Abstract
This research examines the existence of a political monetary cycle that would help incumbents create political business cycles. Previous research in this area examined similar issues but employed a reaction function that forced the author to make a specific determination as to the policy target employed by the Federal Reserve across a given time period. The relevant literature reveals that if the Federal Reserve is attempting to optimize policy response to external shocks, then some mixture of interest rate and monetary aggregate targets is superior to either target individually. The model in this paper solves this problem through the use of the g 1 coefficient. The g 1 coefficient is derived from the underlying behavior of the Federal Reserve in its attempt to choose and employ the optimal policy targets necessary for offsetting unanticipated shocks to the economy. The change in g 1 is regressed on twelve electoral variables to determine the impact of presidential elections on Federal Reserve policy.
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