership on financial performance. To find out and analyze the effect of managerial ownership on financial performance. To find out and analyze the effect of the size of the board of commissioners on financial performance. To find out and analyze the effect of the proportion of independent commissioners on financial performance. To determine and analyze the effect of the size of the audit committee on financial performance. To find out and analyze the effect of firm size on financial performance. To find out and analyze the effect of leverage on financial performance. To determine the effect and analyze the effect of earnings management on financial performance. The result of this research is that institutional ownership has no effect on earnings management. This explains that the occurrence of earnings management has no influence on the institutions that have shares in the company concerned. Managerial ownership has no effect on earnings management. This explains that the occurrence of earnings management has no influence from the directors or managers who have shares in the company concerned. The size of the board of commissioners has no effect on earnings management. This explains that the occurrence of earnings management has no effect on the number of commissioners in the company concerned. The proportion of independent commissioners has no effect on earnings management. This explains that the occurrence of earnings management has no effect on the proportion of independent commissioners owned by the company concerned. The size of the audit committee has no effect on earnings management. This explains that the occurrence of earnings management has no effect on the number of audit committees in the company concerned. Firm size has no effect on earnings management. This explains that the occurrence of earnings management has no effect on the size of the company in the company concerned. Leverage has no effect on earnings management. This explains that the occurrence of earnings management has no effect on the debt owned by the company concerned. Institutional ownership has no effect on financial performance. This explains that institutional ownership does not have any effect on the financial performance of a company. Managerial ownership has an influence on financial performance. This explains that share ownership owned by directors and managers has an influence on the company's financial performance. The size of the board of commissioners has no effect on financial performance. This explains that the size or number of commissioners does not affect the financial performance of a company. The proportion of independent commissioners has no effect on financial performance. This explains that the number of independent commissioners does not affect the financial performance of a company. The size of the audit committee has no effect on financial performance. This explains that the number of audit committees has no effect on the financial performance of a company. Company size has no effect on financial performance. This explains that the size of a company does not affect the good or bad financial performance of a company. Leverage has an influence on financial performance. This explains that the good or bad financial performance of a company, one of which is influenced by leverage. Earnings management has no effect on financial performance. Whether or not earnings management is applied to a company will not have an effect on financial performance.

PurposeAuditors should realize misstatements and communicate to managers for adjustments. Managers usually modify the misstatements, but they have motivations, like earnings management, for not altering the misstatements. The auditor expects to identify the misstatements’ earnings management, inform the managers and reduce earnings management by proposing adjustments. This study aims to determine whether identified and adjusted misstatements cause a decline in earnings management. Is the increase in the materiality of identified and adjusted misstatements associated with a reduction in earnings management?Design/methodology/approachThe identified and adjusted misstatements are obtained from the difference between nonaudited financial statements and audited ones. Earnings management is computed using the adjusted Jones model, and the quantitative materiality threshold has also been calculated based on the Iranian auditors’ guidelines. These variables and other required information were gathered for 159 listed firms on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2014–2019 and examined by the regression models.FindingsThe results show a negative relationship between identified and modified misstatements of total assets and earnings management and a positive and significant relationship between identified and adjusted misstatements of total liabilities and earnings management. However, the positive relationship between identified and adjusted misstatements of net income with earnings management is not significant. Besides, the relationship between the materiality difference and an absolute value of identified and adjusted misstatements (materiality minus the absolute value of misstatements) of total assets and earnings management is positive and significant, but the negative association between materiality difference and the absolute value of identified and adjusted misstatements of total assets and earnings management is not significant. The relationship between materiality difference and the absolute value of identified and adjusted net income and earnings management misstatements is negative and significant. These results indicate that the more material the identified and adjusted misstatements, the less earnings management.Research limitations/implicationsThe difference between nonaudited and audited financial statements represents identified and adjusted misstatements (audit adjustments). The client probably made some adjustments, but separating these adjustments from the auditor’s identified items was impossible with the available data.Practical implicationsThe results show that significant audit adjustments decline earnings management. Paying more attention to a high-quality audit performed by the audit firms, auditors, managers and users and, consequently, discovering misstatements and adjusting or reporting them would decline the earnings management’s unfavorable impacts.Social implicationsThe unfavorable consequences of earnings management can cause the inappropriate transfer of wealth in the capital market and some investors’ loss to others’ benefit. These consequences can cause a loss of trust and leave unfavorable psychological effects on the capital market and society. Identifying and adjusting significant misstatements can lead to the decline of such impacts.Originality/valueThe previous studies assessed the relationship between identified and adjusted misstatements (audit adjustments) and earnings quality or earnings management. However, this study focuses on audit adjustments’ materiality to assess the impact of significant adjustments on earnings management.

In this paper, we examine the relationship between credit ratings, credit ratings changes and earnings management. Since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, many listed firms collapsed, leading investors to suffer losses. As a result, credit ratings have become a very important indicators of firms’ financial stability for investors, government agencies and debt issuers and other stakeholders. Firms with a similar credit rating are grouped together as firms of similar credit quality (Kisgen 2006) because credit ratings provide an ‘economically meaningful role’ (Boot et al. 2006). Numerous studies find that managers care deeply about their credit ratings (Graham and Harvey 2001; Kisgen 2009; Hovakimian at al. 2009). Firms that borrow equity in the form of bonds may have incentives to increase credit ratings with opportunistic earnings management. A change in a firm’s credit ratings has a direct impact on a firm’s profitability. Firm’s benefit from better terms from suppliers, enjoy better investment opportunities and have lower cost of capital when their credit risk is lower. Firms incur a higher cost of debt and experience additional costs when their credit risk is higher. American studies find that firms use earnings management to influence credit ratings (Ali and Zhang 2008; Jung et al. 2013; Alissa et al 2013). Credit rating agencies have stated they assume financial statements to be reasonable and accurate (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003; Standard and Poor’s, 2006) and they do not consider themselves to be auditors. They take the information in the financial statements as accurate. Therefore, there is a potential for managers to engage in earnings management to influence credit ratings. In South Korea, there have been numerous experiments with auditor legislation because of financial collapses due to earnings management in the 2000s. Therefore, a decomposition of the relation between opportunistic earnings management and credit ratings is an important consideration for Korean accounting academia. Previous Korean studies have examined whether credit ratings in period t are significantly related to level of earnings management in the same period; however, those studies fail to find the consistent results. It is widely known that credit rating agencies allow one year credit watch period to assess default risk before credit rating decision. Firms with an incentive to increase their credit ratings through earnings management will only realize if earnings management positively influences credit ratings in the following year. Therefore, we focus on establishing a relationship between the levels of earnings management at time t and credit ratings / changes at time t+1. Our study provides a more robust analysis by establishing if both accrual based and real earnings management in period t influences credit ratings and credit rating changes in period t+1. Using a sample of 1,717 Korean KRX firm-years from 2002 to 2013, we find a negative relation between earnings management in period t and credit ratings in period t+1, suggesting that firms with higher credit ratings have lower levels of earnings management. Moreover, we find that firms that experience a credit ratings change in period t+1 are less likely to engage in opportunistic earnings management in period t, suggesting that firms do not have the potential to increase credit ratings. We also find that firms that experience a credit rating increase in period t+1 have a negative association with opportunistic earnings management for accruals measures. Moreover, when we split our sample into firms that experience 1) a credit rating increase, 2) decrease and 3) remaining the same, we find that firms that engage in earnings management are more likely to remain unchanged or experience a credit rating decrease. Thus, taken together, we find no evidence of relationship between opportunistic earnings management and an increase in credit ratings in the South Korean public debt market. Our results may be of interest to regulators, credit rating agencies, market participants and firms that question whether level of earnings management in current year influences credit ratings in the subsequent period.

Prior studies suggests that earnings management can be distinguished on beneficial earning management or efficient earning management and opportunistic earning management. Although there is a positive motivation of earning management activity, that is the attempt manager to convey private information to shareholders and debtholders in order to reduce the informationgap that occurs in asymmetric information (beneficial or efficient earnings management , but the overall motivation of earnings management tends to be viewed negatively and is triggered by the interests of managers to maximize the interests of himself or the interests of business entities in order to maintain the market price of the stock at a specified value or the particular provisions ofa contract that is likely to prejudice the interests of external users of financial statements (opportunistic earnings management). Various manipulations of accounting scandals such as the case of Enron, WorldCom and others have influenced the way the public thinks, so begin to form the opinion that all the earnings management activities is a negative activity intended to defraud and must be fought. Earnings management can be performed with accrual oraccounting earnings management and real earnings management. Accrual or accounting earnings management have only a consequence of the accruals and will not affect cash flow. While real earnings management will affect cash flow and in some cases also affect accruals. There are some things you can do to reduce the practice of earnings management, which stricter accounting standards, the employment of an external auditor of a public accounting firm that has high integrity with long history and implementing good corporate governance practices. To detect accrual or accounting earnings management can be used several models in which one is best according to Dechow et al. (1995) is amodified Jones models. But Aminul Islam et al. (2011)stated that the Jones model of modification is not effective when applied in Korea and Bangladesh. Meanwhile, to detect the presence of real earnings management can use such a model of Roychowdhury (2006).

In 2008, the FASB and the IASB, in collaboration, issued an exposure draft of a conceptual framework for financial reporting. The boards agree that decision-useful information should be the main feature of financial reporting. The boards ignore, however, the fact that information asymmetry, which enables 'insider trading' and 'earnings management', may hamper this objective. US regulators try to thwart 'insider trading' with 'full disclosure' (FD) reporting requirement. FD contracts but does not prevent the phenomena of 'earnings management' – a key factor in recent market debacles. We argue that transparency in financial reporting may further diminish 'earnings management'. This 'see-through' qualitative feature exposes mangers' motivation for business activities, and clarifies their agreement with the firm's objectives. We propose that 'full disclosure' and 'transparency' are complementary features, which may lessen information asymmetry and enhance usefulness. We suggest integration of these qualities into the CF.

PurposeThe aim of this study is to investigate whether debt maturity matters for the choice of earnings management strategy (i.e. accruals earnings management and real earnings management).Design/methodology/approachThe sample involves 486 American listed firms extracted from fortune 1,000 over the period 2006–2014. Panel data regression models are employed to empirically test the impact of short-term debt and long-term debt on manager's choice of earnings management form. The generalized least square technique is applied to estimate the parameters of the regression models.FindingsThe results show that managers are more likely to manage earnings through real activities and reduce their use of accruals earnings management once short debt is increasing because the latter induces heavy lender's scrutiny. The managers move hence to real earnings management due to a lower possibility of being discovered. Moreover, the results reveal a simultaneous use of accruals earnings management and real earnings management for firms with high long-term debt. This finding highlights that long-term debt does not produce regular lender's enforcement allowing managers to use both earnings management techniques to reach earnings targets.Research limitations/implicationsThis research has two limitations. Like many other studies, the measure of discretionary accruals is subject to measurement errors. Moreover, the sample exclusively involves large firms extracted from Fortune 1,000. Therefore, the attained results may be not available for small and medium firms.Practical implicationsThe findings have implications for both researchers and lenders. For researchers, the present work points out that the decision about the debt maturity structure is crucial for all managers because they establish their earnings management policy accordingly. For lenders, the findings imply that increasing scrutiny effectively constrains accounting manipulations but does not eliminate earnings management activities altogether. The managers move to another earnings management strategy (i.e. real earnings management). This evidence may support the lenders and the creditors in their decision-making processes.Originality/valueThis paper adds to the accounting literature by providing new and interesting evidence on the role of debt maturity on the trade-off between the earnings management tools. Prior studies provided mixed finding for the issue of earnings management in levered firms. The findings of this study should be viewed as a first step to understand the mixed results on this issue. While most papers focus on one earnings management form when they examine the earnings management in levered firms, the authors highlight the impact of debt on both accruals and real earnings management simultaneously.

This study explores the informational and opportunistic characteristics of earnings management in ASEAN countries. Earnings management has an impact on the profitability of the companies. A positive relation between earnings management and future profitability reveals that earnings management is informational. However, negative a relation between earnings management and future profitability indicates that earnings management is opportunistic. This study uses data from the OSIRIS database. Four hundred and eighty five (485) companies from the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand are used as a sample. This study focuses on 2 types of earnings management: (1) accrual earnings management and (2) real earning management. Modified Jones model is used for the accrual earnings management. Real earnings management follows Roychowdury (2006). The results show that the characteristics of earnings management are not consistent. Real earnings management is informational in Thailand, but opportunistic in Indonesia. Accruals earnings management is informational in the Philippines, but opportunistic in Malaysia. Country factors such as culture may explain the inconsistency of the results in ASEAN.Keywords: accruals earnings management; ASEAN countries; future profitability; informational; opportunistic; real earnings management

PurposeGiven the unique nature of Indian family firms and the recent failure of many business houses (Bhushan Steel Ltd., Hotel Leela Ventures Ltd. etc.) it is important to understand the relationship between the earnings management practices of the family firms and the debt. In this paper an attempt towards this has been made.Design/methodology/approachThis study makes use of an empirical approach to understand the relationship between earnings management and debt in the Indian context. This study was conducted by considering a large sample data of 16,629 family firm years spread across nine years. This study makes use of fixed effects and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regressions to test our hypothesis.FindingsFirst and foremost, this research supports the socioemotional wealth theory. It indicates that maintaining the control of the business is one of the socioemotional factors for the Indian family business and Indian family businesses ladened with debt engage in earnings management to protect their socio emotional wealth (control of the business). Evidence for higher earnings management practices for firms with above average debt has also been documented. Further, the fact that real activity earnings management is the preferred earnings management choice over the accrual-based earnings management as majority of debt is from the banks and financial institutions has also been demonstrated. Finally, the analysis indicates that accrual-based earnings management and real activity earnings management are complementary to each other. However, real activity earnings management can also act as a substitute for the accrual-based earnings management but the reverse is not true. Even among the real activity earnings management, cost-based real activity earnings management was preferred over the revenue-based real activity earnings management as the former is more elusory.Research limitations/implicationsThis research is limited to the listed family firms of India. Since the family firms around the world are heterogeneous the findings from this research might not be extended to other economies.Practical implicationsThe study has meaningful insights for policy making and monitoring of the family firms. It also aides the investors in taking investment decisions with respect to family firms in India.Originality/valueThe study is unique as it integrates the family firms, debt and various types earnings management. Previous studies have focused mainly on accrual-based earnings management. The study also provides insights on the relationship between earnings management practices and debt covenants at various levels of family holdings.

Geography, business strategy and accruals-based earnings management